Regional Security

Afghanistan Reconnected: Engaging Iran

EWI’s Afghanistan Reconnected Process aims to further Afghanistan’s stability and development through better economic connectivity with its neighbors. Obviously, Iran is a particularly important neighbor to Afghanistan. In addition, the state of affairs post-sanctions presents fresh opportunities for engaging Iran in regional and international cooperation.

With this in mind, EWI conducted on December 19-20 an outreach mission to Tehran, consisting of senior private sector experts from EWI’s regional network and led by EWI’s Vice President Ambassador Martin Fleischer. A full day of roundtable discussions, organized on behalf EWI’s Iranian Partner, the Institute for Political and International Studies (IPIS), composed of 50 participants from think-tanks, government departments, media and diplomatic corps, as well as Ambassadors of Afghanistan and India to Iran. The mission continued with a series of high-level meetings with government agencies, inter alia with Vice-Foreign Minister Dr. Sajjadpour, and was concluded by a business roundtable hosted by the Iran Chamber of Commerce and its affiliates.

The mission was of tremendous value for understanding Iran’s perspective on Afghanistan and for identifying opportunities as well as stumbling blocks for cross-border cooperation. Key findings include

  • Iran, while already maintaining close ties with its eastern neighbor, stands ready to assume a more active role in strengthening social and economic structures in Afghanistan.
  • To achieve security and stability, Iran favors a regional approach, i.e. one that includes all relevant players, and stands ready to collaborate constructively in such a joint effort.
  • Iran — i.e. government and private sector — are willing to invest in Afghanistan’s energy sector and provide capacity building support so as to increase electricity supply.
  • Iran is determined to promote regional connectivity by substantially contributing to alternative land and sea initiatives which will benefit Afghanistan.
  • There is a need to improve the conditions for trade and investment in Afghanistan, inter alia in terms of legal framework, banking systems, and transparency in contracting.

IPIS and EWI will spell out these findings in more detail, and policy recommendations drawn therefrom, in a policy paper that will be jointly developed by both institutes and published in spring 2017. 

Kawa Hassan Explores Mosul Post-ISIS

In a prime time interview with "Kurd Connect", a joint program between Voice of America's Kurdish Service and NRT, the independent Kurdish Satellite channel, Hassan underlined three conditions that would translate the military defeat of ISIS in Mosul into a lasting political settlement. Hassan made his comments as coalition forces are making gains in the offensive to recapture Iraq's second largest city from the terrorist organization.

Hassan said it was highly possible that ISIS would ultimately lose Mosul. But, he added, the bigger question was what would happen afterwards.

The liberation of Mosul, said Hassan, could lead to a new beginning for Iraq and the emergence of an inclusive Iraqi state provided three conditions were met: 

  • Iraqi authorities should regain the trust of the Moslawis, the people of Mosul. This is important because the sectarian policies of Iraq's previous government and the collapse of the people's confidence in the Iraqi army and post-2003 Iraqi state led to the ISIS takeover in June 2014.  
  • The United States, United Nations, European Union, donor countries and regional states should set up a special fund for the stabilization and reconstruction of Mosul. The humanitarian and reconstruction needs in Mosul are immense. The international community and regional states can play a positive role in rebuilding Mosul by committing to financial resources. This will send a signal to the Moslawis that they will not be abandoned once ISIS is defeated. 
  • International and regional powers should play a positive role in bridging the divide between the diverse Iraqi communities to reach mutual compromises regarding territorial disputes, distribution of wealth and power sharing.

Hassan's comments can be accessed in full here, beginning around the 6:45 mark. The interview is in Kurdish.

Japan's Growing North Korea Problem

The Korean peninsula is evolving into an acute security concern for Japan, with a host of provocations this year.

U.S. President Barack Obama's policy of strategic patience with regard to the North has failed, and Pyongyang has continued to expand its capabilities in missile technology and weapons of mass destruction. Since the beginning of the year, the North has conducted two nuclear weapons tests and a barrage of ballistic missile tests aimed at refining range and accuracy.

Continued instability in the peninsula will be one of the chief international security problems that Obama's successor will inherit when he or she takes office next year. Adding to this problem is concern among U.S. allies — including Japan — about the credibility of Washington's treaty commitments across the region.

U.S. presidential candidate Donald Trump has questioned the value of U.S. alliances with Tokyo and Seoul, accusing both countries of engaging in free-riding and benefiting from Washington's security guarantees at little cost to themselves. Trump also has suggested that Japan and South Korea should look to the procurement of nuclear weapons as a potential solution to regional security threats posed by North Korea.

Click here to read the full article in Nikkei Asian Review. 

ASEAN-China Code of Conduct Will Languish as Long as China Sets the Pace in South China Sea

BY: STEVEN STASHWICK

As China’s unilateralism and conflicts with its South China Sea neighbors have increased over the last decade, so has the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) focus on implementing a binding Code of Conduct to obligate a peaceful resolution of the region’s territorial disputes. Last week, ASEAN and China issued a Joint Statement commemorating 25 years of dialogue and declaring progress on a variety of security and economic frameworks, including the elusive Code of Conduct. But ASEAN’s effort toward such a Code is now well into its third decade, which should temper excitement over any news of progress. Over those 25 years, ASEAN claimants have seen their positions in the South China Sea eroded in favor of China. Meanwhile, China has faced neither economic nor significant political costs for its actions, nor perceived unacceptable risk of armed conflict over them. Binding diplomatic progress appears unlikely until it does.

The challenge facing China-ASEAN diplomacy is that China controls the pace of conflict escalation. China’s military predominance means ASEAN nations typically de-escalate incidents, least one spark a conflict they couldn’t win. As the precipitator of most of those incidents, China retains the option to back off if one threatens greater escalation than it desires.

It was thus ASEAN’s recognition of its weaker position that motivated the idea of diplomatically limiting Chinese behavior in the South China Sea. ASEAN first proposed a binding Code of Conduct in 1992 after China adopted a controversial territorial law declaring sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and considered much of the sea itself to be territorial or internal waters. China’s occupation of the Philippines-claimed Mischief Reef in 1995 heightened ASEAN’s alarm over China’s regional intentions and strengthened calls for a binding Code of Conduct. China rebuffed those efforts until 1999, and subsequent negotiations led to a Joint Statement and Declaration on Conduct in 2002.

In 2003, Professor Leszek Buszynski, now at Australian National University, examined what finally brought China to the table with ASEAN. He showed that China was uninterested in participating in a Code of Conduct until 1998, when the Philippines sought to involve the U.S. in the dispute through new defense agreements and by restarting joint exercises. Around the same time, seeing a linkage with its obligations to Taiwan, the U.S. began deploying carrier strike groups to the South China Sea.  

Nonetheless, China and ASEAN’s objectives remained divergent. ASEAN sought to place limits on a stronger China that it saw as an instigator and aggressor. China wished to use the negotiations to placate anxious ASEAN states, limit deeper U.S. involvement in the region, and prevent a final agreement from restricting its interests. Since even the appearance of Chinese conciliation could be touted as a victory for ASEAN, China held the diplomatic upper hand. The result was not a binding Code of Conduct, but a non-binding Declaration on Conduct wherein the parties “undertake” to resolve disputes by peaceful means (not “commit” or “pledge”) and agree to work on a Code of Conduct based on consensus, a diplomatic “out” insisted on by the Chinese delegation.

Professor Buszynski’s key insight was that a militarily- and economically-dominant party would only place voluntary limits on itself if it faced balancing risks or costs from its behavior. In the late 1990s, new U.S. involvement in the region provided the prospect of such risks and costs, inducing China to come to the negotiating table. But that new power balance was insufficient to get favorable terms for ASEAN. Since the 2002 Declaration, China has built significant port, radar, and airfield facilities on features in the Spratly Islands, attempted unilateral oil exploration in areas contested by Vietnam, and used its Coast Guard and Maritime Militia to evict fishermen and government vessels of other South China Sea claimants.

Nonetheless, recent China-ASEAN statements still provide only ambiguous restrictions on behavior:

  • Fourteen years after agreeing to continue to discuss a binding Code of Conduct, and 24 years after ASEAN first proposed the idea, last week’s Joint Declaration continues to merely “undertake” to resolve disputes by peaceful means and is committed to “working substantively” towards a binding Code of Conduct, which still must be “based on consensus.”

  • The July 25th Joint Statement by ASEAN Foreign Ministers and China on implementation of the Declaration on Conduct states signatories will “undertake to exercise self-restraint” on activities that threaten peace and stability, to include “refraining from action of inhabiting on the presently uninhabited islands,” language that may implicitly recognize the disputed features China already occupies. Further, since the only major feature left that China may want to occupy is Scarborough Shoal—where the U.S. has explicitly warned China against construction—a non-binding prohibition against new occupation does not concede much.

  • A September statement on use of the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) by China and ASEAN seems to oblige parties to use its voluntary communications and safety protocols when their ships or aircraft meet and interact. But the agreement only applies to naval units and not the Coast Guards and irregular maritime units responsible for most harassment and incidents in the region.

China has delayed meaningful diplomatic progress on a binding Code of Conduct for decades by spacing out superficial concessions, and perpetually committing—and then affirming its commitment— to make progress towards that goal. China’s aggressiveness has not come without a price; many ASEAN nations now cooperate more closely with the U.S. on security, while significantly building up their own militaries. But China’s military spending is still five times the combined defense budgets of the major ASEAN powers. At the same time, studies show a narrowing gap between U.S. power projection and Chinese capabilities to counter it, suggesting that unlike the early 2000s, the mere presence of U.S. military power may be a diminishing motivation for China to engage in meaningful diplomacy. China is still largely setting the pace of events in the South China Sea, and ASEAN should not expect better diplomatic outcomes unless China perceives genuine costs or risk from its actions.

Steven Stashwick is a writer and analyst based in New York City. He spent ten years on active duty as a U.S. naval officer with multiple deployments to the Western Pacific. He writes about maritime and security affairs in East Asia and serves in the U.S. Navy Reserve. The views expressed are his own. Follow him on Twitter.

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the author and not that of the EastWest Institute.​

Can China disarm Japan’s moves in the South China Sea?

Tensions are spiking again between China and Japan as China seeks to fend off any involvement by Japan in the disputed waters of the South China Sea and China tightens the vice on Japan in the East China Sea, J. Berkshire Miller writes in Asia & The Pacific Policy Society.

Last month, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy conducted a number of naval drills in the Sea of Japan, termed “a confrontation drill”, aimed at simulating a potential maritime conflict. Of course, Beijing caveated—with little attention to strategic planners in Tokyo and Washington—that the exercise was “not aimed at any one country”. The drills, which follow a significant uptick in tensions over the past few months in the East and South China Seas, are telling on Beijing’s strategic intentions to push back against what it sees as a coordinated and sustained effort by the US and its allies—principally Japan—to “name, shame and contain” China.

Indeed, the past year has seen a marked deterioration in Japan-China relations, especially as a result of increased tensions in the East and South China Sea. One of the big watermarks has been the decision on July 12, by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague, to award the tribunal ruling to the Philippines in its dispute with China over the latter’s expansive claims in the South China Sea, largely centered on its intentional ambiguity surrounding the infamous “nine-dash line”. Beijing has predictably responded by calling the ruling a “waste of paper” and has assembled its diplomatic influence in the fractured Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in order to disrupt potential unity on whether the ruling should be respected. 

 

The full article can be accessed here.

Afghanistan Reconnected: Cross-Border Cooperation at a Critical Juncture

Overview

The EastWest Institute, in presence of Ms. Adela Raz, Deputy Foreign Minister for Economic Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, and Dr. Mohammad Humayon Qayoumi, Chief Advisor of the President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, is holding a roundtable discussion and preview of the forthcoming EastWest Institute report titled “Cross-Border Cooperation at a Critical Juncture,” at 11:00 on September 7, 2016, at EWI’s Brussels Center.

The purpose of the event is to share perspectives on Afghanistan’s role in regional economic cooperation and to present the preliminary findings of EWI’s forthcoming report, “Afghanistan Reconnected: Cross-Border Cooperation at a Critical Juncture.” 

 

Afghanistan Reconnected: Sustaining Regional Cooperation in an Insecure Environment

Following the conclusion of the ISAF mission, in the wake of an increasingly violent Taliban insurgency and amid fears of a growing Islamic State presence, 2015 has seen a worsening security situation. However, the renewed international commitments expected from the 2016 Warsaw NATO summit and the Brussels Ministerial Conference on Afghanistan should be motivated not solely by security concerns, but also by what the region and the world could gain from a more stable Afghanistan. A draining of international support to Afghanistan risks jeopardizing the sustainability of local institutions.

Against this background, the EastWest Institute (EWI) convened a roundtable discussion “Sustaining Regional Cooperation in an Insecure Environment,” on March 10, 2016, in Brussels. The event, held in the framework of EWI’s “Afghanistan Reconnected Process,” aimed at discussing with Brussels-based practitioners and interested organizations the perspectives developed by participants in the Afghanistan Reconnected Process since its inception. For the occasion, EWI brought to Brussels a number of active participants in the Process from Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, who shared their direct experience dealing with energy, trade and transit issues in Greater Central Asia.

Main findings were:

  • Ghani’s Challenges: Over the course of 2015, Afghanistan underwent political, military, and economic transitions. Many changes have taken place since the formation of the National Unity Government, and still more reforms need to be implemented at a subnational level to ensure local development and effective administration. The Ghani administration has already implemented a number of initiatives to revive the country’s economy; these include combatting endemic corruption, and taking steps towards empowering Afghan women, recognizing their fundamental role in long-term economic growth. The administration is also working to foster much-needed cooperation with Afghanistan’s neighbors. Despite having relatively effective people-to-people connectivity, the region remains—in terms of trade—the least connected area in the world.
     
  • Relations with Pakistan: Participants in the event recognized that a stable Pakistan is in the long term impossible without a stable Afghanistan; however, the two neighbors have yet to find common approach to regional security challenges. They are intertwined in many ways, including common development and energy needs. However, despite the 20,000 individuals who cross the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan on a daily basis, the countries’ respective bureaucracies are reluctant to adopt more liberal business visa policies, which would help bring the existing trade and transit between the neighbors into the formal economy.
     
  • Energy: As both Pakistan and Afghanistan are energy-hungry, they both stand to benefit from the progress in regional transmission projects such as the Central Asia South Asia Electricity Transmission and Trade Project (CASA-1000) and the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline. Pakistan in particular depends on Afghanistan to meet its energy needs, as most of its energy imports will have to come through its neighbor. However, regional energy transmission projects should not be stalled in the face of a deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan. Rather, the costs of providing security to power supply lines and pipelines should be factored into the energy costs.
     
  • The China Factor: The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has the potential to be a game-changer for the prosperity of the region. In fact, the 44 billion USD investment in power production, industrial parks and private sector development committed to the project by Chinese president Xi Jinping will have positive repercussions on Pakistan’s neighbors as well (including Afghanistan), even if neither the corridor nor the projected east-west axis (“One Belt, One Road”) will cross Afghanistan directly. In return, China is increasingly recognizing that instability in Afghanistan constitutes a risk for its ambitions, hence China’s engagement in the quadrilateral peace process.
     
  • India’s Interests: The country is currently the one of the largest investors in Afghanistan, and has focused its commitments to practical, tangible contributions, such as the construction of the Salma dam and other infrastructure projects. New Delhi’s interests in Afghanistan are greatly influenced by India’s future economic growth prospects, which will require better connectivity to reach foreign markets for its exports. In addition, regional energy projects such as CASA-1000 could work as a two-way street by not only bringing hydro-energy southward but eventually give India the possibility to export energy towards its northern neighborhood.
     
  • A Unifying Threat: The region as a whole currently faces two unprecedented opportunities for enhanced regional cooperation. The first unifying aspect is the increasingly shared perspective of common security risks stemming from Islamic extremism. Regional bodies such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) are all engaged in discussions on how to address the risks related to the return from Syria and Iraq of fighters of Central Asian origin. The perception of this as a common threat could become a rallying point to further a joint security vision across the region.
     
  • Iran: The second opportunity for enhanced cooperation lies in Iran’s expected opening to the outside following the progressive lifting of international sanctions. For Afghanistan and its northern neighbors, this entails a variety of opportunities, e.g. easier access to maritime transport through the port of Chabahar, which offers a transit alternative to the Pakistani ports of Karachi and Gwadar. Furthermore, the Iranian market will offer an additional outlet and transit corridor for Central Asian energy exports, leaving room for optimism for the region’s connectivity prospects.

Afghanistan Reconnected: Sustaining Regional Cooperation in an Insecure Environment

Overview

The EastWest Institute has convened a series of high-level consultations to address regional economic security issues in Afghanistan post-2014; this work is known as the “Afghanistan Reconnected Process”. Between 2013 and 2015, the Process has involved high-level representatives of governments, parliaments and the private sector from Afghanistan, Central and South Asia, as well as from regional and international organizations, to discuss the opportunities and challenges for cross-border economic cooperation in Afghanistan and the region.

The EastWest Institute is pleased to invite you to a roundtable with practitioners to be held at EWI’s Brussels Center. The event will aim at presenting the Afghanistan Reconnected Process to the Brussels-based audience and at enabling dialogue on participants' perspectives on Afghanistan's future in light of the current situation.

The event will include presentations from selected high-ranking speakers from Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, and Turkey. The presenters, who have been active participants in EWI’s Afghanistan Reconnected Process, will share views from their direct experience dealing with energy, trade and transit in Greater Central Asia. Presentations will be followed by a discussion moderated by Ambassador Martin Fleischer, Vice-President for Regional Security at the EastWest Institute.

Welcome and registration will be from 16:00 – 16:15. The event will be followed by a networking reception.

The meeting will be conducted under Chatham House Rule.

Atlantic Council Picks EWI's Kawa Hassan for Task Force on the Future of Iraq

New York (February 19, 2016) - The Atlantic Council's Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East has invited Kawa Hassan, the EastWest Institute's Director of Middle East and North Africa's Regional Program, to join The Task Force on the Future of Iraq. This Task Force will bring together 25 top Iraq experts from around the globe who will make specific recommendations to the incoming American administration's transition team in late November 2016.

"We're delighted that Kawa has been selected to contribute to this important project," EWI CEO and President Cameron Munter said. "Kawa Hassan's work at EWI has been informed and nuanced, and I'm sure he'll bring these qualities to the Atlantic Council study. Kawa is one of the most promising voices speaking on the Middle East today."

The Task Force will convene four times in 2016 to analyze the drivers of instability and sources of opportunity in Iraq and devise policy recommendations for Baghdad, Erbil and regional and international partners. Besides the Rafik Hariri Center, supporters of the Task Force include the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, the American University of Iraq, Sulaimani and the Bayan Center.

Among other Task Force initiatives, Hassan will be drafting a paper on governance in the Kurdistan Region, as part of his participation.

"I am honored and thrilled to join this timely, needed initiative and to be a member of a team of internationally renowned Iraq experts," Hassan said.

"Iraq, the Middle East and the wider world are at a crossroads. In order to defeat ISIS and build new and inclusive political contracts, the root causes that led to the emergence of this Frankenstein and apocalyptic actor that calls itself the Islamic State should be addressed through fresh perspectives and new policies. This lies at the heart of EWI's strategy that aims at addressing seemingly intractable problems and anticipating tomorrow's security challenges."

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For press inquiries contact:

Sarah Stern
Acting Director of Communications
Email: sstern@eastwest.ngo
Phone: +1 212 824 4145
Mobile: +1 646 662 1913

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