Hassan was quoted in Cyprus Mail's December 19 article, "'The ‘Arab Spring’: unfinished business, ten years on."

As quoted in this article: “The toll has been terrible in terms of the destruction of social, economic and basic infrastructure,” Kawa Hassan, vice president of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Programme at the East West Institute, told the Sunday Mail. “You can’t even recognise countries like Syria and Yemen anymore.”

“The history of these protests has not been written yet,” says Hassan.

In Syria, “The inaction of the West exacerbated a disaster,” says Hassan, “giving room for regional states to intervene.”

Yet, “With great historical events like this, there is always unpredictability,” says Hassan. Few could have predicted the uprisings would happen when they did and where they did – with recent events in Sudan and Algeria also a big surprise to many.

One thing is certain, however: “The genie is out of the bottle,” says Hassan. “One thing we shouldn’t take at all for granted now, is the status quo.”

Click here to read the full article on Cyprus Mail.

Moderated by EWI Senior Program Associate Dr. Andreas Kuehn, the workshop invited international experts from government, tech industry, academia and civil society to discuss how trust and security in global ICT supply chains can be strengthened to enhance security, safety and stability in cyberspace. The workshop focused on the challenges that governments in the Global South and small and medium-sized businesses (SMBs) face as they often lack the capacity and resources to manage ICT supply chain risk effectively.

Speakers included: Dr. Philipp Amann, Head of Strategy, Europol EC3 European Cybercrime Centre; Dr. Amirudin Abdul Wahab, CEO, CyberSecurity Malaysia; Dr. Salah Baïna, Professor, ENSIAS Engineer School of Computer Science and System Analysis, Morocco; Dr. Katherine Getao, CEO, ICT Authority Kenya; and Anastasiya Kazakova, Public Affairs Manager, Kaspersky.

Please find a recording of the panel here. A report and a commentary of the workshop are also available.

On December 1, the EastWest Institute (EWI) and the Center for Applied Research in Partnership with the Orient (CARPO) hosted the ninth “Brussels MENA Briefing”—a series of after-work briefings on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region—on “Kuwait and the post-Sheikh Sabah Era.” 

Speakers included Vice Admiral (ret.) Ahmad Al-Mulla, advisor to the Kuwaiti Ministry of Defense, and Dr. Courtney Freer, assistant professorial research fellow at the Middle East Center of the London School of Economics. Well-known experts on the Persian Gulf region and members of the European policy community virtually attended this briefing, which was held under the Chatham House Rule.

Speakers began by highlighting the main accomplishments of Kuwait’s late Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Shabah. Among them, his efforts towards women empowerment, strategic development policies and a neutral foreign policy aimed at protecting Kuwait from conflicts in its immediate neighborhood stood out for the speakers—in particular, Kuwait’s neutrality as a country located in the “triangle of danger” between Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran. Many top officials perceived Sheikh Sabah as a “humanitarian leader” with Kuwait being on the forefront of financial aid and the coordination of donor conferences for countries in conflict. 

Both speakers held that the legacy Sheikh Sabah leaves behind cannot be filled by his successor and half-brother Sheikh Nawaf Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah alone; the entire Kuwaiti political establishment must invest in continuing the path outlined by the late Sheikh Sabah. Speakers noted that Sheikh Nawaf has left the Kuwaiti cabinet untouched—an important indicator for demonstrating his commitment to ensuring continuity.

Among the most important challenges ahead, speakers emphasized the need to tackle comprehensively endemic corruption in both the private and public sectors . The economic transformations in light of the country’s demography, the changing geopolitics of energy and the severe impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on Kuwait’s various business sectors require strategic and long-lasting readjustment policies.  

One speaker observed that Kuwait’s parliament is representative of the ethnic and sectarian diversity of the nation, a unique characteristic that ought  to be safeguarded. Participants held that this domestic pluralism entails a pluralistic foreign policy approach, which seeks to balance conflicting interests. This diversity is illustrated in the country’s tolerance of the political presense of the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as its leniency towards  a powerful Shia parliamentary faction. Both experts argued that these disparate  political fractions impact the country’s foreign policy—for instance, in its overall pan-Arab outlook, as well as its continued support for the Palestinian cause. 

Considering the country’s efforts to “nationalize” the Kuwait private and public sector, one speaker pointed out that it remains to be seen whether this process will change public political attitudes, impacting the future composition of the parliament. Given the importance of this process, both speakers held that Sheikh Nawaf will be well-advised to not view his reign as a one-man show, but to seek the involvement of Kuwait’s entire political class.

Dates for upcoming Brussels MENA Briefings:

Tuesday, February 2, 2021: Topic to be confirmed

Event Reports from Previous Briefings:

The Biden Administration’s Middle East Policy and Transatlantic Relations

The Economic Dimension of the Conflict in Yemen 

Jordanian Foreign Policy in Light of Regional Geopolitical Shifts

How to Rescue Sudan’s Transition Process?

A New Iraqi Government in Place: Challenges and Opportunities for Iraq in its Neighborhood

The Status Quo of the Libyan Conflict: Is the Berlin Process Obsolete? 

Post-Sultan Qaboos Oman: Transition Opportunities and Challenges

Iran After Parliamentary Elections

On November 30, the EastWest Institute (EWI), together with its partners at the German Chambers of Commerce in Algiers and Casablanca (AHKs), held a webinar entitled “The Startup Industry: Challenges and Opportunities for Cooperation”—the fifth in a series of virtual meetings as part of EWI’s ongoing Algeria-Morocco Business Dialogue. The webinar brought together six entrepreneurs, three Algerian and three Moroccan, to take part in a cross-border business dialogue aiming to promote greater economic connectivity between the two countries in the startup sector.

The Startup Industry

Startup initiatives are a relatively new phenomenon within the Maghreb, with regional countries varying their measures to cultivate a thriving ecosystem for young businesses. Numerous startups have sprung up throughout the region recently, especially the three main countries of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, as innovative leaders pursue sustainable and inclusive approaches to their respective country’s development. As a new generation of workers begin to graduate from university, the region is experiencing a growing trend of fresh graduates increasingly seeking opportunities in the private sector instead of applying to safer governmental jobs in the public sector—a characteristic of previous generations. This growing entrepreneurial spirit not only needs to be harnessed, but must be actively encouraged so regional states can diversify their markets and explore new streams of revenue.  

The respective startup ecosystems in Algeria and Morocco are experiencing disparate levels of success. In Algeria, there remains plenty of room for government intervention in terms of promoting innovation and seeking means to attract investments. Local investors are familiar with bureaucratic hurdles to conducting business in the country, resulting in the negative conviction that the local startup ecosystem lacks the capacity to scale up. Morocco, on the other hand, boasts a more vibrant startup ecosystem with the country increasing its Global Entrepreneurship Index (GEM) from 5.6 to 8.8 percent between 2017 and 2018. Nevertheless, this is offset by the fact the country failed to continue this trajectory into 2019 as a lack of promotion and a culture of risk-aversion hindered the country’s burgeoning startup industry. 

Local Experience

The webinar assembled startup entrepreneurs from across a wide spectrum of business interests, including renewable energies, logistics management, communications and IT and digital solutions. Each of the startups represented differed in their business life span, ranging from eight years to only one month. This enabled EWI and its partners at the AHKs to ask a range of questions pertaining to the different stages of development required for founding a new business in the region, as well as the trials and tribulations which inevitably accompany such an endeavor in the world’s least economically integrated region. 

Consistent with previous webinars under the framework of  the Algeria-Morocco Business Dialogue, participant testimonies affirm that opportunities for business collaboration across the border are rare. All the entrepreneurs present discussed their various projects in Europe, sub-Saharan Africa and North America, yet not one participant had any current avenues of business in the respective neighboring country. From an economic perspective, the current state of affairs is immensely counterproductive given the proximity, similarities in culture, shared desire of young graduates to develop startups, and market complementarity between the two countries. 

It must be noted however, that this dearth of bilateral trade is not a result of lack of trying from the perspective of business leaders on the ground. During the webinar and in previous project meetings, participants attested to a distinct lack of knowledge and trust in the respective markets on each side of the border. With this in mind, EWI, the AHKs and the participants of the webinar composed the following policy recommendations to help identify means to kickstart better commercial relations. 

Recommendations

Pool resources: A major concern for one of the participants who worked in digital solutions for the transport sector was the incurred cost due to a lack of synchronization between companies in the same industry. Companies on either side of the border possess the capacities to make operations more cost-efficient and environmental. However, to move beyond this current state of affairs, Algerian and Moroccan organizations need to pool resources to overcome this fragmentation.

Foster a more cooperative culture: In order to pool resources and develop more efficient and environmentally friendly operational practices, local companies must address the lack of trust, which currently hinders the region unlocking its economic potential. Fostering a culture of cooperation requires the sharing of information so organizations on either side of the border understand each other’s markets and learn how to navigate administrative bottlenecks and bureaucratic hurdles. 

Build on current successes: Despite the dire analyses of multiple international institutions regarding regional integration, there are some cooperation success stories in the Maghreb. The energy sector presents one of the flagship cooperation sectors in the region. This should act as a launching pad to explore new avenues of cooperation, such as joint regulation or an interconnected network of production lines. Startups could offer local assistance in developing these initiatives. 

Learn from the Tunisian model: Both Algerian and Moroccan participants praised Tunisian initiatives in the startup industry, which could act as a successful regional model in their respective countries to develop a healthier ecosystem for upcoming enterprises. Tunisian startups formed an association to harness their collective bargaining power to lobby the government in granting them economic subsidies and advantages. To date, there is no such Moroccan or Algerian union for startups to lobby for their collective needs. 

Encourage market access: The inability of both Algerian and Moroccan startups to found their own collective associations means young organizations often have to navigate their respective markets without any discernible structure or local administration. Private and governmental mistrust towards startups is a consequence of the lack of understanding in how startups operate. Market access can be encouraged by providing startups with financing and regulations tailored towards their particular needs. 

About the Algeria-Morocco Business Dialogue

Despite its vast potential, the Maghreb region is often cited as being one of the least economically integrated regions in the world. The Algeria-Morocco Business Dialogue project seeks to bring together Algerian and Moroccan business leaders from multiple business sectors with the aim of overcoming obstacles to bilateral trade between the two neighbors.

The dialogues center on topics vital to successful entrepreneurship in Algeria and Morocco such as food security, agriculture, healthcare, the impact of digitalization and new technologies and energy—with a particular focus on how to attract quality investment, ensure environmental protection and empower businesswomen.

COVID-19 has unfortunately had a detrimental effect on the overall operation and schedule of the project. Each meeting was envisioned as an in-person conference such as the first event on the agricultural industry, which took place as a two-day delegation to Berlin to attend the city’s Green Week—one of the world’s largest international agriculture trade affairs. Nevertheless, EWI has moved the project online in order to maintain the good momentum of the project generated in Berlin. Although this means the discussions between participants are less interactive, they proved no less intensive nor productive as the following policy recommendations attest.

Click here to read a French translation of this event report. 

Click here to read an Arabic translation of this event report.

Links to Reports of Previous Briefings:

Cooperation in the Automobile Industry

Women’s Empowerment and Entrepreneurship: Challenges and Opportunities

The Agricultural and Food Manufacturing Sector

The virtual workshop assembled 13 speakers and over 60 participants to discuss key shifts in nuclear posture and technologies, as well as escalation dynamics originating both within and outside of South Asia. 

Click here to read the full event report on the SIPRI website.

Al Kaylani founded the Arab International Women’s Forum in London in 2001 and she felt that 2021, being the milestone 20th Anniversary of AIWF, was an appropriate time to hand over the role to a successor. AIWF was set up as a development organization with the clear aim of supporting women’s leadership and social and economic growth, in the MENA region and always within an international context. AIWF is a leader in convening stakeholders from government, business, civil society, academia and media to develop key initiatives addressing the capacity, skills and leadership of Arab women. It is a key belief of the AIWF that empowering women is crucial to the prosperity and sustainability of the MENA region.

Through Al Kayani’s leadership, the Forum has led on numerous initiatives and landmark reports and recommendations which have been widely disseminated. While this year has been a challenging year for many organizations throughout the world, despite the restrictions of COVID, AIWF has remained active through a series of substantive webinars and continued outreach with AIWF's International network of institutional, corporate and advocacy partners.

Commenting on the handover, Al Kaylani said: “I am proud to have founded the AIWF and honored to have served as Chair for close to 20 years. I am excited about the prospect of Dr Afnan’s leadership and am confident that she will be an outstanding Chair. I look forward to supporting her in taking the AIWF to its next phase of development in 2021 and beyond.”

Click here to read the full announcement on the AIWF website.

The discussion, chaired by CRC's Dr. Ranj Alaaldin, will focus on the main challenges to stabilization and reconstruction, the future of democracy promotion in the region, reconciliation and peace-building and the role that international actors like the United States and Europe can play to constrain the fallout from conflicts and their second-order effects. 

Participants include EWI Vice President of the MENA Program Kawa Hassan, Frances Brown from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Jomana Qaddour from Atlantic Council and Emad Badi from the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance.

Click here to learn more and register.

Read Hassan's remarks from the lecture, below.

Today, I will talk about the root causes that produced ISIS and other terrorist organizations in post-2003 Iraq and the outlook ahead.

I would like to begin my lecture with a very basic but nonetheless crucial question: how could a brutal, apocalyptical menace like ISIS succeed in occupying large swaths of Syria and Iraq during its heyday (from 2014 to 2017), impose its will on millions of people and make sextual slavery the norm in the twenty-first century?

The answer or answers are not as straightforward and simple as the question itself. Too many structural reasons—internal and external—could be identified for the rise and surge of ISIS:

• On a macro-political level, the post-colonial state in Iraq—and as a matter of fact, in Syria and other countries in the Middle East—dismally failed to produce a polity that is inclusive and respects basic human rights. The barbarism of ISIS leader and henchman, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, does not originate within a vacuum: it builds on and is the logical conclusion of decades of unimaginable brutality and human rights violations committed by Saddam Hussein, Hafez and Bashar al-Assad, Gaddafi and other dictators. ISIS is an authoritarian byproduct—a consequence, not a cause of the current catastrophe in the Middle East. The violent political culture in these states and prisons were, and still are, top universities for the graduation of the leaders and the rank and file of ISIS and other extremist groups. The only difference between ISIS and dictators is that ISIS meticulously documents and broadcasts its barbarism with pride;
• Sectarian, political and economic exclusion and marginalization of Sunnis by the post-Saddam political order;
• Systemic corruption of the post-Saddam ruling kleptocracy and the subsequent lack of good governance, rule of law, transparency and accountability;
• Intolerant and exclusivist educational curriculum pre- and post-2003;
• Political and military miscalculations and overreach by the U.S in the early years of the occupation; and
• Geopolitical jockeying by regional and international powers for influence that exploited the political vacuum and state failure after 2003.

With massive military, political and financial support from the global coalition against ISIS, the Iraqis managed to liberate Mosul and other areas previously occupied by ISIS. Militarily, ISIS has been significantly weakened, but not completely defeated. ISIS ideology is still very much alive and kicking.

The reconstruction of ISIS liberated areas and return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) pose daunting challenges. Recently, the Iraqi Ministry of Migration and Displacement announced that all IDP camps will be closed and their residents relocated by the beginning of 2021. Aid agencies warn that hasty closure of the camps will render 100,000 people homeless. 400,000 “ISIS families” face the danger of exclusion from reintegration efforts, and hence, stigmatization for the rest of their life. To date, there are no serious indications how Iraqi authorities will deal with 50,000 undocumented “ISIS children.” Lack of strategic, long-term and coordinated reconstruction planning hampers the return and reintegration of IDPs. All in all, these problems, in particular, the lack of policy for dealing with “ISIS families and children,” create a ticking time bomb scenario for Iraq and the international community.      

The hard-won “post-ISIS” stability and reconstruction opportunities in Iraq have been systematically undermined by the ubiquitous and endemic corruption of the post-2003 ruling elites. Iraq’s real problem is not ISIS, nor is it the Iran-U.S. regional rivalry and proxy conflict. Iraq’s key challenge is internal—the politically sanctioned corruption of the post-2003 ruling elites has whittled away the state from within to the extent that it is poised to crumble. The October Uprising of 2019 shook the system to its core. The youth-led protest movement has shown resilience in the face of brute violence by government and paramilitaries, but it also faces daunting internal and external challenges to change the system. 

The international attention given to Sudan’s normalisation with Israel has shown the country’s importance as a geostrategic site subject to regional rivalries in the Horn of Africa. But increased regional pressure on Sudan is endangering its transition towards an inclusive, civilian government following the peaceful popular revolution that led to the ousting of long-ruling president Omar Al-Bashir on 11 April 2019. This article will describe how regional interference in Sudan could destabilise the transitional process, with a specific focus on the rivalry between the ‘Arab Troika’ and the Qatar-Turkey alliance.

The Sudanese Revolution and Political Shifts

Following the ousting of Bashir in 2019, military and civilian leaders signed a power-sharing agreement which initiated a transition towards a democratic government, under the guidance of Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok and Chairman of Sudan’s ruling Transitional Military Council, Lieutenant-General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. This transition signified a shift in Sudan’s foreign policy.

During Bashir’s 30-year rule, Sudan enjoyed close relationships with Turkey and Qatar. This included a deal between Turkey and Sudan that gave Ankara control over the Suakin Island in the Red Sea, a deal which has since been suspended. However, this did not prevent Bashir from moving closer to the UAE and Saudi Arabia from 2014 onwards, in the hopes of bettering relations with the US and securing financial gains from the Gulf. When the Qatar diplomatic crisis erupted in 2017, Bashir decided to remain neutral, a move that accelerated Sudan’s eventual economic collapse.

Click here to read the full article on the LSE Middle East Centre Blog.

Click here to read an Arabic translation of the article.