Regional Security

Afghan security forces are in one hell of a fight with Taliban insurgents this year. According to statistics compiled by an American-led coalition official in the country and seen by the New York Times, casualties rates are up 50 percent compared to the previous year.

So far 4,100 soldiers and police officers have been killed and about 7,800 wounded with months of heavy fighting still ahead. In comparison, in all of 2014 around 5,000 members of the Afghan security forces were killed battling the ongoing insurgency.

In March 2015, the commander of U.S. Forces in Afghanistan, Gen. John F. Campbell, testified  in front of the U.S. House of Representatives Armed Services Committee on the war and combat readiness of Afghan security forces (see: “Quo Vadis Afghanistan: General Campbell Testifies on the Hill”), and also discussed Afghan losses:

A high ANDSF [Afghan National Defense and Security Forces] attrition rate, which accounts for casualties and all other losses to the force, has had an impact on combat readiness. If present rates continue, it will pose challenges to force development over time. The main causes of ANDSF attrition are assessed as poor leadership; high operational tempo; inadequate soldier/police care; and poor force management.

According to a retired Afghan general interviewed by the New York Times, the current casualty rates are, among other things, caused by the lack of an offensive spirit among troops. “We are in a passive defense mode — we are not chasing the enemy. Units get surrounded, and we don’t send them support, so they are killed,” he says.

The New York Times reports that Afghan security forces are struggling to maintain a military stalemate and are slowly losing ground to extremist forces in the country:

A range of interviews with army and police commanders and regional government officials in crucial battleground areas indicated that even though the Afghan forces have nominally met their goal of maintaining a presence in every city and all but a very few district centers, they are often functionally penned in by the Taliban, rarely mounting patrols, much less taking territory back.

Nevertheless, it is unlikely that insurgent forces will be able to dislocate them from key geographical positions and major cities during this year’s fighting season.

The United States has so far spent $60.7 billion to train, equip and pay 195,000 members of the Afghan army and 157,000 members of the police force. However, as I reported before (see: “Taliban Onslaught: What Is Happening in Afghanistan?”) the number of troops and police is not reliable according to John Sopko, the special inspector general for Afghanistan reconstruction (SIGAR).

Indeed, the United States and NATO have no clear idea how many Afghan soldiers and police are currently engaged in combating Taliban insurgents (see: “Pentagon Declassifies Information on Afghan Security Forces”). The New York Times reports that desertion remains a critical problem for government forces.

A June 2015 report by the U.S. Department of Defense discussing the progress of the war in Afghanistan admits that the performance of Afghan security forces “was uneven” during combat operations.  However, the paper also points out that government forces “continue to demonstrate that they are capable and can undertake relatively sophisticated operations with minimal coalition advice and assistance.”

Additionally, the report observes:

Overall, the ANDSF’s most critical gaps remain in aviation, intelligence, and special operations, all linked to the ANDSF’s targeting capability. These gaps will endure for some time, even with the addition of key enablers. 

Last, it predicts that casualty rates will “increase in the next several months.” It appears that Afghan security forces will have a tough fight ahead of them in the next couple of months.

To read this article published by The Diplomat, click here.

Ties between Russia and Japan are slowly picking up steam again after a 16-month chill following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014. Earlier this month, Shotaro Yachi, Japan’s national security adviser, traveled to Moscow and met with his Russian counterpart to discuss President Vladimir Putin’s plans to visit Japan later this year. And despite ongoing tensions over Ukraine, there are also signs that Japan’s foreign minister, Fumio Kishida, may travel to Russia in the coming months to prepare for a potential Putin visit. Japan-Russia cooperation is also continuing on the security front with bilateral maritime security drills, focused primarily on border security, slated to take place later this month near Russia’s Sakhalin Island.

Since his election in late 2012, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has expended considerable diplomatic energy toward repairing Tokyo’s relationship with Moscow. Abe has met with Putin on numerous occasions, including two official visits to Russia. Indeed, Abe’s policy shift on Russia was so dramatic that his visit to Russia in 2013 marked the first official trip by a Japanese leader in a decade. Nevertheless, Japan still maintains a need to balance its desire to improve ties with Russia with its obligations, as a member of the G-7 and chief regional ally of the United States, to sanction Moscow for its involvement in the continuing fighting in eastern Ukraine. After Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Tokyo fell in line with its G-7 partners and implemented a limited set of economic sanctions on Moscow.

Now, even with Ukraine unresolved, Abe is looking to reinvigorate his policy embrace of Russia and maintain a nuanced approach to Putin. This push for engagement is premised on three main pillars. First, Abe remains convinced of his need to resolve the longstanding territorial dispute with Russia over the southern Kuril Islands, known as the Northern Territories to Japan. Second, both Tokyo and Moscow share a desire to enhance their energy partnership. And, finally, both sides have a strategic interest in closer relations as a potential balance or hedge against China’s rapid rise in the region.

On the island spat, there appears to be momentum toward a resolution after decades of failed discussions between the two sides. While Abe has prioritized Japan getting the islands back, he has subtly indicated his desire to compromise on Tokyo’s longstanding insistence that all four of the disputed islands be returned to Japan. Indeed, in early 2013, Abe sent former Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori to Moscow as a special envoy on territorial issues. Before his trip, Mori floated the idea of a compromise: “splitting” control of the four disputed islands. Abe has officially stepped back from such an idea, maintaining the position that all of the islands be fully returned to Japan. However, Abe knows that such a one-sided resolution would never be backed in Russia. Japan and Russia continue to have backroom discussions on a potential resolution to the islands dispute, which has resulted in the two sides failing to officially sign a peace treaty ending hostilities from World War II. The stage appears set for a grand bargain on the islands during Abe’s tenure; both sides indicate that the conditions have never been better for a breakthrough.

Moreover, in addition to talks on the island row, Abe and Putin have each announced plans for stronger economic cooperation, with a focus on bolstering Japanese investment in Russia’s far east. The two also have agreed to a more enhanced bilateral energy dialogue. Since Japan shut down its nuclear power plants after the 2011 Fukushima disaster, it has looked to Russia for energy imports, most of all liquefied natural gas. Russia quickly became one of Japan’s top energy trading partners, and plans for a gas pipeline, which have been mooted for decades, were reportedly revived last fall. That has carried over to the security front. Last year, Abe pledged Japan’s support for Russia’s counterterrorism concerns while seeking Moscow’s understanding about Japan’s defense and security reforms.

Before Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Tokyo and Moscow had agreed to regular “2+2” dialogues between their respective ministers of defense and foreign affairs. The first such meeting took place in November 2013 in Tokyo and marked a significant improvement in bilateral ties. During that meeting, both sides agreed to increase cooperation in a number of strategic areas as an initial step toward elevating the partnership. But the Ukraine crisis put a temporary moratorium on these high-level exchanges.

There is a broader strategic element to Japan-Russia relations, too. Abe’s sustained engagement with Russia is based on the conviction that improved ties with Moscow will help Japan’s economy and guard against China’s growth and assertiveness. Tokyo sees this as even more of an imperative, considering the shifting geostrategic environment in the region brought by closer ties between Moscow and Beijing. Russia, for its part, also has an interest in improving relations with Japan in order to balance its complex relationship with China and continue its own stated goal of a Russian “pivot to Asia.” 

Abe and Putin will continue to be challenged in their attempts to bolster their relationship due to external pressures created by the Ukraine crisis. But there is a new opening for a grand bargain involving the Kurils, especially as Abe suffers in the polls because of his contentious legislation to expand the role of the military, currently in the Japanese Diet. Abe may look for a diplomatic win with Russia to help soften the blow of the security bills domestically and distract critics from his polarizing security policy. 

Indeed, Abe appears to be pursuing a similar agenda with China, by improving ties with Beijing and looking for a visit there later this fall. The biggest challenge for Japan and Russia in the coming months will be for both sides to retain at least some of the momentum despite Tokyo’s sanctions against Moscow, which aren’t likely to subside anytime soon, unless in concert with its other G-7 partners. Without that larger change, Japan will be forced to maintain a balanced line with Russia going forward, one that is compartmentalized and issue-specific, but could still yield results.

To read the article published by World Politics Review, click here. 

ISIS has succeeded in developing enhanced methods of communicating their ideology and propaganda to appeal to thousands of youths from the around the world in an effort to recruit them to fight for ISIS in Syria and Iraq.

The conference, organized by the EastWest Institute in cooperation with the Hollings Center for International Dialogue, featured experts in policy, theology, deradicalization and counterterrorism practice, and social media from the Middle East, North Africa, Europe, and the U.S. Participants analyzed and debated tools and methods used for recruiting and disseminating propaganda and messaging by extremist groups, the role of religious institutions, past and present deradicalization efforts, and the conditions and challenges to crafting a successful and appealing counter-narrative to ISIS’s ideological propaganda.

The conference was followed by a public panel debate at Kadir Has University entitled “Key Strategies in Countering Extremism: Experiences from the MENA Region and Pakistan.” EWI’s Vice President for Regional Security, Amb. Martin Fleischer gave opening remarks and supporting comments were provided by Manal Omar, Vice President at United States Institute of Peace, and Shafqat Mehmood, Founder and Chairman of PAIMAN Trust Alumni. The Discussion was moderated by Serhat Güvenç, Deputy Dean of the Faculty of Economics, Administrative and Social Sciences at Kadir Has University.

*A comprehensive report will follow in the next days. 

Photographer: Ulaş Tosun

Economic and political turmoil in Ukraine has led to a significant reduction in energy consumption which should have eased the country’s key economic burden—its heavy dependence on dollar-priced hydrocarbon imports. In 2014 natural gas consumption alone went down by 16 % to 42.6 bcm, and imports fell by 8.3 bcm to 19.5 bcm. Falling demand and cheap crude also decreased Ukraine’s natural gas bill which went down from $12 billion in 2013 to $8.8 billion in 2014.

The country nevertheless continues to depend on energy imports—the energy import bill is indeed one of the most important internal economic and political challenges Ukraine faces. Almost all the proposed solutions have one common point: diversification and a shift away from dependence on Gazprom. However, these policy ideas still lack a realistic implementation plan and sound cost-benefit analysis: a fixation on import diversification has led to the neglect of domestic energy resources and a failure to promote energy saving.

So what is the solution?

Fixing Naftogaz’s deficit and improving the governance of this national champion must be the main priority of Ukraine's energy policy. The decrease of energy imports should have reduced the deficit of the national energy company Naftogaz. In reality, the deficit went up from $2 billion in 2013 to at least $7-$8 in 2014. Though non-payments and national currency devaluation have contributed to Naftogaz’s shortfall – they cannot explain the fourfold increase in the company’s deficit. Residential gas prices went up 50 % as of May 2014, industrial consumers continued to pay market-based tariffs, higher than the average price of imported gas - all this should have helped to alleviate Naftogaz’s deficit. Furthermore Naftogaz produces enough cheap gas to cover over 90% of Ukraine’s residential/heating demand. According to various media reports part of the deficit was linked to the mismanagement of production and gas flows. For example, in December 2014, Ukrainian national weekly ZN.UA published summary conclusions of the Audit Chamber of Ukraine. The report claimed that in 2011-14 period around 2 billion cubic meters per annum (bcma) produced by Ukrnafta—an upstream subsidiary of Naftogaz—were sold to private entities at the highly discounted price of $15 - $26/mcm, representing only a fraction of Ukraine’s industrial tariffs. Naftogaz was forced to source these volumes abroad paying in average $700 million per year. It is estimated that at least 3 bcm of gas produced by Naftogaz and its’ subsidiaries do not reach intended customers in residential/heating sector. Putting the house in order is therefore a clear “must”. Introduction of transparent governance is in the case is the only solution able to boost Naftogaz’s financial results and decrease its deficit.

Improvement of energy efficiency is also extremely important for Ukraine, which is in dire need of affordable energy supplies to re-launch its economic and industrial growth. According to the World Energy Council, the energy consumption of Ukraine's GDP reached 0.47 million British thermal units last year, almost four times higher than the average within the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. While some policy measures were implemented by the previous governments, introduction of energy-saving and energy-efficiency measures had been effectively blocked by lobbies of domestic energy intensive industries. In the last five years, the energy intensity of Ukraine's economy decreased only by 3.5 percent—a meager result even if compared with rather modest progress made even by its’ eastern neighbors. Energy saving is a low hanging fruit in Ukraine—it is cheap and will bring immediate results. Ukraine's energy-saving potential could reach as much as 40 - 50 percent of its current energy consumption.

Ukraine’s 'independents' is an important source of natural gas which should not be underestimated. In June-November 2014 period, Ukraine’s gas production rose by 2.1% year on year to 18.1 Bcm. This was mostly due to the performance of independent companies, whose output rose by 26.7% to 2.67 Bcm; conversely, Naftogaz’ production fell by 1% to 15.43 bcm. Independents’ output could reach 5.7 bcm by 2017 under a favorable investment-friendly tax regime.

Ukrainian government chose a different path, sharply increasing gas taxation for private producers in December 2014. The new fiscal regime clearly favours the license–holder of the large fields (e.g. Naftogaz) over smaller private enterprises and risks to undermine both the growth of independents and liberalization of Ukraine’s gas market.

These examples show that the energy reform in Ukraine stalls due to the lack of real reforms and some of the government’s actions even against the spirit of the Energy Community and liberalized energy market. While the Ukrainian leadership took some steps which shows its commitment to reforms—e.g. adoption of Third Energy Package compliant gas market law (Law N. 2250), thus breaking Naftogaz’s monopoly—Kiev has still a long way to go. However these steps should be coherent with a general fiscal and energy policy. New laws should also be working in practice and not only on paper. Increasing transparency, strengthening institutions and reducing the complexity of the legal system should be given high priority. It is up to Kiev to fully play by the European rules and not just applying them selectively.

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To read the article at the European Energy Review, click here.