Regional Security

On January 25, the Eastwest Institute (EWI) and the Hanns Seidel Foundation jointly hosted a conference on investment opportunities in Kyrgyzstan at the EWI office, in Brussels.

The high ranking Kyrgyz delegation included HE Nurhanbek Momunaliev, Chief of Staff, government's office and Minister of the Kyrgyz Republic; HE Azizbek Omorkulov, chairman of the management board, RSK Bank; and HE Asein Isaev, Kyrgyz Ambassador to Benelux, France, EU, NATO and UNESCO. Prominent speakers included HE Peter Burian, European Union Special Representative for Central Asia and Najam Abbas, EWI Senior Fellow.

Dr. Wolfgang Klapper EWI Vice President, Director of the Regional Security Program, delivered opening remarks, expressing his appreciation for the new openness of the Kyrgyz government following the Presidential Elections on October 15, 2017 and outlined EWI's interest in cooperation with Kyrgyzstan. In his remarks, HE Peter Burian stressed the EU's willingness to support Kyrgyzstan's transformation process. EWI Senior Fellow Abbas reflected on the "40 steps for Kyrgyzstan's National Renewal and Revival" — a new economic policy initiative while also sharing key economic data and indicators.

The Kyrgyz delegation conveyed to participants the country's enormous investment opportunities across various sectors. Both presenters and participants echoed an appreciation of Kyrgyztan's efforts to reinforce its trade and investment links to Europe and called for a concrete follow-up to translate the country’s political willingness into further definable actions.

The conference, which was attended by 70 participants, was moderated by Dr. Markus Ehm, director of the Brussels office of the Hanns Seidel Foundation.

BBC Arabic: Are Bread Revolutions a new phenomenon?

Kawa Hassan (KH): Bread revolutions or uprisings [linked to food insecurity], are not new. These kinds of popular protests have occurred throughout contemporary history and in the distant past. For instance there were food uprisings in the 17th, 18th, 19th and 20 centuries. Perhaps one of the most famous bread revolutions is the Women's March on Versailles that started on October 5, 1789. The French women were protesting against high prices and the scarcity of bread- it influenced and intertwined with the French Revolution. In the 20th century, the Middle East was the scene of numerous bread revolutions- Egypt in 1977, Tunisia in 1984, Algeria in 1986, Jordan in 1989- to name a few. 

 BBC Arabic: Why there is a strong link between bread and uprisings? 

KH: As we know bread is a basic staple food for human beings, therefore it is not a surprise that there is an organic link between [the availability] of bread and the outbreak of revolutions. Bread revolutions happen as a result of an economic crisis, food shortages, corruption and mismanagement, harvest failures, food speculation, etc. In some cases the root causes are structural economic crises, in other instances both political and economic factors lead to food uprisings. In theory we may differentiate between the economic and political causes, but in reality it is difficult to decouple the economic and political systems that both produce systemic crises [and eventually lead to social and political protests].   

 BBC Arabic: So the term bread revolution is used to refer to all kinds of food uprisings? 

KH: Indeed bread [is often] used as a symbol to refer to different types of protests against rising food prices and the imposition of taxes. An interesting example is the so called Salt Riot in Russia in 1648. This was triggered by the imposition of a universal tax on salt- it led to an increase in salt prices and subsequent violent protests. Another example would be the potato riots in Russia in the 19th century.  

Listen to the full interview in Arabic here. Hassan's remarks starts around the 4:58 mark and ends at 9:00.

Photo: "DSC_0754.jpg" (CC BY-NC 2.0) by dirk.hofmann

On January 10, Ambassador Cameron Munter appeared on the David Webb Show to discuss the latest developments in the U.S.-Pakistani relations, including the Trump administration's announcement to withhold at least 900 million USD in security assistance to Pakistan until it takes action against militant groups. 

"Simply cutting (Pakistan) off and expecting Pakistanis to change behavior, to me, is just a short-term response," said the former U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan.

Click here and here for soundbites from the interview.

Photo: "Pakistan Diaster Relief" (CC BY 2.0) by DVIDSHUB

On December 13, the vice director of Russia’s National Defense Command Center, Victor Kalganov, and three prominent Russian Ministry of Defense officials made an official visit to North Korea. Kalganov’s trip to Pyongyang came after United States Secretary of State Rex Tillerson called for renewed DPRK-U.S. diplomacy, and underscored Moscow’s commitment to a peaceful resolution of the North Korea crisis.

Since North Korea fired four ballistic missiles towards Japan on March 6, the Russian government has devoted considerable diplomatic resources to resolving the nuclear standoff. Many analysts have cited Russia’s desire to increase its influence in the Asia-Pacific region and alignment with the North Korean regime as rationales for its expanded diplomatic involvement on the Korean peninsula.

While these factors have shaped Russian policymakers’ perceptions of the DPRK crisis, the best explanation for Kremlin’s active role in resolving the standoff is Russia’s desire to showcase its great power status to both its domestic audience and the international community. To this end, , Russian diplomats have rallied support from European and Asian leaders for a peaceful resolution to the North Korean crisis, and used a mixture of coercive diplomacy and back-channel negotiations to convince the DPRK to come to the bargaining table.

These diplomatic initiatives are principally aimed at preventing a war between the United States and North Korea. Much like how Russia’s successful diplomatic outreach to U.S. allies in Europe and the Middle East on Syria helped soften Washington’s position on Assad’s removal, Kremlin policymakers believe that building an international consensus around the need to avoid war with North Korea will moderate President Donald Trump’s hawkish rhetoric towards Pyongyang. Enticing North Korea to the bargaining table would also assist this aim. If Russia can help successfully prevent a war, Moscow’s status as a conflict arbiter will increase tremendously, expanding Russia’s alliance network and Putin’s prestige at home and abroad.  

An Increased Voice

Russian policymakers believe that revealing the chasm in perspectives between Trump administration’s hawkish rhetoric and the international community’s perceptions will cause the United States to de-escalate and align with the international consensus. To facilitate this effort, Russia is trying to convince U.S. allies to support its preferred solution to the DPRK crisis and pressure Trump to refrain from military action.

Since March, Russia has emerged as a leading international supporter of China’s dual freeze proposal, which calls for a freeze on North Korea’s nuclear weapons development in exchange for the suspension of joint U.S.-South Korea military drills on the DPRK’s borders. Even though the United States has rebuffed the dual freeze proposal, Russia has reached out diplomatically to U.S. allies in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region to convince them to endorse the plan and pressure Washington to follow suit.   

For example, on August 18, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov held a bilateral dialogue with his German counterpart Sigmar Gabriel. Berlin’s subsequent expression of support for the dual freeze proposal gave Moscow’s position on North Korea critical legitimacy within the European Union.  

The Russian government has also attempted to expand support for the dual freeze proposal in the ASEAN bloc. On August 9, Lavrov announced the creation of a permanent Russia-ASEAN mission to bolster security cooperation with Southeast Asia on North Korea and transnational terrorism. Public statements expressing solidarity with the Russian position on North Korea by ASEAN leaders like Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte have also gained widespread coverage in the Russian state media, reaffirming the link between Moscow’s great power status aspirations and diplomatic involvement on the Korean peninsula.

In addition, Russian officials have leveraged improved relations with South Korea to shape Seoul’s perspective on the North Korea crisis. Moscow’s outreach to moderate members of South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s inner circle has produced tangible results, as a group of Moon’s foreign policy advisors expressed tentative support for a dual freeze proposal on September 14.

If the Trump administration responds to Moscow-induced diplomatic pressure from U.S. allies by loosening its preconditions for diplomacy with North Korea and desisting from further military threats against Pyongyang, respect for Putin as a peacemaker will grow considerably. Such an outcome would  help Putin consolidate his nationalist base ahead of the 2018 presidential elections, and bolster the credibility of Russia’s arbitration ventures in other regions.  

Coercion and Co-option

To steer North Korea towards a peaceful course, Russia has combined coercive diplomacy with co-option. To highlight its displeasure with Kim Jong-Un’s brinkmanship, Russia supported the imposition of comprehensive UN sanctions against North Korea on September 12. As Russia has replaced China as North Korea’s most trusted international partner, according to the DPRK’s February 2017 ranking of international allies, Moscow hopes its expressions of displeasure with Pyongyang will resonate with North Korean policymakers.

Even though Russia remains officially committed to implementing the entire UN sanctions regime against North Korea, in practice, Russian policymakers have distinguished between “legitimate” punitive sanctions worthy of full compliance and “counter-productive” sanctions that threaten North Korea’s economic stability.

Russia routinely violates sanctions against the DPRK that it deems to be counter-productive, believing North Korean aggression is more likely if Kim Jong-Un faces internal instability. As such, in November 2017 Russia increased oil exports to North Korea aimed at preventing  volatility and unpredictability associated with a potential collapse of the North Korean economy.

In exchange for this vital material support, Russian diplomats have held bilateral dialogues with North Korean officials aimed at convincing Pyongyang to accept diplomatic negotiations with the United States over its nuclear program. If Russia can convert the goodwill accrued from Putin’s post-2014 rapprochement with North Korea into a diplomatic breakthrough, Moscow will highlight its diplomatic independence from China and great power status in the Asia-Pacific region.

The Russian government’s efforts to steer the United States and North Korea towards a peaceful course has increased its credibility as a diplomatic stakeholder in the region. Arguably, based on its ability to maintain a line of communication with both North Korean officials and pro-engagement members of South Korea, Russia is presenting itself as a useful partner for U.S. policymakers seeking a peaceful resolution to the DPRK nuclear crisis.

As Washington’s current strategy of combining sanctions against North Korea with periodic engagement of China struggles to gain traction, the prospect of Russia as a go-between in the crisis may take on increased relevance.

Samuel Ramani is a DPhil candidate in International Relations at St. Antony’s College, University of Oxford. He is also a journalist who contributes regularly to the Washington Post, The Diplomat and Huffington Post. He can be followed on Twitter at samramani2 and on Facebook at Samuel Ramani.

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the author and not that of the EastWest Institute.

Photo: "Entering the Kremlin walls." (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0) by SusieQ158

Syrian Civil Defense, also known as the White Helmets, is a civilian-run organization that according to their code of conduct aims to provide “disaster and war response in Syria, to carry out search and rescue operations and to save the maximum number of lives.” The organization was founded in 2013, two years after the civil conflict broke out in Syria. To date, the organization has saved 60,000 lives and currently has 3,600 members that carry out its mission primarily in Hama, Daraa, Aleppo, Homs, Al Qusayr, and Damascus among other cities across this war-torn country.

In 2016, the organization was the recipient of the Right Livelihood Award, recognized for “outstanding bravery, compassion and humanitarian engagement in rescuing civilians.”

Munir Mustafa is the Deputy Director of the Syrian Civil Defense. Prior to the civil war, Mustafa was a firefighter in his hometown of Aleppo who decided he no longer wanted to serve the Syrian government and instead started  a “civil defense” unit in 2012. He is among the first civilians who joined the White Helmets. According to Mustafa, since 2013, the organization has lost 207 of its members in the line of duty. He recently sat down with EWI Fellow Tara Kangarlou to discuss the work of the SCD and lessons from a war-torn Syria.

Q: Raqqa and Deir ez Zor are among the two recently liberated cities in Syria that are no longer controlled by ISIL forces. However, there is ambiguity and struggle over the political governance of these liberated areas. As a humanitarian organization, what’s the best governing solution that would help maintain the safety of the citizens in these two areas?

MM: We are an impartial organization and our sole mission is humanitarian support. We provide rescue services and much needed relief for people and neither care nor can we influence which political party or country or government has governance over the region or a city, but trust that consideration will be given to the welfare. As per our mission, what matters is if we can support the people.

Q: How difficult is it for the White Helmets to work in places like Raqqa or Deir ez Zor?

MM: White Helmets is not allowed to operate in the areas that are controlled by the Assad regime or Russia and their allies; but if we were allowed access into those areas we would have no problem providing support for the local population. The White Helmets first operated in groups and missions but later joined forces and the organization was formally founded in 2013-2014, a few years after commencement of the war,and that’s why the Assad regime sees us as part of the opposition and deems us illegitimate. They don’t recognize us. We offered multiple times to go into different areas that can benefit from our support—areas that are controlled by the regime, like suburbs of Damascus, parts of Aleppo—but they rejected us every single time.

Q: Considering that the majority of ISIL strongholds are being liberated inside Syria, what are some of the immediate threats that Syrians face? How is White Helmets responding to ISIL liberated areas?

MM: While Daesh (ISIL) is gone, there are other groups and militias—including the Shia and “Zeynabis” emerging in these areas that will ultimately lead to clashes; so not all those liberated places can be considered as secure. On the other hand there are other areas that were liberated by Daesh, like Jarablus and Al baab that are controlled and supported by the Turkish government, where we have been successful operating in and have opened three more centers there.

Q: There are multiple besieged areas inside Syria that have faced horrific humanitarian conditions and shortage of food, healthcare, and are denied basic necessities. Many UN and international relief agencies have not been able to access these areas. How successful has the White Helmets been in operating in besieged areas?

MM: It’s incredibly difficult to operate in these areas. We can’t transport any needed equipment in these areas, including much needed medicine, medical and rescue equipment that would make a tremendous difference on the ground; so instead, where can make an impact, and the only thing we can do in this circumstance, is to transfer funds to trusted, local contacts who are operating there.  However, the process is not easy as it takes a lot to channel funds into those areas—more than 10 percent gets cut out in fees and commissions along the way. The besieged areas are the most difficult places to work in and support, but this is the price we have to pay to ensure some degree of impact.

Q: There have been talks and also some steps forward creating “safe zones” inside Syria. How successful can this idea be towards stopping the bloodshed?

MM: The creation of safe zones is in theory a great idea. If you have safe zones where you can start running a political dialogue then you may then have a possibility to reach a political solution for the crisis. Conversely, if you have safe zones where airstrikes are still ongoing—as is the case presently—then there is no point. For safe zones to be successful there needs to be a system of international monitoring and supervision that can guarantee safety.

Q: Seven years into this crisis, over 16 million people are internally displaced and five million are scattered across the Middle East as refugees. How do you view the prospect of a political transition in Syria ending the crisis?

MM: Syrian people won’t ever accept Bashar Hafez al-Assad as their President—especially after all the attacks we’ve seen—including the chemical massacres. In particular, they consider him a criminal, and therefore they can't acknowledge his leadership. The International Criminal Court and United Nations condemned the Syrian regime for his responsibility for many massacres, most recently the Khan Shaykhoun massacre which involved the use of  chemical sarin gas that killed more than 90 people and caused many injuries. There have been numerous massacres by the use of barrel bombs in Aleppo city and many hospitals and civil defense centers were targeted because they were providing assistance and medical treatment to civilians. All this is part of a systematic criminal mentality on the part of the Syrian regime. Theoretically and practically Assad remaining in power is an impossible notion. I do not believe the Syrian people will ever accept him for the the degree of sadness and despair he has inflicted on every single household. How can he possibly remain as president?

Q: How can the international community and the United States help stop the bloodshed? And then support a political transition?

MM: First, if you want to stop the bloodshed, you have to understand the cause of this bloodshed. Most of the bloodshed is caused by airstrikes. On a percentage basis, I would project airstrikes account for approximately 70% of the deaths, as conducted by the Asaad regime and Russia. If the flights can be stopped, then the damage will be reduced to the approximately 30% caused by the mortar shells and rockets that cannot reach far distances but are on the frontliones of the fighting. In order to stop this we need to deploy peace teams and monitoring forces under the auspices of the United Nations. To stop the air war over Syria we need international agreements that will exert pressure on Russia and the Assad regime.

Q: Based on your first-hand work on the ground, what are the three mains things Syrians need in Syria?

MM: First, stop the fighting and bloodshed. Then, find a political solution, and finally a plan of reconstruction, which includes allowing the safe the return of displaced persons and refugees. However, we cannot talk about any negotiation or peace plans without stopping the killing inside Syria, and aircraft targeting of civilians. Only then we can talk about sitting at the negotiating table, followed by a process to hold accountable individuals  accused of war crimes, and Bashar Al-Assad should be the first one of them. Finally, we can talk about the political solution and actual reconstruction to rebuild Syria again.

Q: You were a fireman before the war broke in Syria. What made you resign from your post and join the White Helmets? Aren’t you afraid of living inside Syria especially given the work you do?

MM: I was a fireman and yes, my work was a humanitarian effort, but after the war broke out, it became political and I was no longer serving people and community. Rather, I was dispersing protesters and people who opposed the regime. It was then that I decided that I no longer want to serve as a fireman and have my role be politicized. If one day, firefighters once again become a humanitarian organization that it was previously, then I will proudly go back to this profession.

As regards my personal welfare regarding the work I do—Syria is home, and you can’t leave home, regardless of the circumstances.

Q: If you could have a message for the U.S. President, on behalf of the White Helmets and the Syrian people, what would you tell President Trump?

MM: The United States is one of the strongest—if not the strongest country in the world—and I would ask President Trump to use all this power and weight to exert pressure on the Assad regime and Russia to end the bloodshed. I would ask him to help stop the conflict immediately  and push toward a political solution. President Trump recently helped Syria greatly in defeating ISIL, and I believe he has the same capacity to end the bloodshed caused by Assad and Russia.

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the author and not that of the EastWest Institute.

Photo: "Palmyra - تدمر" (CC BY-ND 2.0) by J_Llanos

Ambassador Cameron Munter discusses the political situation in Lebanon, following the surprise resignation of Prime Minister Saad Hariri. Munter talks to Voice of America, beginning around the 7:28 mark.

Listen to his remarks here.

Click here to read a Q&A with Munter following his meeting with Lebanese President Michel Aoun.

Photo: "Faraya Mzaar Ski Resort, Lebanon" (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0) by Paul Saad

The East West Institute is mentioned in a Huffington Post article regarding its Track 2 work with Center for Applied Research in Partnership with the Orient (CARPO). In the article, CARPO's head Adnan Tabatabi shares the joint effort by the two organizations to bring together a group of influential figures from rivaling neighbors Arab Saudi and Iran on a regular basis. The meetings are confidential.

The collaboration between EWI and CARPO has so far produced four policy reports: Iranian and Saudi Perspectives on ISIL, Iranian and Saudi Perspectives on the Refugee Crisis, Iranian and Saudi Perspectives on the Post-Oil Economy, and Iranian and Saudi Perspectives on the Risks of Climate Change and Ecological Deterioration.

Click here to read the article on Huffington Post.

Photo: "Wadi Rum" (CC BY-SA 2.0) by twiga_swala

Ambassador Cameron Munter, CEO & President of the EastWest Institute, following a series of high-level dialogues in Lebanon the week of November 27, shares his insights and observations on the political scenario evolving in the country and across the region.   

Q: Lebanon is again making front page news. What is at the root of the unfolding political crisis in Lebanon?

There's a basic Lebanese crisis: it's a diverse country, but one which (unusual for the region) has a functioning constitution that seeks to share power and prevent conflict. The immediate Lebanese crisis occurred when Prime Minister Hariri, in Saudi Arabia (where his family has traditionally had extensive business interests) announced on Saudi TV that he was resigning. Upon his return to Lebanon, he has worked with other leaders to remain in power, and is almost certain to keep his job. In a broader sense—will this lead to tension or even violence? I don't think so. Lebanon is resilient, and the whole episode has cemented support, even among Shia Muslims and Christians, for Hariri, a Sunni Muslim. 

Q: Based on your meeting with President Michel Aoun, what is the current sentiment about the ongoing situation and prospects for engaging the key actors and fostering stability in the country, and thus the wider region?

President Aoun, as well as other key leaders in Beirut, told us that they expect things to remain calm. There are differences of opinion, to be sure. But all parties told us they seek stability at this time. 

What may we expect to happen? In the short run, there's an “era of good feeling”: the Lebanese have rallied around Hariri and there may be a month or two in which accords may be reached. But the leadership is aware that external issues—in Israel, on the peninsula, to the north—will have an as yet unknown impact.

Q: The primary question on people’s mind is whether Prime Minister Hariri is likely to remain in office? Beyond that what lies over the horizon? Is there a real concern of escalating tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia, or Hezbollah and neighboring Israel?

Hariri will remain in office. It seems clear that efforts by the Saudis to press him have failed (and one wonders what that game plan of the Saudi leadership might be). Of course, given Lebanon's location, the country is vulnerable to pressure if Saudi-Iranian tensions rise, or if Israel and the Hezbollah within Lebanon square off. But everyone is watching to see what will happen in Syria, now that the military campaign against the Islamic State has been successful. How that plays out will have a significant impact on the actions of the players in Lebanon. 

Q: Is it possible that Lebanon may be dragged into a proxy style conflict similar to what we have witnessed in Syria, Iraq and Yemen?

I think it's unlikely there will be a proxy war in Lebanon. The Riyadh episode has actually brought the Lebanese together for the time being. There's a window of opportunity for the constitutional coalition to work together to address both foreign and domestic issues. Let's hope the leaders take advantage of this opportunity. 

Q: Lebanon hosts nearly two million Syrian refugees. Is there concern that a potentially volatile situation may trigger a new refugee crisis?

Meanwhile, Lebanon, with a population of approximately six million, hosts 1.7 million refugees from Syria (not to mention Palestinians who have been in the country for decades). Should the fragile peace fail, those refugees would seek shelter elsewhere—something that no one wants to see. The Lebanese leadership wants stability at home and ultimately, the reconstruction of Syria that would allow most refugees to return home.

It will be interesting to see if the humanitarian tragedy of Syria and Northern Iraq leads to international agreement on rebuilding: the reconstruction of Mosul or Aleppo would be an enormous step towards alleviating the strain of refugee support in the region. But to date, I don't see Europeans, Americans, Russians, Chinese or anyone else taking the lead on this issue.

Photo: "Harissa Cathedral From Ghosta, Lebanon" (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0) by Paul Saad