



ELIMINATING THE NUCLEAR THREAT

Forging a New East-West Consensus
on Weapons of Mass Destruction



EASTWEST INSTITUTE
Forging Collective Action for a Safer and Better World

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EASTWEST INSTITUTE

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The EastWest Institute is an international, non-partisan, not-for-profit policy organization focused solely on confronting critical challenges that endanger peace. EWI was established in 1980 as a catalyst to build trust, develop leadership, and promote collaboration for positive change. The institute has offices in New York, Brussels, and Moscow.

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Cover photo: A plenary session at the EastWest Institute's consultation on weapons of mass destruction on October 24, 2008. From left to right: IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, EWI Co-Chairman George F. Russell, U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. U.N. photo by Paul Filgueiras.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On October 24, 2008 the EastWest Institute convened an international consultation on weapons of mass destruction at the United Nations headquarters in New York. The event drew experts and luminaries from around the world, including U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, who delivered the keynote speech, former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency Mohamed ElBaradei, Russian Ambassador to the U.S. Sergey Kislyak and leaders from other countries, including China, India, Japan and Pakistan.

U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon offered a five-point proposal, which included an enforceable international convention against nuclear weapons, for concrete measures to end the global logjam on weapons of mass destruction. In his proposal, which he has reiterated several times since then, Secretary General Ban urged:

- All states to negotiate an international nuclear weapons convention, backed by a strong system of verification;
- The U.N. Security Council to discuss security assurances with non-nuclear states;
- The international community to pursue institutionalization of nuclear treaties, including the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty;
- Nuclear states to be more transparent about the sizes of their arsenals, stocks of fissile material and specific disarmament achievements;
- All states to pursue complementary measures, including the elimination of other types of WMD.

The consultation generated a broad range of ideas to help reduce or eliminate nuclear weapons, which everyone agreed was an urgent priority. As Ban Ki-moon said, “A world free of nuclear weapons would be a global good of the highest order...when disarmament advances, the world advances.”

Complete transcripts of the plenary sessions are included in this volume. Below, a summary of the key ideas presented.

PLEASE NOTE: These proposals do not necessarily represent consensus views.

Proposals for all states:

- Conduct a sober assessment of East-West differences and begin a dispassionate search for military and economic strategies towards disarmament that respects all parties’ need for security and development.
- Outlaw nuclear weapons now and advocate for complete disarmament in the future. Such action will be a litmus test to demonstrate commitment to nuclear disarmament.
- Stop any deployment of new anti-missile systems on borders of other countries and restore the understanding that ballistic missile defense destabilizes nuclear arms control.
- Make proliferation to non-state actors an international crime.
- Invest in nonproliferation education, as the U.S. has done with the National Nonproliferation Act and a National Nonproliferation Education Fund.

Proposals for the U.S., Russia, and NATO:

- Conduct the bilateral relationship in a way that does not encourage proliferation. Reduce nuclear forces as a first step towards disarmament.
- Replace treaties due to expire in 2009 and 2012 by conducting fresh negotiations for deep cuts in the near future.

- Withdraw NATO nuclear weapons from European states and withdraw Russian nuclear weapons deeper into Russia to contribute to lowering of East-West tension.
- Address imbalances in conventional weapons and expansion of military blocs.
- Expand the ambit of the U.S.-Russia joint initiative to combat nuclear terrorism

Proposals for all nuclear-weapon states:

- Do not wait for a Russian-American agreement before beginning to act on zero nuclear.
- Begin exchanging ideas to determine intermediate targets towards eventual disarmament.
- Unambiguously display political will to eliminate nuclear weapons, as Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev did in Reykjavík in October 1986.
- Introduce much more restraint and responsibility in nuclear policies and practices, especially nuclear doctrines.
- Keep nuclear and conventional doctrines separate. Define as clearly as possible the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons.
- Ratify all protocols to any relevant regional nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties.
- Pledge to a no-first-use policy to build confidence with non-nuclear-weapon states.
- Agree not to use nuclear weapons against each other under any circumstances.
- Begin negotiations for an agreement on non-deployment of weapons on foreign lands.
- Send unclassified material to the U.N. Secretariat and publish more information about nuclear arsenals, stocks of fissile material and specific disarmament achievements.
- Show greater transparency on:
 - Reductions in nuclear stockpiles
 - Reductions of nuclear warheads and delivery systems
 - The number of dismantled nuclear warheads and delivery systems
 - The pace of dismantlement, including the types of dismantled nuclear warheads and delivery systems
 - Total numbers of nuclear warheads and delivery systems and/or the number of deployed weapons
 - Reductions in nuclear weapons complexes
 - The years in which countries stop producing fissile material for nuclear weapons
 - Disposal of excess fissile material
 - Efforts to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in security doctrines
 - Plans or intentions for further nuclear disarmament
- The U.K. should revisit its decision on the Trident submarines.

Proposals for Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty states:

- Fulfill all obligations under the treaty to negotiate on effective measures leading to nuclear disarmament.
- Implement the thirteen steps that formed part of the consensus of 2000 NPT Review Conference in a way that promotes international stability and is based on undiminished security for all.
- Create strong institutional backing for the NPT, including a standing secretariat.
- Find a diplomatic and a political solution to the question of Iran's nuclear program within the ambit of the NPT
- Conclude safeguards agreements with the IAEA, and voluntarily adopt the strengthened safeguards under the Additional Protocol.

Proposals for the United Nations and other multilateral institutions:

- Strengthen the IAEA as a focal point of a reinvigorated global nuclear order allowing for safe and secure expansion of nuclear energy.
- Establish a commission of strategic force commanders to analyze the military utility of nuclear weapons in the current and future geopolitical and geostrategic environments.
- Engage with regional adversaries to resolve outstanding disputes, reduce the dependence on nuclear deterrence and, in some cases, diminish the sense of nuclear vulnerability.
- Preclude the possibility of regional nuclear competitions by ensuring that a new East-West consensus on weapons of mass destruction is based on principles of universality and non-discrimination.
- Renew efforts to bring the CTBT into force.
- Bring into force Central Asian and African nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties.
- Establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.
- Encourage the Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiations on a fissile material treaty immediately and without preconditions.
- Make the Proliferation Security Initiative treaty based and universally implemented.
- Convene a summit on nuclear disarmament that enables new leaders in key countries to commit to concrete steps for disarmament, peaceful settlement of disputes and an active role for the United Nations.
- End Security Council paralysis on proliferation issues by developing a collective nuclear security system that people can rely on. Ensure a Security Council that can work in a systematic way in cases of non-compliance.
- The U.N. Security Council should begin discussions, perhaps in its Military Staff Committee, on security issues in the nuclear disarmament process.
- The Security Council should unambiguously assure non-nuclear-weapon states that they will not be threatened with nuclear weapons.

Proposals for the International Atomic Energy Agency:

- To ensure effective verification, the IAEA needs the authority, resources, satellite imagery, and capability to do environmental sampling...
- Do more to control and protect nuclear material.
- Start work towards multi-national regulation of and cooperation on production and supply on nuclear fuel.
- Address the demands for access to civil nuclear fuel cycle and agree upon a multinational approach to the fuel cycle that is equitable and fair.

UNOFFICIAL TRANSCRIPTS

Ban Ki-moon

United Nations Secretary General

It is a great pleasure to welcome you all to the United Nations. I salute the EastWest Institute and its partner non-governmental groups for organizing this event on weapons of mass destruction and disarmament.

This is one of the gravest challenges facing international peace and security. So I thank the EastWest Institute for its timely and important new global initiative to build consensus. Under the leadership of George Russell and Martti Ahtisaari, the EastWest Institute is challenging each of us to rethink our international security priorities in order to get things moving again. You know, as we do, that we need specific actions, not just words. As your slogan so aptly puts it, you are a “think and do tank”.

One of my priorities as Secretary-General is to promote global goods and remedies to challenges that do not respect borders. A world free of nuclear weapons would be a global public good of the highest order, and will be the focus of my remarks today. I will speak mainly about nuclear weapons because of their unique dangers and the lack of any treaty outlawing them. But we must also work for a world free of all weapons of mass destruction.

Some of my interest in this subject stems from my own personal experience. As I come from Korea, my country has suffered the ravages of conventional war and faced threats from nuclear weapons and other WMD. But of course, such threats are not unique to my country.

Today, there is support throughout the world for the view that nuclear weapons should never again be used because of their indiscriminate effects, their impact on the environment and their profound implications for regional and global security. Some call this the nuclear “taboo”.

Yet nuclear disarmament has remained only an aspiration, rather than a reality. This forces us to ask whether a taboo merely on the use of such weapons is sufficient.

States make the key decisions in this field. But the United Nations has important roles to play. We provide a central forum where states can agree on norms to serve their common interests. We analyze, educate and advocate in the pursuit of agreed goals.

Moreover, we have pursued general and complete disarmament for so long that it has become part of the Organization’s very identity. Disarmament and the regulation of armaments are found in the Charter. The very first resolution adopted by the General Assembly, in London in 1946, called for eliminating “weapons adaptable to mass destruction”. These goals have been supported by every

Secretary-General. They have been the subject of hundreds of General Assembly resolutions, and have been endorsed repeatedly by all our Member States.

And for good reason. Nuclear weapons produce horrific, indiscriminate effects. Even when not used, they pose great risks. Accidents could happen any time. The manufacture of nuclear weapons can harm public health and the environment. And of course, terrorists could acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear material.

Most states have chosen to forego the nuclear option, and have complied with their commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Yet some states view possession of such weapons as a status symbol. And some states view nuclear weapons as offering the ultimate deterrent of nuclear attack, which largely accounts for the estimated 26,000 that still exist.

Unfortunately, the doctrine of nuclear deterrence has proven to be contagious. This has made non-proliferation more difficult, which in turn raises new risks that nuclear weapons will be used. The world remains concerned about nuclear activities in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and in Iran. There is widespread support for efforts to address these concerns by peaceful means through dialogue.

There are also concerns that a “nuclear renaissance” could soon take place, with nuclear energy being seen as a clean, emission-free alternative at a time of intensifying efforts to combat climate change. The main worry is that this will lead to the production and use of more nuclear materials that must be protected against proliferation and terrorist threats.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The obstacles to disarmament are formidable. But the costs and risks of its alternatives never get the attention they deserve. But consider the tremendous opportunity cost of huge military budgets. Consider the vast resources that are consumed by the endless pursuit of military superiority.

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, global military expenditures last year exceeded \$1.3 trillion. Ten years ago, the Brookings Institution published a study that estimated the total costs of nuclear weapons in just one country -- the United States -- to be over \$5.8 trillion, including future cleanup costs. By any definition, this has been a huge investment of financial and technical resources that could have had many other productive uses.

Concerns over such costs and the inherent dangers of nuclear weapons have led to a global outpouring of ideas to breathe new life into the cause of nuclear disarmament. We have seen the WMD Commission led by Hans Blix,

the New Agenda Coalition and Norway's seven-nation initiative. Australia and Japan have just launched the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. Civil society groups and nuclear-weapon states have also made proposals.

There is also the Hoover plan. I am pleased to note the presence here today of some of that effort's authors. Dr. Kissinger, Mr. Kampelman: allow me to thank you for your commitment and for the great wisdom you have brought to this effort.

Such initiatives deserve greater support. As the world faces crises in the economic and environmental arenas, there is growing awareness of the fragility of our planet and the need for global solutions to global challenges. This changing consciousness can also help us revitalize the international disarmament agenda.

In that spirit, I hereby offer a five-point proposal.

First, I urge all NPT parties, in particular the nuclear-weapon-states, to fulfill their obligation under the treaty to undertake negotiations on effective measures leading to nuclear disarmament.

They could pursue this goal by agreement on a framework of separate, mutually reinforcing instruments. Or they could consider negotiating a nuclear-weapons convention, backed by a strong system of verification, as has long been proposed at the United Nations. Upon the request of Costa Rica and Malaysia, I have circulated to all U.N. member states a draft of such a convention, which offers a good point of departure.

The nuclear powers should actively engage with other states on this issue at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, the world's single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. The world would also welcome a resumption of bilateral negotiations between the United States and Russian Federation aimed at deep and verifiable reductions of their respective arsenals.

Governments should also invest more in verification research and development. The United Kingdom's proposal to host a conference of nuclear-weapon states on verification is a concrete step in the right direction.

Second, the Security Council's permanent members should commence discussions, perhaps within its Military Staff Committee, on security issues in the nuclear disarmament process. They could unambiguously assure non-nuclear-weapon states that they will not be the subject of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Council could also convene a summit on nuclear disarmament. Non-NPT states should freeze their own nuclear-weapon capabilities and make their own disarmament commitments.

My third initiative relates to the "rule of law." Unilateral

moratoria on nuclear tests and the production of fissile materials can go only so far. We need new efforts to bring the CTBT into force, and for the Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiations on a fissile material treaty immediately, without preconditions. I support the entry into force of the Central Asian and African nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties. I encourage the nuclear-weapon states to ratify all the protocols to the nuclear-weapon-zone treaties. I strongly support efforts to establish such a zone in the Middle East. And I urge all NPT parties to conclude their safeguards agreements with the IAEA, and to voluntarily adopt the strengthened safeguards under the Additional Protocol. We should never forget that the nuclear fuel cycle is more than an issue involving energy or non-proliferation; its fate will also shape prospects for disarmament.

My fourth proposal concerns accountability and transparency. The nuclear-weapon states often circulate descriptions of what they are doing to pursue these goals, yet these accounts seldom reach the public. I invite the nuclear-weapon states to send such material to the U.N. Secretariat, and to encourage its wider dissemination. The nuclear powers could also expand the amount of information they publish about the size of their arsenals, stocks of fissile material and specific disarmament achievements. The lack of an authoritative estimate of the total number of nuclear weapons testifies to the need for greater transparency.

Fifth and finally, a number of complementary measures are needed. These include the elimination of other types of WMD; new efforts against WMD terrorism; limits on the production and trade in conventional arms; and new weapons bans, including of missiles and space weapons. The General Assembly could also take up the recommendation of the Blix Commission for a "World Summit on disarmament, non-proliferation and terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction".

Some doubt that the problem of WMD terrorism can ever be solved. But if there is real, verified progress in disarmament, the ability to eliminate this threat will grow exponentially. It will be much easier to encourage governments to tighten relevant controls if a basic, global taboo exists on the very possession of certain types of weapons. As we progressively eliminate the world's deadliest weapons and their components, we will make it harder to execute WMD terrorist attacks. And if our efforts also manage to address the social, economic, cultural, and political conditions that aggravate terrorist threats, so much the better.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

At the United Nations in 1961, President Kennedy said, "Let us call a truce to terror?. Let us invoke the blessings

of peace. And as we build an international capacity to keep peace, let us join in dismantling the national capacity to wage war.”

The keys to world peace have been in our collective hands all along. They are found in the U.N. Charter and in our own endless capacity for political will. The proposals I have offered today seek a fresh start not just on disarmament, but to strengthen our system of international peace and security.

We must all be grateful for the contributions that many of the participants at this meeting have already made in this great cause. When disarmament advances, the world advances. That is why it has such strong support at the United Nations. And that is why you can count on my full support in the vital work that lies ahead.

Thank you very much for your support.

Mohamed ElBaradei

Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency

I will just make a few remarks from my position as a practitioner in an area where I see an increasing danger to our survival, and an objective of a world free of nuclear weapons that has gone completely awry. The problem I see from where I am sitting is not very pretty at all. I see increasing reliance on nuclear weapons by the weapons states. All of them, almost without exception, are modernizing their weapons. I see increasing temptation by more and more countries, particularly in areas where disputes are festering, to acquire either nuclear weapons or the nuclear weapons capability, which is something that we need to address- the ability to have the ingredients that allow them to develop the nuclear weapons in a very short span of time, a matter of months in fact. I see 250 cases of illicit trafficking of nuclear material per year. A lot of these materials that we discover have never been reported to us, and a lot of the cases that were reported to us were never recovered.

I see an international organization, that is IAEA, that does not have the will with all to do the job effectively. We know now that to do the job properly we have to have the ability to detect declared activities, but also undeclared activities, which is more important. And yet we don't have the legal authority- the so called additional protocol. There are more than 100 countries that have not subscribed to the additional protocol.

We don't have the resources, financial and human re-

sources, that allow us to do the job adequately. And despite my warning over the years, despite the panel that I assembled last year, 20-20, under the former President Zedillo, which says that the agency's resources and legal authority should be vastly expanded, but still I do not see an adequate response from member states. Then I see our sponsor, which is the Security Council, that is not really functioning as it ought to be. In many cases it's paralyzed, in many cases it is not able to act. These are the specific challenges we are facing, and when we talk about nuclear weapons I think we are also talking about nuclear security, that we have a collective nuclear system that people can rely on, because in the absence of that it will continue to be a Sisyphean challenge to try to control the spread of nuclear weapons. Countries where there are theocracies, democracies, dictatorship, what have you, all care about their survival, that is a fact, and that is not going to change unless they feel there is a system of security they can rely on, and which does not depend on acquiring nuclear weapons.

And so when we talk about nuclear weapons and we talk about nuclear security we talk about peace- these are all linked. And when we talk about peace it is even more complex because then you need to address the two billion people that live under \$2 per day. You need to understand the link between poverty, lack of good governance, violence, civil war and then you end up [with] efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction.

I frankly do not see that we need more resolutions. There are over a thousand resolutions, by every forum. I do not think we need new initiatives to say how we go about things or forums. We have a forum that is on disarmament that is completely paralyzed for the last 10 years. Nothing in fact has been done for the last 10 years, which is symptomatic of where we are on this issue. What we need is a concrete action -- how to go from here to there. And the only way I see is for states-people, like Dr Kissinger and his quartet as they were called yesterday, coming to say that the world could not continue to rely on nuclear weapons.

We cannot continue to have 27,000 warheads, 20 years after the end of the cold war. We cannot continue to have deployment of nuclear weapons on cold war status alert, half an hour allowed by each president, Russia or the U.S. to respond to a reported nuclear attack, which could be based on computer error. As I said yesterday, it is a bridge to nowhere. This is not the kind of world we would want to leave to our children. So, it gives me a ray of hope that people like Henry Kissinger, Sam Nunn, Bill Perry and George Shultz are really coming now with a wakeup call, that we cannot afford if we want our humanity to survive, to continue on that path. They came with concrete actions

that I think I can summarize, and I think he would agree with me to drastically cut nuclear arsenals and move towards nuclear disarmament.

It's not going to happen overnight but we need to have a timeline, we need to have a road map. We need to control the spread of sensitive nuclear technology. I have put, and many others have put a proposal for multinational approach to the fuel cycle that is equitable and fair. We need to do better to control the nuclear material, the physical protection of nuclear material. Dr Kissinger and his colleagues rightly said that the concept of deterrence is irrelevant to terrorists because if they already have the nuclear sources they will simply use it. So that to me is the most ominous danger we are facing. It is not one or more states acquiring a nuclear weapon, it is an extremist group acquiring a nuclear weapon. Because any state, in my mind, will continue to operate under a system of deterrence. That is not something that I condone, but in terms of priority, my priority number one is nuclear terrorism.

Then, verification. I mean I can do, we can, the agency, as much as we are allowed to do. I need the authority, I need the resources, I need the satellite imagery, I need the capability to do environmental sampling. The technology has become so sophisticated and we are going through a moving target all the time. Unless we are able to get these resources we will miss cases of proliferation. This is something that people do not like to hear, but that they have to hear. And finally we need to fix, frankly, the Security Council, the compliance mechanism. We need to get a Security Council that can work in a systematic way in any case of non-compliance. That obviously will increase much when the nuclear weapons states, the five permanent members, will continue to drastically reduce the nuclear weapons, because then they will have the moral authority to clamp on those that are trying to cheat the system. Well I think I will stop here, but again I am privileged to be with you today and I wish you, of course, good luck. This is absolutely an initiative that is needed yesterday, and I would emphasize that what is more important is absolutely concrete action, less resolutions and more concrete action, thank you very much.

Henry Kissinger

Former U.S. Secretary of State

Ladies and gentlemen, it's a great privilege to share this stage with such a distinguished group on what is perhaps the key issue in the long-term of our time.

I will make a few observations and then I will call on the various panel members in an order determined by the United Nations, by the Secretary General's office, so you should read nothing into the order in which people are called upon.

I have greatly respected the role that Mr. ElBaradei has played, and the Secretary General put forward some very constructive ideas. Let me very briefly talk about how I got involved with this so-called group effort. I feel very strongly that one of the most immediate objectives with which we must deal is to prevent any further proliferation of nuclear weapons. At the same time, it is impossible for the nuclear powers to insist that no one else can have nuclear weapons if they do not show some willingness to modify their own programs and to move their own programs in a direction that leads towards a lesser reliance on nuclear weapons and if one can design a program to the eventual abandonment of nuclear weapons.

When I was in office the most daunting question that I thought I faced was what I would tell the President of the United States if he told me that he had exhausted all his diplomatic options and that the only recourse was nuclear war. Luckily, I never had to make that decision, because both the Soviet Union, at the time, and the United States came to very parallel conclusions in every crisis about the limit beyond which one should not go – towards nuclear war. But that is, from an historical point of view, an intolerable position. Even when two countries maintain the principal balance, it becomes unmanageable when a whole variety of nuclear countries are conducting not just an overall equation with each other, but their regional conflicts so that you can have nuclear powers towards each other, nuclear powers toward nonnuclear powers, regional nuclear powers towards each other. That calculus will become too unmanageable and will sooner or later lead to a use of nuclear weapons which would then have vast consequences on the consciousness of mankind and indeed on the overall global equation.

At the same time, as the Secretary General pointed out, the nuclear issue involves very many levels, because, on the one hand, the United States and Russia have ninety-plus-percent of all nuclear weapons. So the discussion of the appropriate level for an interim period of these weapons towards each other has a Russian-American component. At the same time, I don't agree with those who believe that first there has to be a Russian-American agreement and then other countries are brought in one step at a time. There are issues that are principally Russian-American. For example, the one Mr. Mroz mentioned at the beginning, what the appropriate level of nuclear weapons might

be when they are at their present high levels, and the figure of a thousand is often mentioned. This is a negotiation that could be conducted essentially bilaterally between the United States and Russia. But it should be accompanied by the conference that the Secretary General mentioned of all the nuclear countries, in which they begin exchanging ideas of the appropriate levels that an international agreement might get to on an interim basis towards a more complete disarmament. I think it is important to involve all the nuclear countries at that point.

One also cannot have the affected nonnuclear countries simply as bystanders. One difficulty when one talks about any goal is that we really are operating on two levels. One is the conceptual level. What are we trying to accomplish and what is the world going to look like when we have reached that objective? How will security then be defined and what will it be based on? That in the first instance is partly a conceptual problem and that requires the active participation of non-governmental groups. The non-governmental groups often play a useful role in helping to define goals. They need to understand that great goals cannot be achieved in one jump, but through a series of stages needed. So it is not enough to affirm the desirability of an ultimate world without nuclear weapons. One has to be able to describe how one is going to get there and through the participation of what negotiation, and in the process, and the process is of verification. One of our group has often described this in the simile of climbing a mountain surrounded in fog and that you know you want to reach the top, but you may not know where the top is and how far it is until you go into the fog and start walking into it. And as you go, the view may clear, so that the relationship between the objective and the stages needs elaboration.

I had to absorb what the Secretary General was saying by listening to it. I thought many of the steps that he proposed could be implemented simultaneously and could be begun simultaneously. The objective cannot be reached unless the affected countries feel that they have had a part in devising it. It cannot be imposed by bilateral, American negotiations with individual countries.

So I'd like to thank the organizers of this conference. It addresses a key issue; maybe the key issue of the survival of our world. And the challenge we have is to bring great objectives into relationship with practical steps, and that will be a great task.

We have a distinguished panel here and I want to thank again Dr. ElBaradei for what he had said and for the great contribution he has made with his patience and wisdom.

Let me call now on Ambassador Kislyak from the Russian Federation. Of course we all know that Russia and

the United States has the oldest of such large arsenals, and has a special need to conduct their own relationship in a way that does not inflame the incentives towards proliferation. Mr. Ambassador, it is a great privilege to have you here.

Sergey L. Kislyak Russian Ambassador to the United States

It is a great privilege to be invited to address this audience. I think that as this discussion already shows that there is no lack of ideas that has to be addressed in the issues of nuclear disarmament, what is missing may be actions. As another practitioner like Dr. ElBaradei, I am always trying to measure how these ideas that are noble, that we all agree to, can be synthesized in actions that would bring something that we all agree. Nobody wants nuclear weapons used, nobody wants nuclear weapons to continue to be a threat, and nobody wants nuclear weapons to continue, because, inherently, they are threatening.

I would like to say that there is no lack of commitment to the goal of nuclear disarmament, either. There is the number of documents that all the U.N. members, at least those are members of the NPT, have signed up. I will quote to you from the conference of non-proliferation in 2000. It states the steps among the things that we all agree to do.

“The steps by all the nuclear-weapon states leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all.”

That is a principle that nobody can [con]test. That is a right principle. The question is how to work towards the implementation of this principle. Always maintaining the undiminished security or rather assuring undiminished security and stability. There is multitude of things that need to be done. Dr. Kissinger said, and I think absolutely rightly, that the U.S.A. and Russia need to be worried [about] inflaming the situation that undermines our ability to move towards nuclear disarmament. It is also part of the question. But I would like to reduce the whole debate to three basic elements that needs to be dealt with as a prime priority.

1. We need to continue with steps on nuclear disarmament. And I fully agree that the U.S.A. and Russia have a special role to play, they have a good legacy of achieving 50 per cent reductions and the START Treaty that is still in force has been implemented fully in terms of reducing

nuclear weapon capabilities of both sides. We have the Moscow Treaty that calls for the significant reduction of warheads by 2010.

But the question is "What is next?". The START Treaty will expire next year and if we do not have a successful treaty that would continue the process, and hopefully would make further steps in nuclear disarmament, we will wake up on the 1st January of 2010, without any agreements between Russia and the U.S.A. to reduce nuclear weapons. And unfortunately that is also the case for the ABM Treaty, it is no longer, and we would have both free for all in the strategic nuclear weapons and free for all in the defense capabilities. It has always been a theory among the arms controllers that the synthesis of both is always a very explosive mixture. Because if you do develop nuclear weapons, offensive nuclear weapon capabilities plus you protect your territory from surprise attack, you might be tempted to use the weapon. That means that nuclear weapons might become, in the future, something that people might consider to be used. So we think that further steps need to be continued.

We are in dialogue with our American partners. To be honest, as of today, I cannot report that we have moved significantly ahead. Maybe it is not the place to put the blame on. We decide what is important. We are not yet there, we are not, as far as Russia is concerned, as certain where we are going to move beyond the START Treaty. I remind you that the treaty expires in December 2009. We also agree that the nuclear disarmament is such a thing that is certainly not only an exclusive issue of Russia and the U.S.A. We certainly would like to have more contribution from other nuclear weapon countries and certainly, since this is an issue that requires a lot of additional discussions among the states, we think that it is not a monopoly even of the non-nuclear weapon countries. How to best force what is largely called an international consensus that would be conducive to next measures of nuclear disarmament. It certainly is something that needs to be discussed among member states of the U.N.

And I would agree with Dr. Kissinger on the special role of the NGOs to play, in terms of fermenting ideas and dialogue that would be helpful for the states, for the negotiations. I think that the initiative that has been discussed by the EastWest Institute is very interesting, is very important. It is important because it is a wakeup call together with the formal statements of the U.S.A. The ideas in general go along the lines of the Russian initiatives and positions. We certainly believe that there are a lot of practical things that need be discussed. There are a lot of elements that need to be formulated before one

can fully agree but first it is a wakeup call, secondly, it is a direction that has pointed to us that might help to change the mentality of the people that have been governing our policies so far.

2. Secondly, apart from classical nuclear disarmament, I would say that one could not expect nuclear weapons countries to decrease and eliminate, finally somewhere in the future, the nuclear weapons, unless one is sure that while nuclear weapon countries reduce the holdings that nuclear weapons do not appear elsewhere. So non-proliferation is important in its own right and also it is important as a guarantee of the stability that would help the nuclear weapon countries to embark further steps on toward nuclear disarmament.

3. I would like to stress also that at all steps that might be considered in the future, the principle of undiminished security will be very important, at least for us. What does it mean? It does not mean necessarily any automatic linkages to some particular issues that may be dear to us in other areas of arms control. What I am trying to say is that in order to be able to reduce the reliance on deterrence, one has to be sure that you have a political and security environment that is reliable enough to abandon deterrence on a mutual basis.

It is a multi-component issue. Certainly one can raise here the question of imbalances and conventional weapons. In the case of Russia, for example, one has to take into account the situation in Europe where one big alliance is enlarging itself, pushing its military infrastructure [right up] to Russian territory. We also have to take into account that anti-missile systems are being placed next to our borders, and as I said earlier, offensive plus defensive system certainly has to be taken into account whenever you are planning your next military programs, and planning certainly your disarmament actions, you are wishing to undertake.

So, undiminished security is something needs to be well-addressed, substantively addressed. And it is as equally important to us as it will be most probably important to the U.S.A. and the other nuclear weapon states, as it is important to other countries that do not possess nuclear weapons but who might contemplate -- even without announcing so -- having capability that can be used in the future, to make a U-turn in the policy and to become nuclear. Dr. ElBaradei made a reference to the big number of countries that do possess materials that can be used in future for creating nuclear weapon capability. It is a real problem that needs to be addressed now, up front in our discussions. We are also very cognizant that the problem is very immediate. I fully agree with Dr. ElBaradei on this

issue that irrespective of whether we are successful or not with nuclear disarmament and increasing the severity of the non-proliferation regime, which is important in its own right.

There is a looming problem of nuclear terrorism. The nexus between terrorism and nuclear materials is something that is increasingly important for us to address. That is something that, at least my government and the government of the U.S.A. have understood and we have launched a joint initiative. A joint initiative that will be certainly backing up what the Agency has been doing so far. And we are relying to great extent on the contribution of the agency this implementation of this initiative. We have already more than 70 partner countries to the initiative. And it is enlarging and we hope to make it global. Because when you deal with nuclear terrorism or the threat of nuclear terrorism, you need to have a global response. Otherwise, terrorists will use whatever window they will find anywhere on the planet.

So, I think that as far as my country is concerned we are very much interested in exploring together with the U.S.A. the next steps in nuclear disarmament. We are willing to work with other countries in the CD on number of issues that are on our agenda. Unfortunately this body has been blocked by the competition of the priorities of different countries. And we think unnecessarily so. And in the meantime, there is no substantive discussion, but a number of priorities there. The priorities that we are pushing for. One is the prevention of the arms racing of outer-space. That is also another issue that might have a serious impact on the implementation of the principle of undiminished security.

So, we live in a complex world. And we need to address things seriously. There is no lack of ideas. There is no lack of commitment. I think if one wants to pursue the measures of nuclear disarmament, one can see a thick set of commitments already available. What is important is that we sit together and start working on these issues. In this respect, I would like to thank those people who are bringing this issue to international leaders now. It is another important signal that might come from this forum today, and it is something that we will be willing to pursue with the other countries and negotiate for.

Ved Malik

Retired General and Chief of Staff of the Indian Army

In Indian mythology, a divinely created weapon, the Brahmastra was endowed with catastrophic powers of destruction. It was specifically forbidden to be used, except in the direst of emergencies. Our sagas record that this weapon could be employed only when all else failed to stop the onslaught of demons. The parallels between nuclear weapons and the Brahmastra are irresistible, but then nuclear weapons are not mythological, they exist in real life, for the demons and the devout alike. You would have noticed that the statement on the Hiroshima memorial states “please rest in peace, for the error will not be repeated”. So therefore, for me it is an honor and a privilege to join this company that would like to see that the error is not repeated. Thank you very much EastWest institute for inviting me to this conference.

What about India’s approach to nuclear disarmament? In a last-ditch effort, before having to accept the strategic necessity for nuclear weapons in India, Rajiv Gandhi has warned the world, here in the United Nations, on 9 June 1988, and I quote, “Left to ourselves we would not want to touch Nuclear Weapons, but when tactical considerations in the passing play of great power rivalries are allowed to take precedence over the imperatives of non-proliferation, with what leeway are we left?”

In the very same speech he proposed an action plan that included a binding commitment by all nations to eliminate nuclear weapons in three stages by 2010; tangible progress at each stage, to demonstrate good faith and build the required confidence, and changes in doctrines, policies and institutions to sustain a world free of nuclear weapons. There was hardly any international response, and later India became nuclear. We have now been able to finalize the chemical weapons convention, but the goal of nuclear disarmament has remained a mirage. Meanwhile new kinds of threats and challenges have begun to confront national, regional and global security. Many of us have talked about it, there is this growing risk that nuclear materials, devices and weapons may be acquired by the terrorists or non-state actors who consider suicide bombing an effective military strategy.

All countries that are driven by extreme ideologies will also face the specter of a new nuclear push, even from those within the non-proliferation treaty. Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, who was here last night and this morning also, warned that there could be thirty virtual nuclear weapons

states on the horizon. There are other developments, like the unveiling of the A.Q. Khan Proliferation Network, nuclear tests, and some other countries wanting their own uranium enrichment programs, and so on. The complexity, and the contradictions, that characterize the nuclear proliferation domain. There is also the culpability of many responsible nations. As someone said last night, the world is on the precipice of a new and dangerous nuclear era. But despite that, many nations are advocating a new rationale for the retention of nuclear weapons and developing better weapons.

Nuclear deterrence may have prevented major powers from nuclear exchange, but now it is becoming increasingly hazardous and decreasingly effective in the lower and middle part of the armed conflict spectrum. Nuclear umbrellas, as statistics indicate, have encouraged more proxy, low intensity wars in which more lives have been lost than in World War One and Two combined.

Ladies and gentlemen, nuclear deterrence is a rational theory, a perception based theory. It is of no use in the global war against terrorism and asymmetric wars. During the cold war and many years after that, many leaders believed that nations armed with nuclear weapons and deterrence do not go to war with each other, but this too has been proved wrong. The Soviet Union and China went to war in 1968, India and Pakistan went to war in 1999, and I have personal experience of that as Ambassador Kissinger mentioned just now. There was considerable nuclear brandishing from the other side. Despite a proven military aggression on India, our forces were not allowed by the political leadership to go across the boundary or the line of control. It was a hard decision, much against military logic and public demand. To keep the conflict away from the nuclear threshold our military accepted that nuclear capability can increase the chances of a proxy and a limited conventional war. Such a conflict, without responsible political military oversight can escalate to the level of weapons of mass destruction. One more example. The U.S.A. and its coalition partners attacked Iraq when they strongly suspected that they possessed weapons of mass destruction. What if Iraq did possess ready to fire weapons of mass destruction?

Nuclear weapons countries may have reduced their Nuclear weapons arsenals recently but the quality and destructive capacity of the elements have increased substantially. As a soldier I say with conviction that modern nuclear weapons are deterrent, but not usable in war. They make war neither fightable, nor winnable. Nuclear stability rests on deterrence but not on their military utilization.

Perhaps a commission of retired strategic force com-

manders of the nuclear weapons states, if constituted, would be in a more convincing position to tell the world about the military utility of nuclear weapons in the prevailing and future geo-political and strategic environment.

So how do we sustain the new momentum? Like in the 60s and 80s, we have yet another opportunity, perhaps the last, to reconsider nuclear disarmament before the number and spread gets out of hand of responsible governments. Here we must congratulate the efforts of secretaries Henry Kissinger, William Perry, George Shultz and Senator Sam Nunn who have taken the initiative and seized the opportunity to rekindle the vision of a nuclear free world. As you all know, we in India support any call for a nuclear free world. In the conference on a world free of nuclear weapons in New Delhi and again in the United Nations General Assembly on September 26, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh reiterated India's continued commitment to Nuclear disarmament that is global, universal and non-discriminatory, with complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame.

Abolishing nuclear weapons would require that we abhor new developments and de-legitimize them. We should also introduce much greater degree of restraint and responsibility in our nuclear policies and practices. I believe our first target should be nuclear doctrines. Nuclear doctrines are the ones that carry latent texts and aggressive messages. I think we should de-fang the nuclear doctrines. These doctrines can be made transparent, changed to reduce reliance on the first use, non-use against non-nuclear weapons states, keeping credible nuclear deterrent only in the interim, as we have done in India. We should also attempt to keep nuclear and conventional doctrines apart, with threshold for the use of nuclear weapons defined as clearly as possible.

Aggressive nuclear doctrines need to be astute. In the current geo-politics it would be near impossible for any political leader to order use of nuclear weapons preemptively against a state or a non-state target, and a no-first-use pledge by all states will help in the de-legitimization process. It would be a meaningful confidence building measure. By itself it will not obliterate incidence of nuclear terrorism, but making proliferation to non-state actors an international crime will diminish the risk that follows proliferation networks in states with lax enforcement.

So long as large, ready to launch nuclear arsenals exist, the risk that these weapons will one day be detonated remains high. Nuclear weapons at a de-alerted state are less susceptible to accidental use. Many states have already adopted such measures. If all nuclear powers adopt this measure it would give more warning to decision makers.

It would help in de-legitimization of the weapons later. Yet another measure that would be considered is to agree to non-deployment of weapons on foreign lands. The range and quality of missiles allows extended deterrence without having to deploy weapons on foreign land.

It is not the fighting, but the decision making that takes time. We need to devise transparency measures that could be effective whenever there is political will to enhance nuclear transparency at global and regional levels. With tongue in cheek, may I suggest that we take a look at the memorandum of understanding, signed by the Indian and Pakistani leaders at the Hague Summit in 1999. In that memorandum, both countries agreed to pursue a list of confidence building measures. This included measures aimed specifically at nuclear risk reduction, measures indicating common ground between India and Pakistan, and highlighted areas where future agreements may be possible at bi-lateral and regional levels. One can foresee any challenges, such as the verification regime for reduction of arsenal nuclear material, dual use dilemma of nuclear energy, unconditional CTBT, verifiable FMCT and ownership, control and location of such facilities for international control of fuel seekers. All these will require non-discriminative political framework and assurances in the form of regional peace and cooperative security agreements.

Let me summarize a few productive steps for the year 2009 which I would like to recommend:

- An unequivocal commitment of all nuclear weapon states to the goal of complete elimination of nuclear weapons to be followed by negotiations for a nuclear weapon convention, prohibiting any further development, production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons and on their destruction leading to the global non-discriminative and verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons. Set a deadline to that goal, now.
- Legally binding agreement on the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states.
- Nuclear doctrines to be made transparent by all nations and kept separate from conventional doctrines, so their thresholds are not easily blurred.
- Agreement by nuclear weapon states on no brandishing and no first use of weapons.
- Agreement for nuclear states to keep their nuclear weapons in de-alerted state to reduce the risk of accidental use.
- Consolidation of nuclear destruction of CBMs to bilateral and regional levels to establish common grounds where future agreements may be possible.
- Constitution of the commission of the strategic force

commanders to analyze military utility of the nuclear weapons in the prevailing and futuristic geopolitical and geostrategic environment.

- Starting negotiations for an agreement on non-deployment of weapons on foreign lands.
- Promotion of civilian control of nuclear weapons as they are likely to regard these weapons only as instruments of deterrence, and will be more sensitive to the need of security of safe custody.

India has an impeccable record on non-proliferation and the long-standing commitment to nuclear disarmament that is global, universal and non-discriminatory. We believe that the pursuit of such a goal will enhance not only our security, but security of all countries. But that objective cannot be achieved through half or ambiguous measures and approaches without a deadline. Half measures have been tried before. We know where they lead to, or more accurately where they do not lead to. While we seize the moment, there is a long way to go. The way ahead will of course depend upon high level investment of political and diplomatic capital by the international community, particularly of the major nuclear weapon states.

Pan Zhenqiang

Retired Major General, People's Liberation Army of China

First of all I'd like to join my previous speakers in expressing my sincere thanks to the EastWest Institute to invite me here to participate in this very stimulating discussion, on a subject, which I think is one of the most vital for the future security and the peace of the world. I would also like to take this opportunity to salute Mr. Chairman and your other three colleagues. Incidentally, in China we labeled you as the new "gang of four" for the significant initiative launched for rethinking the role of nuclear weapons and the efforts for nuclear disarmament to lead into global zero. And I particularly feel inspired, because you are not alone, behind you I am aware that there are a number of prestigious world experts, high ranking officials and scholars who share your views and even try to work very hard to translate this new vision into specific steps towards a nuclear free world. So a momentum seems to be gathering for the reactivation for the world efforts for nuclear disarmament. That's of course fine.

On the other hand, honestly I am not so entirely optimistic about the prospect of a nuclear free world, because there seems to be still major differences, even in your own

country. And there are many people in Washington who still ask the question, whether abolition of nuclear weapons would really work in the interest of the United States. And furthermore, despite all our enthusiasm for a nuclear free world, I think that at the end of the day, much of the final depends on the attitudes of the governments. And so far, as I see it, none of the governments of the nuclear weapon States seem to show some signs of a change of their thinking on the role of nuclear weapons, or any kind of a modification of their nuclear programs for modernization. So I think that we will all agree that this is the kind of uphill, the kind of efforts, and a lot of work needs to be done in order to put our world efforts on the right track. Now what are the problems? I think the problem is a kind of a circular problem that we seem to be plagued with for so many years in the past. Traditionally, there has always been a kind of debate, as what kind of step, that who is going to do what as a first step. I think this is the kind of debate that we will be engaged in for years and years without any kind of consensus.

Nuclear-weapons states insisted that it is very difficult for these countries to give up their nuclear weapons unless there is a reassurance from non-nuclear weapons states for non-proliferation. All the others will receive more and a greater restrictions for non-proliferation purpose.

On the other hand, non-nuclear weapons states resent that the nuclear weapons states fail to honor the obligations for nuclear disarmament while making nuclear disarmament a condition...they are making the progress on non-proliferation a condition for the implementation of a nuclear disarmament.

And even among nuclear weapon states there is also a kind of a debate, as who is going to do what first? As I talk, Kissinger's question highlights the problems on the part of the United States or Russia, [at] what level will the deep cuts of the arsenals by the two major nuclear powers involve the participation of other nuclear weapons States in the process of further nuclear disarmament. I think this is a legitimate question, but I think for China, I cannot speak for China, but as I understand the position of China, I think China might also stress that it is perhaps too early for China to consider to take substantial steps in joining the progress on less insubstantial nuclear disarmament, by the two nuclear superpowers.

When I say this, of course, it means the reduction of nuclear arsenal, but I don't think reduction in size of nuclear arsenals would be adequate to alleviate the security concerns of China. So there seems to be a kind of question to each other. all for the sake of security, and when we are trying to ask each other questions like this and I think that

in the end we might perhaps reach nothing with some kind of knowledge that each side's actions might jeopardize its own security interest.

So I think that this is precisely the problem that prevents progress on nuclear disarmament. To me it seems that there is never such a kind of strong moral and legal pressure against the possession of nuclear weapons. And without such a pressure, nuclear weapon states or non-nuclear weapon states, why must give up the nuclear option, if they think that nuclear weapons will still play a role in their security strategy. And therefore, I think in order to truly make it possible to have breakthroughs in nuclear disarmament, reaching consensus on the nature and the role of nuclear weapons may be as much important as addressing specific issues, as the ones enumerated in your article, Mister Chairman, in *The Wall Street Journal*, as far as many suggestions by other research institutions.

Now the reasons are quite simple. Why stress the change of the vision on nuclear weapons? Because, first of all, if we are so specific on the technical or political issues, very specific, and then I would say that countries would have different preferences on the prioritization of these measures. And secondly, many measures suggested are always reinforcing and mutually affecting each other [and this] is making them very difficult to implement. And last but not least, when states lack confidence in trusting each other, as we see today, many such measures involve elaborate verification arrangements or so-called hedge moves that could tie down the countries' concerns in intractable negotiations, often with little tangible results. So on many occasions these negotiations often become a circular problem, as I said and complicate the dilemma.

It is perhaps imperative to build a consensus on the nature and the role of nuclear weapons first, before fixing the specific issues. After all, it is the vision of nuclear weapons that will guide the nuclear policy of states. On the nuclear field, it is my belief that only when we take nuclear weapons as weapons of mass-destruction, as weapons against humanity, and weapons that should be outlawed and rid of, as we did about the chemical and the biological weapons, can [we] be then in a better position to address all the other specific issues related to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in a binding moral and legal framework. It is all into this reasoning that I strongly suggest that it is time for the world to consider delegitimizing nuclear weapons now as the first step towards nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation. Outlawing nuclear weapons as a first step will not solve all the problems for nuclear disarmament; just as the criminal law in any country cannot eliminate all the violence and crime in a

society, but it will [not] make a visible difference without such a legal instrument.

The same can also be said about nuclear disarmament: if the world is to achieve a consensus in the form of a binding legal document that possession of nuclear weapons constitutes violation of the norm of the international relations, and the crime against humanity. With such a convention in place the nuclear weapon states will find it more difficult to argue for their nuclear arsenals for the sake of security or any other reasons. And the non-nuclear weapon states would also find it harder to cross over the red line of proliferation, even if violation or cheating occurs by states or non-state actors, the international community would find it in a terribly [strong] position to forge consensus to taking common action to bring them to justice.

In a final analysis, if chemical and biological weapons can be outlawed, why cannot nuclear weapons? Much depends on the strategic wisdom and the political courage of leaders of world nations, and nuclear weapon States in particular. It is in this sense that it can be well argued that it takes specific action to outlaw nuclear weapon now, while you are advocating abolishing them in a far more remote future – [that] may constitute a litmus test whether nations are truly serious about nuclear disarmament.

But of course, if countries saying that time is not ripe for such a kind of outlawing action of nuclear weapons, then at least I think to demonstrate their good will about a change in the vision of the role of nuclear weapons in their security strategy, then nuclear weapons States can do one more thing now, pending nuclear disarmament, and that is to agree not to use nuclear weapons against each other under any circumstances, and not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states at any time and under any condition. This is not only the most significant confidence measures I could ever think of in the nuclear field which would go a long way towards building greater trust between nuclear weapons States and a non-nuclear weapons State, as well as among nuclear weapons States themselves. It is also a physical indication of the change of the vision of the role of nuclear weapons. This constitutes a truly meaningful step towards the goal of achieving a world free of nuclear weapons.

Finally, I like to say a few words about a document I recommend strongly that we perhaps should try to recall. Because of my close association with the Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, I strongly recommend that you go to try to read a very significant document called a “Russell Einstein Manifesto”, which was a statement signed by a group of most eminent scientists from both the East and the West in mid-1950s, calling for

nuclear disarmament.¹ Pugwash was then founded based precisely on the spirit of this declaration. The manifesto gave only one reason why the world community should take urgent measures to get rid of the nuclear weapons: because they are inhumane weapons which would bring untold suffering and destruction to mankind once used by whoever may be. For that purpose the document urged that we remember humanity and forget anything else. Although half a century has passed, we seem still confronted with the same and even more acute problem of a nuclear threat. I think of the words of our forefathers all give us inspiration when we tackle the problems of nuclear disarmament.

Henrik Salander Swedish Ambassador to the United States

I want to thank all arrangers and especially the EastWest Institute for convening this consultation and the Secretary General for his inspiring speech. Hans Blix was supposed to be behind this panel. He is sending his regards to everybody and wishes also successful consultation today.

Hans’ talking points are available.² I have been asked not to repeat them but to give my own take on the highest priority steps for 2009. The starting point is that the tensions that have built up during the last decade or so, are completely out of proportion relative to existing differences on substance. And that, in turn, creates obstacles to action that is needed to tackle common challenges. Hans has enumerated the number of such tension-raising developments, one of which, for example, the direct element for us here today is the number of studies and plans about modernizing nuclear capabilities that are made today. Instead of plans and studies about how sufficient defense can be maintained without nuclear weapons. It is clear that non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and disarmament of WMD cannot be successful if not proceed by every state as increasing its own security.

A win-win situation for everybody must be reached. The fundamental flow in the philosophy of unilateralism that has prevailed in Washington for some years is to my mind that it has sought to increase U.S. security at the expense of others. In other words, conducting a zero-sum game,

¹ See <http://www.pugwash.org/about/manifesto.htm>.

² Dr. Blix’s comments have been included in this transcript after the Salander intervention.

without this being successful, or counter-productive, also according to its own yardsticks or criteria.

I think we often forget the win-win concept. It is exactly the philosophy behind most efforts in recent years to create a roadmap for negotiations or for measures pointing the right direction. For example, the thirteen steps part of the consensus of 2000 NPT Review Conference, explicitly says that the actions to be taken by the nuclear weapons states, such as the diminishing role for weapons, transparency about holdings, unilateral reductions, lowering readiness of arsenals and several others are to be taken, as Ambassador Kislyak quoted, in a way that promotes international stability and is based on undiminished security for all.

And I remember locked-room negotiators spending two nights on that sentence alone in 2000. Similarly, the Blix Commission also tried deliberately to make sure that all its sixty recommendations were in the interest of all states. And the same thought permeates the Wall Street Journal articles by our four distinguished American statesmen. Next years' priorities will require leadership and that must come from the source which will be in the best position to provide it, namely the new Washington administration, regardless of whether it is a McCain or Obama administration. I believe that by sending a few forceful selected signals early in its tenure, I mean in the first three or four months or so, the new administration can change the discussion climate in our area of competence drastically.

Such signals will be well-received, and they may generate an upper spiral replacing today's negative anticipations affecting most multi-lateral processes. Let's take the NPT review cycle as an example. The third Prep Con preview in 2010 is normally not expected to produce much. But with new policy signals behind its back, the U.S. delegation to the Prep Con could create a new dynamic. And the better discussion climate will in turn be conducive to reach an understanding across the board, that is a shared security interest to have the Prep Con succeed -- not because of the international climate as such, but because the strength of the empathy is vital for all states, ironically, enough even for the few states outside of it.

This is also one of reasons why one of the priorities I want to emphasize in the WMD area in 2009, are NPT-related. That is quite natural since biological and chemical weapons do not pose by far [the] political and strategic problems as serious as nuclear weapons do. I will enumerate my priorities, and let me tell you I have not been at all original in selecting them. In fact, every one of them you already know. This is not surprising because the most urgent steps to take now are already proposed and internationally

negotiated in roadmaps and sets of recommendations that are remarkably much overlapping. Almost everything to do is already there. In the Wall Street Journal articles, in the thirteen steps from 2000, in the Blix Commission, and the several other similar but less publicized efforts.

When just mentioning priorities one by one, I do not mean to say that they must be realized next year or even partly done next year but that their respective processes are already started or improved or changed for the next year. They are in no particular order of importance.

- Continued and verified reductions of Russian and U.S. nuclear forces of the START and the Moscow Treaty.
- The start of negotiations of the Fissile Material Production Cutoff Treaty (FMCT)
- concrete steps towards bringing the Test-Ban Treaty into force
- decreased readiness of nuclear forces, especially the two largest arsenals
- start of work towards some kind of multi-national regulation of and cooperation on production and supply on nuclear fuel, and finally
- a drastic improvement of the steering and governing of the NPT process as such.

This adds up to six priorities. I could of course easily put up five or six more, security assurances for example. And I will put up two more in a second. But I feel that these six have an urgency and realism about them that make them worthwhile to concentrate on next year, both by the new administration in Washington for the other nuclear weapon states and for non-nuclear weapon states. As I mentioned, not only most but all of these priorities are NPT-related. I call the CTBT entry into force NPT-related. As I call FMCT negotiations NPT-related, because they were both part and parcel of the carefully negotiated consensus which prolonged the NPT definitely in 1995.

Therefore, the standstill in the CTBT and FMCT processes respectively is a breach of the agreement reached on the life of the NPT, therefore also a zero-sum approach to international security instead of the shared interest approach. Decreased readiness is among the thirteen steps, and multi-national fuel cycle initiatives of course directly related to Article 4 of the NPT. The two other priorities which are considered to be Iran and DPRK are also NPT-related but different. They are special cases, although systemic in the sense that they are examples of problematic aspect of the regime. I do not believe like many others apparently, that these cases are the first in the cascade as it were in the proliferation. Very few states actually want to possess nuclear weapons. In the cases of Iran and DPRK,

more talks and more direct engagement is the priority for next year.

There is not enough time now for the elaboration of the six priorities I mentioned. Enough to say that nothing would jump-start our agenda better than the entry into force of the CTBT. It is difficult to imagine anything more disastrous right now than nuclear tests by one or more of the eight possessors of arsenals.

Multilateral approaches to the fuel cycle have been contemplated for decades now and increasingly less in few years, 2009 is a time to start more focused international action on that. Disarmament is as crucial as ever, contrary to what is often heard these days. It is unsustainable in the long run that the non-nuclear weapon states are legally obliged to place their fissile materials under safeguards whereas there is no treaty to control materials in the nuclear weapon states or in the non-NPT states. Or more simply put, if countries are to pursue disarmament effectively, they must at some point agree on an eradication of all future production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. A fissile ban is far from sufficient but it is necessary.

Finally, the NPT needs stronger institutional backing. It is strange, for example, that this, the most important of all treaties, does not have a standing secretariat.

Hans Blix

Former Executive Chairman of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission

(Remarks submitted but not delivered)

With the end of the Cold War and crusading Communism we all drew sighs of relief. The risk of a release of nuclear weapons by mistake or misunderstanding remained but a big nuclear war was no more plausible.

Many longstanding controversies were solved. States that had been locked into the Soviet empire became independent. The new climate of global cooperation enabled the Security Council in 1991 to authorize armed action to stop Iraq's aggression against Kuwait. Significant reductions took place in nuclear armaments and agreements were reached, for instance, to outlaw chemical weapons and to extend the Non-Proliferation Treaty without time limit.

Sadly, however, the opportunity to develop and solidify an order of cooperative security was missed. We sorely need to recreate it and seize it.

We have experienced a period in which unilateralism, military actions without Security Council authorization and stalled disarmament have brought new East-West tensions that are totally out of proportion to existing differences on substance and raise hindrances against action needed to tackle common challenges.

Preparations are made for space war and cyber war. The newest military doctrines allow a broader reliance on nuclear weapons. National studies and plans are about modernizing nuclear capabilities, not about how sufficient defense can be maintained without nuclear arsenals.

Annual world military expenses are currently in the range of 1.3 trillion dollars – almost half of it falling on the U.S. Have taxpayers around the world resigned themselves to restraints on health and education budgets and free spending on weapons? The recent package of 700 billion dollars to rescue the U.S. economy caused a popular uproar but about 700 billion dollars for U.S. military expenses next year were accepted without a murmur.

Many countries send huge quantities of oil and gas to thirsty consumer nations and billions of the payment received are used to pay for mountains of weapons. A miserable deal!

It is high time for a sober assessment of East-West differences on substance and for a dispassionate search for adjustments in the military, economic and security spheres and for disarmament that respects the need of all parties for security and development.

As proposed by several distinguished U.S. statesmen and supported by a large number of people in and outside the U.S., the nuclear weapon states should stop the ongoing race to weapons and take the initiative to a process of disarmament aiming eventually at a nuclear weapon free world.

Like the U.S. statesmen the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission that I had the honor to chair has presented practical arms control and disarmament measures that are ripe or overripe for adoption and would help to lower tensions and risks. For instance:

No measure would send a more important signal than bringing the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty into force. Ratification by the U.S. and China would help to get the same binding commitments against testing by India, Pakistan, Iran, Israel, Egypt and North Korea. If the U.S. preserves a freedom to test all others do as well.

Conclusion of a convention providing a verified stop of any further production of enriched uranium and plutonium for weapons would close the tap for new material going into weapons. It could also help to allay the risk of a nuclear arms race caused by fears in China and Pakistan

that the new U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement could enable India to import uranium and use indigenous uranium outside IAEA control to make more weapons.

Taking nuclear weapons off high alert everywhere would reduce the risk of catastrophic unintended releases.

Withdrawal of NATO nuclear weapons from European states and withdrawal of Russian nuclear weapons deeper into Russia would contribute to lowering of East-West tension.

A U.N. summit should be convoked to enable the many new or rather new leaders in key countries to recognize the accelerating interdependence and common interests of states and make clear commitments to concrete steps of disarmament, peaceful adjustment and an active use of the United Nations.

Questions and Answers

Greg Austin: Well Ladies and Gentlemen we've got some interesting ideas on the table, the EastWest Institute and our partner organizations have invited you here today to challenge these ideas. This is not the start or the end of the conversation it is a part of the long process that has been going on for decades. We are looking to quicken the agenda. The EastWest Institute and its partner organizations are looking to sharpen approaches and to get more movement in the next 12 months than we have in previous years.

We've received a large number of questions from the floor. We've gone through the process of using this system to try and record your questions so that they don't die after the conference if they don't get asked. We will be placing all questions on our website.

I've selected some questions for the panelists, but I thought that I would just go through a quick list of the issues that have been canvassed and the questions received so far so that the panelists might pick out one or two that they prefer to comment on rather than the questions that I've selected for them. Clearly in the 30 or so minutes remaining we don't have time to address all of the questions, thank you for your interest.

We have about 10 main categories of questions, the first one is the question of de-legitimizing nuclear weapons, trust building and confidence building is the second, political will, a global summit, should there be preconditions. One of the questions that received multiple iterations is 'what's the importance of setting a date for action', what's the importance of setting a timeline and a time frame

for zero nuclear. Then we had some more traditional on CTBT ratification, several questions on the importance of a nuclear weapons convention, the Swedish delegation has posed the question of a no first use treaty and the impact that might have on NATO.

The panel has been asked to address the question of asymmetries of power in conventional military forces, the impact of relative power in conventional military forces on moves towards zero nuclear. The issue of verification has been put on the table. The issue that received the biggest number of questions was the relationship between civil nuclear power, and how we manage civil nuclear power in the decade ahead and how we advance efforts in nuclear non-proliferation in terms of weapons, and in particular, one of the big points of interest there was the U.S.-India nuclear agreement and how that's impacting on efforts to make appropriate progress on the MPT forum.

The role of space weapons was an important issue raised, including ballistic missile defense, then the final biggest set of questions was the role of individual region conflicts, such as that between India and Pakistan, that between Israel, Iran and its neighbors, that between the U.S. and Iran, the situation on the Korean peninsula, all of those regional conflicts, what is the relationship and the link between demilitarizing those conflicts and making progress at the global level on these other measures. So panelists we've got a full range of comments there.

Ambassador Kislyak do you believe that the Russian rhetoric about the threat to its security posed by NATO may result in increased enmity between west and east. Is this a bad example to the wrong approach to confidence building measures?

Sergey L. Kislyak: Thank you. It happens so that I was the first Russian Ambassador to present credentials to the Secretary General of NATO in '96 when we established formal relations based on Russia-NATO council. So I think I have a personal feel for how things were developing between us and NATO.

It's not about rhetoric coming from Moscow that NATO is aggressive or NATO is threatening us. We certainly understand that NATO isn't preparing a war against us when we watch closely the actual deployment. But, we also watch policies, and we also understand that NATO has not changed its basic design and basic role. It is acquiring new missions elsewhere, but the basic design of the organization hasn't changed. We certainly understand that the preparation for a conflict in the future is continuing.

We see the infrastructure of NATO coming closer and closer to our borders. We see that this infrastructure comes to us with increased reliance on mobility and fast

deployment of forces. And on top of that we saw NATO in action when they started the first ever military campaign in Europe, bombing campaign against Serbia, that wasn't, as far as we were concerned, legally proven, to put it mildly, and we understood that NATO as an entity is prone to taking wrong decisions.

To a lesser extent we saw wrong decisions made around the conflict in South Ossetia, we saw that it was instinctively anti-Russian, rather than based on good analysis of facts on the ground, and we understand that certainly we haven't yet reached the quality of relations with NATO that make us relax about the next steps the organization will make. We are also witnessing that with the expansion of NATO, NATO is becoming less friendly to Russia, because a number of new members that have become members recently have also brought a lot of anti-Russian rhetoric that is instinctive and not based on any reasons and any facts on the ground, and we have to take all of these into account. If you ask us what relationship with NATO we would like to have, I would say we would like to have a real partnership.

We have developed a number of documents with NATO that lay excellent ground to building a real partnership. We have a real historical document that was achieved that was called the Founding Act. And later on, after the conflict in Serbia has split us apart, and we have found a way, if you will, rapprochement, we have almost agreed on 9 areas where we, NATO and Russia, are facing the same challenges. That is, non-proliferation, terrorism and many others, and we agreed that we would be working together.

What happened in reality? I think Russia, at least, is not very much satisfied that NATO was taking seriously the commitment of working with us as partners. What we were offered to be was a kind of partner that would be fulfilling decisions made by NATO and helping to accomplish missions that would be led by NATO, which means NATO would take decisions as to what is wrong or right, NATO will define how to deal with the issue, and the partnership means Russia needs to service this decision. It's not the kind of partnership we had expected to build with NATO, unfortunately we haven't so far reached the level of partnership that would give us good confidence that NATO is a good partner to Russia. Is it achievable in the future? I hope so, but most probably we running through difficult times that do not necessarily accelerate the achievement of these goals. But we are there to work with NATO in order to address common challenges.

Greg Austin: Thank you Ambassador Kislyak, I won't ask you to answer this part of the question, but I think that

what's put on the table is 'what is the link between NATO and Russian moves in U.S.-Russian strategic arms limitations and negotiations'. Would you like a short answer?

Sergey L. Kislyak: Short answer: there is no immediate impact of it, because the negotiations that are ongoing with the United States that haven't brought yet any specific results are on strategic weapons and we are interested in continuing this process. We do have problems elsewhere with some of the policies of NATO, some of the policies of the United States, most probably our partners also have questions as to some of our policies, that's the normal way of negotiating, but, we do not bring any linkages to the issue of achieving that go beyond start 2 that expires in the end of next year.

Greg Austin: Thank you Ambassador Kislyak.

General Malik, pot luck or would you like to select from the list?

Ved Malik: Pot luck.

Greg Austin: Ok, do you endorse a U.N. summit of all Nuclear Weapons states to reduce Nuclear weapons? What benefits do you see of such a conference, especially in the short term, and do you think it would be appropriate that that conference be at official level, or second track, or track 1.5.

Ved Malik: I have no hesitation. Firstly, I would like to mention that I am not speaking for India, I am speaking for myself, having retired from the establishment some years ago. I have no hesitation on recommending a nuclear summit for all states, for all countries. The nuclear powers, non-nuclear states, as well as some who are in between, but I think that before we give them some kind of agenda to work on, there may be a requirement for many of the NGO groups, like yours, to sit together and sharpen the agenda that they have for such a summit.

Greg Austin: General Pan, pot luck or the list?

Pan Zhenqiang: Pot luck.

Greg Austin: Well, sadly, you get the same question. What's your view of a summit for Nuclear Weapons states, what would be the short term goals, what would be the advantages, and could it happen, in China's case, at official state-to-state level.

Pan Zhenqiang: I think that should be a good exercise, but of course much depends on the agenda, so, what kinds of things they are going to talk about. What kind of agreement would be expected. Therefore I think a world summit should be a good idea but I think that should be based on very good preparations, and some kind of prior consultations among the major players.

Greg Austin: Thank you, we're being admirably brief here. We're going to get lots of questions in. Ambassador

Salander, pot luck or the list.

Henrik Salander: I think I will take something from the list.

Greg Austin: Ok, please.

Henrik Salander: First let me agree with general Pan on his recommendation on the Russell Einstein manifesto, I really recommend everybody to read that, that is really inspiring reading.

Well, delegitimization of nuclear weapons, yes, but it's a goal quite far away, and the first step on that road is a diminishing role for nuclear weapons, which is one of the agreements from 2000 MPT revcom.

A No-First-Use Treaty? Well, I do not much believe in that. I fear that that is a detour. I think that it is either better to go directly for a convention or to start building towards a convention by negotiating overlapping treaties like the FMCT, CTBT, etc. which in the end, overlapping will form the basis for a convention, and then the road to zero.

And then speaking of a road to zero, verification was mentioned. Verification is really fundamental, and much work is needed. Very much more knowledge than we have today is needed for the road to zero to be effective. I especially commend states like the U.K., Norway and others that are really looking into verification these days, its important.

A global summit, yes its among the Blix Commission's recommendations on WMD. I think it should not be convened too early and it must be very well prepared, I think at the earliest 2012 or 2013.

The role of regional conflicts was mentioned, yes, it's no coincidence that three of the hottest spots on earth are complicated very much by nuclear weapons, I'm thinking of course of the Korean Peninsula, the subcontinent and the Middle East. And it's clear that these regional conflicts cannot be solved truly, deeply without the nuclear weapons question being solved there, and globally.

Greg Austin: Thank you Ambassador Salander.

Ladies and gentlemen the EastWest Institute and its partner organizations are very interested in the question of political will and what are the next big steps we have to take in the next 12 months to generate that political will. We've had an important question from the floor from one of the disarmament missions in Geneva, we've heard many ideas today about what needs to be done, in fact there's a very long laundry list, but I think this question asks us in bringing out panel to a close, what's the single biggest thing you'd like to see in terms of a demonstration of political will, either to the zero option, or to a sharp reduction in nuclear weapons. What is the biggest single step you

would like to see in the next 12 months in terms of building political will, symbolic commitment either towards zero nuclear, or to a sharp reduction in nuclear weapons. Ambassador Kislyak would you like to start?

Sergey L. Kislyak: Entry into force of the CTBT. Thank you.

Greg Austin: This is going to be very short. General Malik?

Ved Malik: I think in fact this is also answering one of the questions that somebody has raised. A commitment by all political leaders of the world, putting a deadline to the convention that we have been talking about. And when you put a deadline it is a great confidence building measure for all states, nuclear as well as non-nuclear states, it shows their commitment and also it does in a way speed up the progress on that.

Greg Austin: Thank you very much. One of the questions from the floor has proposed a deadline of 2020, would you think that's too soon?

Ved Malik: Well I think that requires more thinking than my giving an answer just like that.

Greg Austin: Ok, thank you very much, General Pan.

Pan Zhenqiang: I think that problem for nuclear disarmament is lack of confidence, trust, among the major players. When we try to fix specific problems often the result is not satisfactory because in the back of the minds of many countries there are still some kinds of suspicions. And ... in state to state relations ... this kind of zero-sum nature. And therefore why we are doing all these things should be better communication and consultation. For example among nuclear weapons states, and also at regional levels and therefore I think that greater communication could play a very important role in building the necessary kind of basis for the solution. Thank you.

Greg Austin: Thank you General Pan. Ambassador Salander.

Henrik Salander: With all due respect, it is not that important for non-nuclear weapons states whether the U.S. and Russia have 6 thousand nuclear weapons each or 17 hundred weapons each. It is important to go down, but the difference between those numbers are not critical for non-nuclear weapons states. So therefore when you ask about the single most important step for next year, I pick U.S. ratification of the CTBT, that would send an enormous signal globally. Thanks.

Greg Austin: Thank you very much Mr. Ambassador Salander The last set of questions which I think we can squeeze in here concern other classes of weapons of mass destruction and the threat of terrorist use of other classes of weapons of mass destruction. We can link it to

the question of delegitimization of nuclear weapons the four horsemen in their original article in the Wall Street Journal linked the threat of nuclear terrorism to their entire goal of zero nuclear. If we could ask the panelists to reflect on the question of legitimization, delegitimization of nuclear weapons and its relationship, if any, to preventing nuclear terrorism or other forms of WMD terrorism. I think Ambassador Salander got his hand up first, we are going in reverse order. Thank you.

Henrik Salander: Well, let's first say that the norm against nuclear weapons is enormously strong, fantastically strong. It has been shown by Mrs. Tannenbaum in her recent book – very good book. I tend to be among those who think that the fear for, and the risks of nuclear terrorism and maybe even chemical and biological terrorism is a little bit exaggerated. I may be wrong, and I hope I will not be proven wrong, but - that's my feeling - to steal a nuclear weapon is very very difficult, to build one is perhaps even more difficult, and it couldn't be done by terrorists. A dirty bomb is a possibility, but I think, in fact, a rather distant one even that, because to get your hands on 50 Kilos of highly enriched Uranium or 8 Kilo of Plutonium is very very difficult.

Greg Austin: Thank you Ambassador Salander. General Pan.

Pan Zhenqiang: Well, for the possibility of a terrorist acquiring a dirty bomb, I am not so sure any such kind of terrorist or group is so far technically, is in the position to produce such a kind of a nuclear device. As long as there is some kind of strong consensus among the national governments to take measures against this kind of proliferation. So I think that the international terrorism acquiring nuclear weapons must some kind of association with a certain kind of action, whether intentionally or unintentionally and therefore if we delegitimize nuclear weapons, I think that would build a strong kind of legal and moral kind of pressure of all the national governments, try to take strong measures not only not to acquire nuclear options, but also taking measures against any possibility of supporting this kind of things to terrorist groups. So I think this should be very very helpful in our fight against international terrorism.

Greg Austin: Yes, thank you General Pan, I think this is an excellent point, the proposition, that by building the norm we create the political will to implement stronger actions to control possible uses of WMD terrorism. It is not convincing the terrorists not to use these weapons, it is to convince states to act better to implement controls. General Malik.

Ved Malik: I go by that. I support what you just said,

and what General Pan said, that you delegitimize the weapons and ensure that there is international consensus on making sure that each state is careful about the security safety of the nuclear weapons and material that they have, so that it doesn't fall into the hands of the terrorists.

May I, Greg, I have a point which has been made during speeches by many people and that is on the regional security part, you know, while I go totally for regional security, and I would like to promote cooperative security in the region so that there are no security threats, hassles etc. but as far as nuclear weapons are concerned, I think this cannot be looked at regionally, it has to be looked at globally, so let's not compartmentalize nuclear weapons in a particular region, and nuclear weapons outside the region. I think whatever steps have to be taken, they will have to be taken globally.

I mean for example, I don't know, what is applicable to South Asia because India has border with two nuclear States, one is part of the NPT, as one is part of the P5, and one is not. So it'll be difficult to compartmentalize a nuclear security in a regional setting. But, as I said right at the beginning, that there is a need for us to promote cooperate security in all regions.

Greg Austin: Thank you General Malik. Ambassador Kislyak, last comment.

Sergey L. Kislyak: Answering your question, maybe, mine will be in a dissenting voice, I don't see the delegitimization of nuclear weapons as an instrument of deterring the terrorist. Somebody, I think it was Dr. Kissinger said so today that no deterrence policies would affect actions by terrorists. So we would have long long debates about how to delegitimize weapons, whether they have already been delegitimized or not. In the meantime the terrorists are seeking access to nuclear materials. We know that. So what I am trying to appeal to all concerned is to join today forces in order to build a global action against terrorists. To deny them a chance is the only instrument that we all have. To deny them a chance anywhere in the world on a basis of serious cooperation. My country together with the United States have started an important program of building global capabilities together in order to deny them a chance. We are satisfied that it is developing pretty fast, but not fast enough. We would like to have many more countries, hopefully all the U.N. members joining us, because it is a common threat. Thank you.

Greg Austin: Thank you, Ambassador Kislyak. Ladies and Gentlemen, in closing I'd like to make three broad points. Thank you very much for your participation and coming today. This is the middle point of a conversation. We hope to quicken the pace of the conversation. Your

questions will live. We will put them on our website, we will use them as the foundation of our work as we go forward. We have other interactive survey processes on our website. We invite you to keep up the conversation with us. So thank you for coming, thank you for your questions. The second broad point, please join me in thanking the wonderful panelist speakers, including those absents U.N. Secretary General, Dr. Mohammed Elbaradei and Dr. Kissinger. And the third point ladies and gentlemen in administration, let me just mention that the breakup groups this afternoon are in different locations. [...]

Marco Antonio Suazo

Chairman of the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly (Disarmament and International Security)

May I recognize the work of the EastWest Institute in convening this conversation, this process of exchanging views and to try to reach a consensus in this issue of weapons of mass destruction. This panel will tackle the issue of symmetrical arms control and the reconciliation of unequal power. The process of the panelists really confirms the need for the global community to urgently examine ways to eliminate ... [improve] controls on weapons of mass destruction and to promote trust and confidence between the Euro-Atlantic community and the Asian states. The unequal power relationship, the East and the West presents many challenges to the efforts to resolve the issues of weapons of mass destruction and their control.

Jayantha Dhanapala

President, Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs

I begin with a word of thanks to the EastWest Institute for their invitation to me this morning and also for providing me with this opportunity of paying a public tribute to the work of the EastWest Institute and their inspiring leader John Mroz with whom I've enjoyed an association for over 20 years.

The Institute played a very major role in attenuating the tensions of the Cold War. And I am personally delighted that they are now directing their energies towards the cause of nuclear disarmament. My talking points have

already been distributed and it is in your folder. I do not intend on reading it out, but I will attempt to highlight some of the key points in my presentation.

As President of Pugwash I was delighted to have the Russell Einstein manifesto mentioned here because that is very much the bedrock of the Pugwash movement and its work in the field of eliminating nuclear weapons. The title of our consultation is "Seizing the Moment" and before we get into the trap of regarding this as a kind of copy theme it is important for us to say that this moment must be seized in order to find durable, sustainable, non discriminatory solutions to the problem of the presence of nuclear weapons in the world. We have seen how seizing the moment in a very temporary and selfish manner in Wall Street has lead to the current crisis in the American economy and the global economy. And we would not want the same *carpe diem* attitude to be used in the current situation. So we are seizing the moment in order to have a global solution to a global problem. And it is also useful to remind ourselves, that today the 24th of October is United Nations day.

And so, with the United Nations at the epicenter of a rule based world order, with its Charter acting as a global constitution for us all, and with the Secretary general here making so many constructive proposals, I think it is important for us to remind ourselves of the importance of the United Nations in whatever solutions we propose in seizing the moment. Now, in seizing the moment and in discussing this issue of reconciling unequal and symmetrical arms control, which is the subject of our panel, I think the perspective is extremely important and I do not think that the East-West perspective is sufficient. I do not believe we are on the threshold of a resumption of the cold war, despite the tensions over Georgia and the fact that we are still not assured that the existing bilateral arms control treaties between the Russian Federation and the U.S.A. will be replaced. And so I would propose that in addition to the East-West framework which has been proposed in the notes to our consultations, we also look at three other possible frameworks.

The first is the framework of nation states and non-state actors. Because at a time of danger, of terrorism and of weapons of mass destruction terrorism in particular, which was referred in the earlier panel, we do need to have this dimension also looked upon.

Secondly, I think it is important to look at the North-South framework. Because we have the millennium development goals set for achievement in 2015. And all that we do in the international peace and security framework must impact on that and have a reciprocal arrangement. We have new engines of growth in the south and they are

asserting themselves.

And of course the whole question of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is a very important issue for a number of countries who are developing in the south. And the third framework in the context of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty particularly, is the framework of nuclear weapons states and non nuclear weapons states, as well as those who want to be nuclear weapons states.

We have the so-called phenomenon of a nuclear renaissance with about 40 countries reported to want to acquire the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. And in the absence of the reliable firewall between the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the non-peaceful uses, we have general problems as to how we solve this dilemma. Now when we look at the subject of reconciling unequal power and arms control, I think we must begin by acknowledging that in the modern realpolitik power is inherently unequally distributed amongst nation states.

But the challenge that we are faced with is to mitigate these inequalities in the interest of international peace and security. And in doing that we have to ensure that we have a cooperative world order, a world order which is essentially ruled based and that I think is fundamental and that was also underlined by the Secretary General when he talked about the rule of law. This is I think is being gravely undermined in the last eight years of the Bush-Cheney administration.

Now what are the factors that have really contributed towards this perpetuation of inequality of power, I think the inconsistencies of controlling and overcoming terrorism is the first. Because when we have confronted by this global problem of terrorism, U.N. security council 1540 and the 13 anti-terrorism conventions, they lack universality and are being weakly implemented. The Proliferation initiative, the PSI, is not treaty based, it lacks universality and it is often subjectively implemented. Then we have the UNSCOM/UNMOVIC list of suppliers of weapons of mass destruction to Saddam Hussein's Iraq, which is still secret and we don't know whether the rest of the interests are protecting their own national companies. We also those who are involved in the A. Q. Khan network, either completely off the hook or likely punished. The exposure of the Network itself was inordinately delayed because of U.S. realpolitik. There are these inconsistencies in trying to control the problem of WMD terrorism.

Secondly, there is a problem of failure to implement the WMD treaties that we have. We know, first of all, that biological weapons convention had a process leading towards a verification protocol and that was effectively scuttled by Mr. Bolton.

Secondly, we know that the implementation of the chemical weapons convention has been delayed because of the destruction of existing stocks not having taking place according to the agreed time-table for reasons of lack of expenditure. The NPT has been seriously weakened, by failure of course to implement article 6; by violations of Article 1 caused by Iraq; DPRK which of course subsequently withdrew from the treaty and Libya which restored its credentials after diplomatic negotiations; and serious undermining of article 2 through the Indo-U.S. nuclear cooperation deal blessed by the nuclear supplies group in spite of NPT agreements; and remaining doubts about Iran's compliance with the NPT and by questions of the applicability of article 4, in the face of enhanced demand for nuclear power.

Thirdly the CTBT has not entered into force, 9 states have either not ratified it or signed it and we need to rectify that situation. Fourthly, the fissile material cut-off treaty which was promised in the 1995 documents of the conference that I was privileged to preside over, has not been negotiated yet because of a deadlock in the CD. Next, nuclear weapon free zones, many of the them have not had their protocols signed by the nuclear weapon states and of course proposals for new zones in the Arctic and Middle East are being strongly opposed by nuclear weapon states.

And finally military doctrines, predicated on the actual use of nuclear weapons, continue particularly with NATO despite the ICJ advisory opinion. There are also other aspects which are outside the weapons of mass destruction area -- that refers to small arms and light weapons, the arms trade treaty, which is still being talked about. The Mine Ban Convention and Cluster Munitions Treaty, which is again not universal. The problem of space, the rising military expenditure which SIPRI reports in 2007 was as much as \$1339 billion dollars, where the U.S. share was 45% and where the top 15 states accounted for 83%. Arms exports, where SIPRI again shows that U.S.A, Russia, Germany, France and U.K. accounted for 80% of arms transfers. There is also the increase in privatization of the military in the U.S. and other states which adds vested interests for the military industrial complexes and complicates the implementation of international humanitarian law. There is the ballistic missile defense program which is a provocation to both Russia and China and which is likely to result in an arms race spiral. There are plans for the development of new nuclear weapons and as you know the proponents of the RRW have come out with a publication of a paper signed by the secretary of defense and the secretary of energy of the U.S.

NATO expansion plans are another problem and of

course there are finally stocks of highly enriched uranium, estimated at 1370 tons, excluding a small amount to be blended down and separated to uranium which continues to pose security threats.

Now, in the context of this situation, what are the possible breakthrough measures that we can look for? Obviously remedial action on all the problems which I mentioned earlier, which have aggravated the situation. But we also have to aim at the total elimination of weapons of mass destruction and the regulation of conventional weapons as the U.N. charter stipulates.

Now, most immediately again, a matter that was discussed in the earlier panel, should be the immediate entry into force of the CTBT and I think here a new U.S. administration early next year, could lead the way, in the same way that the Clinton administration led the way toward the negotiation of the CTBT. Secondly, I think it is important for us to implement the two Wall Street Journal Op-Eds of 2007 and 2008. And here I would like to join the praise for Messrs. Schultz, Kissinger, Nunn and Perry, for an initiative which unlike previous initiatives, of those who had pursued nuclear deterrence and mutually assured destruction, is fundamentally different because it has a strong support of the Hoover Institute of Stanford, and it has attracted a wide range of support from both former statesmen and from the two presidential contenders in the current campaign for the U.S. presidency. And so, there is, I think a definite prospect of these efforts on the part of the four retired statesmen being implemented in the near future.

There is also thirdly, the unique opportunity that a new U.S. president will offer to lead the world credibly toward disarmament. And I think it is therefore a sign of a new spring of hope after eight years of a winter of discontent in the area of international peace and security.

Fourthly, there is, again as mentioned by Ambassador Kisylak, an urgent need for the bilateral U.S.-Russian treaties that are expiring in 2009 and 2012 to be replaced by fresh negotiations for deep cuts in the near future. The U.K., I think, has to revisit its position on the Trident, and I am happy to see that there is an active NGO movement in the U.K. on this issue.

We must also have the six-nation agreement on DPRK (on the action for action principle of reciprocity) implemented and there must be no slippage as there was with regard to the agreed framework in the past. There must also be diplomatic dialogue and a political solution to the question of Iran's nuclear program within the ambit of the NPT. In the Middle East, I think we need to have negotiations on a zone free of WMD as part of a reenergized

Middle East peace process. And then, going on the basis of what Dr. ElBaradei has told us, we need to strengthen the IAEA as a focal point of a reinvigorated global nuclear order allowing for safe and secure expansion of nuclear energy for those states who want it, safeguarding against nuclear weapon proliferation and nuclear terrorism.

And finally, I support the idea of a world summit on disarmament, non proliferation and terrorist use of WMD which was in fact recommended by the Weapons of Mass Destruction commission chaired by Dr. Hans Blix and on which I was privileged to serve.

Let me conclude by saying that first of all I think that in this issue of nuclear disarmament, civil society, which was once described by the New York Times as the other superpower, is now reenergized and poised to play a role, a role that it played consistently in the past but went into a hibernation as a consequence of distractions of other issues and because of a number of other international problems.

The NGOs have been at the forefront in the achievement of the land mines ban convention and are now at the forefront of achieving the cluster ammunitions treaty. And I think they can and must push the disarmament envelope much further with the help, of course, of like-minded states. Secondly, just as we were told that there is no need for more resolutions by Dr. Baradei, I think there is no need for more commissions. We have the Canberra commission report, the WMD commission and we have the Hoover plan. And so we have the prescriptions which await implementation and we must get on with that task.

Thirdly, I think there is an urgent need in the short term, to provide non nuclear weapons states with credible and treaty based security assurances. This is a vital necessity if we are going to assure ourselves that non-nuclear weapons states will not continue to aim for the obvious currency that seems to be valid today in international power, and that is possession of nuclear weapons. We have reached a tipping point, ladies and gentlemen, and either we continue with this march of folly especially with climate change looming so closely, and the danger of weapons of mass destruction being used either by states or by non state actors, by design or by accident.

We must take cooperative multilateral action on these twin and related issues. Let me conclude with a quotation from the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, which said and I quote "so long as any state has such weapons, especially nuclear arms, others will want them. So long as any such weapons remain in any states arsenal, there is a high risk they will one day be used by design or by accident. Any such use would be catastrophic."

Ehsan Ul Haq

Retired General and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, Pakistan

Let me begin by commending the EastWest Institute for organizing this high level inclusive consultation on a subject of urgent concern in a world where inequality and discrimination are a reality and as discourse on this subject is marred by mistrust and a lack of communication. This is indeed a welcome step. As you are well aware, Pakistan was compelled to acquire nuclear capability in the face of an existential threat from our neighbor. We were not the first to proliferate in South Asia. Even after India tested a nuclear device in 1974, we continued to plead for a nuclear free zone in South Asia and did not undertake nuclear testing for 24 years until India again tested in 1998, threatening the strategic stability of South Asia and undermining the credibility of our deterrence even in the conventional fields.

The end of the Cold War had generated hopes that peace and security would not be held hostage to dangerous balance of power blocks. The ensuing prospect of disarmament had created an environment conducive to the achievement of the foremost U.N. principle of equal security for all.

However today's global scenario, including the Asia Pacific region, is marked by equally dangerous and complex realities such as the lack of progress in the resolution of long standing regional disputes, the emergence of new forms of conflict which emanated from power asymmetries as well as economic and social disparities and injustices, that continue to obstruct the objectives of equal security for all. Renewed pursuit of balance of power strategies, through the emergence of new power alignments particularly in Asia, and in addition the proliferation of WMDs at state level, possible acquisition of the use of WMDs by non state actors have also been a growing concern.

Ladies and gentlemen, in the light of such an assessment of the complex international environment and threat perception it is timely to intensify efforts in the area of general and complete disarmament. The existing international non-proliferation and arms control regime faces challenges not only from the apparent intention of some to acquire WMDs but also due to the determination of a few powerful states to maintain the status quo while causing the weaker states to disarm.

Nuclear apartheid was not meant to be eternal; it was only regarded as a matter of transition, since the NPT had

identified the common objective of ultimate nuclear disarmament. Despite the discriminatory nature of the regime and the indifferent approach of the nuclear weapons states, the NPT remained essential and an important pillar of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and has been successful in limiting the spread of nuclear technology so far.

This fact, notwithstanding, the efficacy of the NPT to limit nuclear proliferation in the future, is becoming questionable, mainly due to a country exclusive approach being pursued by states that shoulder primary responsibility toward global nuclear disarmament. Like the NPT, the nuclear suppliers group, another important pillar of the nuclear proliferation regime, which aimed to preclude misuse of civil or dual-use nuclear technology, has been rendered ineffective, with its working through consensus arrangement having become controversial.

The NSG, as you will recall, was institutionalized in 1975 as a result of the concerns of the international community regarding India's misuse of civil nuclear technology and explosion of a nuclear device. Ironically, the NSG has been caused to make country specific exemption for the same country that had led to the creation NSG guidelines in the first place. NSG's agreeing to country's specific exception therefore shows the gap between the perceptions and actual actions of states notably in the West. In the contemporary international security environment, the non-proliferation regime is viewed as a tool for achieving political ends.

Security and commercial interests of the developed world, rather than the agreed non-proliferation norms, are guiding the country specific exceptions. This selective and discriminatory approach toward non-proliferation principles and the ensuing lack of sensitivity towards respective threat perceptions of individual states leads to increased insecurity amongst smaller countries -- which is a risky trend, as it can eventually trigger a domino effect and thus completely unravel the non-proliferation regime.

In order to reverse the continuing erosion of the global non proliferation regime, the Euro-Atlantic community needs to review and maybe reprioritize their objectives and adopt measures that are non-discriminatory in nature and do not affect regional security environments in a negative way. In order to achieve the objective of a nuclear weapons free world, efforts should focus toward the root causes of insecurities amongst smaller countries. Constructive engagement with regional adversaries to resolve their outstanding disputes would reduce their dependence on nuclear deterrence, in some cases, it could even diminish nuclear motivational states that feel vulnerable.

To preclude the possibility of nuclear competition

amongst regional adversaries, it must be ensured that the new East-West consensus on weapons of mass destruction and disarmament should not be country specific or country exclusive, but based on principles of universality and non-discrimination.

In summary, I would like to list six points for the deliberation of the forum.

Firstly, there is a need to evolve a new consensus on the entire range of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation issues based on the principles of the United Nations charter and global agreements, especially the declaration and program of action adopted by the first special session of the General Assembly, the road to disarmament.

Second, concerted efforts are required for the revival of the international disarmament structures and processes eroded by mistrust and lack of credibility. Attempts to circumvent the non-proliferation and disarmament mechanisms through the use of the U.N. Security Council must be resisted. The conference on disarmament has an essential role to play in multilateral negotiations on universal and non-discriminatory treaties and the impasse has to be broken.

Third, to restore the credibility of the international arms control regime and achieve the objective of nuclear zero, a top to bottom approach is required. The onus lies on the P5. The non nuclear weapons states of the Euro-Atlantic community can contribute significantly by actively supporting progress on disarmament and credibly holding all states accountable to their obligations with a balanced focus between non proliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Fourth, efforts for a renewed emphasis on non proliferation and disarmament are undermined through the advocacy of doctrines such as preemption, nuclear posture review, development of new war fighting nuclear weapons and the development/deployment of the ballistic missile defenses. Such developments perpetuate tensions at regional and global levels that underlie the motivation to seek security in WMDs.

Fifth, a discriminatory approach for whatever reason will remain counterproductive for working towards a more peaceful world. In particularly a world which has at least 8 or 9 states with nuclear weapons discrimination in any form would further undermine the proliferation regimes.

And finally, looking at the issue of nuclear weapons in isolation in the contemporary world would be inadequate. The issue of conventional balance both in conflict regions of the world as well as in the perceived nuclear zero worlds has to be taken into account.

A fast tracking of nuclear zero carries an obvious impli-

cation for a world with huge conventional arms disparities and festering disputes. While a comprehensively proportionate conventional balance in various parts of the world is not likely, ideas like the conventional forces [agreement] in Europe may still have value. And above all there has to be a determined focus on resolution of regional disputes particularly those which have been on the U.N. agenda for decades.

Sumio Tarui

Japanese Ambassador to the United States

I am greatly honored to be given the opportunity to address this conference. Today I would like to draw your attention to my personal perspective on the theme of today's conference, by first describing the overall global security picture and then touching upon what could be some breakthrough measures in the field of weapons of mass destruction and disarmament.

Even though the memory of the Cold War seems to have almost disappeared in the Euro-Atlantic world and some are talking about the emergence of a "new" Cold War, relics of the "old" Cold War still strongly persist in East Asia. The Korean Peninsula is still divided between North and South. Regional security frameworks are still immature. The lack of transparency in security affairs arouses anxiety. A number of arms control instruments, notably the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), have not achieved universality. What's more, one State has attempted to withdraw from such agreements after violating its obligations. All these problems compound the regional security calculation and render regional peace through disarmament peripheral and more difficult. Disarmament is a daunting task that is facing a great number of challenges, particularly in East Asia. This point was recently highlighted by the unfortunate developments in the denuclearization process of the DPRK within the framework of the Six-Party Talks. I want people from the Euro-Atlantic community to be reminded of this troubling reality in East Asia.

Nonetheless, Japan is fully committed to playing a leading role in promoting regional and global disarmament and non-proliferation and is determined to preserve international peace and security through peaceful means, not through military build-up.

There are many measures and ways to make a breakthrough in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation.

The highest priority for Japan in the current WMD field is to start negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) without delay. In order to achieve the nuclear abolition, the first practical step is to cap the production capability. After the qualitative capping by the CTBT, it is highly logical to pursue the quantitative capping by an FMCT. However, today since I have been asked to choose one or two particular breakthrough measures, I will not go into details of FMCT, which has been at an impasse for many years. I will instead take a different angle and focus on a few practical proposals that could be considered as breakthrough measures.

From Japan's East Asian perspective, transparency can be an effective and practical breakthrough measure. It sounds like a cliché, but transparency can still be a strong breakthrough tool because it requires an open attitude that will create a favorable climate for disarmament and non-proliferation. Of course, there are certain boundaries to what transparency can achieve. I am not talking about completely stripping one's country bare, but just a more open attitude will result in increased transparency and thus raise mutual trust. No matter how powerful and effective a disarmament treaty's verification regime is, if openness is lacking, a treaty may not achieve the desired results.

There can be many transparency measures. The following items are examples of short-term interim measures, which Japan proposed at the 2nd Preparatory Committee for the 2010 NPT Review Conference in 2008. We proposed that nuclear-weapon States should display transparency on:

- The extent of reductions in nuclear stockpiles
- The number of reduced nuclear warheads and delivery systems
- The number of dismantled nuclear warheads and delivery systems, as well as the pace of dismantlement, including the types of dismantled nuclear warheads and delivery systems
- The aggregate number of nuclear warheads and delivery systems and/or those deployed
- The extent of reductions in nuclear weapons complexes, including reductions in the square footage and the number of personnel
- The years in which the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons was ceased
- The amount of fissile material declared excess to and removed from nuclear explosive purposes or national security requirements, and plans for its disposition
- The activities to assist in the removal of fissile mate-

rial from dismantled weapons

- The efforts to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in security doctrine
- The plans or intentions for further nuclear disarmament measures.

In the longer term, more clarity on the discrepancy between declared policies and actual military holdings can be sought. For example, while a nuclear-weapon State's professed policy provides unconditional negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon states, the evident deployment of its intermediate-range nuclear missiles places neighboring non-nuclear-weapon states well within the range of such missiles. This kind of perception may be wrong, but due to the lack of transparency we do not know the actual military holdings and do not understand the reason behind such apparent or possible discrepancies. On a different note, seeking a regional agreement to eliminate intermediate nuclear forces (INF) as proposed by the United States and the Russian Federation, and most recently by French President Sarkozy, may be worthwhile considering.

In conclusion, obviously an unambiguous display of political will by political leaders is the biggest breakthrough measure. There is always a way if political leaders set their mind to it. The most notable example is the summit meeting between the then U.S. President Reagan and the then General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Gorbachev at Reykjavík in October 1986. According to a biography by Richard Rhodes, at the last moment of the meeting, but for a disagreement over the interpretation of the ABM Treaty, the two leaders in principle agreed to the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Reagan said, "It would be fine with me if we got rid of them all", and Gorbachev responded, "We can do that. We can eliminate them all."

William Potter

Director, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies

On behalf of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute, I am very pleased for my organization to co-sponsor this event. Unfortunately, that privilege doesn't provide me with any additional time for my remarks, so I will be very brief and to the point.

My fellow speakers this morning have correctly highlighted many of the challenges we face today on the nuclear

disarmament and arms control front. Some of the threats are long-standing ones that result from traditional power politics, others stem from deficits in the institutions we have created to deal with the problems, and still others are the result of the pursuit of short-sighted policies divorced from both long-term national and international security interests. Especially damaging to disarmament and non-proliferation, in my view, is the frequent pursuit by both NWS and NNWS of uncompromising national positions, usually defended on the basis of commitments to principle, but too often applied irresponsibly. The barren 2005 NPT Review Conference held in this very building, the demise of many of the 13 Practical Steps from the 2000 NPT Review Conference, and the more general failure of the international community to implement measures necessary to counter the WMD dangers posed by non-state actors are illustrative of this phenomenon.

It is very tempting to dwell on these familiar, if disturbing, issues. Indeed, I suspect that some of my panel colleagues expect me to hammer away at the dangers posed by the failure of the United States and Russia to make more headway in reducing tactical nuclear weapons or to raise concerns about the proliferation and terrorism risks associated with the projected nuclear power renaissance. I also have to confess that in an earlier draft of my prepared remarks, I could not resist calling attention to the nuclear terrorism dangers posed by the huge stocks of highly enriched uranium around the world and the urgent need for coordinated international action to secure, consolidate, reduce, and move toward the elimination of HEU in the civilian nuclear sector.

Now I should say in this regard that I take exception to several of the comments of colleagues from the first panel this morning who I think discount too readily the possibility of terrorists to build crude but very real improvised nuclear explosives.

Nevertheless, in deference to the panel's theme of I have decided to restrict my remarks to the serious but often neglected nuclear danger posed by ignorance and complacency about issues of disarmament and nonproliferation on the part of otherwise well educated citizens and their elected officials. The thrust of my message, in telegraphic form, is that ignorance about the dynamics of nuclear proliferation can lead to disastrous results—even for states that rank high on most other indices of power—while a modest investment today in nonproliferation education can be a great equalizer in the international arms control arena.

It is embarrassing to me as an educator to observe how woefully ill-informed most American students, citizens,

and their elected officials are about international affairs in general and nuclear arms control in particular.

Although this low knowledge base is deplorable, it also is understandable, at least in part, given the typical absence of opportunities for study of the subject. Few U.S. high schools have curricula that expose students to issues of disarmament or weapons proliferation and strategies for their control, and oddly the possibility for university training is not much better. Indeed, a survey my center conducted on the state of undergraduate education in the United States indicates that less than one-third of the 75 leading U.S. colleges and universities offer any undergraduate courses devoted principally to issues involving weapons of mass destruction. Even at the graduate level, my tiny university is virtually alone in offering a concentration in nonproliferation studies. As a result, at a time when there is a pressing need for new thinking about disarmament and nonproliferation matters, there are few venues available for training the next generation of specialists or for introducing our future leaders to these subjects.

I suspect the educational deficit I have described is not only an American problem. How many high schools, universities, and graduate programs internationally offer training in the field of nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament? How deep a pool of arms control and nonproliferation experts is there, for example, in the Russian Federation or China or Japan or India or Pakistan? Where in these countries, or any other state for that matter, can bright young students obtain the combination of language, area studies, technical, and arms control and nonproliferation policy skills necessary to pursue professional careers in the field? Indeed, where are we going to find the necessary number of professors to teach our young students the skills they will need to function effectively as arms control diplomats and analysts?

In 2002 a U.N. Experts Group on Disarmament and Nonproliferation Education sought to address these and other related questions and made 34 practical recommendations, which were adopted by the U.N. General Assembly. The good news is that no states have voiced opposition to the recommendations. The bad news is that few states have paid any attention to them, and little progress has been made in the intervening six years in translating support in principle into meaningful action. Indeed, few states or international organizations, including most of those represented on the Experts Group, have even bothered to comply with the General Assembly mandate to report bi-annually to the U.N. on their implementation of the recommendations. An exception to this general rule is the stellar behavior of Japan, and I would like to praise

Ambassador Tarui for Japan's leadership role in continuing to try to focus international attention on the issue, most recently by introducing a Resolution on Disarmament and Nonproliferation Education at this year's meeting of the First Committee. And it is worthwhile noting that the countries represented by all of our panelists are also cosponsors. So there's some headway there but I think we have to refocus our attention.

One very concrete step that could be taken to bolster graduate education in this sphere would be to pass legislation creating a National Nonproliferation Act. Such legislation, perhaps modeled after the National Defense Education Act, which attracted me to the Russian field many years ago, could provide fellowships to U.S. and select foreign graduate students for advanced multidisciplinary training in nonproliferation. Such legislation, which would cost far less than the annual salary of a number of professional basketball or soccer players, could offer financial inducements to attract the brightest students to the field and to encourage more universities to offer relevant courses. I would hope the next U.S. president would support such legislation, but it also should be a priority in the parliaments of the other countries represented at this meeting.

Although I believe government action remains desirable on the nonproliferation education front, an alternative approach would be for one or more foundations to pool their resources to create a National Nonproliferation Education Fund perhaps initially totaling no more than \$20 million. This fund, like that envisaged in a National Nonproliferation Education Act, would be used to attract promising students to the nonproliferation field by offering graduate fellowships on a competitive basis. An investment in nonproliferation education may be necessary if the United States is to improve its ability to anticipate proliferation developments and conduct effective nonproliferation diplomacy. However, it is also an opportune means by which many countries can enhance their organizational capacity to engage effectively in reducing nuclear dangers.

Writing about nuclear proliferation over three decades ago in a book called *The Last Chance*, a great friend of the United Nations—William Epstein—observed a pervasive “feeling of pessimism and fear, almost of hopelessness” in the world. Recent events suggest that, if anything, the nuclear dangers he described and the malaise he observed have subsequently increased many fold.

What then accounts for the failure on the part of the most powerful nations on earth to take corrective actions commensurate with those threats? Is it a lack of political

leadership, a failure of imagination, faulty conceptualization, domestic politics, bureaucratic inertia, competing national security objectives, wishful thinking, the intractable nature of the problem, or simply incompetence?

Undoubtedly, all of these factors contribute to our current predicament, but some are more amenable to correction than others and they should be our immediate focus. In my brief remarks, I have suggested that one partial remedy is to invest far more than we do in training the next generation of nonproliferation specialists.

This important and timely meeting offers an unusual opportunity to explore and identify other concrete and practical means to address the many nuclear challenges we face today. It also affords us the opportunity, collectively, to take the lead in charting a course back from the brink.

W. Pal Sidhu

Vice President of Programs, EastWest Institute

Thank you very much Mr. Chairman,

What an honor it is to be in such a panel. I am really honored and humbled at the same time. Mr. Chairman what I thought might be useful at this stage is, perhaps, is to address some of the fundamental issues that the topic of this plenary session is raised. Then, also, throughout a lot of questions which in fact have risen from the various presentations that we have heard, and perhaps try to take them back to the panel for some more discussion on those issues, as well.

Let me start with a fundamental premise which is really the basis of at least nuclear deterrence, and that is the principle of asymmetry; the fact that you do not need exactly the same number of weapons as your adversary for the deterrence to work. In fact, one of the five nuclear weapon states had just less than two dozen nuclear weapons based on intercontinental ballistic missiles and felt that was adequate to deter in an adversary which had tens of thousands more weapons aimed at them. So, if we are willing to accept that degree of asymmetry in deterrence, is it not possible to think in terms of arms control with the same degree of asymmetry? Is it really essential, as we heard in the morning, for numbers to drop right down to the same parity levels for this kind of arms control to begin? Or is the similar level of asymmetry or ratio possible for arms control and disarmament to begin. As you can imagine, I would probably argue that if we believe that the asymmetry in deterrence of this level of parity is adequate,

then, I think, it is equally possible to have arms control even when you have an asymmetry of arsenals between the two sides. I think it is a principle that we probably need to keep in mind at the global level.

There is another approach that I would also like to put to you that is an asymmetry perhaps at regional levels. There are some regions which have gone into agreements and arms control agreements which have been completely inconceivable in other regions at all, or indeed, even at the global level. Let me talk about the region that I know something about, South Asia. It is the only region that I know in the world where you have an agreement on non attack of nuclear facilities. There is no other region in the world which has a similar agreement at all. This is again, in my point of view, an arms control, if you like, confidence building, asymmetry. That is something to be celebrated as well. That perhaps it is not necessary for all of this to be at the global level for it to work at the regional level. It would be ideal, of course, to have it at the global level, but even within particular regions, if it works it is adequate.

Similarly on the preflight notification of at least the ballistic missile tests, there are only two bilateral agreements in the world: one is between the U.S. and Russia, and the other between India and Pakistan. Again it will be ideal for other regions to have this kind of confidence building measures as well. But perhaps it is not bad that they actually exist in some regions, if not all of them, or indeed at the global level. Let me pursue this further, and take up a particular suggestion that have come up in recent discussions and context of particularly globalizing a bilateral treaty, and I have in mind, the INF treaty.

Again, I think, it is an interesting concept. But if you follow the notion of asymmetry, then, I think, it is important to look at this in various regional contexts as well. Because, the ranges that are put forward in the INF would be strategic in some regions of the world. Perhaps, when the principle of an INF itself is acceptable, its application should be very specific to regions and specific ranges which will be applicable to those regions. In the Middle East, for example, anything beyond 50 kilometers or miles is strategic. And to say that Some of the countries may want to sign up to the INF is a non-starter. So again, I think we need to think about asymmetry in ways that we have not been used to approaching until now. With that sort of broad approach let me flag at least two principles I think which are going to be critical in any kind of arms control, be it asymmetrical or otherwise.

The first is the principle very much laid down in the NPT, that of non proliferation and disarmament. If you flip that around, I think it is equally important to keep in

mind that if you have proliferation, whether vertical -that is an improvement in existing capabilities-, or horizontal, you are likely to also have greater armament. So the flip of this is equally true. That is a very important principle for us to keep in mind. That if you want to go down the root of nonproliferation and arms control then the element of disarmament is equally important.

The second principle, and we've already heard it in both panels, and different phrases have been used for it; accountability, transparency. But there was a wonderful catch phrase, which came up in the context of the six party talks, which was comprehensive, verifiable, irreversible disarmament. This is again a principle that has got to be applicable universally. It has to be applicable to the original nuclear weapon states as much as to any of the new or emerging nuclear weapon states that we might want to address in that sort of sense. And the question of verification; if it is a challenge at the global level, it is also going to be challenge at the regional level. I think that is an important element to keep on mind as well.

Let me then, Mr. Chair, conclude with a series of questions, which I might want to throw open to the audience, and also to the panel. Speaking about asymmetrical arms control, we should certainly keep in mind the concept of unilateral approaches. Let's not forget some of the significant arms control which has occurred at least in the nuclear field has happened unilaterally. That is something we might want to at least look at or revisit.

Second, everybody has been talking about the quartet and the two Wall Street Journal articles which came up. And even though this maybe is a non-starter, what are the prospects of a similar kind of examination among the eight nuclear weapon states of this kind of a possibility? Even if it may be very cautious, or even may challenge the principle, but, I think, it is worth putting out and trying to examine, and we may come up with some very interesting approaches. Dr. Potter and I actually had a meeting where I found it remarkable to see a speaker from Russia endorsing the Wall Street Journal articles and approaches, and saying how it is possible to go down to zero and have it verified, where an American in the same room was actually challenging that perspective as well.

Let me move on to the next question. I think the role of NGOs was very much raised and mentioned as well. Here, we seem to have a very curious asymmetry. NGOs seem to have played an important role in the initial part of weaponization (probably meant dewatering). So references for example ... sort of document. I think that is an important reference. NGOs have also played an important role in preventing escalation of an arms race beyond

the political, and certainly looking at Europe in the 1980s and the INF treaty being very much driven by the bottom-up approach by movements like the one in (Green and Common?) and others certainly was able to contribute to the reversal of that particular race. But beyond that, pushing arms control seems to be much more of a challenge. So the question I have is: Can NGOs who succeeded so remarkably in the issue of mines land mines and even cluster munitions work beyond that point in nuclear weapons? I throw that out as a question.

The issue was raised about raising confidence in disarmament structures, which clearly has been lacking in the last few years. The question that I have is: How would one begin this process of building up and restoring confidence in these particular issues?

Finally, the final question that we need to ask is what are the prospects of countries which presently live under a nuclear umbrella, moving out of the nuclear umbrella and challenging the very premise of extended deterrence, and thereby some of the deterrence or nuclear deterrence arguments that some nuclear weapon states have put up there.

Thank you very much Mr. Chairman.

Questions and Answers

Marco Antonio Suazo: Thank you very much for your presentation. We have several questions, and may I remind all of you that our distinguished panelists are here in a personal capacity for their expertise, for their knowledge of the issues, and also for the experience gained from their positions and tours of duty while they served on their respective governments. So any questions they address, and we've received a few of them, and I've already distributed to them in order for them to prepare themselves, and I will ask them to share with you the question, to read it first, if that is possible, and provide an answer. Those questions will go to the website of the EastWest Institute at the end of the day. I have a final question here that I am going to put at the end, and see if one of them wants to do so. There was one directed to Professor Dhanapala... we will ask him to start.

Jayantha Dhanapala: Thank you Mr. Chairman. The question address to me by Dr. Costas Ionala is under the rule of law that you have mentioned, how can we promote the model Nuclear Weapons Convention presented by Costa Rica and Malaysia to the U.N. Secretary General and mentioned this morning by the U.N. Secretary General Ban

Ki-Moon. Well as you know one of the breakout groups this morning is devoted entirely to the Nuclear Weapons Convention and I hope you will participate in that.

There have been, from time to time, draft Nuclear Weapons conventions presented to the international community. I recall Sweden had one many years ago in the CD, and that is also an NGO draft that is available, and as you quite rightly say the Costa Rica Malaysia draft.

I think the problem that we face is how do we proceed on this. Now the established multilateral negotiating forum is the conference on disarmament, but as you know there has been a great deal of impatience with the procedures and the rule of consensus in the conference on disarmament. So much so that the Mine Ban convention was negotiated outside its framework, and so has the Cluster Munitions Treaty. As somebody who respects institutions and who respects very much the U.N. processes I think this is very unfortunate, and the virtue of the Mine Ban Convention is that it finally returned to the U.N. framework when the convention was finally signed and negotiated, and the implementation of the Mine Ban convention is being pursued through the United Nations.

I would hope that it would be possible to achieve a consensus to negotiate and Nuclear Weapons Convention within the CD, but of course this requires a fundamental change in the positions of nuclear weapons states as they exist today. Again I repeat what I said in my main presentation, that there will be an opportunity with the emergence of a new U.S. administration on the 4th of November for this fundamental change to take place. Change is, I know, the motto of both campaigns, but we want a change that will be of benefit to international peace and security, and I think the Nuclear Weapons Convention as proposed will have to be negotiated, I mean, clearly this is a draft, it's not going to be accepted over night. Every letter, every detail will have to be negotiated and we will also have to have the verification of such a convention detailed and spelt out, probably with the IAEA, or even another organization, given the responsibility of implementing it. Thank you.

Marco Antonio Suazo: Thank you very much. I guess the second question will be tackled by Mr. Ehsan.

Ehsan UI Haq: The question which has been posed to me deals with the CD. And whether a stronger mandate for the subsidiary group on Nuclear Disarmament will make an agreement on the work program possible. In my script earlier I had very strongly suggested that the CD, in fact the entire structure and processes for disarmament should be reinvigorated, should be strengthened.

We feel that is very important and that can be done best by going through those processes, and bringing about

credibility in their working. And above all, as I have said, not having discrimination and not having exclusivity in their decisions. And I feel, that if we can support these subsidiary groups, they will certainly be able to evolve a consensus, because it is very important that on decisions of non proliferation, on decisions or decisions of disarmament we have consensus, and we do not try to impose decisions.

Unfortunately, there is a tendency to go to a smaller body every time, with more western interests, to try to arrive at an easier solution, an early solution, which is not necessarily a consensus based solution, and does not have support in the wider international community, thank you.

Marco Antonio Suazo: Thanks to you. Ambassador Sumo?

Sumo Tarui: Thank you. My question is 'What are the most important actions non Nuclear States could take to move Nuclear Powers to reduce their Nuclear Weapons stockpiles'. Well, this is a very important question and I'd like to answer very shortly.

I think first on all, everybody realizes that the 2005 NPT conference was a very miserable failure, and 2210 review conference everybody has a very solid determination to make it successful. Otherwise the NPT system itself will be very seriously damaged as a result of the failure of 2010. So, one of my answers is that we should try very hard to maintain the NPT regimes as strong as possible, as efficient as possible. This is the very basic points we should take here.

The second is at the same time recently we realized positive developments of the Nuclear Weapons States, for example the French government, President Sarkozy expressed its new nuclear policies of France, including making it clear that the number of warheads-this is the first time for Nuclear Weapons states announcing the number of nuclear warheads. This is a very positive movement.

At the same time the United Kingdom, as you well know, have been taking many initiatives to study to make the process going forward. The United States and Russia are very ready to go forward, to negotiate, on the following next arms control pact. They confirmed, both of them, very definitely, that they will continue to discuss and negotiate on this matter.

And also whenever we think about the reduction of Nuclear Weapons of course everybody think about the security program, how to maintain the security without Nuclear Weapons. And of course there are many, many arguments, so I don't want to repeat those argument, but I think we shouldn't forget the security elements, of course, whenever we think about the nuclear reductions and in

this regard I think the role and importance of education that was stressed by Dr. Potter today, I very much appreciate his very good speech.

And I think that the education, although it takes a long time, is quite important for human beings to understand and carry out the very important tasks in the future. So I think, I very much hope that everybody can share the importance of the education. Thank you very much.

Marco Antonio Suazo: Dr Potter, I guess you have a question also.

William Potter: Actually you didn't hand me one but I intercepted one that was addressed to Ambassador Dhanapala, but since it deals with the Central Asia Nuclear Free Zone I thought I would comment. But I want to emphasize I'm speaking in my personal capacity here.

The question is 'Do you think the P3 will sign and ratify the protocol to the Central Asian Zone in the near future, if not immediately after the treaty's entry into force. When do you think this might be possible and what do you think is needed from each side for that to happen?'

Let me begin first by expressing my appreciation to the Secretary General for endorsing the Central Asian Nuclear Free Zone and calling for its early entry into force. As surprising as that might be it was a new development for a Secretary general of the United Nations, and so I think the SG's comments are really to be welcomed, and here I think I do speak, although I probably shouldn't speak for the five Central Asian states.

I think it will be very difficult for the P3 to ratify the protocol any time soon. But first of all we need to find two states to ratify the treaty in the region. We're still waiting for Kazakhstan and Tajikistan to act. I suspect that they will do so fairly soon, but that's the first step, the Ps also promotes that as the next step.

I think what would be most helpful after the ratification of the five states is for them to issue a joint statement in which they are very clear in expressing their views that there exist no other treaties to which they subscribe that allow for Nuclear Weapons to be deployed on their territory under any circumstances.

To make such a statement, I think would go a considerable way towards persuading the P3 that they can in fact sing the protocol, that it want in any way be in conflict with the concept of a zone which might under some circumstances allow Nuclear Weapons to be deployed. This is a rather esoteric question, and I think that without going into the details of the treaty, the (?) treaty on collective security is probably sufficient, in response to the probing question that was asked.

Marco Antonio Suazo: Thank you very much. There

were several other questions that we are going to compile or they will appear on the website. I'm going to provide them to the representative of the EastWest Institute. I would like to make just a very short remark by myself. And I want to say that the vibe between those possessing nuclear weapons is one example that typifies the unequal power relationship that fuels the differences in disarmament perspective. What those who possess those weapons continue to justify the need to cling to them for their security there will be also, for those that don't possess them, request or research to acquire such weapons to guarantee theirs. The ultimate goal of multi-lateral disarmament effort, that it hope this panel help all of you, all of us, to have a consensus, and we got a sounding board of information and exchanges, in order to achieve the ultimate goal of disarmament. I will conclude with that and give the floor to the representative of the EastWest Institute, that has an announcement to make, and immediately after we will suspend the meeting.

W. Pal Sidhu: Thank you very much Mr. Chairman. As we suspected after such a tremendous start this morning, there has been an overwhelming response for the breakout groups this afternoon, five of which are being held in the Ford Foundation as you know.

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