Europe

Germany Discusses Security and Defense Policy—Silly Season or Real Change?

A spectre is haunting Germany: the spectre of defense policy. Normally, Germany is the country whose public—and even substantial parts of the political establishment—reject anything remotely military-looking. Germany spends only 1.2 percent of its GDP on defense, far below the recommended two percent NATO goal. Many of its universities adhere to the “civil clause” a pledge which forbids military-relevant research at universities and bars members of the German military to even enter universities (such as in the context of information events or panel debates). It is a country in which only eight years ago a President had to resign over comments that the Bundeswehr might need to be deployed to defend Germany’s interest, including economic ones.

And yet, this summer, not one but two defence-relevant topics are front and center: the debate on whether conscription should be reintroduced, and the question of whether Germany needs a nuclear bomb. Is this the silly season or is something more fundamental happening?

Revival of the German military service?

Until 2011, Germany had a national military service of six-to-nine months length, which could either be done in the military or replaced by civilian service. Criticized as unnecessary, too expensive or unfair, the service was put in abeyance in July 2011. However, a recent poll suggests that a majority of Germans support the idea of some kind of national service (though there is no majority for reintroducing the old "Wehrdienst"). In Germany, this debate is in its early stages. But elsewhere in Europe, such as in Sweden and France, conscription has already been reintroduced in different forms.

A German bomb?

The debate on a German nuclear bomb was started by a front-page article in the Welt on July 29, written by German political science professor Christian Hacke. He argued that, as the U.S. under Donald Trump is becoming an increasingly unreliable partner, Germany needs to consider guaranteeing its own nuclear deterrence. He is not the first to argue this point; when Trump was elected in 2016, the editor of the biggest conservative newspaper in Germany had made a similar argument, and a Member of Parliament asked the parliamentary research service to look into options for Germany to share France’s or the United Kingdom’s nuclear weapons.

Silly season or wind of change?

Whether the debate about reintroducing conscription will survive the summer remains to be seen, but both this and the debate about the German bomb need to be taken seriously.

To be clear, Germany will not get a nuclear weapon. It would mean leaving the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (which would place it alongside North Korea, the only country to have done so), it could even lead to a renegotiation of the 2+4 treaty that allowed for German reunification. Acquiring a nuclear weapon would also require a substantial financial investment, which the German public would not be willing to make. In fact, Germany is closing down all its nuclear power plants as Germans reject the technology, so it is inconceivable that Germany could acquire nuclear weapons.

In part, the two debates may have been fuelled by a way-too-hot German summer. But this goes beyond silly season. Germany finds itself in the worst security dilemma since it “rejoined” the west in the 1950s by becoming a member of NATO and the European Union (EU). Germany’s defence capabilities are insufficient, lapidated by decades of underinvestment and public disinterest. Today, owing to the Trump Administration’s policies, the British exit from the EU, a resurgent Russia, and the generally deteriorating global security situation, the German public are now quickly awakening to new realities that may require difficult decisions that will shape Germany’s security future. Unfortunately, the German public and political realm is out of practice when it comes to defense and security debates. They tend to adopt too emotive a response (as was the case with regard to the German drone debate) and are too often ill-informed.

Germany should use the summer break to refamiliarize itself with questions of security and defense policy. Not in order to design German strategies, but because Germany is needed in Europe in this context. The 2016 EU Global Strategy outlines a vision for a European Strategic Autonomy which would mean an EU able to act independently from the U.S. in at least some contexts. It is time for Germany to be part of this debate.

Ulrike Franke is a Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), and part of ECFR’s New European Security Initiative. She works on German and European security and defense, the future of warfare, and the impact of new technologies, such as drones and artificial intelligence. She tweets @RikeFranke.

The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the EastWest Institute

Photo: "Flugshow der Bundeswehr" (CC BY-SA 2.0) by Lutz Blohm

EastWest Institute Hosts Ana Brnabic, Prime Minster of Serbia

BY: BRIAN CHOQUETTE

On July 22, the EastWest Institute in New York hosted Serbian Prime Minister, Ana Brnabic, for a roundtable discussion on a range of topics concerning the current and future economic situation of Serbia—and of the wider Balkan region. Over the course of the conversation, Ms. Brnabic highlighted the government’s ongoing reforms focused on improving overall business climate, restricting barriers and setting forth conditions encouraging business development and economic growth.

To date, results have proven favorable, evidenced by increased foreign direct investment and a higher credit rating through the World Bank.

Of primary significance noted the Prime Minister is the continued emergence of the IT sector in Serbia, which she underlined as the future of the country’s economy, innovation capacity and the source of long-term sustainable growth. While the focus might be on developing modern technology, Ms. Brnabic also reflected on the importance of maintaining Serbian culture and identity, as a critical complement to future growth.

The Past and Future of America’s Improbable Military Commitments to NATO

BY: ALEXANDER LANOSZKA

This week’s NATO Summit in Brussels is a peculiar one. It is arguably the least important of the three NATO Summits held since Russia annexed Crimea. The 2014 Wales Summit was significant because of the need to demonstrate unity and to reassure those most alarmed by Russia’s provocations in Central and Eastern Europe. The 2016 Warsaw Summit was notable for establishing the enhanced Forward Presence whereby NATO members would contribute forces to battalion-sized battlegroups in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. The Brussels Summit is supposed to focus on more technical issues, such as EU-NATO cooperation and improvements to military logistics.

And yet a profound sense of crisis seems to pervade the Alliance. The Washington Post Editorial Board recently featured a column that unambiguously declared in its title that “[U.S. President Donald] Trump is bent on wrecking NATO.” On the 2nd of July, a CNN analyst warns that Trump’s “trashing of the NATO alliance” is “dangerous.” Reports circulate of a letter distributed to various NATO capitals from the White House, calling for under-spending allies to develop plans to increase their military capabilities amid rumors that a potential withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe is under study. Because Trump will meet Russian President Vladimir Putin in Helsinki after the NATO Summit, some worry that the U.S. President will sell allies short in order to strike a deal with Russia.

Everyone should take a deep breath.

To begin with, a sense of precariousness has always shadowed the U.S. military presence in Europe. President Dwight Eisenhower saw U.S. troops in Europe as a temporary expedient and was for five years, by his count, “urging the State Department to put the facts of life before the Europeans concerning reduction (sic) of our forces.” Less than a decade later, Lyndon Johnson confronted an intensifying balance-of-payments crisis that saw massive outflows of gold from the U.S. economy. One tactic he deployed was exerting pressure on West German Chancellor Ludwig Erhard for more offsets (i.e., using U.S. dollars to buy U.S. military equipment) by suggesting that U.S. forces could come home. U.S. troop numbers in Europe remained stable after a partial withdrawal amid the Vietnam War. However, Richard Nixon preferred to rely on U.S. nuclear forces while allies bore the conventional defence burden. More recently, the Obama administration oversaw the withdrawal of combat forces from Germany.

This precariousness has a straightforward geopolitical cause. The United States may be a great power of impressive economic and military power, but it has commitments that span multiple regions around the globe. A rebuilt post-war Europe should eventually have the means to take care of itself. Moreover, the center of gravity in international affairs has steadily been shifting from Europe to Asia thanks to the rise of China. The result is that the United States needs Russia and China to balance one another for the sake of strategic competition, but it must hedge against potential Russian aggression with some presence in Europe. How many troops is enough for this task has never been self-evident.

Still, the U.S. military commitment to Europe has persisted, even though it bears a lighter footprint than in the past. One reason is technological. There may be fewer U.S. conventional forces now in Europe (and in East Asia) than at the height of the Cold War, but they are capable of even greater firepower than before.

Political considerations weigh more heavily, however. Dilemmas abound whenever the United States has considered withdrawing its forces. Allies are often psychologically attached to hosting U.S. military personnel on their territory. Aside from improving local deterrence measures, U.S. forces represent “skin in the game.” An attack on allied territory could kill U.S. forces and thus engage American leaders’ sense of honour or reputation so as to invite an escalatory response.  One dilemma is that some allies might become even more reluctant to spend on their defence if doing so raises the likelihood of U.S. military withdrawals. Another dilemma is that security guarantees are critical for forestalling nuclear proliferation risks. Withdrawing forces might make economic or political sense, but the long-term repercussions could be distasteful. Indeed, it was precisely to head off such risks that some allies appear to be free-riding to this day. Another dilemma is that withdrawing forces can adversely affect power projection capabilities. The United States has forces in Spain, Italy, and Germany in order to perform missions in nearby theatres of operations in North Africa and the Middle East.

How allies respond to potential and actual troop withdrawals depends on their political situation. Frontline allies that face nuclear-armed adversaries have all the reason to be afraid, and so might be tempted to explore the nuclear weapons option. Allies removed from geopolitical threats might in fact welcome withdrawals and be unconvinced that their security is at risk enough to warrant high defense expenditures.

So what does this all mean for the Brussels Summit and, more generally, NATO in the age of Trump? If history is any guide, then the Trump administration will have to wrestle with the same dilemmas that inhibited large-scale withdrawals from Europe in the past. Trump may be unusually combative about having a more equitable defense burden within Europe, but chances are he will get less then what he is calling for and NATO will survive.

Alexander Lanoszka is assistant professor of international relations at the University of Waterloo. He has a co-authored monograph (with Michael A. Hunzeker) on conventional deterrence and Baltic security forthcoming at the Strategic Studies Institute and a book on alliance politics and nuclear proliferation forthcoming at Cornell University Press. You may learn more about his research on www.alexlanoszka.com and follow him on Twitter (@ALanoszka).

The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the EastWest Institute.

Image: "NATO Grunge Flag" (CC BY 2.0) by Free Grunge Textures - www.freestock.ca

The Grand Plans to Renew the European Union

Writing in Stratfor, Dr. Wolfgang Klapper looks at the two recent proposals by European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker and French President Emmanuel Macron in an effort to renew the European Union. 

The European Union is riddled with overlapping problems. The euro currency crisis, diverging policies on Russia and Turkey, irregular migration patterns, rising nationalism, terrorism and Euroskepticism are just a few—not to mention the Brexit. With all of these issues piling up, it's little wonder that some EU leaders have judged the European project to be on the brink of its demise. As Martin Schulz, the former president of the European Parliament, put it in 2015, "the failure of Europe is a realistic scenario." But just as many have assumed the Continent's collapse to be a reality, two political figures have offered much-needed optimism for Europe's future.

Click here to read the full article on Stratfor.

Photo credit: "European Parliament in Strasbourg" (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0) by Council of the EU

EWI Hosts Russia-U.S. High Level Dialogue on Cyberspace Cooperation

On October 13 in Brussels, Belgium, the EastWest Institute (EWI) hosted a Russia-U.S. High Level Dialogue on Cyberspace Cooperation with the Russian National Association of International Information Security (NAISS). The dialogue brought together a diverse set of cyber experts, former government officials and business leaders to discuss norms of responsible state behavior in cyberspace, cooperation on incident response, and countering malicious use of the Internet.

Image: "Circuit 2" (CC BY-NC 2.0) by Mark, Vicki, Ellaura and Mason

Austria Tilts to the Right

The "Respectable Populism" That Brought Kurz and the OVP to Victory

On Sunday, the conservative People's Party (OVP) won the Austrian legislative elections, putting its leader, 31-year-old Sebastian Kurz, on a path to become the country’s youngest chancellor. The OVP secured over 30 percent of the vote, not only defeating the socialist party (SPO) of incumbent Chancellor Christian Kern but, more important, scoring a major victory over the populist right-wing Freedom Party (FPO), which had one of its best results yet. This was no small feat.

Only six months ago, the OVP trailed in third place behind the SPO and the FPO, which was in the lead with 29 percent of the popular vote. (Indeed, throughout 2016, as well as the last six months of 2015, polls indicated that the FPO had a solid lead over the other two parties, which put FPO leader Heinz Christian in pole position to become the next chancellor.) But in May, after Kurz, who had been serving as foreign minister since 2011, took over leadership of the OVP, the party began to climb in the polls. Kurz performed well during the televised debates, running on a platform that was tough on immigration but pro-market, pro-business, and pro-EU. He also projected experience, highlighting his ministerial position while simultaneously playing the role of an opposition politician with his movement, the New People’s Party, or the New OVP. He campaigned under the slogan “Zeit für Neues” (Time for Something New), a rebranding that gave the old party a facelift while leaving its structure in place.

In a sense, what Kurz did was inject respectability and rationalism into what was at heart a populist platform. 

Click here to read the full article on Foreign Affairs (paywall).

Photo credit: "Sebastian Kurz" (CC BY 2.0) by EU2017EE

Cameron Munter Talks America, Russia, Middle East at CIRSD

Ambassador Cameron Munter, CEO & President of the EastWest Institute, joined a panel discussion on July 24 in Belgrade to talk strategies and challenges facing America, Russia and the Middle East. The discussion, organized by the Center for International Relations and Sustainable Development (CIRSD), also touched on the refugee crisis, Syria as well as volatile U.S-Russia relations.

Joining Munter were Vitaly Naumkin, Director of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Science, and Vuk Jeremić, President of CIRSD.

Asked about what "went wrong" in Iraq and past U.S. policies in the region, Munter said that America used to see itself back then as the only superpower in a unipolar world. Munter said some really believed in the prospects of bringing democratic governance to the Middle East even if the idea seemed like an almost impossible undertaking.

Munter remarked that although some believe Americans went into Iraq for oil, numerous tenders had been issued following the fall of Saddam Hussein and none of which were won by U.S. companies. “Other conspiracy theories suggest that that our goal was to weaken the influence of Iran, whereas in reality, this influence has only increased,” he added.

For more details about the event, click here.

While in the region, the former U.S. Ambassador to Serbia also made a number of media appearances including TV station N1 and Danas.

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