Southwest Asia

“The report, mandated by the U.S. Congress, is supposed to present an authoritative assessment of the threat posed to the U.S. by non-U.S. terrorist groups as well as countries designated as ‘state sponsors of terrorism.’”  Sidhu points out.  However, the report effectively absolves Pakistan from its known compliance with terrorist groups.

In contrast, the report lists Sudan as a “state sponsor of terrorism” based on the presence of three banned terrorist groups in Sudanese territory.  “By this logic, Pakistan—home to at least five of the banned terrorist organizations, including Al Qaeda, and consistently found wanting in its ability to rid its territory of these groups—would be an obvious candidate for that label,” explains Sidhu.  In addition, the report fails to acknowledge the fragility of the Pakistani state after its devastating floods

Sidhu points out that the U.S. war in Afghanistan could be the reason Pakistan escaped severe criticism, and ultimately the label of a “state sponsor of terrorism.”

“Even the most benign interpretation that the State Department was blissfully unaware of Pakistan’s links with terrorism is troubling, especially as this was public knowledge even before WikiLeaks,” Sidhu concludes.  “While all of this might well explain the surrealist nature of the report, it cannot justify it.”

Click here to read Sidhu’s article on livemint.com

"Independent analysts warned that most of the intelligence material was of questionable value coming from sources inimical to Pakistan," Sehgal writes in the Pakistani daily, suggesting that much of the information was coming from Afghan and Indian intelligence sources. He further argues that the leaked documents paint a picture of Pakistani intelligence services that is no longer accurate, pointing to Pakistan's own struggle against extremism. "There is a radical difference in the ISI that existed during the Afghan war and the ISI that exists today," he writes. "Clandestine organization like the ISI, CIA, MI-5, KGB, etc necessarily operate in grey areas. But that any would work against the best interests of the state is ridiculous."

Sehgal further argues that the media attention has unfairly focused on Pakistan despite incriminating evidence against other actors in Afghanistan. "The documents leaked by WikiLeaks include details of war crimes by the U.S. and coalition forces and the involvement of Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s family in drug smuggling," he suggests. "Yet these got only cursory media attention."

He is also disappointed by the fractured response in the United States. He applauds "U.S. lawmakers who have taken into account the tremendous sacrifices rendered by Pakistani security forces." But he lambasts pundits such as Richard Haass and Fareed Zakaria for their criticism of Pakistan, which Sehgal claims is based on politics and not policy.

"Perception is nine-tenths of media law," writes Sehgal, arguing for a concerted public relations effort to counter negative views of Pakistan.

"As a coherent platform for our national security strategy, our present media policy is quite impractical and is tilted inwards, rather than being focused externally," he concludes. "The stakes are high, a comprehensive media strategy must incorporate the new ground realities and must project Pakistan abroad by coalescing and force-multiplying the talent and potential of the private sector. The attacks on the army and the ISI have grave national repercussions for us, and they will happen again and again unless we do something."

Click here to read Sehgal's article in The News

Recently, there has been a rather tense dialogue between the Afghan government and the U.S. administration on creating a force at the village level, which can help in bringing peace and security. Creating such a force is one of the key pillars of the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan in tackling al Qaeda and the Taliban, an experiment some claim succeeded in Iraq. On the contrary, Afghans are quite worried about this development because of previous experiences and the conviction that such efforts are only short-term solutions and not a real exercise in achieving lasting peace and stability.

Experience of the Past

One of the darkest eras in Afghan history was the early ’90s. After the Soviet withdrawal, and without any serious international support, many of the resistance groups turned against each other. As a result, Afghanistan was divided into personal fiefdoms of the commanders, and there were several parallel competing militias. The holy Jihad was forgotten and a very destructive power struggle emerged. Anarchy prevailed and major Afghan cities, which were safe until the Soviet withdrawal, were destroyed. Multiple currencies were enforced into circulation by different power brokers, which saw people carrying several currencies when traveling from one region to another.

Kabul was one of the most charming cities in South Asia, but it became a ghost town in a bid for power.  Various militias controlled different parts of the city, while others bombed it to the Stone Age. In one instance, more than four hundred rockets were fired on Kabul, killing hundreds of innocent civilians within an hour. Because of the chaos and lawlessness, the Taliban prevailed, and in a very short period of time, controlled a significant area of country. One of the key reasons the Taliban succeeded in their efforts was due to the fact that they had a monopoly on forces, unlike today’s government.

The Various Approaches after 9/11

Frankly, the U.S. did not come to Afghanistan to make things right for the Afghans or learn from the lessons that emerged out of the ’80s when Afghanistan was abandoned.  Instead, the key purpose and objective was revenge against those responsible for the 9/11 attacks. As a consequence, state building was never a key priority. The light footprint approach was not what Afghans expected, and, unfortunately, the U.S. strategy resulted in the empowerment of the same people that had initially created the foundation upon which the Taliban had emerged.  

Various donors tried, half-heartedly, to establish different sectors of the Afghan security sector. In particular, the Afghan National Police was never given the necessary resources or the leadership, which was desperately needed to succeed. Since problems emerged at the outset with the police, creative ideas of parallel structures surfaced.

Several local defense programs have been tried, and, sadly, their impact has been insignificant. First, the Afghan National Auxiliary Police was established in 2006, but after two years, it was quietly brought to an end. Second, the Afghan Public Protection Program (AP3) was established in Wardak province, but, according to senior officials, it is not being replicated anywhere else, a clear implication of disappointment. Third, in mid-2009 the U.S. Special Forces created a Local Defense Initiative, now known as the Village Stability Program that plans to “secure local communities through development so they no longer provide support to the insurgents.” The objective of the program is to work with the community and not individuals separate of the community.

While each of the above programs was designed differently, at the end, they run into serious challenges of vetting, command and control and most importantly questionable loyalty.

Moving Forward

Afghanistan at this time is the longest war in the history of the United States. Many of the same problems have emerged because the West has not been able to treat the disease and instead has always found quick fixes for the symptoms. 

The objective of the United States is very clear to the Afghans: disrupt, dismantle and destroy al Qaeda. However, the only way to achieve this objective is to strengthen Afghan security institutions that will make sure Afghanistan does not become the hub of international terrorism, once again. 

In conclusion, the village force that is being debated must be part of a broader long-term stability program and has to be associated with an official entity. Alternatively, it will undermine the entire efforts of the exercise in Afghanistan, and it will further perpetuate the culture of lawlessness.

Most importantly, with a force that is a potential threat to the Afghan and international community, the U.S. objective will not be achieved.

If I was the Supreme Leader, I would be preparing now for a military attack against several of the country’s nuclear facilities. The warning signs of such an attack are mounting. My planning would proceed on several levels – diplomatic, intelligence, military and, most importantly, domestic politics.

After years of threat and sanctions against Iran, intelligence analysts face a problem in understanding just when and where the attack might happen. Richard Betts captured the essence of this problem in his 1982 book Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning, by reference to the term “wolf at the door”. After long periods of hostile rhetoric and diplomatic or military mobilization (the “wolf is at the door” and strategic warning of attack is clear), it becomes very difficult to identify the moment when (or if) the operational plan of attack is to be put into place.

The intelligence analyst is forced back on intuition and even more careful analysis. The search intensifies for the “diagnostic” keys – the pieces of evidence that the long announced threat to attack is about to executed. Timing is everything. On 6 June 2010, The New York Times reported that in February, Israel had briefed China on the severe economic consequences for it of an Israeli attack on Iran, could be one “diagnostic” key. The source was clearly an Israeli official, but does the timing of the leak have any significance?

The news story presented the secret and high level briefing as part of the diplomatic effort to convince China to support a new sanctions resolution in the United Nations Security Council. But the significance could lie elsewhere. The leak may have been intended to let people know that China has been briefed on the attack and to imply a degree of co-option or acquiescence. This has diplomatic potential to reinforce pressure on Iran but is more importantly another sign that the window for diplomacy is all but closed.

The escalating diplomatic pressure over more than five years has failed. The Israeli “wolf” is at Iran’s door. If attacked, what is Ayatollah Khamenei’s plan for mobilizing his divided country, a condition he admits (and is plain for all to see)? In a speech of 8 June on the importance of national unity, yet another one, he warned of a rare and new sensitivity to the international situation that would affect the world for generations to come.

Then comes the news that an Iranian plan to send a humanitarian aid ship flotilla to Israel would be cancelled. The Revolutionary Guards let it be known publicly on 14 June that they would not defend the ships, in spite of a promise by Khamenei’s personal representative to the Guards on 6 June that they would. A proposed mass visit of 200 Iranian members of parliament to Gaza is reportedly reduced to just be three members.

Looking for the diagnostics on Iran’s responses to the “wolf at the door”, it is possible – one can never be certain with access to so few sources of evidence – that Iran has just blinked after years of escalating threat.

Why would Iran back down now? The threat from Israel to Iran’s leaders is personal. While Israeli bombs may not target Iran’s civilian leaders individually, an Israeli attack on the country may well unseat them in the most unceremonious way. A famous study from the Cold War by Hannes Adomeit (Soviet Risk Taking and Crisis Behaviour, 1973) noted that as Soviet leaders became more politically insecure at home, they became more conservative on the international stage in terms of risk. Does this now apply to Iran?  Is it starting to think about pulling back from the looming confrontation? 

"Obama’s decision has revealed a near fatal fracture between the civilian and military leadership on the counter-insurgency strategy (COIN)," Sidhu writes, suggesting that the civilian perspective emphasizes counterterrorism with few additional troops and a clear exit date of mid-2011, while the military perspective is based on "additional boots on the ground, strict rules of engagement, and a 'need to stay the course until the job is done' attitude."

Such a rift is a major impediment to any counterinsurgency strategy, Sidhu argues. "The strategy will succeed only if military and civilian components are in sync—this has not been the case in Afghanistan," he writes.

The divide between civilian and military leaders is particularly problematic in Pakistan, where the U.S. is losing an essential struggle for influence. "Pakistan’s elite, particularly the military, has been equally taciturn, if not obstructive, in supporting the U.S. COIN efforts, especially against key elements of the Quetta Shura and the Haqqani network," he writes. "Worse, there is a resignation and helplessness in Washington regarding Islamabad’s counter-COIN strategy. The McChrystal fiasco has only exacerbated this situation and weakened Washington’s influence over its alleged ally."

"With a bickering US security establishment, a resurgent Taliban and a treacherous ally, Obama’s Af-Pak war strategy is at risk of coming apart," Sidhu concludes. "Only concerted effort at the highest levels and a lot of good luck might make this motley choir sing from the same sheet. But this might prove to be an impossible mission even for a totally focused Obama."

Click here to read Sidhu's column on livemint.com

The discussion touched upon:

• United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929, the June 2010 resolution imposing new sanctions on Iran, as the basis of new coordinated national and international measures;
• The impact of the Iran's recent agreement with Brazil and Turkey and its effect on international efforts to engage Iran; and
• The potential role of missile defense systems in the context of Iran’s evolving missile program.

Karokhail shared her thoughts in an interview with EWI.

PN: There is also an upcoming peace jirga scheduled to take place on May 29, 2010. Are female MPs involved?

SK: There will be women MPs and there will also be a few women representatives coming from the provincial councils. The civil society has also allocated seats for women and we will try to bring around fifteen women. Number-wise it’s not very bad, but we are very much concerned with the way women will be chosen to participate to the peace jirga. My suggestion, for which I was strongly advocating, was that women should be chosen by women and not by governmental organizations. If women are chosen by the government, then they will speak government‘s language and not women’s language. We cannot just send any woman to the peace jirga! What kind of woman is going to sit in the council is very important, as well as how she should speak and how she should advocate women’s rights. The final statement of the council is very important for women and we should not do something that will badly affect our achievements.

PN: Could you maybe explain to our readers what are the challenges that female MPs face in Afghanistan?

SK: The main challenge for women MPs is their lack of independence. It is very difficult to be independent, because of the many social norms and traditions that a woman has to respect. And if a woman wants to be totally independent and make decisions by herself, there is always something to remind her that as a woman she is not very respected. For example, whenever a woman had a suggestion for ministerial positions, the Commission gave much more value to men’s suggestions and just shut down women MPs.

The Afghan parliamentary system is dominated by men and they will only give support to those women that are obedient or belong to their party or fraction. Most of the time women like to be independent and have their own agenda, because we are committed not only to the Afghan people but also to women issues. But the heads of the Commissions are mostly men and they tend to work with other men and do not include women nor do they give them equal opportunities.
On the financial side also women lack independence, and this situation limits them greatly. Men MPs usually have businesses that allow them to finance their campaign and to have private security. Women don’t have this kind of facilities and this situation limits their movement. Most of the women cannot travel because of the security situation, so they are not able to campaign properly.

Another problem women MPs have is within the Parliament and amongst women themselves. Because Afghan women are new to the parliamentary rules of procedure, they lack political insight. On the contrary, men are experienced; they know how to coordinate their efforts properly or to organize their own caucuses. This is something that women should also learn: to support each other and to bridge the political divides. I truly believe that those women that will understand this will be very successful.

PN: You have spoken about security problems that female MPs face. During the elections in 2009 most of the female candidates have had serious security problems and, because of this, there were regions where there were not enough women running for seats allocated to women. Do you think that things will be different in the upcoming parliamentary elections?

SK: As mentioned, the security situation greatly affects women’s movement. But one positive change is the recent decree that President Karzai approved. The decree clearly stipulates that if women's seats get vacant, for whatever reason, then the Commission will find a mechanism to fill these seats with women candidates. The article clearly stipulates that the seats will be filled “by the same sex”, which means “women”. This situation may not be the ideal one, but this allows us to keep the quota of female MPs in the parliament unchanged.

PN: This is very good news I believe. One last question: how do you think parliamentarians around the world can mobilize their efforts to support female MPs in Afghanistan?

SK: Well, definitely there are a lot of ways in which parliamentarians around the world can support our work. I had a meeting today with a few friends from civil societies, and we all agreed that we have to support some of the women running for Parliament. Female candidates lack the necessary material for campaigning and they lack the necessary know-how to develop their speeches. The best way to help female MPs is to target them and provide them with the type of support they need.

What I have understood after four and a half years in the parliament is that the number is not important, but rather the quality of the person we are bringing in the parliament. I am convinced that ten strong women will achieve much more than fifty-eight inefficient ones. Of course if anyone needs more information about this issue, they can contact me via email.

PN: Thank you very much for taking your time to speak with us.

Writing for his fortnightly column on livemint.com, Sidhu describes two views on the recent nuclear deal. One, popular in the global South sees a new, more assertive role for successful developing countries, and the other, popular among the developed world, that sees the deal as naïve and unrealistic. The reality, he suggests, is somewhere in between.

"While it is true that both Brazil and Turkey have been more assertive in the international arena on issues well beyond their borders … they have also been cautious in their approach and have sought to work closely with the P5," he writes." The Tehran agreement is not a radical new proposal and resembles the earlier agreement that Iran has discussed with the Vienna group since October 2009."

Sidhu argues that the limited scope of the agreement highlights this deference to the five permanent members of the Security Council. "Had there been an anti-Western sentiment, the contours of the Tehran deal would have looked very different," he suggests. "Brazil might have offered to supply the enriched uranium directly, instead of reiterating that it be supplied by the Vienna group (as was envisaged in the original agreement discussed between Iran and the Vienna group)."

But despite Brazil and Turkey's efforts to accommodate the P5, the P5 has responded with its own draft resolution in the UN Security Council with a new round of sanctions against Iran. Sidhu considers this response disappointing, calling it short-sighted and indicative of "an anti-South attitude." Further, he suggests that the new resolution is unlikely to be effective. Competing demands from the U.S., China and Russia have watered it down, and, because Brazil, Turkey and Lebanon are unlikely to support the resolution, it will not be unanimous. "In this light, a resolution passed by the majority will lack credibility," Sidhu suggests. "The failure to effectively impose these sanctions will only further signal the growing weakness of the P-5 in UNSC."

Sidhu concludes with a call for a united effort. "What is abundantly clear is that to effectively address the crucial issue of Iran’s nuclear ambitions, there will have to be a combined effort of the West and key non-Western powers," he writes. "Neither one can be successful on its own."

Click here to read Sidhu's article on livemint.com

EWI Vice President W. Pal Sidhu is quoted in a Xinhua article regarding regional security in Southwest Asia, and the current state of U.S.-Afghan relations.

Click here to read the article on Xinhua News.