Strategic Trust-Building

The main common conclusions were that the joint decision to set up cooperative missile defense was only very recent (November 2010) and that all parties were working seriously at an official level to understand the full implications.

Dr. Neuneck supported Ambassador Rogozin’s call, emphasizing that NATO and Russian politicians should be fully enlightened on technical capabilities of BMD systems for better strategic decisions. He presented conclusions from a cooperative study by the Academy of Sciences in Hamburg and the IFSH (Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik) released at the end of last year. The German expert argued that it is the right moment for NATO and Russia to decide on the BMD architecture, as he considers NATO's TMD experience minimal, and joint BMD systems and architecture experience  non-existent.

Robert Bell, in an interview with the Voice of Russia before the seminar, called for an examination of lessons learned from the previous positive NATO-Russia cooperation on TMD, when good results were demonstrated on interoperability solutions and operating procedures. Applying these lessons to a new concept of cooperation on a wide area of territorial defense is now possible thanks to the progress of technology and capability of TMD to achieve a range of 3,000 kilometers.

It was stressed that a window of opportunity for closer cooperation between Russia and NATO on non-strategic missile defense was opened at the Lisbon Summit. Furthermore, participants emphasized that an agreement needs to be reached prior to the 2012 American and Russian presidential elections  in order to seize this unique opportunity.

The most serious threat of all was from nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. To address this threat, the United States and the Soviet Union relied in large part on mutual assured destruction and the deterrence imagined to flow from it. The two sides also developed large second strike capability for retaliation as extra insurance. The surprising aspect of this balance of terror was that in 1972 both sides had agreed by treaty to forego large scale development of actual defences against missiles in flight – what is called now ballistic missile defence (BMD). The idea was that by foregoing a comprehensive system of defence against in-flight missiles, the two sides would strengthen mutual deterrence.   

The international agenda for BMD is now significantly different. We are a decade into recurring controversies between Russia and the United States over the role of missile defence and tactical nuclear forces in national deterrence strategies. These disputes have been caused in large part by the United States withdrawal in 2001 from the 1972 missile defence treaty mentioned above. In Russian eyes, this move upset the balance between offence and defence in mutual nuclear deterrence since it was made by the Americans to allow them to drive towards a comprehensive system for destroying ballistic missiles in flight. In December last year, NATO announced its intention to set up a comprehensive system for missile defence, and thereby to formalize the emerging American “missile umbrella” over Europe.

Russia indicated then its readiness to work with NATO to create a pan-European system that extends well beyond NATO. The joint political decision has been taken. All parties are now working out if and how that might be executed. If the details can’t be agreed, all say they are prepared to walk away from the original consensus.

One stumbling block is that Russia does not want to be subject to a “missile umbrella” commanded or dominated by Americans. According to a January 2011 report by the U.S. Congressional Research Service, that motivation may be shared by a number of NATO members too.
Another stumbling block is that Russia needs a BMD system with global reach and wants the NATO-Russia joint effort to cover its Asian territory and potential threats across all of Asia. Since the Americans have theatre missile defence systems in East Asia, that should not be too hard. NATO members should readily accept that they can defend better against missiles coming from Asia if they rely on direct Russian involvement in the defence system. A third stumbling block is Russian insecurity about American dominance in BMD technology in coming decades.

The underlying obstacle however is lack of trust. In large part, the insecurity arises from Cold War stereotypes, but there is also a Russian neuralgia caused by American and NATO use of military force for political purposes other than national defence. A strategic signal is needed, one that can sweep away the remnants of the Cold War, address current sensitivities and establish a modicum of trust at an operational level of missile defence. It may need to be as radical as stationing of joint missile defence units on each other’s territory. 

 But there does have to be a new treaty too, one that re-connects missile defence to broader but contemporary needs of all parties for deterrence. By insisting on a treaty, Russia is not re-living the past, it is very much concerned to obtain some guarantees about its security in the future. NATO could look more closely at how it might benefit from such a treaty.

Click here to read Austin's piece in New Europe

In his recent visit to EWI, Plesch discussed his latest project, which aims to export confidence and security building measures associated with conventional weapon control in Europe to Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.

”There is a continued and growing threat to sustainable development from the uncontrolled proliferation, possession and production of major conventional armaments,” said Plesch. “There is also an increasing awareness in the international community that has risen out of the development of ongoing conventional disarmament work in the area of arms trade, landmines and small arms.”

Plesch believes that European agreements on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and the associated Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) and Open Skies regime provide a strong and unprecedented institutional model for a major expansion of collectively improved international security.

Plesch explained, “These agreements, though under threat, have provided the basis in security terms for a peace dividend where European publics pay a historically low level of around 1% of GDP on the military; it is regrettable that such agreements are one of the few sets of regulations that neither NATO nor the EU have exported to the East and South.”

Plesch’s project is intended to adopt a phased approach that expands over time. He identified the key participants in that process as regional and military experts, academics, government officials and civil society. The project’s aim, he added, is to help re-energize an international constituency capable of carrying through a realistic risk-based global confidence building and disarmament agenda based on applied international and development studies and public policy. It is also intended to put CSBMs and conventional weapons disarmament back on the international agenda to facilitate nuclear and other WMD disarmament.

“The project intends to build on humanitarian campaigns on specific weapons and on the Arms Trade Treaty,” Plesch said. Moderating the discussion, EWI Senior Associate Jacqueline McLaren Miller asked if the uniqueness of the European process and especially its Cold War roots, would hinder its applicability in other regions. In his response, Plesch explained that, as part of insuring the applicability of the European measures and the success of the project, CISD plans to host annual large scale international scoping workshops. It will also organize annual “Conferences on a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone,” a “Common Security and a Nuclear Free Zone in the Middle East Workshop,” and conduct regional feasibility studies looking at regions such as Sudan and the Cambodian-Thai border. His team also plans to develop a non-OSCE observer inspections program, and an active education and knowledge sharing program.

As part of this effort, Plesch and SOAS have been invited by the EastWest Institute (EWI) to present a panel at the Annual Worldwide Security Conference (WSC8). The conference is a platform to reframe perceptions of international security threats and opportunities, and mobilizes experts from governments, businesses, NGOs, and academia to make practical recommendations for policy change.

Plesch also briefly discussed his new book America, Hitler, and the UN, which traces the history of the United Nations from its conceptual origins in 1942 through the defeat of the Axis powers to the present.  

On the topic of the U.S.-China High-Level Political Party Leaders Dialogue, Mroz and Kok briefed Minister Yang on the second round of talks, which took place in Washington, D.C, in December 2010. This dialogue was the first ever visit to the United States by a delegation of Communist Party of China (CPC) officials, and they exchanged candid views with a distinguished U.S. delegation led by former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright (D) and former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Richard S. Williamson (R).

Minister Yang conveyed his appreciation for EWI’s meaningful contributions to improving U.S.-China relations and noted that many areas would benefit from cooperation between the United States and China.

While in Beijing, Mroz and Kok also met with the U.S. Ambassador to China, Jon Huntsman, and a number of other Chinese government officials, including those at the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPC (IDCPC), the National Defense University of the People’s Liberation Army (NDU-PLA), and the State Council Information Office (SCIO).

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The most persistent and most vocal congressional criticism of the administration focuses on economic policy, especially the issue of China’s currency policy. There is widespread concern in the United States that the Renminbi (RMB) is significantly undervalued, which has an adverse effect on U.S. trade and economic interests. In the two-plus years since Treasury secretary Tim Geithner’s confirmation hearing and his declaration (later walked back by the White House) that China was manipulating its currency, congressional critics have found the administration’s efforts sorely lacking. The administration has sought to address those concerns within the context of the larger bilateral relationship, using diplomacy to try to prod the Chinese government into appreciating the RMB. But congressional dissatisfaction has been evident in the bipartisan letters that have been sent to the administration and in aggressive proposals for legislation to pressure the Chinese and the Obama administration on currency appreciation and remedies.

Locke is certain to face some tough questions on the currency issue and other facets of economic policy closely related to his tenure as Commerce secretary. In particular, he will be pressed on perennial U.S. concerns on intellectual property rights and the U.S. trade deficit with China, which rose by more than 20 percent in 2010 over the previous year. China’s recent taking of the top manufacturing spot from the United States and the persistence of the global economic crisis ensure that economic issues will continue to be high on the agenda.

Another highly-contentious issue is China’s adherence to the Iran sanctions regime. A recent letter to President Obama from Senators Joseph Lieberman (I-CT) and Mark Kirk (R-IL), sent on the eve of the Hu-Obama summit, called China’s record on sanctions enforcement and nonproliferation “inadequate and disappointing.” Kirk has indicated that he plans to use the confirmation process to force the issue of the administration’s willingness to initiate sanctions against Chinese companies that are doing business with Iran in violation of Iran sanctions laws. And on March 10, Hillary Clinton received a letter from 10 Senators from both parties (led by Senators John Kyl (R-AZ) and Robert Menendez (D-NJ)) stating: “It appears that Chinese firms in the energy and banking sector have conducted significant activity in violation of U.S. law. We cannot afford to create the impression that China will be given free rein to conduct economic activity in Iran when more responsible nations have chosen to follow the course of action we have asked of them.”

Many senators are hardly satisfied by the administration’s claim that China has begun to improve its export control regime, especially given the latest news from Iran. A recent International Atomic Energy Agency report cited concern over Iran’s lack of engagement with the agency and fears of “possible military dimensions” of Iran’s nuclear program. All of which means that the issue will come to the fore during Locke’s hearing, raising more difficulties for the administration’s efforts to improve U.S.-China relations.

The division in the administration’s China policy is not just between the executive and legislative branches. The bilateral security relationship has also highlighted differences between some in the defense and intelligence communities on what China’s military modernization and burgeoning force-projection capabilities means for the United States. On March 10th, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper labeled both China and Russia “mortal threats” to the United States.   Although he was talking about capabilities rather than intent, Clapper’s remarks undermine the administration’s efforts to frame China as a strategic partner rather than a competitor and provide additional fodder to the administration’s critics on China. Other congressionally-mandated reports have also undermined the administration’s China message: both the Quadrennial Defense Review and the annual review of Chinese military power highlighted concerns that China’s economic and military modernization will ultimately be harmful to U.S. strategic interests. Clapper’s comments will only add to that perception.

What the consistent bipartisan congressional criticism of the administration’s China policy has shown in the past, and what the Locke confirmation process will demonstrate just as vividly, is that Obama’s efforts to improve the U.S.-China bilateral relationship will continue to be challenged at every turn. That is, unless the administration finds a way to involve Congress in the strategic trust-building process it is seeking to promote with China.

Commander Green argued that the consequences of nuclear deterrence failure – causing the detonation of even only one nuclear weapon – are catastrophic. Highlighting the potential economic, environmental, and health ramifications, he questioned why most adherents to deterrence doctrines fail to discuss or acknowledge the likely catastrophic aftermath of its failure. Commander Green also stated that nuclear deterrence is not currently, and has never been, a credible doctrine for maintaining stability in the international order. Threats such as terrorism and cyber attacks, by their very nature, cannot be deterred by nuclear weapons. Also, deterrence is not a viable solution to security threats stemming from the proliferation of nuclear weapons, technology, and material to new states, because the states seeking to develop nuclear weapon programs are unpredictable, often paranoid regimes that cannot be governed by rules of deterrence. Nuclear deterrence actually destabilizes political relationships by promoting hostility, mistrust, and arms racing.

In lieu of dangerous and ineffective deterrence doctrines, Commander Green argued that there are a number of non-nuclear security strategies that are safer, more cost-effective, human, moral, and lawful, as outlined in his 2010 book Security Without Nuclear Deterrence.

Jonathan Granoff, acting as a discussant, responded that it necessary to review the substantive arguments in favor of deterrence and the inclusion, without argument, of the doctrine in the 2010 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review. He stated that arguments in favor of deterrence are circular because they require the existence of multiple nuclear weapon states that are ready and willing-to-use weapons.  Arguments in favor of deterrence either encourage proliferation to states that feel threatened by existing arsenals or promote the ever-spreading nuclear umbrella as a means to combat those proliferation incentives.

The discussion addressed a number of questions including:

• Why is it difficult to reevaluate doctrines of nuclear deterrence in the political arena?
• Was the doctrine of nuclear deterrence actually responsible for maintaining stability during the Cold War? Or were the risks of deterrence more destabilizing towards relations?
•  Given the current security environment, which is characterized by a plethora of new emerging actors and new forms of threats, what role do nuclear weapons have in today’s world?
• Has deterrence stimulated nuclear proliferation around the world?
• What are alternative viable options to old and new security concerns besides nuclear deterrence?

The discussion concluded with recommendations for practical next steps to delegitimize nuclear deterrence in national and international security doctrines, as well as reframe the mindset upholding the value of nuclear weapons:

• Policy makers should convene a series of talks to rebuild a security framework without nuclear weapons, and thus give military planners a reassurance and sense of security in a nuclear weapons free-world.
• Outlining the numerous non-nuclear security strategies, which are safer and more cost effective, is a necessary a step to help shift the mindset towards new forms of security and stability.
• Convincing NATO to eliminate their nuclear weapons capabilities and develop a non-nuclear weapons strategy is crucial to delegitimizing nuclear weapons.
• Key actors should cooperatively persuade states under umbrellas of nuclear deterrence, in order to understand and articulate that the costs of that security umbrella far outweigh the benefits. Such a step is critical to eliminating nuclear umbrellas altogether, which in turn would facilitate further progress towards a world free of nuclear weapons.
• States such as China, Pakistan, and India have expressed interest in a Nuclear Weapons Convention. These states can act as thought leaders to also initiate talks on nuclear deterrence failure.
• Bilateral and multilateral relationships should be reevaluated to promote reassurance instead of deterrence. Such an emphasis on positive reassurance doctrines will lead to less threatening behavior and more international cooperative action.

"Not long ago at all, our partners came out actively for honest democratic elections in the Palestinian territories," Putin said. "Wonderful! Well done, lads! And it turns out Hamas wins, the same people you are calling a terrorist organization and have started to fight against." (Moscow Times).

At one level of politics, Putin’s analysis of Iran and Palestine is rational. On another level, there is a deep neuralgia in Russia about the Muslim world. Putin said that Russia was concerned about the consequences of the recent uprisings in Arab countries for Russian security. He also warned (correctly) that the events could have negative consequences for Europe. The underlying anxiety here is not unique to Mr Putin. He is showing a discomfort here many Western leaders share and that will only grow. 

The anxiety comes about because of shifting power relationships in many fields of national endeavor. On a much lower level, this was symbolized in a tantalizing way in the shock defeat of Russia by Iran (1-0) in a football friendly in Dubai on 9 February. Perhaps the patriotic, sports-loving Mr Putin was smarting from the defeat. The Dubai game, a warm-up for the Euro 2012 qualifiers, was only held in Dubai so that the Russian football federation could get the money from the TV rights involved in playing a team from the region.

More seriously though, the Putin visit to Brussels and the concerns he expressed reflect fundamental shifts in world power at a time when, with the uprisings, revolts and wars in the Muslim world, there is an historic shift under way in world politics. Russia’s relations with the European Union (EU) now look very different from three years ago. Russia has overtaken China as an economic partner of the EU and Putin is determined to make Russia and the EU partners in international security affairs as well.

At exactly the time when the world press was trumpeting the statistic that the Chinese economy had overtaken the Japanese economy, and would eventually surpass the American economy, a different data set from the IMF revealed another shift. The US economy was correctly reassigned to number two spot behind the European Union in GDP on a Purchasing Power Parity basis. And Indian GDP is within a whisker of Japan’s. The bargaining power relationships within the G20 and IMF are shifting and on the global stage have shifted in Europe’s favor.

So, the EU is not a country, some might say. Yes, but it is an “economy”, a single economy, in a world where, as a good Marxists might tell you, economics is in command. The Articles of Agreement of the IMF (Section XIII) dictate that “The principal office of the Fund shall be located in the territory of the member having the largest quota”. Well the European Union now has almost double the quota of the United States, around 30 per cent of the total for the EU compared with just over 17 per cent for the United States, and China’s un-naturally low 3.72 per cent. So the IMF headquarters really should move to Europe.

Journalistic flourishes aside, what does this growing list of re-alignments of politics and power mean? At the very least, in economic and social terms, it means that the initiative for change, the impulse for reform and the power for transformation are slipping even faster from American hands. Russia knows it and is looking for European partnership, especially to secure the southern flanks not just of Russia but of Europe as a whole.

Click here to read this piece in New Europe

Majd is both an insider and outsider to the intricate political world of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The son of an Iranian diplomat under the Shah and grandson of a powerful ayatollah, Majd grew up mainly in the United States. Although he was openly linked with the reformists and translated for former Iranian President Mohammed Khatami (a relative by marriage), Majd also translated Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's infamous 2006 United Nations speech, an experience he wrote about for the New York Observer.

In The Ayatollah’s Democracy, Majd presents a nuanced view of the contested 2009 elections in Iran, arguing that despite the resulting violence, a group of influential ayatollahs—including a liberal opposition—still believe in the ideals of the Iranian Republic. For them, Majd writes, “green represents not a revolution but a civil rights movement, pushing the country toward democracy, albeit its own particular brand of ‘Islamic democracy.’”

Looking at the recent protests in Iran, Majd told EWI that the wave of uprisings in the Middle East has affected Iran, but not to the extent that some Western commentators believe.

Unlike the governments of Tunisia and Egypt, the Islamic Republic still enjoys wide support from its citizens. Why? According to Majd, Iran’s political system is not as dictatorial as some imagine; rather, it grants its citizens some basic freedoms and has no pervasive secret police. For another, the government is a significant benefactor, employing the biggest chunk of working Iranians and providing targeted subsidies to the needy. Majd added that Iranians are the most nationalistic people in the world.

“The idea of overturning the system is anathema to many,” said Majd.

He pointed out that the leaders of the Iranian reform movement are survivors of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, and hence a part of the system. In 2009, they protested against the widespread alleged fraud surrounding the presidential elections – not to overthrow the regime. Now, their biggest concern is to make future elections fair and continue the fight for civil rights.

When asked about the role of the United States in Iran, Majd compared the State Department’s Twitter feed encouraging protests in Iran to its Arabic Twitter feed urging restraint in Egypt.
He said that the best way for the U.S.to help the Iranian opposition would be to engage with the Islamic Republic. Majd argued that normal relations between the U.S. and Iran would help remove the Islamic Republic’s leadership suspicions that the reformist movement is part of a U.S. drive to destabilize the Islamic Republic.

As Majd sees it, when the Islamic Republic’s leadership does not feel under threat, it will allow more space for reform.

The Obama Administration must figure out how to balance a healthy relationship with Turkey with its other global relationships, including with Israel. Obama visited Turkey on his first presidential overseas trip and he has friendly relations with Prime Minister Erdogan (they speak frequently by phone). Turkey’s continued economic growth makes it an attractive destination for U.S. businesses. These days, the Administration appears to be engaging Turkey by speaking a common language: trade. The Administration has developed 20-odd mutually-beneficial initiatives, including the Framework for Strategic Economic and Commercial Cooperation, an annual cabinet-level strategic dialogue to discuss new ways to enhance commercial cooperation. There are currently three bilateral mechanisms (Trade and Investment Framework Agreement, Economic Partnership Commission, Energy Working Group), co-chaired by U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk and Secretary of Commerce Gary Locke on the American side and Zafer Caglayan, Foreign Trade Minister, and Ali Babacan, Deputy Prime Minister, on the Turkish side. Other Initiatives are led by the DOE, State Department, and other agencies (see sidebar).  

Congress’s relationship with Turkey is also complicated. Two of Turkey’s neighbors, Israel and Armenia, have powerful presences on the Hill. Turkey, on the other hand, has not prioritized relations with Congress. So it is not surprising that the Mavi Marmara incident prompted a cacophonous reaction from the Hill, with some lawmakers criticizing Turkey for “growing closer in relations to Iran and more antagonistic towards the state of Israel.” Some lawmakers threatened to switch votes in favor of the Armenian Resolution (H.Res.252), which recognized the mass killing of Armenians from 1915 to 1923 as genocide. After Turkey’s “no” vote on Iran at the UN Security Council, Congress suspended negotiations for arms sales to Turkey. California Democrats Nancy Pelosi and Howard Berman, both influential voices on the Armenian Issue, have constituencies comprised of two of the largest Armenian communities in the country. It is possible that this issue may fare differently under a Republican majority. On January 7, Turkish Parliament Speaker Mehmet Ali Sahin sent a message of congratulations to newly-elected House Speaker Boehner. For the 112th Congress’s storyline, the chapter on U.S. Congress-Turkish relations has yet to be written.  

In October, EWI sent a leadership group to Turkey, Northern Iraq, and Israel, which met with senior leaders and scholars in Ankara, Erbil, and Tel Aviv on topics ranging from U.S.- Turkish relations to Turkey’s ten-year vision, the Kurdish question, and relations with Israel. Stemming from those consultations, EWI DC currently works with the Administration, the Hill, the Turkish Embassy, and several think tanks on U.S.- Turkish relations. EWI will continue to help strengthen this important partnership.