

Side Event
**“Promoting International Security and Stability through
Disarmament”**
22 October 2010
1:15pm – 2:45pm
UN, Conference Room 7 NLB

Mr. High Representative,
Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen

Let me start by congratulating the organisers of this event, the EastWest Institute, in partnership with the Permanent Mission of Kazakhstan, for convening this meeting today to discuss vital disarmament questions. Not only was the EastWest Institute the birthplace, if I may say so, of the UN Secretary General’s important five-point-plan on disarmament two years ago, but it has also been a leading force among civil society organisations, helping to stimulate discussions between high-level actors on crucial issues in the fields of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

Turning to the subject of today’s discussion, I believe that we have reached a turning point in the field of nuclear disarmament, following a number of important developments in the past year or so

- The UN Security Council Summit on Nuclear Disarmament and Non-proliferation in September 2009;
- The signature of the START Follow-on Treaty;
- The successful NPT Review Conference last May; and
- last month the High-Level Meeting on Revitalizing the Work on the Conference on Disarmament.

All these events demonstrate a new momentum, a positive atmosphere in international disarmament negotiations. Most importantly, the agreement reached at

the NPT Review Conference in May has allowed us to enter a new phase in nuclear disarmament:

- For the first time in the 40-year history of the NPT, all states have committed themselves to achieve a world without nuclear weapons and to adopt policies that are fully compatible with this goal.
- And for the first time in the 40-year history of the NPT, there has been an unequivocal, unanimous recognition of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons.

Since we all now agree that nuclear weapons are a real threat and that they must be abolished, our work towards a world free of nuclear weapons should become more focused and benefit from the support of all NPT Member States.

But an Action Plan is only as good as the actions it generates...

Mr. Chairman, you have asked us to address a number of difficult questions today:

- 1) *How to decrease the role of nuclear weapons in security doctrines while balancing national security interests?*

National security: the inadequacies of the nuclear deterrence principle

When we talk about national security interests, we are obviously talking about those countries possessing nuclear weapons or those countries covered by a nuclear umbrella. However, for the overwhelming majority of States, nuclear weapons, their existence, potential use or misuse, represent a threat, not a reassurance.

Security concepts have changed considerably in recent years and, today, concepts range from human security to cyber security or food security. And even States with nuclear weapons are today confronted with a range of new threats and challenges to their security. What role do nuclear weapons play, for example, in a cyber attack on a country's electricity network? The eroding importance of nuclear weapons is already being reflected in ongoing reviews of security doctrines, such as those taking place within NATO, or as reflected by the recently published new UK Defence and

Security doctrine. This is a recognition of the limited usefulness of nuclear arms for national security in the context of newly emerging security threats.

I also believe that further efforts should be undertaken to stigmatise and thereby de-legitimise these weapons. Civil society can and should play its part in this process and we can learn from successful campaigns by civil society concerning anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions. One important channel NGOs should use is through lobbying parliamentarians, as they can clearly set the framework for government action through binding laws or political declarations. We encourage NGOs to intensify their lobbying of parliamentarians on de-legitimizing nuclear weapons.

2) What are the next steps in further reductions in the global stockpile of nuclear weapons? And what role can non-nuclear weapon states play in building transparency and promoting confidence building measures?

From bilateral to multilateral arms reductions

Further reductions in the global stockpile of nuclear weapons will be necessary, and are in fact likely, as maintaining them will become increasingly costly. President Obama has clearly indicated his intention to conclude with Russia further bilateral agreements comprising also tactical and non-deployed nuclear weapons. This development goes hand in hand with the desire of some NATO member states to remove tactical nuclear weapons from their territory. I therefore hope that further bilateral US – Russian nuclear arms reductions agreements, including tactical nuclear weapons, will follow soon.

But this is not enough. All other nuclear weapons states must join these efforts and create a legally binding multilateral instrument on reducing nuclear weapons. The leadership of the US and Russia on this issue will be crucially important. This will require trust and confidence among the NWS. One of the most interesting provisions of the NPT-Action plan on nuclear disarmament is Action 5 where nuclear weapon states are called upon, inter alia, to

- rapidly move towards an overall reduction in the global stockpile of all types of nuclear weapons;
- address the question of all nuclear weapons;
- to further diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons – I will elaborate on this particular item later;
- further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems and thereby reduce the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons and
- to further enhance transparency and increase mutual confidence.

I welcome the announcement by France that it will host the first meeting of the P5 next year. I hope that the nuclear weapon states will share the results of their meetings with others so that we might learn how the non-nuclear weapon states could support this important process.

However, the continued existence of nuclear weapons threatens all of us and consequently, nuclear disarmament is of concern to all of us, nuclear weapon states, non-nuclear weapon states and civil society alike.

New deal?

Indeed, confidence is the pillar on which a world without nuclear weapons will rest - and there is not enough confidence in today's world. Even if all weapons were to be disarmed overnight this would not ensure a future free of nuclear weapons. It is clear to all of us that creating conditions for a world free of nuclear weapons will require the establishment of a system of nuclear security that all states trust. Is it even possible to achieve that? Though 100% certainty can never be achieved, I believe it is. But it will require time, many small steps and much political resolve.

Most obviously, all non-nuclear-weapon States should sign Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements with the IAEA, including additional protocols. This would provide maximum transparency and confidence to all Member States that no ill-intentioned nuclear projects are under way. This requires full transparency at all

stages of the nuclear fuel cycle - something Austria has been calling for several years and we presented our ideas on the multilateralisation of the nuclear fuel cycle in a working paper submitted to the 3rd NPT Prep.Com (INFCIRC/755).

Multilateralization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle

In our view a multilateral framework of supervision of all stages of the nuclear fuel would ensure a more comprehensive implementation of Article IV, where the benefits of advanced nuclear technologies would be made available to all States who seek them on a fair and equal basis.

We suggested in our working paper two parallel tracks which would be pursued simultaneously, the first focused on building transparency and mutual confidence, and, crucially, allowing the IAEA to build a fully comprehensive picture of each State's nuclear capabilities and activities, and the second track setting out steps towards multilateralisation of the nuclear fuel cycle.

The second track would start with the establishment of a nuclear fuel reserve. At the same time, the IAEA would gradually assume the functions of a virtual broker for all fuel cycle-related transactions. Existing facilities would eventually be transformed to new forms of multilateral or regional ownership and new facilities would be established as multilateral facilities from the outset. Finally, a decision would be taken, that the rights enshrined in Article IV, insofar as they apply to the nuclear fuel cycle, would be exercised exclusively through multilateral endeavours.

Until such a multilateral instrument emerges, the international community should elaborate an effective FMCT, bring the CTBT into force, and also work on establishing an effective multilateral verification mechanism for nuclear disarmament.

Current projects such as the one undertaken by VERTIC, which involves a nuclear-weapon-state, UK, and a non-nuclear weapon state, Norway, are already providing valuable insights into the technical challenges, while demonstrating that verification of warhead dismantlement is technically feasible. We encourage further research and studies involving nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States to refine

verification procedures and techniques so that a new multilateral disarmament agreement can also be equipped with a strong and effective verification mechanism similar to that of the CTBTO.

In conclusion, if we all work together – civil society, governments and international organizations – I am confident that we will make progress. This will take time but if we remain dedicated, true to our goal and commitments, we will succeed in creating the framework for a safer world without nuclear weapons for the coming generations.

