Europe

Malik is the former director of the Human Development Report Office at the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). His professional experience in development economics and implementing related programs brought a unique perspective to his presentation, which was followed by a lively question-and-answer session.

Utilizing development data and anecdotes from his time at the UNDP, Malik described how economic inequality, social stratification and uneven access to services drive otherwise peaceful people to ideological extremism and violence.

According to Malik, three important and interrelated forces that push people towards violent extremism are “exclusion, climate change and job insecurity.”

The international community needs to be more “inclusive of other perspectives and increase understanding, in order to implement more effective development policies,” said Malik. Not doing so, he said, has led to inefficient allocation of aid and pushed many in Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, toward violent extremism.

When discussing the impact of climate change on religious extremism, Malik pointed to the Syrian conflict and a drought that began in 2002 that precipitated massive job shortage, ultimately serving as a trigger for the current conflict. Malik also tied climate change issues to conflicts in Mali, Niger and even the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria.

Malik pointed out that 98 percent of the damage wrought by violent extremism occurs in developing countries. He also highlighted a study which found that 70 percent of young Taliban fighters had joined the group because it offered a rare steady job. Malik was careful to point out that job insecurity does not always lead to a rise in violent extremism, but is often a common feature of regions experiencing it.

When asked whether there were policies that do work to increase access to services and decrease inequality and stratification, Malik displayed some optimism.

“If we stop the flow of illicit money, educate the people and invest in job creation programs, we can see tremendous positive change.”

There is one very good reason why Europe and the United States should open negotiations with Russia on a new European Security Treaty. It is Kaliningrad.

The Ukraine crisis is another good reason, among several, but let’s focus on the detached Baltic province of Russia for this discussion.

The other Crimea

Kaliningrad is a piece of territory that the Soviet Union took as a war prize from Germany in 1945, sitting as an exclave of the Russian Federation between Poland and Lithuania on the Baltic Sea.

On December 16 2014, Russia confirmed months’ old rumors that it had permanently deployed nuclear-capable Iskander ballistic missiles with tactical range (400 km) in the province and that they had been there for “some time”, as long as 18 months according to one source.

Such a move was first threatened by Russia in 2008, but suspended 18 months later, in response to the once-planned and then deferred U.S. deployment of ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems in Poland and the Czech Republic.

The official confirmation from Russia about the more recent Iskander deployment in Kaliningrad followed a statement from Moscow the day before that it had the right to deploy nuclear weapons in Crimea.

In Washington, on December 17, in reply to a question from a Belarus journalist on Russia’s “right” to deploy such weapons in newly occupied territory of Crimea, the U.S. Assistant Secretary for European and Asian Affairs, Victoria Nuland, replied that “any effort to further militarize that region will be extremely dangerous and would not go unanswered”.

So Europe’s newest war now has a military nuclear dimension, and the territorial scope of this nuclear dimension now extends to the borders of Poland and the Baltic Sea.

Thank you Moscow! Thank you Washington!

The latest Kaliningrad gambit may yet prove to be a masterstroke of Russian diplomacy. (It was first conceived around 2008, the same time that Russia first began devising plans to threaten Ukraine’s future as a state if it aligned itself with NATO.)

Russia’s aim in its Kaliningrad gambit is to put on the table for Europe the risk of opening up the entire fabric of continental security, mostly de-nuclearized, that has been set in place since the end of the Cold War.

It reminds all parties of the wartime military occupation in 1945 and the tough post-war negotiations on territorial control of the Soviet Union and the Allies.

Kaliningrad had been Prussian or German territory since at least 1657 and was only surrendered on the battlefield in 1945 and in post war settlements.

The perfect plan?

Russian leaders believe that any military activity in or around Kaliningrad by them will be deeply disturbing to Europe’s most powerful and diplomatically conscious countries (Germany, Poland, France and Great Britain).

For Russia, the end point of the Kaliningrad gambit (and of the Novorossiya rebellion in Eastern Ukraine) is a new European Security Treaty which would wind the clock back to 2004, when NATO expanded eastwards to include Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, along with four other East European states.

Not everything can go back of course, but Russia wants compensations. There are three main elements to Russia’s wish list:

1. Recognition of a common military strategic space that binds together Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, a concept that is explicitly enshrined in the Minsk Treaty of 1991 between these three countries that dissolved the Soviet Union.

2. An end to U.S. ABM development and deployment without Russian participation in it.

3. Russia wants to keep Crimea.

However unrealistic these demands have seemed, and still seem, to American and European diplomats, their governments now need to contemplate just how Russia will exploit Kaliningrad to increase pressure on them to come to terms with Moscow on a new European security order.

Kaliningrad is, like Crimea, not connected by land to mother Russia. Moscow will be keen to draw parallels between the two exclaves, which are somewhat anomalous in Europe.

For most people in Europe, there is no ideological or geopolitical contest over Russian sovereignty in Kaliningrad as there is over Russian sovereignty in Crimea.

Crimea 2.0

Russia may begin to create artificial crises around access to Kaliningrad to simulate the situation Crimea now faces, with its dependence on Ukraine for water, electric power, some telecommunications and road access for people and food.

The Russian armed forces already conducted a snap military drill in Kaliningrad from December 5-10. This involved bringing all military forces in the region (airborne, army, navy, air force and missile forces) to their highest level of alert.

Notably, it also included redeployment under exercise conditions of Iskander missiles from Russia within two days.

In October 2013, Russia Today gave wide play to a Lithuanian government threat to cut off supplies to Kaliningrad if Russia continued its bellicose diplomacy toward Ukrainian partnership with the European Union.

And in May 2014, Russia unilaterally suspended its 2001 agreement with Lithuania for joint notification and inspection of military deployments.

Russia may begin to push Europe to the point where it needs to trade peace and quiet around Kaliningrad and the Baltic region for peace and quiet around (Russian-held) Crimea.

As Russia’s ambassador to the UK, Alexander Yakovenko, noted on November 13: “It is an established fact that there has been no formal post-Cold War settlement … this constitutes a major flaw with far-reaching consequences.”

Russia wants such a final settlement. Kaliningrad may be its best card to achieve it.

To read the article at The Globalist, click here

The brutal killing in Paris of Charlie Hebdo journalists dramatises once again the deeply uncivilised nature of international terrorism motivated by religious beliefs. There is no excuse for killing cartoonists in cold blood, for drawings considered offensive by members of a particular religious community.

Those offended would have every right to condemn what is - in their eyes - grossly blasphemous. They could remonstrate with the publication and the concerned authorities, take legal action, caution against provocations that alienate religious communities. But for individuals to believe that it is their religious duty to kill the “blasphemers” and administer “justice” in any jurisdiction and outside any lawful process is deeply reprehensible. To rely on a religious text or injunction to legitimise such murderous conduct is indefensible. 

Contrast 

In Charlie Hebdo’s particular case, two incompatible social and legal norms and, more generally, radically different ways of thinking are at play. From one perspective, freedom of thought is unconstrained by religious injunctions, the principle of freedom of speech is constitutionally guaranteed, and politics is freed from limits imposed by religious texts.In many ways the modern and the medieval are in contrast. The abnormal element is that the terrorists are French citizens, born and raised in the democratic culture and freedoms of this European country and exposed to its social norms. That they should have lived nonetheless within their medieval religious ghettos of thought, so alienated from their liberal environment and so much under the influence of bigoted Islamists in the distant Arabian peninsula, is remarkable. 

To link this slaughter – even while condemning it – to the backlash of the West’s war on terror is to half justify it. The moment we try to rationalise unspeakable acts, they become no longer totally condemnable.Yes, the West has militarily intervened in Islamic countries, forced regime changes there and destroyed whole societies in the name of democracy and human rights, angering many in the Islamic world.But then, several Arab states backed the elimination of Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi, and – Turkey included – support the ouster of Syria’s Hafez Assad. Today, key Gulf countries and Jordan have joined the West in air operations against the Islamic State (IS), besides taking counter-terrorism measures against the Al Qaeda in alignment the West’s war on terror. Egypt, in turn, seems determined to decimate the Muslim Brotherhood. Many Arab states have below the radar understandings with Israel and play tactical politics with the Palestinian issue. 

On the other hand, Saudi Arabia radiates the most fundamentalist Wahhabi ideology, one providing the religious compass for the kind of vengeance exacted against Charlie Hebdo. 

Complicit 

With Qatar and the UAE also complicit in expanding the hold of this extremist ideology over Muslim masses across the world, it becomes that much more difficult to bring about reforms in the practice of Islam, “modernise” it by re-interpreting its texts in the light of today’s requirements and, crucially, removing religion as a source of political and social conflict between the Islamic world and others. To add to all the complexity underpinning Islamic radicalism, it is well to remember the close political compact between the US and Saudi Arabia. So, the notion that Islamic anger against the West for its war on terror caused the butchery in Paris should be treated in a nuanced manner. 

Most importantly, the Kouachi brothers did not justify their monstrous act of killing the cartoonists by invoking the excesses of the West’s war on terror, the thousands of casualties inflicted by military operations, and the ensuing internal lawlessness and violence, or the use of torture against prisoners and the like. In any case, it would not have made any sense if they had, because then Charlie Hebdo and its cartoonists would not have been the logical targets. For them the casus belli was almost primitively religious. They were specifically avenging the insults to their prophet by Charlie Hebdo - overlooking the “insults” the cartoonists had hurled in all directions, including at the Pope and the Jews – and announced triumphantly that, with its principal cartoonists dead, the magazine was finished.

Mobilisation 

The massive public mobilisation in France against the attack on Charlie Hebdo reveals the shock felt in the country. Europe has been stirred by the enormity of the act. It is not clear, however, what this wave of anguish is directed at. Is it to convey Europe will uphold the principle of freedom of expression undeterred by threats from would-be terrorists? Does this mean preserving the space for more “offensive” cartoons against the founder of Islam? The terrorists, in any case, are not raging against “freedom of expression” in general; their aim is to intimidate those who dare to “insult” their prophet. The impact of their action across Europe would have gratified them, as their agenda has got the attention they wanted. Catharsis apart, this public mobilisation will make sense only if the intolerant features of Islam and the sources which nourish Wahhabism/ Salafism are recognised and exposed. 

Unfortunately, political correctness and concerns about a backlash against the vast majority of peace-loving and law-abiding Muslims will dissuade this. The usual cliches will be mouthed that Islam is peace loving, no religion advocates the killing of innocents and that terror has no religion, providing the usual escape route from assuming the onerous responsibility for effective international action against the terrorist menace by both the victims of terror and those at the level of states, mosques and religious institutions that protect and propagate the kind of Islam that breeds such ideological violence. One fears that it will be business as usual once the shock subsides. 

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To read the original article at the Mail Today, click here. 

Participants in the first panel, titled: “A Regional Cooperation to Address the Threat of ISIS” underlined the joint opposition of all stakeholders towards ISIS’ spread and its brutality. Participants pointed that the vacuum of authority, governance, and leadership in both Syria and Iraq—as different as the situation in these two countries may be—allowed ISIS to establish its hold in the territory spanning the border between the two countries. The alienation and subsequent marginalization and exclusion of the Iraqi Sunni community, and the failure of regional and international actors to respond appropriately to the crisis in Syria, were identified as having further fueled the group’s rise.

The current airstrikes of the “Global Coalition against ISIL,” while containing the group’s expansion militarily, were seen as at most a short-term approach in the absence of a political process that  addresses the sectarian conflict in Iraq and the lack of  apolitical solution to end the civil war in Syria. Participants acknowledged the possible negative repercussions of a prolonged military campaign that will allow ISIS to mobilize additional forces and recruits and provide the group with a perceived legitimacy resulting from its direct confrontation with the West.

While it seems necessary to contain ISIS on the battlefield, participants emphasized the need to challenge the group on an ideological level, in order to prevent it from abusing religion for its own political and territorial aims. Participants also noted that ISIS’ idea of an Islamic State that provides an alternative to the current state order has proven popular with disenfranchised and marginalized youths in the region. Additionally, ISIS has also succeeded in attracting a growing number of recruits from Western countries—an issue that deserves further studies.

Participants highlighted the importance of exploiting the convergence of interest of all regional actors in defeating ISIS, as well as the necessity of bringing all regional actors to the table to contribute to a political process, including those who have a record of supporting radical movements. For that, it is essential to understand the individual security interests of the neighboring states involved and try to find common ground. 

Participants specifically addressed the role of Turkey, noting that the reluctance of Ankara to fight ISIS militarily stems from the understandable fear of further endangering Turkey and creating more enemies in the region. ISIS has already declared Istanbul as a target for attack. A lack of defined political objectives within the coalition, especially for a solution for Syrian conflict,is also keeping Turkey on the sidelines. Furthermore, the role of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the fight against ISIS is alarming to Turkey, as it sees it acquiring weapons and expertise that the group could possibly use against the Turkish state.

The second panel, “Iran’s Foreign Policy and its Role in the Middle East,” reflected on the interests and goals that drive Iran’s policies in Iraq and Syria. The discussion emphasized that Iran is increasingly a rational actor with clear interests and objectives, regionally and internationally. ISIS presents a new challenge for Tehran, which threatens the territorial integrity of its ally in Baghdad and of the region as a whole.

Participants discussed Iran’s role in contributing to the current situation by having supported former Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki without pressuring him into adopting a more inclusive approach to governance. There was consensus that Tehran has now, however, taking a constructive role in supporting the new government of Haydar Al-Abadi, which is making strides in overcoming the sectarian divide. This influence that Iran exerts over Baghdad emphasizes the need to engage Iran in any joint regional political process aimed at countering ISIS. Participants highlighted Iran’s pragmatic current foreign policy, one that is not limited to groups or states with a particular religious belief.

Participants underlined that for Iran, the history of armed conflict with Iraq has made Iraq’s stability a foreign policy and a national security consideration of highest priority. Tehran also places a great importance on the holy Shia cites in the Iraqi cities of Najaf and Karbala and wants to ensure a secure environment that will allow Iranian pilgrims to freely visit.  

Participants accredited Iran’s efforts in denouncing violence and extremism by sponsoring the "World Against Violence and Violent Extremism” (WAVE) resolution in the UN General Assembly and hosting the WAVE Conference in Tehran in December 2014.

The discussion showcased the necessity of engaging Iran on a regional and international level. The influence Iran holds in Iraq and Syria, as well as the common interest of Iran, the United States, the EU and the Gulf States in wanting to defeat ISIS provides ample common ground for better regional cooperation.

Participants acknowledged that a permanent and satisfactory agreement, limiting Iran’s ability to produce a nuclear weapon, would allow for better cooperation between western countries, Arab states, and Iran to fight extremism and resolve other regional conflicts.

The third panel, “Europe, The EU, And Countering Violent Extremism: Internal and External Challenges,” involved representatives of various EU organs, and dealt with the current EU approach vis-à-vis the rise of ISIS, the cooperation with states in the region and the two-way flow of ISIS fighters.  

Participants acknowledged the unique threat that ISIS presents for the EU as it is the first instance a terrorist organization is in control of a substantial amount of territory in the vicinity of the European Union. Recent estimates show that 3,000 foreign fighters have traveled from Europe to join ISIS forces.

Participants highlighted the fact that European Union anti-terrorism efforts have been extended significantly both internally and externally. Increased measures have been put into effect, such as early identification of potential extremist individuals and the prevention of their travel. As the Internet is used as a major recruiting tool by ISIS aiming at European youths, EU coordination with Internet companies has increased, and more efforts are being made to detect suspicious travel to Syria and Iraq.

Participants urged that efforts by the EU must not come at the expense of human rights and civil liberties and that those measures should be coordinated with the countries of the region, in the form of intelligence sharing and through Intergovernmental Organizations like Interpol.

Participants acknowledged that Europe and the international community have to shoulder part of the blame for the rise of violent extremism, referring to inaction towards the crisis in Syria and the actions, and the unresolved nature of the Israel-Palestine conflict, which all contribute to the rise of extremism in the region.  The European Union and the international community must support a regional dialogue involving local communities with the aim to counter ISIS. 

The fourth session, “Security and Governance in a Fragile Environment: Lessons from Iraq 2003–2014,” pinpointed the failures that have been caused by domestic mismanagement and bad governance, and by the unhelpful role a number of regional and international actors played in Iraq since 2003.

Participants acknowledged that the time after the invasion of Iraq in 2003 brought with it an erosion of the Iraqi national identity and an exacerbation of sectarianism domestic tensions, triggering a process of re-tribalization and drastic weakening of a national identity. The subsequent Iraqi governments have failed to unite Iraqis and instead “clung to sect-centered elitism,” leading to great polarization and disenfranchisement, especially within the Iraqi Sunni population. Several factors led to the rise of ISIS: the lack of authority of the Iraqi central government in certain areas beyond the borders of Baghdad, especially in Sunni majority provinces; the amount of corruption in the Iraqi central governments machinery, coupled with the security vacuum left by the hasty withdrawal of US troops; and the general failure of the state.

Participants analyzed the role of the Iraqi central government under former Prime Minister Maliki, pointing out the fact that Maliki centralized power and weakened Iraq’s better working political institutions, politicized the armed forces for his own goals, and he subsequently ostracized opponents and local communities beyond Baghdad. These failures in governance, and not necessarily Sunni Iraqi’s affinity to the religious and ideological message of ISIS, led many to view the rise of ISIS as a rebellion against a government in Baghdad that they consider to be illegitimate.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Local and National

1. Encourage inclusive governance and Sunni outreach in Iraq. A domestic political process in Iraq that addresses legitimate grievances of the Iraqi Sunni population, Kurds, and other Iraqi minorities is imperative to fight the root causes of the rise of extremist groups such as ISIS.
2. Support reconciliation measurements in both Iraq and Syria.  With the enablement of the international community and regional actors, local reconciliation processes must be fostered, with the aim of finding a way forward for various parties to the conflict and crafting a unified agenda to countering extremist threats by groups like ISIS. The international community in that regard can provide logistics and know-how while leaving the local actors to take ownership of the process. (Regarding the need for political strategy for Syria see also section “International” below.)

Regional

1. Foster an inclusive regional dialogue to address the threat of extremism. There needs to be an inclusive regional dialogue, including an inter-Arab and Arab-Iranian-Turkish dialogue to address the threat of extremist groups in the region. These talks should address broader geopolitical challenges in the region that are fuelling extremist ideology and ways for reducing tensions. Such a process would be most successful with international legitimacy and consensus, especially from the United States, the Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council and the European Union.
2. Challenge ISIS on the battlefield on ideas. The military campaign against ISIS must be complemented by challenging the group on an ideological level, in order to refute the ISIS philosophy, the violence it has perpetrated and halt its recruitment. Regional, especially Muslim, allies need to coordinate a global response to this ideology on university campuses, mosques, media outlets, the Internet, prisons, social media, and refugee camps.
3. Explore the potential of cross-border Sunni dialogue. Regional Sunni partners in Jordan and the Gulf states should undertake outreach to the Sunni tribes in western Iraq in an effort to re-engineer a program similar to the Sons of Iraq program. Baghdad’s Sunni outreach can only be done effectively in cooperation with regional partners, particularly Saudi Arabia and Jordan. The United States and the international community should carefully weigh the risks and opportunities of providing military and non-military support to select tribes if they prove willing to counter ISIS.
4. Increase intelligence sharing between regional and international actors. Although the United States has a wide range of networked relationships with key Middle East intelligence services, such as with Jordan, Turkey and Saudi-Arabia, the scope and speed of ISIS’s rise came as a surprise. Effective counterterrorism efforts throughout the Middle East require a target-oriented exchange of intelligence that goes beyond these established networks.

International

1. Address humanitarian crises in the region.  The Syrian civil war has sparked one the greatest population exoduses in modern history, with more than 3 million Syrians fleeing to neighbouring countries. Inside Syria, some 6.5 million people are estimated to be displaced. The rise of ISIS has brought additional misery to minority groups in both Syria and Iraq. A coherent strategy must address how to protect minorities, alleviate the suffering of refugees, and help stabilize the countries most affected by their influx.
2. Enable reliable and capable regional partners to take the fight directly to ISIS. The United States is providing the greatest support for forces fighting ISIS. NATO and other U.S. allies should together develop a strategy to help the region counter ISIS with technical support and military assistance. This should include specific commitments to provide support to the Iraqi government, Kurdish forces and third-way opposition alternatives to the Assad regime and ISIS in Syria. At the same time, lessons learnt in the past must be taken into account in order not to “nourish false friends”.
3. Rebuild the regional and international foundations to mediate a solution to the Syrian conflict. Although peace talks in Geneva failed in early 2014, conditions should be set for a political transition in Syria. The international community should work to reinvigorate a regional contact group on the Syrian conflict to start building a foundation for new peace talks.
4. Engage the United Nations Security Council to drain the financing sources of ISIS. The UNSC should establish a Sanctions Committee against ISIS, such as the one existent to implement sanctions against Al-Qaida and individuals affiliated with it and formerly against the Taliban. UNSC financial sanctions should be put in place against individuals and organizations providing or allowing direct support to ISIS.
5. Enhance law enforcement and intelligence fusion efforts to identify and counter ISIS and other terrorist fighters holding Western passports. This should build on existing U.S.-European efforts in coordination with the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL). More than 12,000 foreign fighters are estimated to have flocked to Iraq and Syria; the dangers of extremists coming home to continue the fight with acts of terrorism cannot be ignored. Western countries should partner with allies in the Middle East and local communities on counter-radicalization efforts.
6. Engage local communities in counter-radicalization efforts. Local communities have an important role to play in counter-extremist and de-radicalization strategies in the West. Efforts should be made that counter-terrorism strategies do not further alienate and marginalize the already vulnerable elements of society who are often targets of recruitment by extremist groups.

Formerly serving as the Rector of Tbilisi State University and the former Minister of Healthcare of Georgia from 2008 to 2010, Kvitashivili brings with him a repertoire of healthcare experience with which he hopes to bring about postivie reform to Ukraine.

“I've been working on reforms in Ukraine for the last three months, but my love for this country has a much longer history," said Kvitashvili during his first speech as newly appointed Healthcare Minister. "I accepted the proposal because of my deep respect towards the nation which has a great future." 

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For more information, click here.

EWI Board Member Haifa Fahoum Al Kaylani is the newest board member of the Arab British Chamber of Commerce (ABCC) in London, after being formally nominated by the Palestinian Chamber of Commerce on December 5th. Al Kaylani will look to help the ABCC continue to enhance Arab British trade and business ties, while also pushing to improve the economic and social environment in the Palestinian territories.

To read Al Kaylani's bio, click here.