Europe

“I am not a fascist, a nazi, a terrorist, a criminal or violent. But I am constantly being forced on the defensive”. This is one piece of the evidence of a Muslim student to a Dutch court hearing race-hate charges against Geert Wilders, a member of parliament in October this year. According to Wilders: “Islam is not a religion, it's an ideology, the ideology of a retarded culture. I have a problem with Islamic tradition, culture, ideology.” In another place he says: “The Koran is a fascist book which incites violence.” He called for it to be banned, like Hitler’s book Mein Kampf.

The current Netherlands government, currently a minority government, has come to office by relying on the support of Wilders’ party. This was a sad day for democracy and for the Netherlands.

Switch to the United States and Newt Gingrich, former Republican speaker of the House of Representatives. He called Muslim organizers of a planned religious centre near Ground Zero in New York “radical Islamists” interested in “supremacy” and likened them to Nazis wanting to put up a sign beside the Holocaust memorial or Japanese wanting to put up a sign at Peal Harbor.

New York’s mayor, Michael Bloomberg, countered Gingrich by saying it would be a “sad day for America” if opponents of the planned religious centre got their way. President Obama also backed the right of the organizers of the centre to go ahead with their plans.
Islamophobia is now at the centre of national politics in a number of liberal democratic countries. It has surfaced strongly in international politics. The Organization of Islamic Conference, an international grouping of 57 countries, has initiated a global campaign against Islamophobia.  Al Qaeda has taken note of the rising hostility to Muslims and threatened retaliation for it. There is an escalating climate of fear and hate around this religion in too many places.

What is Islamophobia? According to the Runnymede Trust, it has many faces that include the following. Islam is seen “as a monolithic bloc, static and unresponsive to change”. It is seen as inferior to the West, barbaric, irrational, primitive, sexist, violent, aggressive, threatening, supportive of terrorism and engaged in a 'clash of civilizations'. It is seen as a political ideology. The Trust also noted that hostility towards Islam is used to justify discriminatory practices towards Muslims.

Runnymede, a name taken by the Trust mentioned above, is the place in Britain where the Magna Carta was signed, the document seen as one of the principal sources of political and civil rights enjoyed across Europe today. Ironically, the document was bound by its time. The first provision in it does not grant religious freedom but grants freedom to organized religion, the “Church”. That tells us something. Religion has always been highly politicized and remains so.  In fact, religious freedom (freedom of conscience) is arguably one of the last freedoms to arrive, is often the most politically contested and the most fragile. One reason is that because a religion offers potentially decisive views on what is right and wrong, all sorts of demagogues see it as very fertile ground for sowing the seeds of division and hate to produce a false flower of legitimacy for their own political goals.

The revolutions of Europe and the United States over two centuries ago were supposed to have forced the separation of state and religion, and to have guaranteed freedom of conscience. All citizens might therefore reasonably expect governments in liberal pluralist democracies (and their parliamentarians) not to implement policy or act in any way to appease religious hate or an irrational discomfort with Islam. Oppose Islamophobia, now.  

Land borders are not what they used to be. Finance and investment values are traded through the ether in what often seems like a new borderless world. Even in terms of physical borders, which of course still exist, the air borders of most countries now seem more important. High value trade comes by air cargo as do the tourist dollars. The new threats, such as pandemic and terrorism, also come across the air border more often than across dry ground. In 2009, EU countries refused entry to more than 50,000 people at their air borders.

But this relationship between air frontiers and the land is worth a second look. In 2009, Spain turned away almost 400,000 people at its land borders, and Poland just over 25,000 people. The bigger pressure for illegal migration is on the ground not by air. And of course pandemics and terrorists do cross land borders.

We can look at the changed military strategic significance of ground and air borders in a similar way. Only a few countries of the world guard their ground borders with divisions and tanks. The ground borders have definitely become much less important, relatively speaking. Modern aircraft and missiles allow attack from remote distances with little effective warning time. And as American military leaders remind us, cyber warfare capabilities allow “global strike in milliseconds”.

How do these changed relationships between air and land boundaries play out in geopolitical terms for Europe? For the moment, Europe (the EU) looks very comfortable. There are no strategic military threats from any bordering country and almost no military defence of any kind for ground borders. The one low intensity exception is Cyprus.

For NATO Europe, the picture is very different. Turkey has land borders with Iran, Iraq and Syria that present a range of low level and high level strategic risk, and an active cross-border threat of terrorism and insurgency.

For OSCE Europe, the picture becomes even more complicated. Not only does that include the Turkish frontier’s challenges, but it raises the stakes considerably. Suddenly there are “European” land borders with Afghanistan, China and North Korea.

What then is the fundamental geopolitical character of Europe’s land borders and where in strategic terms, do these borders actually sit? Few would imagine in strategic terms that the EU is the geopolitical essence of “Europe”. Surely, at the very least, Turkey is part of Europe’s land frontier.  But “strategic Europe” (OSCE Europe) might also include Russia and Ukraine at least, even if more conservative views would be ambivalent or negative about including the Central Asian states that border Afghanistan.

Who is looking after border security of “strategic Europe”? What are the common plans or concepts for geopolitical security in the arc from Antakya to Almaty (via Kirkuk and Kunduz)? As we go into the summit season (NATO in November and OSCE in December), who will take up this question?

It is very plain that the United States will not. It would be seen to be against US interests to do so. That is perhaps understandable at one level. For countries of Europe, however defined, continued collective disregard of the security of their geopolitical land borders on the east and south of both Turkey and Russia, or on the OSCE border with Afghanistan in terms of hard security planning can no longer be justified.

In the 20-30 year time frame to which defence planners must look, these frontiers may well be the biggest source of potential land-based threat to Europe. The prospects of war may remain remote. But, on a balance of reasonable probabilities, in the coming decades, this is the area where Europe’s ground forces will most likely be needed.

Participants agreed that success in both areas is of critical importance to all three parties and the international community as a whole. But participants also pointed to lingering distrust among their countries and differences in perceptions and expectations. They stressed  the need for these three parties to seek greater clarity and transparency in order to build up the mutual strategic trust necessary for collaborative success.

These discussions were part of a two-day meeting on November 1-2, 2010, co-hosted by the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) and EWI.  Nearly 40 experts attended, including representatives from the Chinese and U.S. governments, the Policy Planning Unit in the NATO General Secretary’s office, think tanks, universities, and the private sector.

Specific recommendations in the areas of Afghanistan security and climate change talks are summarized below.

Coordinating approaches in Afghanistan and the regional impact of the security situation

Discussion on Afghanistan focused on the basis of mistrust among the three parties and the variations in perceived intentions and expectations for action. Participants generally agreed that collaboration in Afghanistan between the United States and Europe was extensive through NATO. But expectations differed as to the extent of cooperation and contributions by China in rebuilding Afghanistan, and China also expressed concern that the planned military withdrawal by NATO in the next few years would destabilize the country and region.

Policy recommendations:

• China, the United States, and Europe should look for more opportunities to collaborate in providing technical assistance for agriculture, irrigation, education, health, energy, and water resources. Specifically, China should increase its agricultural development assistance to Afghanistan. This would help  develop an labor-intensive agriculture system that would create much needed employment for Afghanistan’s rapidly increasing population. It would also  provide technical assistance to  Afghanistan’s nut crops and juice concentrates, bringing them up to world standards and to introducing them into world markets.
• More in-depth conversations among the United States, NATO, and China should be held in order to clarify misunderstandings, particularly regarding the withdrawal intentions of the U.S. and NATO, and the extent of China’s collaboration with U.S. and NATO efforts.  So as to avoid any misunderstanding or misperceptions,  the United States should actively consult with and brief the countries bordering Afghanistan (China, India, Iran, and Pakistan) before and after publicly releasing reviews on the situation in Afghanistan.
• China, the United States, and Europe should bring together senior level Track 1.5 figures to discuss detailed, action-oriented outcomes pertaining to one specific challenge in Afghanistan.
• The United States should work to improve its public image in China and Pakistan in order to minimize possible barriers to government collaboration and contributions.

Bridging the trust deficit in multilateral climate change talks

In advance of the early December 2010 United Nations climate change negotiations to take place in Cancún, Mexico,  Trialogue21 meeting participants discussed ways to build trust among countries at different stages of development and with different perceptions regarding responsibility in addressing climate change. Discussion focused on issues that caused substantive disagreement during climate talks in Copenhagen and Tianjin, in January and October 2010 respectively. These discussion areas included establishment of a system for the measurement, reporting, and verification (MRV) of emissions commitments; the transfer of clean energy technology; intellectual property rights; and climate financing.

Policy recommendations:

• The Cancún climate talks regarding the establishment of an MRV system should separate measuring and reporting from verification, and work to establish a system for measuring and reporting first.
• The climate talks in Cancún should establish an MRV system that provides incentives, including financial assistance and capacity-building, for developing countries who agree to participate in an MRV system. Developed countries should emphasize that the purpose of the MRV system would be to identify gaps in order to better provide assistance, rather than to point out problems that developing countries would be expected to fix on their own.
• Language and definitions established in the Bali Action Plan regarding MRV should be clarified and agreed upon by technical experts, and should be presented to policymakers in clear, comprehensible language.
• The international community could establish a patent pool for new carbon capture and storage technology to encourage technology transfer, like the patent created in the early stages of civil aviation development.
• To offset the media’s negative representation of negotiations, which results in poor public opinion, developed and developing countries should present the positive steps being taken to combat climate change publicly and collaboratively. For example, the United States and Europe could send fact-finding missions to China to learn from its domestic MRV system. Additionally, countries could initiate joint research, television shows, radio programs, and editorials to demonstrate cooperation in addressing climate change.
• Countries should work together to create a compendium of clean energy technology hampered by  significant barriers to technology transfer, in order to understand why the barriers exist and develop solutions.

The Fifth Trialogue21 meeting built on past meetings on regional security and clean and renewable energy, as well as events convened by EWI and CIIS this year, such as the Fourth U.S.-China High Level Security Dialogue.

In August 2003, NATO took over the leadership of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan under the mandate of the United Nations. As the ISAF website notes: “The Alliance became responsible for the command, coordination and planning of the force.”

But who is running this Alliance? Where is the Allied command at political level that binds together these allies around a political strategy agreed by all of the Allies? According to ISAF, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) “provides overall coordination and political direction”, working “in close consultation” with non-NATO troop-contributing countries. The NAC meets at least weekly, often more frequently, at Ambassadorial level in Brussels, and twice yearly at Ministerial level, and occasionally at Head of State level. Is the NAC really making the political command decisions for the counter-insurgency war in Afghanistan? Should it be?

The answer is no, on both counts. The NAC is not and cannot be a supreme decision making body for the politics of war inside Afghanistan. This gap in political control and accountability for war waged by the international community needs to be fixed.

Everyone accepts the need for a clear transition from the massive intervention by NATO and other allies to a politically sustainable future premised on a self-confident and secure Afghanistan. To do this, we need a new (a genuine) political command council that is dominated not just by a handful of NATO members but by the key political players in the war, of which the Afghanistan government has to be one.
Because support from inside NATO for Afghan combat operations is weakening, the UN Allies and the NAC need to think rather urgently about creating a new structure that provides for a durable, representative and workable political command. The United States has been the pre-eminent policy designer for NATO in this war (and still runs its own independent forces in Afghanistan) but it is not a credible long-term leader for the political transition we now need. The United States, like NATO, has to pass the baton, but to whom and to what?

The answer may lie in how the main actors address the need for a second requirement: effective regional security arrangements that can counter the violent extremists using Islam as their cover. That problem has to be solved primarily by Muslim states and Muslim communities.
The only answer may be to create a new standing Council at head of state level that brings together key stakeholders from the region and the major external powers. It might comprise the UN Secretary General (as chair), Afghanistan, Pakistan, UAE, Saudi Arabia, the Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), the United States, the European Union, Russia, China and India. There would have to be a place for Iran at the table. This Council would not be a command authority for Afghanistan alone, but a political stabilization council and allied command authority for the South and West Asia regions.

The Council could devise, fund and execute a clear set of complementary political, military and economic action plans for these regions in their entirety, even if discrete elements might need to be packaged country by country according to political sensitivities and practicalities. These measures could include a Muslim Peace Corps building on the OIC’s youth initiative from 2003. The Council could serve under UN mandate for renewable periods.

This might be a path marked by controversy, division and failures, but it is the only sustainable path. Such a step would serve to force the pace on regional security cooperation in a part of the world where it is so embryonic, so mistrusted and so visibly needed.

“India’s ‘strategic relationship’ with each of these countries requires tending,” states Sibal. 

Sibal discusses the formation of the India-France relationship after India’s 1998 nuclear tests: “France sensed the opportunity that had emerged to forge a strategic relationship with an independent-minded country that could be a partner in promoting multipolarity as a response to U.S. unilateralism.”

The India-Russia relationship, which had drifted during the Yeltsin years, was renewed under Putin: “Putin saw the strategic need for Russia to restore its traditional ties with India as part of a more balanced foreign policy that reflected Russia’s Asia dimension.”

The India-U.S. relationship is complicated by nuclear weapons, U.S. arms supplies to Pakistan, and the growing economic interdependence between the U.S. and China. Despite many shared values such as democracy, religious tolerance and respect for human rights, “the burden of responsibility to eliminate the negative elements from the India-U.S. relationship still remains with the U.S.,” Sibal claims. 

Sibal believes that Barack Obama should announce his support for India’s permanent membership to the Security Council during his upcoming visit, in order to strengthen the bilateral relationship.

Sibal concludes, “India would need to finely tune the balance of its defense ties with each of these strategic partners to ensure that all three contribute to India security optimally.”

Click here to read Sibal's piece in The Telegraph

"We haven't seen in the international community much appreciation for what multilateral diplomacy in cybersecurity means," EWI Vice President Greg Austin says in an interview for Homeland Security Today. "Neither the United States nor the United Kingdom have come to terms fully what is needed globally in conversations with countries like Russia, China, and India to provide for their own national cybersecurity."

EWI Vice President Andrew Nagorski, joined NPR's Talk of the Nation to discuss the German and European sentiment towards immigration, after German Chancellor Angela Merkel said that the efforts to build a multicultural society have "utterly failed" in her country.

Listen to Andrew Nagorski’s analysis on National Public Radio’s morning show, “The Takeaway.”

Listen to Andrew Nagorski's interview on NPR's "Talk of the Nation", or read the full transcript of the program.

EWI Vice President Andrew Nagorski writes for Newsweek international November 1 issue after German Chancellor Angela Merkel said multiculturalism in Germany has “utterly failed”.