Strategic Trust-Building

NATO has a special class of partners, informally called “contact countries” or NATO’s “other partners”, all in the Asia Pacific. They “share similar strategic concerns and key Alliance values”, according to NATO, and include “Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea and New Zealand”.

In the 1980s, we often called Japan the 16th member of NATO. This de facto status hinged on the American commitment to defend Japan in the face of possible war with the Soviet Union, a circumstance that would have almost certainly involved NATO as a whole.

Fast forward to 2010, North Korea has just attacked South Korea for the second time in six months. The United States has a bilateral security treaty with South Korea. Does South Korea’s treaty relationship with the United States engage NATO on a de facto basis as committed to defend South Korea if there is an all-out war?

The UK, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Greece and Turkey sent forces to the Korean War (1950-53) to fight alongside their United States allies. (So did Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Ethiopia.) The operation was UN-sanctioned, because the Republic of China on Taiwan, and not the Peoples Republic of China, was sitting in the UN Security Council and the USSR, with veto power, had been boycotting the Security Council at the time the vote was taken. The allies (including Taiwan) went to the General Assembly in a Uniting for Peace Resolution to prevent any Soviet veto of the continuation of the UN mandate.

The world is a very different place now, more than half a century later. The UN Command in Korea may still exist formally, as South Africa was reinstated to membership of it in 2010, just last week, almost coincident with the latest North Korean attack. But the Republic of Korea continues to deepen its relations with NATO. The Foreign Minister addressed the North Atlantic Council in May 2010 after offering in April to send a Provincial Reconstruction Team to Afghanistan to join NATO-led forces there.  South Korea participated in the NATO Summit in Lisbon in November 2010 along with some 19 other partner countries.

The latest North Korean attack coincided with the visit to the South by a NATO parliamentary delegation. NATO has expressed strong concern about the attack.

In the new NATO strategic concept approved at the Summit, Asia is not a subject that gets attention even though the “Gulf” (Persian Gulf?) is.  Yet NATO appears to have made what, as a package, could be interpreted as a new formal, if fairly low-level and evolutionary commitment to Asia (and the world). “We will be open to consultation with any partner country on security issues of common concern. We will give our operational partners a structural role in shaping strategy and decisions on NATO-led missions to which they contribute.”

So what is the NATO role in Asia, and more specifically East Asia? It is hard to escape the conclusion that now, as in the 1980s, NATO remains a major determinant of the balance of military power in East Asia. This does not mean that all European members of NATO would become automatically engaged in fighting in Korea if it escalated to all war. The United States and South Korean forces would easily defeat North Korean conventional forces.

It does mean however, that leaders of NATO Europe with an interest in Korean security must now review where exactly they stand. NATO’s centrality to the latest Korean crisis as a continuing power balancer is mandated by the strong and perfectly legitimate interest of China in what may now unfold.   

Click here to read Greg Austin's piece in New Europe.

Going into the midterms, the Obama administration was confident that it could count on at least a dozen Republican votes in favor of New START.  The key to their ratification strategy was Senator Jon Kyl of Arizona, but he issued a surprise announcement on  November 16th that he did not think the treaty should be voted on this year.  Two days later, ten of the incoming Senate Republicans released a letter saying that they wanted a chance to vote on the treaty.  This was a double whammy that could crush the Obama administration’s efforts for a quick, successful vote.

A yes vote from Kyl, it was assumed, would bring along enough Republicans to assure the treaty’s ratification. His new call to delay ratification could well cause other Republicans who may have voted yes to backtrack. Bob Corker, one of the Republicans who initially voted the treaty out of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, had already said he may not support ratification. If a vote is put off until the new Congress convenes in January, the odds look even worse. For New START, it may well be a case of now or never—and never has some serious negative implications for all aspects of the U.S.-Russia relationship.

The administration is refusing to go down without a fight. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, Vice President Joe Biden, and President Obama himself, all veterans of the Senate, are continuing to lobby hard for ratification. In the Senate, they are working closely with John Kerry and Dick Lugar, the chairman and ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, respectively. And Lugar rebuked his colleagues in the Senate this week, arguing, in essence, that national security is falling victim to political considerations. The picture is further complicated by the fact that the administration may need to work both sides of the aisle because as at least one Democratic Senator, Ben Nelson of Nebraska,  has also called for delaying a ratification vote until the 112th Congress.

Among the key issues wrapped up in the debate over the treaty are U.S. ballistic missile defense plans, the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, and the broader U.S.-Russia bilateral relationship.  Some opponents of the treaty have long argued that it constrains U.S. options to deploy a ballistic missile shield. As evidence, they point to its preamble that notes the relationship between offensive and defensive strategic arms.  The Russian government appeared to give them more ammunition when it issued a unilateral statement that that any U.S. missile defense build-up that would “give rise to a threat to the strategic nuclear force potential of the Russian Federation” would justify Russia’s withdrawal from the treaty. To the skeptics, this proved their point.

But neither of these documents is legally binding and thus they do not constrain U.S. options on missile defense.  The critics also largely ignore the fact that the United States also unilaterally reserves the right to withdraw from the treaty if it feels its national interest is threatened. It’s worth recalling that it was the United States, not Russia, that  exercised such an option when it unilaterally withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002. U.S. missile defense plans have long been a highly contentious issue in the U.S.-Russian relationship and BMD was one of the main reasons that the negotiations on the New START treaty took so long. And although the Obama administration refused to go along with any concessions that would tie their hands in terms of BMD, the Russian government portrayed the treaty as doing exactly that in order to show progress on one of their key areas of concern. Russian statements that the treaty should constrain U.S. missile defense plans have thus complicated the picture for the administration.

Additional objections to the treaty arise from the suspicions of its opponents that the administration is not truly committed to the modernization of the U.S. nuclear weapons complex, which becomes all the more important as the number of weapons decreases. Yet the administration had already committed $80 billion over 10 years to ensure the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons complex—and added another $4.1 billion recently to satisfy Kyl.  Linton Brooks, who was in charge of the National Nuclear Security Administration from 2003 until 2007, proclaimed: “I would’ve killed for this kind of budget.”

A broader objection to the treaty is based on distrust of the entire reset effort with Russia. Many American critics believe their country has given away too much in its efforts to build a stronger relationship with Russia across a range of issues and received nothing in return. The Obama administration’s decision to abandon the Bush administration’s plans for a BMD system based in Poland and the Czech Republic  was seen as particularly symbolic in this regard.

But there have been concessions—and some quite significant—from the Russian side. The reset has been underpinned by mutual concessions. Under Medvedev, Russia cancelled its contract to sell S-300 SAMs to Iran, supported new sanctions against Iran for its nuclear program, and opened a supply route through Russian territory for the U.S. military effort in Afghanistan. These decisions have opened Medvedev up to domestic criticism similar to what Obama has faced—giving away too much for too little in return. If the United States does not ratify New START, Medvedev is likely to be unwilling or unable to deliver on some of the most difficult policy issues—Iran, Afghanistan, arms control.

In any honest appraisal,  the ratification of New START would not only give the United States greater insight into the Russian nuclear arsenal and vice versa, but also  greater stability and transparency. There would be  boots-on-the-ground verification,  which the United States has been forced to live without for nearly a year now. Ratification also would help promote progress on a broad range of issues of strategic interest to the United States—on, as Hillary Clinton recently enumerated, Iran, Afghanistan, nuclear nonproliferation, counterterrorism, and counternarcotics. If the treaty is not ratified, cooperation with Russia could well grind to a halt. And both Obama and Medvedev would be seen as failing to deliver on the promise of the reset.  It would be a blow to more than the two leaders’ prestige; it would also undercut U.S.-Russian relations and the prospects for further nuclear reductions anywhere. The stakes are incredibly high.

Sidhu observes that before Obama visited India, it seemed he could do nothing right – and after he visited, nothing wrong. “The reality, as always, lies somewhere in between,” writes Sidhu.

Sidhu points out that although Obama expressed support for India’s permanent membership into the United Nations Security Council, the United States alone cannot guarantee its entry: “China, which has still to fully endorse New Delhi’s case, might use its powerful veto to keep India out.” 

India also has the problem of troublesome neighbors – Afghanistan, Myanmar, Nepal and Sri Lanka – whose relationships with India will ultimately work against the country’s permanent membership into the UNSC regardless of U.S. support.  India will need to make a concerted effort to find a balance between its national interests and its international responsibilities.

Overall, U.S.-India relations are looking at a bright future, but India’s role on the UNSC will prove complicated.

“As Oscar Wilde noted, ‘There are only two tragedies in life: ones is not getting what one wants, and the other is getting it,’” quotes Sidhu. “India might suffer the latter.”

Click here to read Sidhu's article on livemint.com

Participants agreed that success in both areas is of critical importance to all three parties and the international community as a whole. But participants also pointed to lingering distrust among their countries and differences in perceptions and expectations. They stressed  the need for these three parties to seek greater clarity and transparency in order to build up the mutual strategic trust necessary for collaborative success.

These discussions were part of a two-day meeting on November 1-2, 2010, co-hosted by the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) and EWI.  Nearly 40 experts attended, including representatives from the Chinese and U.S. governments, the Policy Planning Unit in the NATO General Secretary’s office, think tanks, universities, and the private sector.

Specific recommendations in the areas of Afghanistan security and climate change talks are summarized below.

Coordinating approaches in Afghanistan and the regional impact of the security situation

Discussion on Afghanistan focused on the basis of mistrust among the three parties and the variations in perceived intentions and expectations for action. Participants generally agreed that collaboration in Afghanistan between the United States and Europe was extensive through NATO. But expectations differed as to the extent of cooperation and contributions by China in rebuilding Afghanistan, and China also expressed concern that the planned military withdrawal by NATO in the next few years would destabilize the country and region.

Policy recommendations:

• China, the United States, and Europe should look for more opportunities to collaborate in providing technical assistance for agriculture, irrigation, education, health, energy, and water resources. Specifically, China should increase its agricultural development assistance to Afghanistan. This would help  develop an labor-intensive agriculture system that would create much needed employment for Afghanistan’s rapidly increasing population. It would also  provide technical assistance to  Afghanistan’s nut crops and juice concentrates, bringing them up to world standards and to introducing them into world markets.
• More in-depth conversations among the United States, NATO, and China should be held in order to clarify misunderstandings, particularly regarding the withdrawal intentions of the U.S. and NATO, and the extent of China’s collaboration with U.S. and NATO efforts.  So as to avoid any misunderstanding or misperceptions,  the United States should actively consult with and brief the countries bordering Afghanistan (China, India, Iran, and Pakistan) before and after publicly releasing reviews on the situation in Afghanistan.
• China, the United States, and Europe should bring together senior level Track 1.5 figures to discuss detailed, action-oriented outcomes pertaining to one specific challenge in Afghanistan.
• The United States should work to improve its public image in China and Pakistan in order to minimize possible barriers to government collaboration and contributions.

Bridging the trust deficit in multilateral climate change talks

In advance of the early December 2010 United Nations climate change negotiations to take place in Cancún, Mexico,  Trialogue21 meeting participants discussed ways to build trust among countries at different stages of development and with different perceptions regarding responsibility in addressing climate change. Discussion focused on issues that caused substantive disagreement during climate talks in Copenhagen and Tianjin, in January and October 2010 respectively. These discussion areas included establishment of a system for the measurement, reporting, and verification (MRV) of emissions commitments; the transfer of clean energy technology; intellectual property rights; and climate financing.

Policy recommendations:

• The Cancún climate talks regarding the establishment of an MRV system should separate measuring and reporting from verification, and work to establish a system for measuring and reporting first.
• The climate talks in Cancún should establish an MRV system that provides incentives, including financial assistance and capacity-building, for developing countries who agree to participate in an MRV system. Developed countries should emphasize that the purpose of the MRV system would be to identify gaps in order to better provide assistance, rather than to point out problems that developing countries would be expected to fix on their own.
• Language and definitions established in the Bali Action Plan regarding MRV should be clarified and agreed upon by technical experts, and should be presented to policymakers in clear, comprehensible language.
• The international community could establish a patent pool for new carbon capture and storage technology to encourage technology transfer, like the patent created in the early stages of civil aviation development.
• To offset the media’s negative representation of negotiations, which results in poor public opinion, developed and developing countries should present the positive steps being taken to combat climate change publicly and collaboratively. For example, the United States and Europe could send fact-finding missions to China to learn from its domestic MRV system. Additionally, countries could initiate joint research, television shows, radio programs, and editorials to demonstrate cooperation in addressing climate change.
• Countries should work together to create a compendium of clean energy technology hampered by  significant barriers to technology transfer, in order to understand why the barriers exist and develop solutions.

The Fifth Trialogue21 meeting built on past meetings on regional security and clean and renewable energy, as well as events convened by EWI and CIIS this year, such as the Fourth U.S.-China High Level Security Dialogue.

After considering the potential expectations from the American and Indian perspectives, Kanwal concludes that while the expectations were not met on every level, the visit was not unsuccessful.

There were four main focus points during Obama’s visit to India: the economy, India’s candidacy for permanent UNSC membership, terrorism and defense in India and the India-Pakistan relationship. 

Obama expressed concern about U.S. outsourcing, which did not bode favorably for the U.S.: “Obama has overplayed the outsourcing card and unnecessarily targeted India as a source of job losses.”  India-U.S. trade only accounts for one percent of the 2009 U.S. trade deficit.

Regarding India’s permanent membership to the UNSC, Sibal assesses, “His words do not amount to an unqualified support for India’s claim.”
Kanwal asserts that Obama made symbolic gestures regarding terrorism in India, but merely skimmed the surface of the issue.  At the heart of this are the conflicted relationships between the U.S., Pakistan and India.

Sibal concludes that the U.S.-India relationship will continue to have its challenges, but that Obama’s visit was an overall success: “All in all, he would merit a B+ grade.”

Click here to read Sibal's piece in The Telegraph

The discussion brought together policymakers, leading experts, and diplomats to develop proposals on the best mechanisms to implement and report on progress of the Nuclear Security Summit, which was convened in April 2010 in Washington, D.C.

Speaking from the Obama administration’s perspective, Ms. Holgate outlined some fundamental principles of the Nuclear Security Summit.  She argued that nuclear terrorism, and the spread of nuclear material, is a global threat with global repercussions. Heads of state have a collective responsibility to maintain nuclear security and mitigate the risks and repercussions of nuclear terrorism.  In addition, Ms. Holgate noted that the focus of the April 2010 summit was narrowly confined to nuclear security because international institutions and frameworks exist that effectively address issues of nonproliferation, disarmament, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.  Finally, Ms. Holgate stressed that the composition of the summit involved a wide representation of states from: nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states; states with existing nuclear energy programs, those wishing to pursue nuclear energy, and states with no immediate plans to develop such programs; and signatories and non-signatories of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT).

The discussion then focused on how to deepen the political commitment to and expand participation in the summit communiqué and work plan. Specific topics that were discussed include:

1. How can the participating states track progress towards the overall goals of the summit, as well as the individual state commitments made in Washington, D.C.?
2. How can these goals and commitments best be implemented within existing institutions and agreements?
3. What topics should be addressed at the next summit, scheduled to be held in Seoul in 2012?
4. How can states not represented at the original summit in 2010 be engaged in the discussions?
5. How can international law play a larger role in guiding the summit’s communiqué and work plan?

In April 2010, U.S. President Obama convened the first global Nuclear Security Summit to “ensure that terrorists never gain access to plutonium or highly-enriched uranium.” Leaders from 47 states, the United Nations, International Atomic Energy Agency, and the European Union convened to discuss the dangers posed by the theft, loss, and illicit trafficking of nuclear materials, as well as the necessary steps to maintain the safety and security of these materials in nuclear weapons and facilities. More information on the outcome of the Nuclear Security Summit can be found at: http://www.state.gov/nuclearsummit/.

Sidhu begins by unraveling commonly-held myths correlating presidential visits to the bilateral relationship, including the idea that Republican presidents have stronger relationships with Indian leaders than Democrat presidents. Sidhu writes, “The reality, however, is far more nuanced. It is determined by domestic politics, quest for exceptionalism, lack of trust and inherent complexity of any relationship, which is becoming increasingly intertwined.”

Sidhu writes that, at its root, discord between India and the United States lies in the countries’ differing approaches to democracy and innate sense of exceptionalism – or belief that they are somehow exempt from playing by the rules.

“Indian exceptionalism is based on its rich civilizational past, its freedom movement, its leadership of the Non-Aligned Movement and its desire to be an autonomous actor in a world of alliances,” Sidhu explains. For the United States, Sidhu cites the “Bush doctrine of preventive war, which was evident in the unprovoked attack on Iraq in 2003.” 

For Sidhu, this sense of exceptionalism ultimately hinders the bilateral relationship, as it can preclude constructive international military and defense decisions. He points out, “India and the U.S. have chosen to test the limits of their exceptionalism on some of the most contentious military, nuclear and security issues on which they have had little or no interaction or serious differences. For instance, New Delhi was reluctant to accept the end-user monitoring arrangement with the U.S. (a standard even for Washington’s closest and oldest allies), which is essential for any transfer or military equipment to take place.” 

Sidhu concludes that on both sides, diplomatic efforts should extend beyond Obama’s visit to such forums as India-US Strategic Dialogue and the UN Security Council.

How will we know if Obama’s visit has been a success? “The litmus test will be the joint declaration that will follow from the visit,” Sidhu writes. “If it candidly acknowledges the challenges and opportunities, then the relationships will benefit.  Otherwise, it will be a clear signal that the relationship will descend into familiar and meaningless platitudes.”

Click here to read Sidhu's article on livemint.com

“India’s ‘strategic relationship’ with each of these countries requires tending,” states Sibal. 

Sibal discusses the formation of the India-France relationship after India’s 1998 nuclear tests: “France sensed the opportunity that had emerged to forge a strategic relationship with an independent-minded country that could be a partner in promoting multipolarity as a response to U.S. unilateralism.”

The India-Russia relationship, which had drifted during the Yeltsin years, was renewed under Putin: “Putin saw the strategic need for Russia to restore its traditional ties with India as part of a more balanced foreign policy that reflected Russia’s Asia dimension.”

The India-U.S. relationship is complicated by nuclear weapons, U.S. arms supplies to Pakistan, and the growing economic interdependence between the U.S. and China. Despite many shared values such as democracy, religious tolerance and respect for human rights, “the burden of responsibility to eliminate the negative elements from the India-U.S. relationship still remains with the U.S.,” Sibal claims. 

Sibal believes that Barack Obama should announce his support for India’s permanent membership to the Security Council during his upcoming visit, in order to strengthen the bilateral relationship.

Sibal concludes, “India would need to finely tune the balance of its defense ties with each of these strategic partners to ensure that all three contribute to India security optimally.”

Click here to read Sibal's piece in The Telegraph

The consultation brought together leading experts and diplomats to discuss how best to implement Action Point Five of the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference Final Document. Panelists and participants identified opportunities for cooperative action to promote “international stability, peace, and undiminished and increased security” and facilitate further progress towards disarmament. 

The consultation was the second in a series focused on implementing the action plan of the Final Document. On 9 September 2010, the EastWest Institute and Mission of Kazakhstan convened a high-level consultation to prioritize this ambitious action plan.  During that consultation, implementing Action Point Five emerged as the highest priority.

The October 22 session was chaired by Mr. Sergio Duarte, the United Nations High Representative for Disarmament. The panel of experts included:

• Her Excellency Byrganym Aitimova, Ambassador E. and P. and Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission of Kazakhstan to the United Nations
• His Excellency Jim McLay, Ambassador E. and P. and Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission of New Zealand to the United Nations (speech)
• Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr., Former Special Representative of the President for Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament; Executive Chairman, Board of Directors, Lightbridge Corporation (speech)
• Ambassador Christian Strohal, Permanent Representative of Austria to the United Nations in Geneva (speech)

The panel addressed the following questions:

• What are the next steps to further reduce the global stockpile of nuclear weapons? How can ongoing disarmament efforts be designed to ensure, rather than undermine, strategic stability at lower nuclear numbers?
• How can nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states work together to decrease the role of nuclear weapons in security doctrines while balancing national security interests?
• What role can non-nuclear weapon states play in building transparency and promoting confidence-building measures in ongoing disarmament discussions?

All panelists agreed that the successfully concluded 2010 NPT Review Conference, and the unanimous adoption of the Final Document, created unprecedented opportunities to accelerate progress on nuclear disarmament. The panelists also broadly concurred that future progress on disarmament depends upon operationalizing the outcomes of the Final Document in the near future. 

Recommendations from the session include:

• Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapon systems is a necessary step to facilitate future disarmament efforts. It would not only reduce the likelihood of an unauthorized or accidental launch, but also build confidence between nuclear weapon states and facilitate a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons in state and international security doctrines.
• Greater transparency must be achieved in future disarmament efforts and will help operationalize action point five. Nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states can work together to standardize reporting structures, and thus build the much needed confidence for significant reductions in nuclear arsenals. 
• Reducing numbers in an agreed and verifiable way is possible, but to achieve future progress on disarmament the United States must make progress now.  The U.S. Senate must ratify New START, and the U.S. and Russia must successfully negotiate a follow-on agreement that addresses tactical and conventional weapons.  After this process, and when the U.S. and Russian arsenals are decreased to a threshold where multilateral discussions can begin, negotiations can start that involve all nuclear weapon states.
• Recent successes in the international agenda towards disarmament and nonproliferation have created the momentum necessary to delegitimize nuclear weapons and decrease their role in state and internationals security doctrines. Nuclear weapons have no inherent military role; rather, it is their political saliency that is important.  The political saliency of nuclear weapons must be reevaluated and both non-nuclear weapon states and civil society have an important role to play in delegitimizing nuclear weapons.
• All non-nuclear weapon states should sign the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), including the additional protocols. This requires full transparency of all stages of the nuclear fuel cycle. A multilateral framework to monitor the fuel cycle would help ensure the comprehensive implementation of Article IV of the NPT Treaty.
• Maintaining strategic stability in a post-nuclear weapons-free world must be addressed as disarmament progress is made. How will strategic stability be maintained as significant reductions are made, nuclear weapons are delegitimized, and new security threats emerge? Discussions on disarmament, nonproliferation, and maintaining strategic stability should be held in tandem.

In May 2010 the signatories of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty unanimously adopted the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The document outlines a 64-point action plan on nuclear disarmament that includes concrete steps towards a nuclear weapons-free world.