Europe

European Security: Take China Seriously

Greg Austin wrote this piece for his weekly column in New Europe

China’s hard-won diplomatic gains in Europe in the last two decades are under threat. China’s position in the world of information security is taking its toll, at the same time as European apathy or even resentment towards China is growing. China’s government should act more forcefully to redress both sets of perceptions. At the same time, European institutions, including the EU and NATO, must take China more seriously as a security actor.

European businesses, especially banks and high tech companies, are becoming more hostile because of aggressive efforts coming from inside China to steal privileged information, to use the internet for criminal fraud, to penetrate key infrastructure networks and to generate spam. According to an official Chinese source, the country dealt with 48,000 cases of cyber crime in 2009. Russia’s Kaspersky Lab has identified China as the source of more than half of the world’s cyber crimes in 2009. Serious corporate leaders who are aware of cyber security threats emanating from China no longer engage in any electronic communication for business when they visit the country.

China also sees itself as a victim of large-scale international cyber crime. In June this year, China published its first Internet White Paper. In this document, China committed itself to working with international partners to fight cyber crime. European governments and their  regional organizations need to respond to this commitment and engage more effectively with China to address mutual concerns about cyber security.

Public attitudes in Europe to China are getting more negative, compared with increasingly favorable images of China in many other regions and countries (including even Japan). For example, according to a recent poll commissioned by BBC, “in Italy and Spain already low positive views [of China] have decreased by seven points so that just 14 per cent in Italy and 22 per cent in Spain view China's influence as favorable”.

In January 2010, Charles Grant of the Centre for European Reform noted that attitudes toward China were becoming “prickly”. A Pew Global Attitudes survey report released three weeks ago noted that opinion on whether China’s economic rise is beneficial reported that “majorities in Germany, France and Spain … see China’s economic strength as a bad thing for their country”. The deterioration in European views of China since 2005 revealed in the Pew data has been sharp, with the number holding negative views rising in the UK from 16 to 35 per cent and in Germany from 37 per cent to 61 per cent of those surveyed.

China’s diplomats in Europe have a job on their hands. This is complicated by the relatively small amount of political attention European leaders give to China, apart from occasional official visits. This trend toward indifference has been evident for several years in the regular EU-China summits, about which Chinese sources have often complained. More surprisingly, the European neglect of China also surfaced in the report of the Albright experts group on NATO’s new security concept. The giant Asian country on a growth trajectory got three very bland mentions in that report. The gulf between American preoccupation with China’s rise as a potential security competitor and a more benign (more indifferent?) view at government level in Europe could not be more pronounced. Who is right here?

Europeans need a more rounded and better developed view of what China is and what it holds for their future. As the cyber challenges suggest, risk management for European security (and NATO) in the next ten years may depend far more on how change unfolds in China than in any other single country in the world.

Reframing Strategic Stability in the 21st Century

On 30 June 2010 the EastWest Institute, in partnership with Wilton Park, convened the inaugural meeting of Reframing Strategic Stability in the 21st Century, a project to help ensure stability between nuclear-weapon states, at Wilton Park, UK.  The meeting brought together for the first time representatives from the original five nuclear weapon states - China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States - to discuss this critical issue and identify the parameters for this project. 

Main discussion points included:

  1. While the Cold War saw the emergence of five nuclear powers, which coincidentally are also the five permanent members of the Security Council (P5), strategic stability largely revolved around the two most powerful, the United States and the former USSR/ now the Russian Federation.  That paradigm has drastically changed to an asymmetric multipolar world, with complex inter-relations among key global powers. This project on strategic stability aims to frame the new architectural order of the post-Cold War era. 
  2. Strategic stability should be defined as “preventing war between nuclear states,” as opposed to the traditional definition  of a nuclear balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. Participants acknowledged the broad scope of strategic stability, encompassing more actors and new security threats, but agreed to maintain a narrow focus on preventing war between nuclear states. 
  3. Nuclear weapons are no longer the only issue affecting strategic stability. Many new factors are in play  in the 21st  century, including  economic interdependence, political relationships, regional conflicts, energy issues, cybersecurity, and non-nuclear sophisticated conventional systems.
  4. Participants  also discussed the scope of the project and whether  to focus only on  the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (the P5) or the eight nuclear-armed countries (the P5 and  India, Israel and Pakistan).  It was felt that given the complexity of the subject, in the  first phase of the project  a larger group of  representatives from the P5 will  analyze strategic stability primarily among their five countries, but with an eye towards the other three nuclear powers. The second phase will include representatives from  India, Israel and Pakistan and will discuss strategic stability more broadly among the eight nuclear states. 
  5. Participants noted the complexity of bilateral and multilateral relations that affect strategic stability, not just among the P5, but also their relations with other states, such as Iran. 
  6. Although the factors and relationships affecting strategic stability have expanded beyond U.S.-Soviet/U.S.-Russia  nuclear issues, the project should draw  lessons from the history of that relationship and apply them, when necessary, to other situations. Other stable relationships, such as that of France and the United Kingdom, can also provide guidance.
  7. The project will identify factors related to nuclear weapons and sophisticated conventional weapons that affect strategic stability. Such factors may include, but are not limited to:
    • Ballistic missile defense 
    • Prompt Global Strike weapons
    • Anti-submarine warfare 
    • Conventional strike capability
    • Counterforce capability
    • De-alert
    • Nuclear proliferation
    • Conditions for possible use of a nuclear weapon
    • Early-warning systems
    • Implications of reductions in nuclear weapons
    • The relationship between offense and defense  Vulnerability and survivability
  8. As the size of the P5 arsenals continue to shrink and the world makes progress towards the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons, the P5 could demonstrate an exemplary, responsible role of leadership by developing a code of conduct. A code of conduct among the nuclear-weapon states would go a long way towards meeting the obligations of the NPT article VI and would assuage the non-aligned and others who have criticized the nuclear-weapon states since the treaty entered into force for not taking sufficient steps towards nuclear disarmament. A code of conduct would be far easier to develop on a Track 2 level than at an official level. 

Links:

EWI Director Louise Richardson in the New York Times

A New York Times article features Louise Richardson, a member of EWI's Board of Directors, who is the first woman, the first non-Brit, and the first Roman Catholic to head St. Andrews University. The article highlights her role desegregating several institutions in St. Andrews and making them accessible to women.

Source
Source: 
The New York TImes
Source Author: 
Raymond Bonner

Conflict Prevention and the European External Action Service

On June 29, EWI and the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office convened a panel discussion, “European External Action Service and Conflict Prevention,” at the European Parliament. Heidi Hautala, a member of the European Parliament and Chair of its Subcommitee on Human Rights, hosted a panel of parliamentarians and civil society representatives seeking to ensure that conflict prevention becomes an integral part of the new European External Action Service (EEAS). 

The EEAS was set up in a political agreement between Europe's High Representative for Foreign Affairs, the European Council, the European Commission and the European Parliament in June 2010. The parties agreed to set up a new external action structure, one endorsed by the Lisbon Treaty, that can represent the European Union in international affairs. This action service would also include a unit to deal with conflict prevention and crisis management. But it is unclear who will staff the unit, where the resources will come from or who will pay for them. 

The panel at the European Parliament brought together civil society and parliamentarians to begin determining the practical steps necessary to create a robust and cohesive conflict prevention unit in the EEAS.  There is much to be done. But the good news, as the panel revealed, is that there is a huge willingness to work together. More than 120 members of the national and the European parliament, as well as civil society organizations working on crisis management, attended the meeting. They reaffirmed their commitment to use all their resources in a coordinated and effective way to achieve the common goal of a strong conflict prevention focus within the EEAS.

Such a focus can give the EU a global footprint in peacemaking. It is an immense opportunity to –prevent conflicts before they start and make a real, tangible difference for millions of people. It also offers the potential to better coordinate European activities and resources with the U.S. and other key actors, even on the most protracted conflicts. 

But the future effectiveness of the EEAS is still debatable, some participants argued, and its formation faces several challenges. Among them, participants identified infighting and ideological divergence among the EU member states as the most serious one. There is insufficient agreement regarding the objectives and the nature of a common foreign and security policy. There are also concerns that national governments do not regard the EEAS as a viable structure to pursue the foreign policy objectives and are not sufficiently committed to it.

Parliamentarians and civil society have a special role to play in overcoming these barriers, participants suggested. They can highlight the impact an EEAS conflict prevention unit can have on the EU's global reputation and it's ability to create positive change in the world. They can also pressure EU member states to change the skeptical perceptions of the EEAS.

Participants committed themselves to further advocacy in coming weeks. In particular, there will be a series of meetings between leading advocates for conflict prevention and senior decision makers in the cabinet of Baroness Catherine Ashton, the High Representative for the European Foreign and Security Policy, who has the ultimate responsibility to implement the agreement mandating the EEAS.

The panel discussion was an initiative of the Parliamentarians Network for Conflict Prevention and Human Security, which will continue to work with national and European members of parliament to draw the attention of EU member states to the activities and potential of the EEAS.

Protecting Terorrists: Lessons for NATO?

Greg Austin wrote this piece for his weekly column in New Europe

The chasm between certain political values in Europe and those in the United States was exposed yet again this past week in the ruling of seven judges of the European Court of Human Rights that a particular American prison regime (at ADX Florence) may be a treatment too harsh even for people who might be convicted of terrorism charges.

The Court was happy enough for four people indicted on terrorism charges to be extradited from the UK to the United States, and so dismissed a number of their pleadings. Yet the Court upheld, temporarily at least, the claims of three of them about just how ugly prison life would be for them. The court kept in place a restraining order against their extradition until it studied the matter more closely.

On top of that, the court also held that the term of imprisonment that the four faced was so long – life without parole or 50 years for one – that their appeal against extradition on those grounds alone was admissible for further hearing. The cases have been in and out of the Court beginning in 2007 for two of the applicants and since 2008 for the other two.

The European judges are troubled by the United States application of “special administrative measures” (SAMs) in the Federal Bureau of Prisons. According to the U.S. Attorney General, Eric Holder, SAMs are applied “when there is a substantial risk that a prisoner’s communications or contacts with persons could result in death or serious bodily injury” to others. The main feature of the prison regime in ADX Florence that is under challenge is a more or less permanent form of solitary confinement applied selectively to certain prisoners. Its opponents regard this as inhumane in the extreme or at best counter-productive for the purposes it is intended to serve.

Human rights organizations, doctors, criminologists and prisoners’ rights groups in the United States have long railed against the conditions in supermax prisons like ADX Florence.  It houses some 40 or so convicted terrorists and almost 400 other serious criminals.

This latest example of an Atlantic “values” gulf in the court has a lesson for NATO. There is not a strong political and social consensus in Europe that matches the commitment of United States national officials to fight international terrorism the way the American government is doing it. There is ample other evidence of this gulf in values, not least the political furore in Europe over extraordinary renditions of terrorist suspects. The same sort of divide is appearing in the policies of key NATO members in respect of fighting terrorism in Afghanistan with military forces.

What is the real problem here? NATO has seen far more serious challenges in the past to its cohesion and solidarity from differences across the Atlantic. Not too many of Europe’s citizens really feel any sympathy for the four indicted prisoners.

But the new mood at a political level may be different. There are signs that the traditional solidarity of NATO among security elites and among political and social leaders may be in some sort of serious decline. We need to study this question and, if the above diagnosis is correct, find explanations and ways to address it. More importantly, there has to be a better answer for it than we are hearing from some as to why it should still matter.

NATO solidarity matters for good reasons of hard international security that have little to do with political values. An over-emphasis on values in the new NATO security concept to the relative neglect of solving the concrete security problems as we will face them outside Europe or on its periphery in the coming decade may be to the long term detriment of NATO solidarity. 

NATO Values: Osh, CSTO, Bordyuzha

Greg Austin wrote this piece for his weekly column in New Europe

Europe’s eastern frontier (now in the heartland of Asia) has exploded in the news with almost 200 people killed in communal violence in the Osh region of Kyrgyzstan. The country is a member both of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), set up in 2002 on the basis of a 1992 treaty. The Secretary General of CSTO, Nikolai Bordyuzha, a leading Russian military and political figure, has been coordinating the main international military and security response to the Kyrgyz crisis, culminating as of June 14 in provision by CSTO of intelligence, mobility and law enforcement assets to support local authorities.

As NATO prepares its new security concept in coming months, we will begin to hear much more about Osh, the CSTO and Bordyuzha than we might have were it not for these unhappy events. Coolness in the diplomatic relationship between CSTO and NATO until now was at the background of a June 15 article in the International Herald Tribune. In a co-authored op-ed, former US Ambassador to Russia, Jim Collins, called on NATO and the United States to “look beyond old stereotypes” and offer “full cooperation and partnership with both the CSTO and OSCE” in addressing the security problems of Central Asia and Afghanistan. The authors described the CSTO as a “natural regional partner” of NATO and the United States. Collins knew to whom he was speaking. Leading officials in the Obama administration have argued forcefully against any move to closer relations with the CSTO. Many strategic analysts in the United States believe that NATO reasons for “not recognizing the CSTO are self-evident”, as an American academic commentary as recent as June 13 argued.

Russian Ambassador to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin, had complained on June 9 just days before the violence in Osh erupted, that “we do not understand those who say the CSTO represents only Russia's interests and can therefore have no contact with NATO”. The interesting dilemma is that in NATO parlance, there are grades of partnership, defined largely by where a state sits on the spectrum of full democracy. Many in NATO attach such political significance to the term “partner” that any relationship between NATO and CSTO would be like “sleeping with the enemy”. (Some CSTO members do not meet the standards NATO sets for the highest level of partnership based on degree of protection of basic political rights.) In addition, for many members of NATO, CSTO is seen as Russia-dominated and a proof that Russia has not abandoned Soviet-era imperialist ambitions toward its near abroad.

The report issued by Madeleine Albrights’s “twelve apostles” on the future NATO security concept said rather pointedly that “on the list of NATO partners, Russia is in its own category”, mentioning later that “some governments are more sceptical than others” toward Russia.

The Albright report did however urge the alliance to “forge more formal ties” with regional security organizations including CSTO. This was the second last sentence in a nine-page section on NATO partnerships, even though CSTO is NATO’s approximate counterpart in the far east of Europe.

Political relations between this or that regional organization, even military organizations, can be rather formalistic affairs. So why does it matter whether NATO and CSTO spend much time talking with each other? The answer has three parts: heartland Asia will remain vital to the security of “old Europe”; NATO does not have the political stomach to stay there militarily; and the CSTO is an emerging security actor there. One could conclude that the reasons for stronger NATO-CSTO relations are more self-evident than the arguments against.

EU Nervously Eyes Polish Election

The Smolensk tragedy was an event of enormous importance for the Poles, and may also be a key event for the EU as it awaits the results of the Presidential election. How will the deaths affect the result of this vote brought forward by three months, which at one point had looked like a shoo-in for the ruling Civic Platform’s Bronislaw Komorowski?

He is now facing the late Lech Kaczynski’s twin brother Jaroslaw, whose PiS party had looked out of the running until Lech’s death boosted it in the polls. Jaroslaw’s campaign slogan is “Poland is the most important.” Komorowski is far more pro-European, and wants early adoption of the euro single currency.
The accident has brought two fomer sworn enemies closer: Poland and Russia, and one of the stated ambitions of Poland’s EU presidency, in a year’s time, is to improve relations with the east.

“The Poles feel this acutely, the need to stabilise their relationships with the east, particularly with Russia, and to bring Russia into a more regular dialogue with the European community, with NATO,” says the EastWest Institute’s Andrew Nagorski.

Poland has long been considered pro-American above being pro-European. It hosts US missiles, and its EU membership in 2004 came five years after joining the NATO club. But that is not the whole picture says Poland’s representative at the EU

Jan Tombinski;
“The EU is where our future challenges lie. NATO membership was dictated more by our past fears, but both represent our integration into the western world’s institutions.”

Poland’s Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski agrees;

“I think the circumstances have changed. The USA no longer feels threatened by a European defence identity, quite the contrary, they would like to see a more capable europe to share the burden.”

Poland’s European identity is also bound up in its adoption of the Euro. Warsaw had previously said it would like to make the change in 2012, but the economic crisis has pushed that date back.

Jan Tombinski explains why;

“Two years ago we committed to announcing a timetable but today we’d prefer to wait a little while to benefit from a more stable and confident eurozone, and build the best entry conditions we can. I also don’t think that today the eurozone is ready to take us in.”Where Poland stands in Europe depends to a large extent on Sunday’s election, because the Polish presidency can veto legislation, and has power in the realms of defence and foreign affairs.

Copyright © 2010 euronews

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Source: 
euronews

Secret Warrior: A Journalist Unlocks her Father's Heroic History

Andrew Nagorski wrote this piece for The Weekly Standard

"I’ve always been an optimist,” Rita Cosby writes in this moving book, “but my relationship with my father was one challenge I was always pessimistic about.” The TV and radio journalist had ample grounds for that pessimism: On Christmas Eve 1983, when Rita was still a teenager, her Polish-born father announced that he was ending his 32-year marriage, leaving her Danish-born mother for another woman. “I’m moving on,” he declared. His explanation to his stunned daughter was that “life is too short not to be happy.” With that, he left to start a new family, apparently without a shred of remorse.

The man Rita knew as Richard Cosby was a civil engineer who rarely displayed any personal emotions. He was matter-of-fact about teaching Rita and her brother, Alan, about life and death. “All things have to die,” he said. “It’s part of life. Some survive and some don’t.” He didn’t take much interest in his children’s school activities or friends, and he dedicated endless time to his own physical fitness, training for the dozens of marathons he ran. When she was eight, Rita saw him return from one of his runs and take off his soaked T-shirt. She was mesmerized by a large scar on his right shoulder and then noticed several other scars, holes, and slashes scattered elsewhere across his body. When they were alone, she asked her mother whether he had been in a fight. “Your dad went through some tough times when he was growing up,” she replied. “We don’t talk about it.”

Once her father left, Rita began thinking of him as someone always on the run, trying to escape an earlier life he never discussed—or, later, the family he left behind. After her mother died of cancer, she began sorting her things and came across an old tan suitcase she had never seen before. Inside were a worn armband of the Polish resistance, a rusted POW tag with a number and “Stalag IVB” engraved on it, and an old identity card for ex-POWs bearing the name “Ryszard Kossubudzki.” At that moment, she realized that she needed to pursue her father as she would the subject of one of her stories—with the goal of finding out about his mysterious earlier life and the hope that this would finally bring them closer together.

She succeeds on both counts. She visits her father repeatedly in Alexandria, Virginia, and gets him to tell her the stories that he had resolutely avoided sharing earlier; the items in the tan suitcase broke down all the remaining barriers. Suddenly, he is sharing his memories freely—producing a vivid portrait of himself as a young resistance fighter and of Poland under German occupation.

Rita Cosby had known her father had grown up in Poland, but had no idea what had happened to him there as a teenager during the war. When the Germans invaded on September 1,1939, he was 13. Eager to fight the occupiers, he lied about his age two years later, claiming he was born in 1925 instead of 1926. Since the “Home Army” resistance didn’t accept recruits under the age of 16, this allowed him to join the burgeoning movement at 15. He never told his parents what he was doing, although they soon caught on. 

At first, the teenager with the code name “Rys”—also the Polish word for a lynx—was armed with false documents and dangerous overconfidence. Walking home on a deserted street one evening, he and a friend jumped into an empty “Germans Only” tram car. When they heard the sound of police sirens, they made a run for it—only to be caught by two German policemen. One of them slapped each of the Poles hard across the face; but then, after accepting their false papers as the real thing, ordered them to get lost. 

Rita’s father quickly learned not to underestimate the daily dangers. During the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising of 1943, he watched helplessly as one woman jumped out of the window of a nearby house engulfed in flames; the Germans had surrounded the area and were systematically destroying the buildings. Tellingly, he never mentioned such experiences when Rita was growing up, even when she was writing a paper for her eighth grade class on “Jews Under Nazi Rule.” His resistance education included the lesson that the less you talked about yourself, the better the chances of physical survival—and the more you compartmentalized your feelings, the better for your emotional health. It was a lesson he would carry with him until his daughter finally broke through his personal shell.

The richest reward in that effort is Rys’s personal account of the Warsaw Uprising in August-September 1944 when about 40,000 sparsely armed Home Army fighters tried to liberate the city by themselves. It was an astonishing display of near-suicidal courage—doomed to failure because Soviet troops refused to cross the Vistula River to help the insurgents. Stalin preferred to allow the Nazis to wipe out the Polish resisters, who were dedicated to an independent Poland that he had no intention of permitting to reappear after the war. 

The revealing glimpses of this desperate fight include a fitting tribute to the many young women who joined in that battle, often serving as couriers, a singularly dangerous job. At one point Rys found himself in the company of a 17-year-old named Henryka, who pleaded with him to spare his last bullet for her if they were about to be captured. Their brief romance, such as it was, ended when she joined several other resistance fighters in seizing a seemingly abandoned German tank; when they drove it back in triumph to their unit, it exploded—killing everyone around. The Germans had packed it with explosives before leaving it as bait. Rys rushed over but couldn’t find her remains since “suddenly there was nothing left of her life. Nothing to even say she existed.”

When the order came to evacuate, the only escape route was through the sewers. Since the Germans had already been dropping grenades and poison gas into the sewer system, it couldn’t be a more perilous journey. The Polish film director Andrzej Wajda’s famed 1957 production Kanal provides a terrifying account of one unit’s desperate attempt to escape. But Rys’s more modest description is also richly evocative:

The moment we entered, everything was swallowed by darkness, and the sounds of the battle above were instantly muffled and replaced by the eerie sound of running, dripping water. As soon as I dropped through the entrance I landed in deep filth. The smell was overwhelming. My brown suede shoes were covered in waste. For a few seconds I couldn’t move.

The resisters had to trudge single-file, holding on to each other, in total silence so the Germans wouldn’t hear them above. They worried about booby traps, grenades, and getting lost. The worst fear was to become separated from the guide, drifting into the maze of sewers and never finding a way out. Like the others, Rys had complete confidence in his guide: “I didn’t find out until much later that he was drunk the entire time,” he told his daughter. “I suppose any human being who’s reduced to trudging through darkness and filth on a daily basis for months would have to be.” 

The rest of Rys’s story—how his body was torn apart by shrapnel and it felt “like a balloon losing its air,” and his return from the near dead to his stint in a POW camp in Germany—is equally compelling. But it’s his personal account of the Warsaw Uprising that constitutes the heart of this book. It’s also what makes for an emotional return to Warsaw 65 years later, arranged by a daughter who was determined to complete the journey through his revived memories. She discovered he was supposed to be awarded the Fighter’s Cross, but never knew it. In Warsaw, he met the late President Lech Kaczynski, whose father had served in the same resistance unit, reunited with fellow survivors, and finally received the recognition he deserved.

In the process, father and daughter genuinely reconnect. “I hope I have given him the gift of a daughter’s love and the ability to release painful memories,” she writes. That she does, and it’s impossible not to feel the genuine emotion that builds throughout this story. “If I were ever at war,” she adds, “I would want my dad to have my back."

Andrew Nagorski, vice president and director of public policy at the EastWest Institute, is the author of “The Greatest Battle: Stalin, Hitler, and the Desperate Struggle for Moscow That Changed the Course of World War II.”

EWI Convenes Leaders from OSCE Countries to Ensure Euro-Atlantic Security

On June 16, 2010, EWI convened a consultation on Euro-Atlantic Security at the European Parliament in Brussels. The event, held in cooperation with the Justas Vincas Paleckis, a member of the European Parliament, was the inaugural meeting of EWI’s Eminent Person’s Group (EPG) for Euro-Atlantic Security and builds on EWI's previous work in this area.

The EPG is a group of former high-ranking political and military figures from countries in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The idea to set up the EPG was a recommendation of the EWI Experts Group and EWI's influential 2009 policy paper, Euro-Atlantic Security: One Vision, Three Paths.

The mandate of the EPG:

  1. To gain acceptance at high political levels within the OSCE and/or among its member states of new approaches to existing security disputes within the OSCE area;
  2. To identify appropriate responses, possibly through the creation of new mechanisms, to address security threats to OSCE members in a way that recognizes the principle of indivisible security across the OSCE area;
  3. To reconcile the demands of traditional security while addressing emerging threats, such as cyber attacks and other physical threats to international economic resilience (e.g. uncontrolled migration or bio-attack).

The main purpose of the EPG is to offer fresh ideas on Euro-Atlantic security to political leaders in private and sometimes in public. The EPG will operate both as a group that meets occasionally to discuss progress and as a cluster of individuals in conversation with other political leaders on a one-on-one basis to stimulate new ideas.

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