South Asia

Six Factors Affecting Peace Prospects in and Around Afghanistan

As September 21 marks Ashraf Ghani's first year in office as President of Afghanistan, EWI Senior Fellow Najam Abbas draws attention to six evolving developments in recent months, analysing how these could contribute in the coming year to creating a conducive climate of cooperation allowing China, India, Russia and their partners to achieve improved relations in both Central and South Asia.

Amidst much concern and gloom around the situation in and around Afghanistan, it is important to take into view following six factors which may contribute towards increased regional efforts for stabilizing in the coming months. 

Firstly, at a time when the withdrawal of NATO and allied forces from Afghanistan has created a vacuum of power, China has taken cautious steps to take a leading role in that country. Beijing has also realized that time is not at the side of Russia (which could have filled in the gap created after the pullout of the American troops from Afghanistan). Becoming entangled in the aftermath of Ukrainian crisis having annexed Crimea, it will become difficult for Russia to regain its leading status in the region Afghanistan- Central Asia region which is now being assumed by China. In contrast to Russia, the Chinese have approached Afghanistan with utmost flexibility and caution with calculated measures to carve out a space for themselves.   

Secondly, China’s offer to facilitate a dialogue seeking peace and political reconciliation between the Afghan and Pakistan government was among other factors also expedited by Ashraf Ghani who in his maiden foreign visit as Afghanistan’s president requested China in October 2014 to facilitate reconciliation with Pakistan. Having approached with close allies of Pakistan as intermediaries has resulted in senior Pakistani military officials establishing closer contact with their Afghan counterparts. These initiatives will help Pakistan and Afghanistan address each other’s security concerns and also to contribute the two neighbours reshape their respective strategic paradigms as partners in of pursuit of joint solutions to common challenges. It is said that if Afghan President Ashraf Ghani’s government provides assurances and guarantees regarding Pakistan’s security, then upon acquiring a reliable partner, Islamabad will not have the need to seek any alternate or additional guarantees from non-state actors in Afghanistan. These have been followed by the initiatives encouraging Pakistan to facilitate negotiations to find ways and means to bring peace and reconciliation between the warring Afghan factions.

A third important development is the talks between different Afghan factions involving the Taliban and the government for bringing peace in Afghanistan with some rounds being facilitated by and held in China. In November of 2014 and on 7th July 2015, China facilitated peace talks between Afghanistan’s warring factions, a third round scheduled for 30th July was postponed as some circles broke the news that the Taliban leader Mullah Omar had died two year ago. Making public of this fact at this stage was aimed to reflect that (a) the Taliban are without any real leadership and (b) they may not have unanimity of ranks and hence (c) in the absence of any genuine unified leadership the Taliban do not enjoy much authority to enter into and conclude any negotiations about the future of Afghanistan. However, the new Taliban leader Mullah Akhtar Mansur is said to be inclined towards a negotiated settlement with the Afghan authorities but he will need to demonstrate how he will rally support for a majority of Taliban followers to back a peace agreement.  
    
A fourth notable matter is that China and India have worked together to bring gradual improvement in their bilateral relations moving from past a relationship of rivalry and mutual misgivings to cautious cooperation. The joint statement issued during Indian Premier Narendra Modi’s May 2015 visit to Peking declared: “We have a historic responsibility to turn this relationship into a source of strength for each other and a force of good for the world.” In his keynote address at the India-China Business Forum, Modi said: ‘Indo-Chinese partnership should and will flourish. As two major economies in Asia, the harmonious partnership between India and China is essential for the economic development and political stability of the continent’.  

Fifthly, the granting of full membership to India and Pakistan in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization makes SCO the organization which now has three countries Pakistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan sharing borders with Afghanistan (also an observer state in SCO). According to Outlook magazine’s commentator Sibal Dasgupta under the SCO auspices China, India and Pakistan will regularly share the same table to consider solutions to common challenges. This is a major development which will help them to look at the issues from a wider perspective and interact with each other in an improved context. Given that India and Pakistan both are being conferred full membership of the SCO, it will be an excellent forum for the two countries to deliberate at the highest level on critical issues like countering terrorism, and break ice on bilateral issues on the sidelines, notes Professor Swaran Singh from Delhi.

Sixthly, with economic sanctions expected to be gradually lifted from Iran, efforts will increase for connecting Western Afghanistan closer with the Iranian port of Chahbahar, a step which will also facilitate increased trade between India and Central Asia and contribute to regional prosperity.

 

This article was originally published on BBC Uzbek. Click here to read (in Uzbek).

The Great Democracies’ New Harmony

In an article for Gulf News, EWI Advisory Group Member Joseph Nye explains the variables that influence U.S.-India Relations.

In the article, Nye suggests that "Indian economic success is an American interest on its own." Given these interests, he notes that "It would be a mistake to cast the prospects for an improved US-India relationship solely in terms of China’s rising power."

To read the full article published by Gulf News, click here.

Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan

Overview

EWI Chief Operating Officer Jim Creighton and Program Assistant Ettore Marchesoni will particpate in the Academic Forum of the Sixth Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan (RECCA-VI). They will present the following report—Afghanistan Reconnected: Businesses Take Action to Unlock Trade in the Region. The event will take place on September 3-4 in Kabul, Afghanistan. 

The conference will feature presentations on Afghanistan's energy security, trade, and regional connectivity, in addition to roundtable discussions on the greatest challenges and opportunities facing Afghanistan today.

Is the Afghan Army Losing the War in Afghanistan?

Halfway through the fighting season, Afghan security forces are struggling to hold their ground.

Afghan security forces are in one hell of a fight with Taliban insurgents this year. According to statistics compiled by an American-led coalition official in the country and seen by the New York Times, casualties rates are up 50 percent compared to the previous year.

So far 4,100 soldiers and police officers have been killed and about 7,800 wounded with months of heavy fighting still ahead. In comparison, in all of 2014 around 5,000 members of the Afghan security forces were killed battling the ongoing insurgency.

In March 2015, the commander of U.S. Forces in Afghanistan, Gen. John F. Campbell, testified  in front of the U.S. House of Representatives Armed Services Committee on the war and combat readiness of Afghan security forces (see: “Quo Vadis Afghanistan: General Campbell Testifies on the Hill”), and also discussed Afghan losses:

A high ANDSF [Afghan National Defense and Security Forces] attrition rate, which accounts for casualties and all other losses to the force, has had an impact on combat readiness. If present rates continue, it will pose challenges to force development over time. The main causes of ANDSF attrition are assessed as poor leadership; high operational tempo; inadequate soldier/police care; and poor force management.

According to a retired Afghan general interviewed by the New York Times, the current casualty rates are, among other things, caused by the lack of an offensive spirit among troops. “We are in a passive defense mode — we are not chasing the enemy. Units get surrounded, and we don’t send them support, so they are killed,” he says.

The New York Times reports that Afghan security forces are struggling to maintain a military stalemate and are slowly losing ground to extremist forces in the country:

A range of interviews with army and police commanders and regional government officials in crucial battleground areas indicated that even though the Afghan forces have nominally met their goal of maintaining a presence in every city and all but a very few district centers, they are often functionally penned in by the Taliban, rarely mounting patrols, much less taking territory back.

Nevertheless, it is unlikely that insurgent forces will be able to dislocate them from key geographical positions and major cities during this year’s fighting season.

The United States has so far spent $60.7 billion to train, equip and pay 195,000 members of the Afghan army and 157,000 members of the police force. However, as I reported before (see: “Taliban Onslaught: What Is Happening in Afghanistan?”) the number of troops and police is not reliable according to John Sopko, the special inspector general for Afghanistan reconstruction (SIGAR).

Indeed, the United States and NATO have no clear idea how many Afghan soldiers and police are currently engaged in combating Taliban insurgents (see: “Pentagon Declassifies Information on Afghan Security Forces”). The New York Times reports that desertion remains a critical problem for government forces.

A June 2015 report by the U.S. Department of Defense discussing the progress of the war in Afghanistan admits that the performance of Afghan security forces “was uneven” during combat operations.  However, the paper also points out that government forces “continue to demonstrate that they are capable and can undertake relatively sophisticated operations with minimal coalition advice and assistance.”

Additionally, the report observes:

Overall, the ANDSF’s most critical gaps remain in aviation, intelligence, and special operations, all linked to the ANDSF’s targeting capability. These gaps will endure for some time, even with the addition of key enablers. 

Last, it predicts that casualty rates will “increase in the next several months.” It appears that Afghan security forces will have a tough fight ahead of them in the next couple of months.

To read this article published by The Diplomat, click here.

Afghanistan Reconnected: Advocacy and Outreach Mission to India

India strongly committed to Afghanistan’s stability and to regional development.

A delegation of eminent experts was brought to New Delhi by The EastWest Institute from June 14-16 2015, receiving high level official and private sector attention. The purpose of this Advocacy and Outreach mission was to advocate for actionable policy recommendations towards improving development and stability in the region by unlocking the potential for economic cooperation. The main results of this mission were:

  • A strong commitment of both the Indian government and the business community to the future of Afghanistan and to enhanced regional connectivity.

  • A recognition of progress made: Since the start of EWI’s Afghanistan Reconnected Process, a number of concrete steps have been taken by governments in the region to facilitate cross-border interaction.

EWI's Afghanistan Reconnected Process has since 2012 brought together parliamentarians, former Ministers and CEOs from various countries to elaborate and advocate concrete recommendations for post-2014 Afghanistan and for regional development in Central and South Asia. After the advocacy missions to Pakistan in March 2015 and to India in June 2015, next steps will be missions to Kabul, Afghanistan, and Dushanbe, Tajikistan, in November 2015. The process is meant to conclude in a major conference in the region in early 2016.

Click here to download the full event report

Click here to download the advocacy paper.

View photos from the event on Flickr.

Why Afghanistan Needs Pakistan

The Afghan President is reaching out to Pakistan. A former U.S. brigade commander thinks that’s a good thing.

I served two tours of duty in Afghanistan. During my first deployment in 2009, I was the Chief of Plans for ISAF Joint Command working under U.S. Generals David M. Rodriguez and Stan McChrystal. During my second tour in 2010, I assumed command of combined Team Uruzgan, a diverse force of coalition soldiers from ten countries, including Australia, Singapore, France, New Zealand, and the United States (see:“Shades of Gray in Afghanistan”).

These two deployments in the country revealed to me the extent to which fear of Pakistan permeated all Afghan discussions pertaining to national security and that such a pervasive angst had the potential to undermine our joint efforts in combating Taliban insurgents. Here are two brief examples.

In October 2009, the Afghans were in the process of training and equipping their sixth Afghan National Army Corps, the 215th Corps.  With the support of ISAF and NATO, this major combat unit represented a significant increase in combat capability.  The unit was designed to help bring security to the southern and eastern regions in Afghanistan and serve as a counter balance to the Taliban safe havens in Pakistan.  The deployment location and mission of the 215th Corps was a critical strategic decision worthy of significant analysis and debate at the highest levels in Kabul.

After exhaustive analysis which examined the Taliban disposition, Afghan National Army force allocation, and a review of critical information associated with the most pressing threats to the Afghan government, the recommendation of the Afghan Army staff, supported by ISAF, was to station the 215th Corps in the vicinity of Helmand Province. This decision was made to relieve the hard pressed 205th Corps in Kandahar and double the Army’s effort in the most threatened area of Afghanistan. Eliminating the Taliban presence in Kandahar was seen as essential to the success of the over-all mission.  Establishing a major Army headquarters in Helmand with the new 215th Corps would enable to 205th Corps to concentrate its forces on the most critical region.

The plan as designed was approved and executed, achieving dramatic results in Kandahar. After two years of fighting with the 205th Corps focused in Kandahar and the 215th focused in the adjacent Helmond province, the Taliban had largely been eliminated from Kandahar. Yet, the plan as briefed by the Afghan Army staff was approved only after heated exchanges and pointed discussions centered on whether the Corps should be focused on Taliban insurgent activity or against a potential armored attack from Pakistan directed at seizing Kabul.

The deep seeded mistrust and historical animosity between Afghan and Pakistan leaders directly influenced the planning for critical Army unit mission assignments and could have prevented what turned out to be a substantial gain against the Taliban.

In August 2010, Provincial Governor Khoday Rahim was holding a district wide Shura the isolated village of Chora in southern Afghanistan. This was his first visit since the accidental death of the district governor, Rosie Khan, and it turned into what seemed like a giant episode of the “Jerry Springer Show.”  Rosie Khan’s son, Mohammad Dawood Khan, had taken over as the district governor and the provincial governor was going to discuss challenges to local security and economic growth. At the Shura, the tribal elders and other leaders of the district met with the governor and other Afghan and Coalition leaders, including the police chief, Brigadier General Gul, the army commander, Brigadier General Hamid, and the National Directorate of Security chief, General Zakaria. The pointed discussions lasted four hours in the shade of the district center building in temperatures in excess of 100 degrees Fahrenheit. Chora’s leaders raised issues about Taliban influence, water sharing agreements, the need for education and health care requirements.  The Provincial Coalition leaders — myself included — received these points, offered updated information and pledged to do everything possible to help the city improve to the maxim extent possible.

The most memorable comment came from an older leader, who looked to be in his eighties.  As is the custom, he got up from his seated position on the floor to address the assembled Shura. He began by stating that the source of all problems in Chora stemmed from Pakistan. Unsurprisingly, he asserted that the Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence agency was responsible for the Taliban, created all internal challenges with the Afghan government and was at the heart of problems with development and governance throughout Afghanistan. After a 45-minute monologue, he concluded with the conviction that the only reason Pakistan had nuclear weapons was to use them on Afghanistan prior to an all-out invasion and occupation.

The distrust of Pakistan permeates discussions and drives decision making from the outer districts like Chora to the highest levels of government. The accusations regarding Pakistan’s support to the Taliban, ISI support and manipulation of critical Afghan functions, and long standing territorial disputes are forefront in the minds of political, military and citizen thinking.

President Ashraf Ghani attacked this notion head on. Prior to assuming the presidency of Afghanistan he recognized that peace and stability in Afghanistan was only to be achieved with full cooperation with the Pakistan military establishment as well as the civilian government. His landmark visit to the Pakistan Minister of Defense in November 2014 exemplifies his dedication to reversing the friction between the two Central Asian countries.

Ghani has made several additional visits to Pakistan. He has empowered his ministries to engage closely with their Pakistani counterparts. Working to bring a regional approach to economic development as well as military cooperation against both the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban are at the forefront of his aspirations. Reducing the 16 day transit time for fresh produce to get from Kandahar to Karachi; approving long term multi entry visas; improving the transshipment process and border crossing point operations; capitalizing on Afghanistan’s vast mineral and agricultural opportunities; and improving cooperation on implementation of  the Central Asia South Asia Electricity Transmission and Trade Project (CASA 1000), the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India Natural Gas Pipeline (TAPI) Project, and the Afghanistan Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA) among others, are all on the president’s economic high priority list.

On his military priority list, he has pledged to work with Pakistan on reducing the Taliban’s safe havens on both sides of the border. He must eliminate or at least reduce the influence and perception of influence of the ISI. The cooperation between Afghan and Pakistani militaries has improved dramatically but needs to be expanded to the Haqqani network and other insurgents who are not yet targeted. Leaders of both countries acknowledge these challenges and pledged to work toward mutually beneficial solutions.

During a recent trip I took with the EastWest Institute to Islamabad, senior leaders at the ministerial and presidential level confirmed the necessity and the commitment to move forward together to improve cross border cooperation against common enemies and to make demonstrable progress toward regional economic cooperation. Much work needs to be done. Each Pakistani ministry recognized that the window of opportunity opened by Ghani would stay open only so long. They all understood that the Afghan President had taken significant risks in reaching out to both Pakistani military and civilian leaders. These risks must be rewarded quickly by concrete and verifiable actions that could be used as compelling evidence of Afghan and Pakistani cooperation in both military and economic terms.

The Pakistani ministries and senior political leaders are committed to achieving increased cooperation with Afghanistan and taking advantage of the excellent opportunity afforded them. Afghanistan’s patience and Ghani’s political capital are not infinite. Cooperation across the border is a vital component to long-term regional security. Both Afghanistan and Pakistan need to demonstrate commitment to mutually beneficial actions by achieving tangible results quickly.

For the full article published by The Diplomat, click here

EWI's President-elect Munter Interviewed on India Today TV

In an interview with India Today TV, EWI President-elect and former U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, Cameron Munter, discusses India-Pakistan relations and the role of EWI in fostering peace by expanding the dialogue to include key regional stakeholders.

1) How do you see the Indo-Pakistan relations now as compared to when you were posted in Islamabad?
A: I have always felt that the key to Pakistan's success and future would be the improvement of relations with India. There have been many times since I became the ambassador in 2010 when I thought that there might be a warming or there might be a thaw. Especially, a thaw that focused not only on politics, but also on economics, prosperity, investment, something that the rest of the world could follow on to help on prosperity of Pakistan and Indians as well. At this point, I am as optimistic as I have been in the past. The hopes have increased after Nawaz Sharif and Narendra Modi were put at the helm.

2) In 2013 elections in Pakistan, for the first time, Kashmir was not an issue and there was consensus across parties to have good relations with India. Today, all parties in Pakistan are toeing the military line against India. How do you see this shift?
A: I don't see this as a shift at all. It is a rhetorical shift based on disappointment from the Pakistan side. Underneath it all, those people who were the constituents - you mentioned the PPP, PTI, PMLN - there is a broad consensus that goes from top to bottom that a better relationship with India is necessary. When I was there, even found it in my talks with the military that good relations with India and stability in the region was necessary for Pakistan's future. I choose to see this as a passing phase where there are thoughtful people in Pakistan with deep issues, that people want to figure out a way to deal with India, but they haven't figured it out yet.

3) On Pakistan's completely different standards of acting against terror group attacking Indian interests in Pakistan.
A: We don't know a lot, and I have been out of the US government since 2012. So whatever I say would be mere speculation. There is a debate going on in Pakistan army on what is the existential threat to Pakistan. The traditional narrative is that India is the existential threat. 10 years of hard fighting in FATA, KPK have led many people who are leaders in Pakistan military, intelligence to come around the idea that perhaps there is another existential threat to Pakistan - that is the jehadi threat. So many soldiers have been killed by jehadis, many Pakistan soldiers have died since 2001. They are trying to figure out what it is. And it is possible that this could be addressed if there is proper dialogue with India.

4) On the anti-India sentiment in Pakistan.
A: I take you back to the elections of 2013, that no one found the reason to call on that to be elected. It could be that these are latent questions and that 60 years of troubles don't go immediately. But I am cheered by the fact that no one had to campaign over this idea. What we at EWI want to see is that we bring these bilateral questions to the floor but also look at these issues in the regional context. If we bring Afghanistan's future into it, if we look at China's interest in the region we can also look at the future of Iran. We can look at all the problems of the region and say perhaps all of these issues that you raise can be looked at a different way.

5) On America's hope about rise of Modi and politics with Pakistan.
A: The invitation to Nawaz Sharif was welcomed. Modi is seen as a very strong leader. He has a very strong reputation as a charismatic man who can get things done. Also, he can see things in a new way, and is the man who can break away from tradition because of his domestic strength and reach out to his neighbours that in the past has been limited to this kind of bilateral relations. We're not sure, it is something time will tell. We had hoped from an American point of view, he would be able to strike early in his tenure to take advantage of the new fresh feeling that he had. But it may still not be too late to have some creativity in the debate. I repeat what EWI is trying to do here is talking with Pakistan-Afghans and Indians in this conference and is trying to foster that kind of debate so that ideas are out there.

6) On terrorism - Hafiz Saeed, Lakhvi- How can India trust Pakistan?
A: It is true. I think that these suspicions are addressed to me over and over again. The more they're dug, the less possibility is that there is going to be peace. I don't deny that terrorism is an important issue especially since Mumbai attack 2011. However I would suggest if we continue to say the same things and make these accusations again and again we'll go nowhere.

7) How should India deal with Pakistan on Hafiz Saeed issue?
A: Are you suggesting that we should raid Pakistan to go after Saeed? I think we need to figure out a way to work with the authorities in Pakistan to see that justice is done. And we have not always been successful. We engage with the people in-charge but not always successful. Just like Lakhvi's release, it was a controversial thing. We make representations to the Pakistani's all the time. Your high commissioner in Pakistan with whom I had great contact when I was there we talked about it all the time. We were very open about it that it's very difficult to accept if you're Indian or people around that this may not be something we'll be able to solve. We may not be able to do that. What we would like to think however is that there is a broader discussion of issues within which this terrorism issue is embedded and this broader discussion leads to greater understanding so that this question doesn't derail everything else.

8) What use of the US bounty on Hafiz Sayed who is not underground but holding anti-India rallies in open?
A: What we're talking about is not a bounty it's something the press has said, it is not something we say. We're looking for information that could lead to his arrest and we're willing to pay for this information. A bounty implies that you're giving money so that someone will be killed like the old American west. So India should realise that term the 'bounty' has been created by the press erroneously. What we are looking for is information, evidence so that he could be behind bars.

9) What about India's evidence for arresting Saeed.
A: This is not something I can judge. But i would hope that we would get enough evidence that it would lead to Saeed's arrest. And that is what we have offered to pay for.

10) On SAARC summit next year in Islamabad and US expectations from India and Pakistan. Should Modi go?
A: A gesture of friendship is always good. I think it is up to him to decide what he wants to do. But what we hope every leader in the region will do as it would be an advantage to have a regional approach and have a dialogue. And if he makes that trip it leads to greater trust. So absolutely, it's always great to talk.

11) India called off official talks, but Modi spoke to Nawaz on pretext of cricket and sent Foreign Secretary on SAARC yatra. Was it under Obama's pressure during Republic Day?
A: Again I am an ex-diplomat so I can't say. But , when I was a diplomat in Pakistan, absolutely. We have always pressed Pakistan friends to talk with India and vise versa. We did not try to tell them what they should talk about. We try to tell them that there should be more talks then agreements. So there is no doubt in my mind yes we encouraged that dialogue.

12) The operation that killed Laden - Was it a covert or did the Pakistanis know about it?
A: Pakistan didn't know. We did not inform them. There has been an article in the New York Times by Seymour Hearsh which claims that this was a joint operation that Pakistan was told in advance and that the entire set of arguments since then had been a vast cover up. All I can say is that if it was a cover up then it also fooled the American ambassador in Pakistan. Because all the evidences that Seymour gave does not convince me.

13) There were political repercussions to the Operation.
A: Absolutely, it cost is a lot. It was a decision that was very important for us, we knew it would also have an impact on our relations with Pakistan. But in that operation there was a great deal of information taken on that particular house in Abbottabad. And there was no information that I knew during my time as a diplomat that the Pakistan government was involved in taking care of him, protecting him, knew about or took part in that raid.

14) Were there no apprehensions about breach of sovereignty?
A: There were a lot of discussions about what it would mean; we knew it would be a very difficult issue. But as our president said from the beginning if we found where this man was we were going to make sure we got him.

15) So covert operations okay for the US?
A: I think the part of the President's approach was that he was going to keep his word that this man wanted by the international community, was the man we were going to make sure we got.

16) If India were to conduct similar operations in Pakistan, would the US be okay with it?
A: That's for India to decide. I think dialogue is the way out. Anytime you resort to any other methods, you're taking great risks. Dialogue is the only way to do things.

17) But if dialogue on Lakhvi, Hafiz Sayeed, Dawood Ibrahim does not yield results, covert operations is the way out for India?
A: What I am saying is anytime you have the opportunity to make dialogues you should use it. If you make a judgement you have to live the result. We had to live with the result of our incursion into Pakistan. I think if we dwell only on terrorism, if we see that as the beginning and end of the relationship, then we were missing out the entire possibilities of long term of solving problem.
We during Afghan war often looked at 'urgent driving out the important'. I would like to ask my Indian and Pakistani to see if they can look beyond the urgent and important questions to say that solution can lie in broader and long term discussions where you're talking about what the people want, where you forget past make some progress which means your children are going to be safe.

18) So, the US is okay with covert operations against groups hitting it, but different standard for India Pakistan since they share borders and are nuclear neighbours?
A: I would suggest India should work in its interest and India's interest is a stable Pakistan. A stable Pakistan - a democratic, prosperous and gets along with India. This is not a favour to Pakistan, it is a favour to itself. If India has a problem with a neighbouring country, then it is for India to contribute in solving these problems. It is not a question of Americans wagging their fingers. It is a question of India and serving their self interest. I think that Pakistan has many things it could do to meet India half way and vice-versa.

19) How strong is the al-Qaeda today?
A: I don't mean to duck the question but I am not in the government anymore so I can only tell you what I read in the newspapers. I think al-Qaeda is still a force, but it has been degraded. However, it is still a potent force in the world. I don't know if ISIS and can't comment on the claims that ISIS has made will weaken or strengthen al-Qaeda. But radical forces like that still exist, they are still powerful and we're still concerned about them.

20) How do you perceive ISIS in Afghan-Pakistan? Could it impact Kashmir?
A: I just can't say, I m not trying to avoid the question but I am not in the government anymore so I don't have the access to this information. Anytime you get that kind of threat you should be concerned. India, Pakistan and America should try to work together.

21) Can China be roped in to play a more pro-active role in Afghanistan?
A: One of the things quite interesting about China in this region is that it professes to have very similar goals to the US and India. Goals like keeping radical Islam from upsetting them and the region and second its economic interest. I think China is here to play a very constructive role. It may not be a role based on anything other than self interest. But I think we should look to China and China's interest in Pakistan and Afghan. I know there have been discussions at high levels between China and India. We applaud this kind of diplomatic relations.

22) But India has security concerns of encirclement with China being in PoK and in region.
A: I think New Delhi needs to talk openly with the Chinese. The Chinese are being open about what they want to do. You can choose to see someone as an enemy if you wish, but if you choose to try to understand why they are doing things and where the mutual advantage is that is probably more.

 

Click here to view the interview at India Today TV

 

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