Strategic Trust-Building

To view an article about Firestein's speech at Consensus Media, click here. (In Chinese)

Firestein also appeared on NTDTV earlier this year to discuss his predictions for the elections. The question up for debate was whether America may elect an unconventional candidate as President over the more traditional politicians. Firestein's remarks are in English.

Firestein commented, "I still stand by my prediction very confidently, that she [Hillary Clinton] will be the nominee, and that she will become the next U.S. president." 

For the full inteview at NTDTV, click here.

The transcript of the interview, which aired during Channel NewsAsia’s First Look Asia program, is given below. 

Interviewer: Good morning to you with us on First Look Asia. This hour, there has been a major boost for the United Nations’ struggling peacekeeping missions. At the UN General Assembly, U.S. President Barack Obama has announced that more than 50 countries have offered 30,000 new troops—and amongst them, China. Its president, Xi Jinping, says that China wants to take the lead by contributing 8,000 troops; this would make Beijing one of the largest players. Mr. Xi also offered $100 million U.S. dollars of military aid to the African Union for crisis response. And amid concerns of China’s rising military might, President Xi said that China was committed to peaceful global development. Mr. Xi’s trip to the UN caps off his weeklong visit to the U.S., and at a summit with Mr. Obama, they also vowed to fight climate change that left largely unresolved the issues of cybersecurity and the South China Sea.

Let’s speak now with Ms. Kok Piin-Fen. She’s the director of the China, East Asia and United States Program at the EastWest Institute, and she joins us today from New York. Ms. Kok, President Xi says that China is committed to peaceful world development. How much of this do you think will assuage concerns about China’s military rise and the inroads into the peacekeeping missions?

Kok: I think that to the degree that the rest of the world can see that China is putting its growing military capabilities to global good, so to speak, in the area of peacekeeping, which, as you know, China has been very active in this area for years now. So I think to that degree, some of those concerns will be assuaged. But the problem is really more in China’s immediate neighborhood where other countries in Asia are still very suspicious of its strategic intentions and what it’s planning to do with its rising military, especially on the naval front with all of the territorial disputes happening in the South China Sea and East China Sea. So in that area, it is still going to be very tricky trying to persuade China’s neighbors that its intentions are really peaceful.

Interviewer: So Ms. Kok, just picking up from there, what could China do to comfort or reassure its neighbors in Asia and abroad?

Kok: I think it needs to explain itself a little better. For example, in the South China Sea, a lot of tensions recently have just revolved around China’s actions reclaiming islands and then, after the reclamation, building all sorts of infrastructure, including military infrastructure, and now we’re looking at reports saying that it has built a third airstrip in the South China Sea. I think China needs to explain more clearly and more transparently what its strategic thinking has been behind actions such as these. And it needs to use appropriate words because, to be very honest, in the area of public diplomacy I think it’s still a bit lacking, and some of the words that the Chinese government has used thus far may have come across as disingenuous and perhaps not really constructive. 

Interviewer: Ms. Kok, now Chinese state media have hailed Mr. Xi’s visit to the U.S. as a success. But in your opinion, what were the hits and what were the misses?

Kok: The fact that neither side shied away from addressing the difficult issues such as cyber or the South China Sea, I think that was a good sign because it shows a mature relationship. They’re willing to focus not (only) on the positive or feel-good aspects of the relationship but really get together at the presidential level and be able to talk about the tough issues. 

Firestein gave his comments in Mandarin.

Click here to view the video on YouTube.

Click here to view the video on YouTube.

What will be the main points of discussion during President  Xi’s visit to the U.S.?

There are three components to President Xi Jinping's visit. First, he will be in Seattle, meeting with U.S. tech companies at the U.S.-China Internet Industry Forum, so of course there will be a lot of talk about cybersecurity. The U.S. firms will surely be seeking to raise their concerns about new Chinese legislation and regulations that restrict the way they can operate in China. 

I expect that the Chinese will in turn seek some assurance from the companies that they will comply with those legislations and regulations when doing business in China. The Chinese will also likely try to see if there is a way to win the companies over and prevent the Obama administration from going ahead with sanctions against Chinese hackers. 

The next stop will be Washington, D.C., where President Xi will meet with President Obama as well as other senior leaders from both the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. government. I think the issues discussed in DC will primarily be political and national security issues, including, again, cyber, maritime tensions, and in light of the upcoming UN summit in December—climate change. Perhaps with its upcoming presidential election in early 2016, Taiwan will be a point of discussion as well.  

They will also have a good deal of discussion on China’s economy and what’s happening there with the stock market and currency devaluation etc., as well as try to achieve more progress on the U.S.-China bilateral investment treaty. 

The last stop will be New York. It will be Xi’s first attendance at the UN General Assembly session in his position as president. While in New York, we expect him to articulate China’s vision of the world and what kind of role he sees China playing in fulfilling that vision.  

What is the public opinion in the U.S. regarding the visit?

I think the American public will view this visit in the context of three factors. First, there is considerable negative public opinion of China these days—whether you are talking about economic competition and China “stealing U.S. jobs,” or acts such as hacking, stealing intellectual property, manipulating the economy, currency and other trade practices, or increased assertiveness in foreign affairs, such as what we are currently seeing in the South China Sea. 

There is also a lot of concern about the tightening of political controls in China—the Chinese government’s clamping down on human rights, freedom of the Internet, freedom of speech, and trying to control the ability of foreign NGOs to operate in China as well. And indeed, we do see some of those negative opinions being manifested in the discourse among U.S. Presidential candidates. 

The second context would be that there has been a lot of bad economic news coming out of China recently. I think Americans would like to hear from President Xi and other Chinese officials so that they can make sense about what exactly is happening in China, with its economy, where it’s headed, and what possible effects it may have on the U.S. economy and U.S. investors doing business in China. 

Finally, the third area would be that Americans want to have a better idea of who Xi Jinping is, beyond this idea of “the strongest leader since Mao Zedong or Deng Xiaoping”-- of a country that’s communist, but also the second largest economy in the world. But I think what all this means is that the Obama administration needs to find a balance between advancing its common interests with China and trying to come up with some tangible positive outcomes, but also, at the same time, being able to take a firm position on many of these issues of concern.

 Xi Jinping needs to find that balance as well, as it is a period of vulnerability for China, its economy, politics and leadership. Questions have been arising about whether Xi Jinping and other Chinese leaders are equipped to deal with the many problems that are festering at home. During this visit, he needs to be seen by the Chinese people as a strong leader abroad--whether it’s in Washington or at the UN--advancing China’s interests and vision. At the same time, he needs to reassure the U.S. and the rest of the world that he and the Communist Party of China leadership have things under control at home, especially on the economic front.  

What role do you see the South China Sea and cybersecurity playing in the discussions?

These two topics will play a very important role in the discussions. This upcoming summit between President Obama and President Xi will be a great opportunity for the two presidents to sit down and address in a very serious and honest way their mutual concerns not only about those two issues but also regarding the other sources of tension in the bilateral relationship.  

This will also be a great opportunity for the leaders to go beyond specific problems and to clarify their respective strategic thinking behind the actions they are taking, not only regionally but also globally. 

The last presidential summit saw progress in areas such as climate change. Do you foresee any positive outcomes from this visit?

The last summit, held in Beijing in November 2014, produced several significant, tangible and groundbreaking agreements not only on climate change but also with regards to visas, tariffs on high-tech goods and military confidence-building measures. That set a high bar for the upcoming presidential summit. While it is going to be a challenge to match the level of cooperation of the previous year’s meeting in light of all the negativity surrounding current U.S.-China relations, both parties will try to produce some positive and specific outcomes this year. 

We are seeing reports over the last couple of days on a possible agreement to limit cyber attacks against critical infrastructure. I think both sides will also be seeking to build on the military confidence-building measures reached last year. Leaders of both countries will want to announce progress on the bilateral investment treaty and possibly on climate change, in order to pave the way for more constructive and productive talks in Paris at the end of the year. 

All this aside, observers and domestic constituents of both countries will also expect some progress on—or at least a concerted effort to address—the contentious issues as well, such as cybersecurity and the South China Sea. I think, especially in America, people will not deem this meeting a success if those concerns are swept under the rug simply because the leaders wanted something positive to come out of it.  

In the article, Miller writes that "Abe's statement met with mixed reviews in the region. On the one hand, the Japanese prime minister managed to satisfy some South Korean and Chinese concerns by including key phrases used in previous Japanese apologies... On the other hand, Abe's statement met with some skepticism: both the Chinese and South Korean governments questioned Abe's decision to go no further in his remarks than his predecessors had, rather than issue a new apology."

To read this article published by Foreign Affairs, click here.

Despite China’s protestations against discussing the issue, the South China Sea was front and center at this month’s meetings between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and other regional players in Kuala Lumpur. Amid criticisms of China’s island-reclamation activities, the U.S. and China continued to trade accusations that the other is militarizing the South China Sea. Meanwhile, China maintained its objection, to no avail, to internationalizing the South China Sea issue through the involvement of non-ASEAN members.

The ship has sailed on both fronts. Now, more than ever, the South China Sea has become both a military and international issue. Given how all parties appear to have dug deeper into their positions, the situation looks unlikely to change anytime soon.

While Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi told his ASEAN counterparts that China has halted its reclamation of artificial islands on atolls and reefs in disputed parts of the Spratly Islands, it is proceeding with the construction of military installations on some of those islands.

Alarmed by the unprecedented scale on which China has conducted its reclamation activities (and is seeking to project force from these reclaimed features), the U.S., the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia and others have engaged in a flurry of maritime patrols and joint exercises. The Chinese navy itself recently conducted large-scale air and sea drills, although it states that those were routine drills planned far in advance and not aimed at any third parties.

Southeast Asian countries are also building up their maritime military capabilities as part of a broader trend of increased defense spending in the region. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, defense expenditures in Southeast Asia rose by 45%, in real terms, between 2005 and 2014, reaching $35.9 billion in 2014. Vietnam, whose territorial claims overlap the most with China among all Southeast Asian claimants, increased its defense spending by 128% during this period and by 9.6% in 2014 alone.

Efforts to manage and contain tensions in the South China Sea are also now involving players beyond the territorial claimants—China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei—and, for that matter, ASEAN, which is still negotiating a code of conduct with China.

The U.S. involved itself several years ago, when then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said at an ASEAN Regional Forum meeting in Hanoi in July 2010 that the United States has a “national interest” in freedom of navigation and would be willing to facilitate multilateral talks on the South China Sea issue.

Japan, which is involved in a territorial dispute with China in the East China Sea, has lent its political support to Vietnam and the Philippines, has proposed to participate in surveillance patrols in the area, has provided a patrol vessel to Vietnam and may do likewise to the Philippines—actions that could threaten Japan’s tenuous rapprochement with China. Australia, India and most recently, Britain, have also voiced concerns about the situation in the South China Sea.

Given the $5 trillion in global trade that passes through the South China Sea, the international attention is unsurprising, especially if the ability to navigate vital shipping routes could be compromised. However, the varying definitions of “freedom of navigation,” particularly as it relates to permitted (especially military) activities in exclusive economic zones (EEZs), have been an ongoing source of contention, prompting China to articulate its position on the limits to freedom of navigation following the ASEAN meetings.

Between the U.S. and China, such differences have already given rise to several dangerous incidents at sea and in the air over the years. These include the deadly collision between a U.S. navy EP-3 surveillance plane and a Chinese J-8 fighter jet in 2001, the 2009 harassment of the USNS Impeccable by Chinese vessels, and more recently, the buzzing of a U.S. navy P-8 plane by a Chinese J-11 fighter jet in 2014. (All these episodes occurred off the coast of Hainan.)

Even as external parties have become more vocal about their concerns, they have made it a point to distinguish between taking an interest in managing the situation and choosing sides on the territorial claims themselves. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Russel drew that distinction when he remarked that the U.S. remains neutral about the merits of the sovereignty claims but is “not neutral” when it comes to the resolution of disputes in accordance with international law. Yet he has also shown how delicate that balance is, having previously publicly questioned the legal validity of the nine-dashed line, which forms the basis of China’s territorial claims.

A greater source of potential conflict is what now appears to be an increasing propensity of all parties to turn to military deterrence to defend their interests in the South China Sea. This trend will be difficult to reverse as long as each side perceives others to be raising the stakes—which makes the implementation of maritime confidence-building measures (CBMs) all the more important at this juncture.

The most significant CBM would be a binding code of conduct between ASEAN and China, negotiations on which are proceeding slowly. On the more immediate front, China and ASEAN are reportedly in discussions to establish a hotline to deal with emergencies in the South China Sea. The United States and China are making good on their November 2014 agreements on two sets of military confidence-building measures, regarding the notification of major military activities and rules of behavior for air and maritime encounters. As part of this process, both governments are aiming to agree on an annex on air-to-air encounters by September 2015, to complement the rules on at-sea encounters that have already been agreed upon.

More broadly in the region, the U.S., Chinese and other navies have begun practicing the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea during joint exercises or routine maritime operations.

But CBMs alone are not sufficient if the default position is still to undertake risky behavior. Such risky behavior could be in the form of reckless or aggressive actions by vessel crew that lead to inadvertent conflict. Tensions could also escalate when parties act on threat assessments based on suspicion or a lack of clarity regarding the other’s strategic intentions.

In short, CBMs that seek to avoid or mitigate the risk of maritime clashes need to be accompanied by efforts to facilitate an environment that constrains the tendency for conflict. Such efforts could include: toning down inflammatory rhetoric and breaking the vicious cycle of alternately ratcheting such rhetoric up and down; encouraging constructive behavior, or at least discouraging (or refraining from) provocative behavior (the latter is formalized in the ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea); and maintaining open channels of communication through which all sides are willing to explain their respective positions on the issues and talk to, not past, one another.

As the meetings in Malaysia showed, those are tougher to materialize: Harsh rhetoric abounded, and the countries could not agree on the halting of provocative actions. Yet, an alternative would be a much more dangerous scenario that would allow such differences to play out in a game of military “chicken” in and above increasingly crowded waters.

To read this piece on The Diplomat, click here.

Genscher notes that "We live in a globalized world and need the strength of all [countries] to solve the problems around us." Genscher suggests that Russia's activities in Crimea and Ukraine must be addressed, and that "If one wants to influence the other side, one has to talk to it. And, namely, without preconditions." 

For coverage of the interview published by Sputnik International, click here.

For details on the interview published by Süddeutsche Zeitung (German Edition), click here.