Europe

2018 Annual Report

The EastWest Institute is pleased to release its 2018 Annual Report, chronicling the programmatic activities, achievements and new initiatives in the past year and reflecting key geopolitical trends around the world.

The institute remains focused on tackling these evolving issues, as well as on forecasting challenges in other topics and regions.

To access the complete report, please click below:

Global Commission's Cyber Stability Hearings at the UN

The Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace (GCSC) conducted its fifth public hearings at the Palais Des Nations, United Nations Office in Geneva, on January 22, 2019. Hosted by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), the hearings featured discussions between members of the Global Commission, Geneva-based international organizations, government representatives, civil society and the private sector, and focused on how peace and security in cyberspace is influenced by international law, human rights, Internet governance, development, sustainable development goals and other issues.

“We greatly appreciate UNIDIR hosting the Commission and lending its expertise on the incredibly complicated topic of cyber stability,” said Marina Kaljurand, the GCSC’s Chair. “This meeting was emblematic of the multi-stakeholder nature of the issue and the range of actors required to address stability, security and continued confidence in the digital platforms on which we all depend.”

Renata Dwan, Director of UNIDIR said that “These Commission meetings were important because after being on the UN agenda for over two decades, we are now seeing an expansion on the discussion around what cyber stability means and for whom. A debate that began focused on State behavior, is now becoming a much wider discussion about the role of the private sector, of regions and of individuals—and how to develop space for rights, for equity, and for access that enhances development for all.”

A keynote address was delivered by Fabrizio Hochschild, United Nations Assistant Secretary-General for Strategic Coordination, and remarks were also provided by Jon Fanzun, Special Envoy for Cyber Foreign and Security Policy, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs of Switzerland.

Over the course of the day, attendees participated in two hearings. The first focused on International Law, Peace and Security and Cyber Stability and featured the following speakers: Anja Kaspersen, Director, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, Geneva Branch; Deborah Housen-Couriel, Senior Researcher, Interdisciplinary Cyber Research Center at Tel Aviv University; Helen Durham, Director of International Law and Policy, International Committee of the Red Cross.

The second hearing focused on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, human rights and Internet governance and included remarks by: Francesco Pisano, Director of the Library, United Nations Office at Geneva; Peggy Hicks, Director of the Thematic Engagement, Special Procedures and Right to Development Division, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR); and Elena Plexida, Senior Director Government and IGOs Engagement, ICANN.

In its closed session on January 23, the Commission continued discussions on the definition and principles for cyber stability, and recommendations for a future international peace and security framework for cyberspace. The input from the hearings informed the Commissioners’ discussions. A definition of cyber stability and recommendations for the international community going forward will be central elements in the GCSC’s report.

The GCSC would like to thank the organizations that have submitted feedback in response to the Request for Consultation on the Singapore Norm Package. The received comments were collected and presented to the Commission in Geneva and will be considered in the writing of the GCSC Report.

The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, the EastWest Institute, the Chairs and Commissioners would like to thank UNIDIR for hosting the GCSC in Geneva, as well as the GCSC partners, the governments of the Netherlands, Singapore and France, Microsoft, ISOC, Afilias and the other funders for their support.

The GCSC will next convene in March 2019 in Japan on the margins of the ICANN64 meeting. In the run-up to this meeting, the GCSC continues to welcome input from other stakeholders on its work. Comments may be sent to info@cyberstabililty.org or cyber@hcss.nl.

Click here to learn more.

Brexit: Uncertainty the only Certainty

After a truly tumultuous couple of weeks in British politics, following the publication of Theresa May’s 585-page EU withdrawal agreement, it is finally apparent that the wheels of reality are slow starting to crush the Brexit dream

Now that some of the dust has settled surrounding the media frenzy around No. 10, it is clear that this agreement has little purchase among anyone in parliament. Brexiteers are appalled at the prospect of the UK relinquishing its ability to shape future EU policy decisions whilst still subject to them under the transition period. Remainers see very little reason to think this deal addresses their concerns regarding jobs and Britain’s economic future. Elsewhere, in Northern Ireland, the Democratic Union Party (DUP), for whom May relies upon for a majority, are dismayed at the idea of the territory remaining in a deeper relationship with the EU to the rest of the UK. Whilst Scotland is unhappy for the exact opposite.  Thus it seems the only thing currently uniting the commons is the feeling of disdain, disenchantment and derision towards May’s deal. As the Washington Post reported, the deal “gives everyone something to hate.”

And yet, it is painfully clear that May could never have achieved anything much better than what has been agreed. A sentiment encapsulated by European Commission President Jean Claude Juncker following the Brexit summit in Brussels last Sunday when he stated to reporters that “Those who think…they will get a better deal will be disappointed in seconds.” May’s negotiating position has been compromised from the outset, primarily because the promises made by the most ardent and ferocious supporters of Brexit in 2016 were built on fantasy.  During the campaign, Brexiteers vowed Brits can and should have their cake and eat it; pledging to end free movement, withdraw from the customs union and avoid a hard border between Northern Ireland and the Republic, all whilst simultaneously retaining the economic benefits of regular membership. Promises which are inherently contradictory.

To this day, it remains difficult to fathom how Brexiteers came to internalize and justify such logic when it could never be in the EU’s interests to allow a member state to leave the union with a better trade deal than its remaining members. Nevertheless, the true irony in this whole sorry state of affairs is that the UK was already treating itself to a healthy piece of cake with regards to the terms of its membership: It was able to retain the pound instead of the Euro and was exempted from the borderless Schengen Zone.

The Contents

The proposal itself sets out the legal conditions of the UK’s formal withdrawal and centers around three pillars: the financial settlement, the rights of EU and UK citizens in either territory, and the border between the UK and the Republic of Ireland (the EU’s only physical border with the UK). However, when delving into the nitty gritty of the proposal, it is not difficult to see why it has garnered such an abhorrent reaction.

Firstly, the proposal seemingly locks the UK into a permanent state of purgatory. Neither in the EU nor completely out. “The worst of all worlds,” as opposition leader Jeremy Corbyn put it. The scheduled transition period for the UK leaving the EU is set to last until December 2020 once it formally leaves in March 2019. Under the transition, the UK would remain subject to all current and potentially new EU laws despite having no formal input. Fundamentally, the transition period is supposed to allow businesses and governments enough time to prepare and adapt to the new state of affairs in the relationship.  Furthermore, it will provide both the UK and the EU time to flesh out a viable trade agreement, with the possibility of an extension if an agreement is not reached. However, for Brexiteers this is where the alarm bells begin to ring, since the agreement itself does not set a specific time for how long this transition may be extended. Hard-Brexiteers, particularly, have denounced this as a betrayal of Brexit; relegating the UK to a form of vassalage. Far from the Brexit dream of “Taking back control.”

These fears are also linked to the backstop proposal for Northern Ireland which would kick in if a trade agreement is not found after an extended transition period. The backstop is the proposed mechanism to prevent a hard border between the North and the Republic amidst fears the installation of security checks could reignite previous troubles on the island. It would temporarily see the entirety of the UK, including Northern Ireland treated as a single customs area, which in practical terms would mean more checks on goods entering and leaving Norther Ireland and the rest of the UK. Although Theresa May has repeatedly stressed that the backstop mechanism is a last resort and that both London and Brussels do not wish to see its implementation, it has raised concerns within the DUP that it potentially paves the way for Northern Ireland to be reintegrated into the EU since under the proposed terms, it would remain in a deeper customs relationship with the EU than the rest of the UK; a red line for DUP leader Arlene Foster.

There is a backstop review mechanism, though this has been one of the most highly contentious facets of the agreement; for it prevents the UK from unilaterally exiting the backstop if it found it no longer necessary. Instead, a joint EU-UK Joint Committee would have to agree to terminate these customs arrangements, essentially granting the EU veto power over the UK. This particular caveat was primarily behind former Brexit Secretary, Dominic Raab’s shock resignation, just hours after the announcement of the agreement two weeks ago. In a Sunday morning interview, Raab expressed his fears that this arrangement threatens to impinge upon UK sovereignty, by potentially signing the country up to a customized union “no democratic country in history has ever signed up to.’”

Where do we go from here?

The result is we are in a situation whereby May’s deal will likely be voted down in the house of commons, which will precipitate even more uncertainty. As mentioned previously, May resides over a minority government which is dependent on the 10 DUP MPs for a majority. In addition to the fervent Brexiteers and remainers in her own party, May is very unlikely to find any support in the opposition who are either remainers or see little reason to support her own government.

A rejection of her agreement will therefore increase the likelihood of a whole host of possibilities including a no-deal Brexit, a second referendum, a potential leadership contest within the Conservative party, or a general election. There are pros and cons for each of these scenarios but the harsh fact remains that none of them provide any clarity as to what will happen after they come into fruition. Unfortunately it seems, uncertainty, is the only certainty surrounding Brexit for the time being.

The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the EastWest Institute

European Defense Cooperation in the Second Machine Age

BY: NICOLÒ DEBENEDETTI, ANDREA GILLI & MAURO GILLI

In the first week of June, the European Commission officially launched the European Defence Fund―a financial vehicle to support defense research and cooperation across European Union (EU) member states. This important step comes as no surprise: with the British “Brexit” referendum one year ago, and the American presidential election in November ushering a shift in U.S. foreign policy, continental European countries have felt growing concerns over NATO’s commitment to their defense. Recent geopolitical unrest has further reinforced these fears: from Russia’s conventional and hybrid threats to the rise of the Islamic State and overall instability both in the Balkans and in the Greater Middle East.

In this light, it is only natural that Europe wants to strengthen its defense cooperation to achieve more effective security, superior deterrence and wider global influence. The European Defence Fund can partially serve these goals by addressing the historical weakness of past European cooperation projects, namely the incapacity to generate economic efficiency through adequate scale (larger production runs decrease the unit cost of production). However, as we enter the Second Machine Age―the era of accelerating computer power, automation and increasing digital connectivity―three main aspects deserve attention in the context of growing geopolitical uncertainty surrounding Europe and the transatlantic alliance.

Navigating Current Realities

First, past multinational joint programs like the Tornado and the Eurofighter, often touted as signs of success, belong to history books. Though still touted as a sign of success, and pursued by national policymakers and bureaucrats in Brussels, large joint cooperative projects are unlikely to deliver the benefits they used to in the past; the growing complexity of military technology is making these programs progressively less likely to achieve their intended goals. It is becoming increasingly difficult for countries to pool together their technological expertise to deliver effective weapon systems.

Future large-scale programs, in other words, will need to have a single, capable prime contractor and individual European countries will have to accept unequal work-share agreements. Whether such a single prime contractor is a transnational European company such as Airbus (France, Spain and Germany), MBDA (France, Spain, Italy and Germany), Leonardo (Italy, UK and Poland) or Thales (France, UK and the Netherlands) or a national company able to allocate only subcontractor work abroad is a purely political decision. Work-sharing agreements that split systems integration responsibilities across many countries and companies are not going to work any longer.

Second, European countries have to leverage opportunities brought about by progress in software and processing power. The faster development cycles of payload (e.g. missiles and sensors), for instance, call for modular designs, common standards and harmonization of interfaces to enable rapid upgrade and modernization of existing platforms. So far, however, EU member states have resisted these measures, being more interested in restricting competition from foreign producers. Thus, in many realms, Europe needs market-based cooperation, not politically mandated cooperative projects. Similarly, EU countries should openly embrace the capabilities of non-traditional or commercial companies for the development of strategic capabilities, such as unmanned systems, cyber and satellites. In contrast, they have primarily tried to preserve the position of their national champions: one of the many results is that no EU country has been able to develop a single medium-altitude, long-endurance drone yet. All programs, awarded to EU heavyweights, have in fact failed thus far (see Gilli and Gilli’s chapter in the forthcoming Oxford Handbook of European Armed Forces).

Third, commercial technologies are driving innovation not only in the civilian but also in the military realm thanks to the opportunities offered by machine learning, big data and robotics. To reap the benefits of this transition, European countries must make a concerted effort to enable the exploitation of commercial technologies. To this end, European countries should keep in mind the challenges that lie ahead. For example, current regulations on Intellectual Property Rights are based on the premise that defense technology is a product of government funding. Thus, governments retain some rights over technology. Commercial companies or civil research labs are legitimately concerned that by entering the defense business, these regulations may harm their long-term economic interests. Moreover, both the defense acquisition regulations and the military procurement workforce are currently unfit for dealing with commercial technology. Innovative commercial companies do not work along the lengthy and rigid defense procurement time cycles and do not find appealing working with organizations that espouse significant compliance demands. Similarly, while the current defense procurement workforce is specialized in dealing with the defense acquisition process, it is less suited to deal with and respond to the more agile world of commercial companies. As such, appropriate reforms are needed. Finally, the potential benefits from exploiting commercial technologies will be larger if European countries pursue a concerted and harmonized approach.

Change in Step with Technology

Today, European countries require a broader range, and thus, more expensive and complex portfolio of capabilities to address the newer and broader set of threats with which they are confronted. The European Defence Fund makes several important and useful proposals in this respect. However, the current wave of technological change is undermining one of its assumptions: the centrality of joint multinational armament projects must give way to adopting a more flexible approach to technological advances. If European countries want to enhance their military capabilities, it will require a paradigm shift in the way Europe perceives and handles technology, industry and procurement. It is a daunting prospect but one that is inevitable if Europe wants to afford the broader set of capabilities and closer degree of collaboration that a bigger security role requires.

Nicolò Debenedetti is President of Aleph-Analisi Strategiche, Bocconi University in Milan. Andrea Gilli is post-doctoral fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs of Harvard University, Cambridge, MA. Mauro Gilli is Senior Researcher in Military Technology and International Security at the Center for Security Studies of ETH, Zurich. This article summarizes and updates the recent Brief for the European Union Institute for Security Studies.

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the author and not that of the EastWest Institute.

Transnational Security Governance and Cyberspace Security

Bruce McConnell, who oversees EWI's cyberspace initiative, will deliver his presentation at the 2017 Annual Security Review Conference on June 29 in Vienna. The three-day conference is organized by Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

Four years ago, U.S. national security advisor Susan Rice observed that the world’s “most vexing security challenges are transnational security threats that transcend borders: climate change, piracy, infectious disease, transnational crime, cyber theft, and the modern-day slavery of human trafficking.” Today, one could add migration, violent extremism, the safety of fissile nuclear materials, and overall information security to that list.

These issues share at least two characteristics: First they are accentuated in their severity by modern technology. The bad guys, both state and non-state actors, are well equipped with the latest computers, communications equipment, and weaponry, and their ability to use these tools is enhanced by their access to global networks. Second, no international regimes or institutions have these transborder issues well in hand. Rather, global bodies like the World Health Organization or the International Telecommunication Union are generally struggling to remain relevant. The post-war structures that have kept peace for 70 years face a crisis of legitimacy as rising powers that were not present at Bretton Woods scorn the old order and create their own institutions and power centers.

The Cyber Arms Race and Information Warfare

Today we are focusing on security and cyberspace. Cyber-enabled attacks in the lead-up to the U.S. Presidential election roiled relationships in Washington and globally. The term cyber-enabled emphasizes a new characteristic of cyberspace—it’s no longer its own thing. It’s part of everything. There is very little actual “cyber crime.” Instead, we see a plethora of ordinary crimes and attacks: theft, fraud, trespassing and destruction of property that use cyber means.

From a geopolitical standpoint, this cyber-enablement has produced a runaway cyber arms race, led by the United States, Russia, China, Iran, Israel, and some European countries, with many others, including North Korea, following close behind. Over thirty countries have formed cyber offense units. Non-state actors such as organized criminal gangs and the Islamic State are also players.

The U.S. Democratic National Committee hacks and related incidents consist of burglary and publication of the fruits on Wikileaks. From a legal standpoint, while it is against U.S. law to enter a computer without authorization, these incidents may fall more into the shadow zone of espionage. As for the publication, the U.S. Supreme Court has generally protected media publication of accurate, stolen materials of public interest obtained by a third party.

What’s new for Americans is the possibility that there is an “information war” between East and West. Indeed, some states do not use the term cybersecurity, preferring the broader term “information security." The events around the U.S. election have evoked a global conversation around fake news, political trolling, social media bots, and the weaponization of intelligence.

On the other hand, we have recently seen additional evidence regarding Western cyber actions against North Korean missile systems and the CIA’s capabilities. Even assuming the most benign motivations by all parties, these continuing, ungoverned state-on-state skirmishes in cyberspace increasingly undermine terrestrial security and stability.

In contrast to cyberspace, other international domains are governed by norms of behavior and international law. In the airspace it is illegal to shoot down a commercial aircraft. But in cyberspace, the way in which international law applies is still being debated. In commercial aviation we have organizations like the private sector International Air Transport Association and the governmental International Commercial Aviation Organization that partner to maintain safety and security on a global basis. There are no comparable institutions for cyberspace.

Everyone in this room is painfully familiar with the provisions that keep that network secure: identity proofing of everyone who gets close to a passenger plane, licensing of pilots, filing of flight plans, certification of aircraft, etc. We have none of these things in cyberspace. Yet the financial value of the commercial transactions conducted over the Internet (and here I’m not even counting SWIFT and other special purpose networks) is actually 100 times greater on an annual basis than the value of goods transported in the air cargo system.

Progress is modest. A group of governmental cyber experts has worked at the United Nations for over 10 years to come up with an initial set of non-binding norms of behavior in cyberspace. These include:
• Not allowing the use of information and communications technology, or ICT, to intentionally damage another country’s critical infrastructure.
• Not allowing international cyber attacks to emanate from their territory.
• Responding to requests for assistance from another country that has been attacked by computers in the first country.
• Preventing the proliferation of malicious tools and techniques and the use of harmful hidden functions.
• Encouraging responsible reporting of ICT vulnerabilities and sharing associated information.
• Not harming the information systems of the authorized cybersecurity incident response teams.

In February 2017, the government of the Netherlands, with the support of Microsoft, the Internet Society, the EastWest Institute, and the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, launched the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace. The GCSC is chaired by Marina Kaljurand, former Estonian foreign minister, and co-chaired by Michael Chertoff, former U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security and Latha Reddy, India’s former deputy national security adviser. This multistakeholder commission will build on and extend existing efforts to develop and advocate for norms and polices to enhance international security and stability and guide responsible state and non-state behavior in cyberspace.

On the private sector side, global ICT companies are beginning to step up to the responsibility that comes with their great power in cyberspace. For example, Microsoft recently issued a set of norms of industry behavior that global ICT companies should follow in their business practices. Examples of the kinds of norms that companies are considering include:
• Creating more secure products and services.
• Not enabling states to weaken the security of commercial, mass-market ICT products and services.
• Practicing responsible vulnerability disclosure.
• Collaborating to defend their customers against and recover from serious cyber attacks.
• Issuing updates to protect their customers no matter where the customer is located.

Clearly, the industry is at an immature stage. Its rapid growth in importance has outstripped systems of governance, including the first line of defense—the market. As a general matter, until very recently customers demanded two things from the firms that supply ICTs—price and features. The market has responded, giving us all manner of convenience and efficiency, in business and in our private lives. Finally, however, buyers are starting to recognize the criticality of ICT to their daily activities, and thus they demand, and may be willing to pay for, security.

Yet there is a gap between what they need and what they are able to command. To address this gap, we recently published a “Buyers Guide for Secure ICT.” This guide recommends questions that buyers can ask ICT suppliers to help them evaluate the security of the products and services that these suppliers deliver. Despite best efforts, the reality of today’s dynamic technological environment—with product cycles of 18 months or less—continues to challenge policy development. Two developments are dramatically altering the security picture.

First, we are moving to the cloud. We store our information there on virtual machines operated by major providers like Amazon Web Services. While AWS and Microsoft’s Azure provide much stronger cybersecurity and resilience than any single enterprise can field, they also create systemic risk, with large potential consequences from technology failures or attacks. A second emerging source of risk is the Internet of Everything (IoE). In a few years there will be ten times as many devices—Fitbits, heart monitors, automobiles, thermostats, machine tools and floodgates—connected to the Internet than today’s smartphones and computers. These devices, when combined with 3-D printing, promise to disruptively transform manufacturing and transportation. They will also create a ubiquitous, global sensor network that will be communicating what is going on everywhere. And these sensors are shockingly insecure—built with easy to guess passwords, transmitting their data unencrypted, and being essentially un-patchable.

The conventional wisdom is that the IoE represents a massive increase in the attack surface. But at EWI, we are exploring two questions. First, why do we assume the bad guys will own the sensor network? Why not have the good guys own it and use the knowledge of what is happening on the Internet to increase security—for example, by isolating problems and fixing them before they can spread? Second, we ask, how will the IoE shift the balance between endpoint and network security, and what are the societal implications of that shift?

There is much to be done in cyberspace to make it, and the information we all rely on, trustworthy and secure. I will be happy to get into some of those issues during the discussion. The question becomes, what institutional constructs are needed to ensure that work gets done?

Sovereignty and its Alternatives

One of the existing constructs that no longer serves us in the networked age is sovereignty, at least as defined by the Treaty of Westphalia that ended the Thirty Years War, in 1648. We need new forms and combinations of local and global leadership and participation. Since Westphalia, sovereignty has been focused primarily on protecting territory from outside forces. Today, we stand in a time of transition, balancing this traditional emphasis with a newer one based on states’ responsibility to citizens for what happens within their borders.

It is not that borders do not exist, but borders matter differently than they have before. Take cyberspace, for example. It is impossible to define in what country the domain citibank.com actually resides, not to mention where the tens of thousands of cyber attacks each day on that domain come from. This ambiguity makes it difficult for individual states to enforce the law in cyberspace. We need networked responses to networked threats.

One example of the creation of a new form of governance relevant to cyberspace was last year’s transfer of Internet traffic routing management from U.S. control to an international, multi-party, multi-sector governance community. The result is a complex structure that only a geek could love. But, it is also a real-time experiment in so-called multi-stakeholder governance, and well worth watching. For the shorter term, however, as states turn inward and transnational challenges multiply, we face an urgent need for institutions that can act globally in an agile manner, or at least with more agility than governments. Currently, the only existing organizations that can approach that agility are large, global corporations. Admittedly, they are not ideal—they have conflicts of interest based on their focus on returning shareholder value. 

Of course, states have conflicts of interest as well when it comes to global issues, rooted as they are in territory. Nevertheless, companies, such as Coca-Cola, are increasingly investing in the future. Coca Cola needs clean water resources in Africa—it will not be in business there in 20 years if there is not clean water. Microsoft practices and advocates for responsible behavior by large technology companies to reduce conflict and increase stability in cyberspace.

Power in the 21st Century

These challenges and responses relate directly to the nature of power in the 21st century. We are living in the networked age. The value of networks increases as more people become members. In my view, we are reaching a critical mass of interconnectedness in the developed world, and the rest of the world will be there in the next 10 years. But critical mass for what effects? Not even the most civic-minded would advocate for direct democracy by everyday citizens on the complex questions that face our planet and our societies. That is why we have professional politicians and expert agencies, at least on a good day. What we do need, however, are ways to help those officials get to more nuanced answers. This is already happening on the local level in Europe and the U.S. where experts brief randomly selected civic councils to help them come up with advice for elected officials on a broad range of issues, from refugee assimilation to sustainability planning.

For these kinds of conversations to happen globally, we need to harness the technology that is increasingly connecting us. How can corporations help? Could firms host objective global forums that deal with some of the issues that will affect their bottom line and the rest of us with them? Perhaps some of the lessons learned from the trend to open, collaborative innovation networks—as practiced by DuPont, BT and other firms—may apply here.

National Security and Global Security

While global security issues are becoming salient for the long-term, in the short-term, national security “stories” dominate national security policy. I use the term “stories” to distinguish rhetoric from actuality—both in terms of action and in terms of effectiveness. The increasing attractiveness to mainstream politicians and electorates of fear-based, nationalistic narratives does not always translate into action—and when it does, such actions do not always improve national security. For example, Xi Jinping’s government discriminates against U.S. technology companies in rhetoric, but the implementation is much more measured. And as far as the effects, banning world-class technology does little to improve global confidence in the Chinese banking sector.

The principal reason for this trend is that our planet is shrinking—people everywhere are feeling increasingly impinged by alien cultures, values and populations. Certainly, this is understandable in Europe given the weak economy and the rapid influx of hard-to assimilate refugees. But even when there are not a lot of new people coming, digital information from around the world affronts and disrupts our attention. And so in democracies, many people find the echo chamber of like-minded voices or the seductive addition to a constant feed of electronic news more comfortable. The networked age is not easy to live in. Meanwhile, dictators—like cult leaders—always shield their subjects, and themselves, from diverse viewpoints.

Nationalist isolationism does not do well against threats that cut across borders, like migration and terrorism. ISIS is a global threat network, as we have seen this year in Paris and London. Networked threats require networked responses. Until we get this right, humanity will continue to lose ground against the forces of atavism, cynicism and hopelessness. We cannot let this happen on our collective watch.

Photo credit: "Data Security Breach" (CC BY 2.0) by Visual Content

Munter Analyzes Trump's "America First" Policy

On June 12, EWI President and CEO Cameron Munter talked to Voice of America’s International Edition to discuss the role of the U.S. on the world stage under President Donald Trump. 

Asked about his take on other foreign leaders pursuing a more globalist foreign policy in the wake of Trump’s ‘America First’ vision, Munter replied that "There are two ways to look at this. One way is you can’t rely on the United States implies we can’t trust the United States. That’s very negative and very harsh way of looking at it. There’s another interpretation of [what Merkel said] that I think is a little less apocalyptic…and that’s that Europe must pull its weight in defense…[Europe] can’t just be an economic  superpower and not be a military and political security superpower." 

Commenting on Trump’s decision to pull out of the Paris Climate Accords, Munter stated that although the decision shows clarity within the Administration’s policy objectives, it does constitute "a huge symbolic blow that the world’s biggest country, which has been a leader in this area, is now the outlier. It is a symbolic blow to the idea of solidarity. It is a symbolic blow to the image of the United States as a leader."

Munter went on to say that "if we are to ignore the way in which multilateral institutions have worked, we will be leaving a world that we’ve used very much to our advantage in my opinion for the past 70 years."

Listen to his discussion below, beginning around the 6:20 minute mark. 

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