Now that some of the dust has settled surrounding the media frenzy around No. 10, it is clear that this agreement has little purchase among anyone in parliament. Brexiteers are appalled at the prospect of the UK relinquishing its ability to shape future EU policy decisions whilst still subject to them under the transition period. Remainers see very little reason to think this deal addresses their concerns regarding jobs and Britain’s economic future. Elsewhere, in Northern Ireland, the Democratic Union Party (DUP), for whom May relies upon for a majority, are dismayed at the idea of the territory remaining in a deeper relationship with the EU to the rest of the UK. Whilst Scotland is unhappy for the exact opposite.  Thus it seems the only thing currently uniting the commons is the feeling of disdain, disenchantment and derision towards May’s deal. As the Washington Post reported, the deal “gives everyone something to hate.”

And yet, it is painfully clear that May could never have achieved anything much better than what has been agreed. A sentiment encapsulated by European Commission President Jean Claude Juncker following the Brexit summit in Brussels last Sunday when he stated to reporters that “Those who think…they will get a better deal will be disappointed in seconds.” May’s negotiating position has been compromised from the outset, primarily because the promises made by the most ardent and ferocious supporters of Brexit in 2016 were built on fantasy.  During the campaign, Brexiteers vowed Brits can and should have their cake and eat it; pledging to end free movement, withdraw from the customs union and avoid a hard border between Northern Ireland and the Republic, all whilst simultaneously retaining the economic benefits of regular membership. Promises which are inherently contradictory.

To this day, it remains difficult to fathom how Brexiteers came to internalize and justify such logic when it could never be in the EU’s interests to allow a member state to leave the union with a better trade deal than its remaining members. Nevertheless, the true irony in this whole sorry state of affairs is that the UK was already treating itself to a healthy piece of cake with regards to the terms of its membership: It was able to retain the pound instead of the Euro and was exempted from the borderless Schengen Zone.

The Contents

The proposal itself sets out the legal conditions of the UK’s formal withdrawal and centers around three pillars: the financial settlement, the rights of EU and UK citizens in either territory, and the border between the UK and the Republic of Ireland (the EU’s only physical border with the UK). However, when delving into the nitty gritty of the proposal, it is not difficult to see why it has garnered such an abhorrent reaction.

Firstly, the proposal seemingly locks the UK into a permanent state of purgatory. Neither in the EU nor completely out. “The worst of all worlds,” as opposition leader Jeremy Corbyn put it. The scheduled transition period for the UK leaving the EU is set to last until December 2020 once it formally leaves in March 2019. Under the transition, the UK would remain subject to all current and potentially new EU laws despite having no formal input. Fundamentally, the transition period is supposed to allow businesses and governments enough time to prepare and adapt to the new state of affairs in the relationship.  Furthermore, it will provide both the UK and the EU time to flesh out a viable trade agreement, with the possibility of an extension if an agreement is not reached. However, for Brexiteers this is where the alarm bells begin to ring, since the agreement itself does not set a specific time for how long this transition may be extended. Hard-Brexiteers, particularly, have denounced this as a betrayal of Brexit; relegating the UK to a form of vassalage. Far from the Brexit dream of “Taking back control.”

These fears are also linked to the backstop proposal for Northern Ireland which would kick in if a trade agreement is not found after an extended transition period. The backstop is the proposed mechanism to prevent a hard border between the North and the Republic amidst fears the installation of security checks could reignite previous troubles on the island. It would temporarily see the entirety of the UK, including Northern Ireland treated as a single customs area, which in practical terms would mean more checks on goods entering and leaving Norther Ireland and the rest of the UK. Although Theresa May has repeatedly stressed that the backstop mechanism is a last resort and that both London and Brussels do not wish to see its implementation, it has raised concerns within the DUP that it potentially paves the way for Northern Ireland to be reintegrated into the EU since under the proposed terms, it would remain in a deeper customs relationship with the EU than the rest of the UK; a red line for DUP leader Arlene Foster.

There is a backstop review mechanism, though this has been one of the most highly contentious facets of the agreement; for it prevents the UK from unilaterally exiting the backstop if it found it no longer necessary. Instead, a joint EU-UK Joint Committee would have to agree to terminate these customs arrangements, essentially granting the EU veto power over the UK. This particular caveat was primarily behind former Brexit Secretary, Dominic Raab’s shock resignation, just hours after the announcement of the agreement two weeks ago. In a Sunday morning interview, Raab expressed his fears that this arrangement threatens to impinge upon UK sovereignty, by potentially signing the country up to a customized union “no democratic country in history has ever signed up to.’”

Where do we go from here?

The result is we are in a situation whereby May’s deal will likely be voted down in the house of commons, which will precipitate even more uncertainty. As mentioned previously, May resides over a minority government which is dependent on the 10 DUP MPs for a majority. In addition to the fervent Brexiteers and remainers in her own party, May is very unlikely to find any support in the opposition who are either remainers or see little reason to support her own government.

A rejection of her agreement will therefore increase the likelihood of a whole host of possibilities including a no-deal Brexit, a second referendum, a potential leadership contest within the Conservative party, or a general election. There are pros and cons for each of these scenarios but the harsh fact remains that none of them provide any clarity as to what will happen after they come into fruition. Unfortunately it seems, uncertainty, is the only certainty surrounding Brexit for the time being.

The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the EastWest Institute

The most useful analysis on the future of warfare highlights how cultural, institutional and professional biases can cloud objective thinking on forthcoming military conflict. For example, analysts often fall into the same trap: imagining the conflicts they would like to fight rather than the conflicts that are most likely to transpire.

Nevertheless, analysts cannot shy away from thinking about the future; after all, it really is their core business. In a recent paper that was meant to be a discussion starter inside the European Union’s institutions, I made a long list of assumptions about the future of warfare. Building on this issue, below is an overview of what analysts view as the main uncertainties pertaining to warfare for the next decade. These are issues experts normally cannot agree on, yet are decisive for the future trajectory of big global trends.

Is China going to surpass the West in military capability?

China has the capabilities and the will to catch up. However, to surpass “the West” China would need to undertake its full transformation into a interventionist power. In addition, no one is sure in how far China’s current strengths—centralized control over priorities, investment and the private sector, a long-term plan and a focus on big ticket technical solutions such as AI and space technology—are useful in innovating its military in the future.

Will China (and Russia) build up a military alliance that could project power globally?

The Trump administration’s policies are harming the alliances and friendships the U.S. has carefully developed and seen as one of its greatest assets over the last 70 years. Does this provide space for China to come in and create a global “Silk Road alliance” with new and old authoritarian regimes—above all Russia—and opportunist democracies? How would western militaries do in a worldwide conventional war against such a group of peers? The West has not been good in estimating its capability versus that of its competitors.

What is the danger and the potential of the cyber-dimension in warfare?

The future of cyber will depend on the future of vulnerabilities, especially the development of the internet of things, and on possible international control and verification. The digital revolution has produced a new domain in which to spy, sabotage and prepare the battlefield, but some experts think the worst gaps in our defences have been filled. A new generation of military and civilian leaders seems increasingly aware of the realities of this game. Artificial Intelligence (AI) might provide more balance between offence and defence, and international norms start to shape behaviour. Nevertheless, the future holds more players, more hackable systems and more valuable and critical cyber territory to fight over.

What will be the future of research and application of robotics, autonomous systems and artificial intelligence?

Much depends on how fast these technologies will develop, how quickly and economically they will be incorporated into weapons systems and the effect of international regulation. Their impact will also depend on their capability in the wide range of future crises, and in subduing civilian populations. Arms races and early adoption could lead to loss of control. Beyond that, the major question is how AI will develop—as an evolutionary or revolutionary capability—and how we master our interaction with AI advice and decisions. Preferring AI and autonomous systems in a supportive role rather than as final arbiter of life and death might come with a heavy price tag, but it is one we might be willing to pay to maintain our belief in the value of a human finger on the trigger.

Will there be a paradigmatic technological breakthrough in either quantum computing, general artificial intelligence, or defensive strategic weapons?

All three breakthroughs are low-probability, high-impact events. A general AI would revolutionise the whole world, and with it warfare. Quantum computing has been a catchphrase for some time, but its revolutionary potential has not been sufficiently researched. Current fantasies of technologies rendering even hypersonic or ballistic missiles useless would of course change the nature of deterrence and could open a new age of limited warfare.

How far will nuclear deterrence limit and shape big power conflict?

Most experts still think that the risk of a nuclear exchange in a major war between nuclear powers is too damaging for anyone to try their luck. Others point out that limited wars could be fought under the assumption that the use of nuclear weapons would be seen as breaking a taboo and would pose even graver consequences for the user. One growing uncertainty is in misinterpreting your opponent(s). Due to the multipolar nature of the future international system, nuclear powers will have to deal with more ambiguity, aggressive behaviour and shifting alliances. This puts additional strain on political, diplomatic and military systems that presently might not be built for such a world.

What will happen to the idea of using nuclear weapons as deterrents or bargaining chips?

The fates of countries that have developed or kept their nuclear weapons versus those that have not might affect the thinking of other states contemplating the adoption of nuclear capability. One just has to compare the current state of Libya, Ukraine and Iran to that of North Korea, Israel and Pakistan. Important here will be the future trajectories of the North Korea conflict (which could signal options to other countries), the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and NPT non-signatories (such as India, Pakistan, Israel), and potential nuclear weapon states (such as Japan, Saudi Arabia and Iran).

Leopold Schmertzing is a policy analyst in the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS). This article draws from his recently published “ESPAS Ideas Paper: The Future of Warfare.”

The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the EastWest Institute

The EastWest Institute is pleased to endorse The Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace, announced by Emmanuel Macron, President of France, on November 12, at the Paris Peace Forum.

EWI advocates for the principles presented in this document, designed to inform and engage stakeholders—including governments, the business community and civil society—to establish “rules of the road” that will benefit all Internet users around the world. Such efforts highlight the opportunities and the threats in cyberspace today, and underline the shared responsibility of all netizens to work to ensure a safe and secure cyberspace for everyone’s benefit.

“Although details will continue to be debated and refined, the Paris Call reflects an emerging global consensus around what is—and what is not—acceptable behavior for states and non-state actors in cyberspace,” said Bruce McConnell EWI’s Global Vice President. “It is high time for the international system to bring the cyber arms race under control.”

The measures championed in this initiative align with the objectives and ongoing efforts of the EastWest Institute’s Global Cooperation in Cyberspace program, which is committed to reducing conflict, crime and other disruptions in cyberspace and promoting stability, innovation and inclusion.

EWI invites you to join The Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace, and to support it as an important contribution to the collaborative process of ensuring cyberspace security.

PARIS CALL FOR TRUST AND SECURITY IN CYBERSPACE

November 12, 2018

Cyberspace now plays a crucial role in every aspect of our lives and it is the shared responsibility of a wide variety of actors, in their respective roles, to improve trust, security and stability in cyberspace.

We reaffirm our support to an open, secure, stable, accessible and peaceful cyberspace, which has become an integral component of life in all its social, economic, cultural and political aspects.

We also reaffirm that international law, including the United Nations Charter in its entirety, international humanitarian law and customary international law is applicable to the use of information and communication technologies (ICT) by States.

To read the document in its entirety, please click here.

 

The Pentagon has launched a preemptive strike against the Russian hackers who may have attacked the 2016 presidential election with social media influence campaigns. Numerous initiatives, including Harvard University’s Defending Digital Democracy Project, have educated officials on how to fortify elections against cyberattacks and encouraged social media companies to take down fake accounts. Despite these efforts, 67 percent of Americans consider that a foreign influence campaign, either by Russia or other governments, during the midterm elections is “very or somewhat” plausible.

Their worry might have some basis. There’s another threat that few have worked to defend against: malware, or malicious software, designed to steal, deny or alter information. And our research strongly suggests that these attacks are underway in U.S. swing states, as we explain below.

Click here to read the full article on The Washington Post.

On October 3, the EastWest Institute (EWI) honored Dr. Armen Sarkissian, President of the Republic of Armenia, with its John Edwin Mroz Global Statesman Award in recognition of his distinguished career and achievements as a statesman representing the interests of Armenia, and for his contributions to the field of global development.

The award presentation took place at EWI’s Annual Gala, held at the New York Athletic Club, New York City. The evening’s program featured a keynote presentation by noted entrepreneur and philanthropist, Aso Tavitian. Also in attendance were Grigor Hovhannissian, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Armenia to the United States; Mher Margaryan, Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations; Erzan Kazykhanov, Ambassador of Kazakhstan to the United States; Vassily Nebenzia, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Russia to the United Nations; Kaha Imnadze, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations; Berge Setrakian, President of the Armenian General Benevolent Union; and Vartan Gregorian, President of Carnegie Corporation of New York, among other dignitaries. CBS News Anchor, Reena Ninan, served as Master of Ceremonies.

“At a time when Armenia is undergoing a profound period of transition, Dr. Sarkissian has been entrusted with bringing about stability and offering a new vision for his country’s path towards a more democratic and prosperous future,” stated Ross Perot, Jr., Chairman of the EastWest Institute. “Capably navigating his country through this spring’s Velvet Revolution, Dr. Sarkissian once again demonstrated the true value of statesmanship for the greater good.”

Dr. Armen Sarkissian was elected President of the Republic of Armenia in 2018. He formerly served as the Prime Minister of Armenia (1996-1997), Ambassador of Armenia (1991-1999) to the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and The Vatican, as well as Head of Mission of the Republic of Armenia to the EU and NATO (1995-96).

He is the founding president of Eurasia House International. Since 1999 he has been Director of the Eurasia Programme at the Judge Institute of Management, Cambridge University’s Business School, with expertise in state-building structures and free market transition processes in CIS countries.

“Dr. Sarkissian continued efforts to foster a spirit of cooperation and collectiveness is emblematic of his public service to his native Armenia, and instrumental to his work on economic development,” added Ambassador Cameron Munter, CEO & President of the EastWest Institute. “He is both a diplomat and an innovator, which allows him to earn the trust of stakeholders and develop creative solutions to address today’s pressing political and economic issues.”

Dr. Sarkissian has been actively associated with the EastWest Institute since 2005, and retains the title of Vice-Chairman, Emeritus.

The EastWest Institute (EWI) established the John Edwin Mroz Global Statesman Award in memory of its late founder. This award recognizes people who share John’s vision of a peaceful world, who work passionately to achieve it and who embody his values as a trust-builder.

Thank you to our sponsors:

Chairman Sponsor Sarah and Ross Perot, Jr. President Sponsors Mary and David Boies  Addison and Olivia Fischer, Planet Heritage Foundation Bob and Tamar Manoukian Aso O. Tavitian Anonymous Donor Inspiration Sponsors Haig and Elza Didizian Ralph and Ala Isham Johnson and Johnson Peacekeeper Sponsors Catsimatidis Family Foundation David and Laura McKenzie Medical Transcription Billing, Corp. Nu Skin Enterprises  Henry and Myrna Sarkissian Unisys Corporation Insider Sponsors Alterra Worldwide  M. Joseph Bild Covington & Burling John Hurley and Kevin Taweel Gunjan and Anurag Jain Hagop and Ica Kouyoumdjian Toros and Gacia Mangassarian Nazar and Artemis Nazarian Family Foundation Pivotal Foundation Berge and Vera Setrakian

 

 

“Europe’s progress on defense must be further consolidated. We have laid the foundations for its strategic autonomy. Several of our partners are realizing that, as part of a balanced transatlantic relationship, Europe is the natural framework for our security and the protection of our borders, given challenges that can only be faced collectively.” Thus, proclaims the French government’s 2017 Defense and National Security Strategic Review. Europe as the natural framework for European security: who could take issue with that?  

In theory, European strategic autonomy makes a lot of sense. It’s not aggressive, it maximizes defense spending and makes Europe a stronger partner to the U.S. But, there—with the word Europe—begins the problem. Which countries would be part of European strategic autonomy efforts? France had hoped that a small coalition of the willing would sign up for a strong PESCO featuring strategic-autonomy qualities. PESCO, the European Union’s (EU) permanent structured cooperation on security and defense, which was activated last December, is the continent’s best bet for strategic autonomy. France’s key partner Germany, however, advocated a less ambitious version. In the end, last year, 25 of the EU’s 28 member states signed up for a decidedly weak PESCO.

Now, Europe has a security and defense policy framework that includes most of the EU—but among its participants are several Central European countries, as well as Sweden and Finland, who are committed transatlanticists. Indeed, despite their differences with the Trump administration, this spring, Sweden and Finland signed a defense cooperation agreement with the Pentagon, and this month, the Swedish government announced it will buy the American-made Patriot missile system. It begs the question: if the EU is not united in working towards strategic autonomy, which body representing “Europe” would do so? There is none.

Given the advantages that European strategic autonomy could deliver, most importantly a coherent voice in defense and security policy backed up by corresponding military capabilities, that’s a shame. But, the complications in trying to implement such autonomy don’t end with the definition of Europe: on the contrary, that’s where it starts.

Within a region—however integrated its member states—national interests compete. And strategic autonomy boils down to issues such as job-creation. Airbus, the best example to date of a pan-European venture, delicately manages factories in the countries participating in the venture, but it’s not an easy arrangement. Which country or countries would benefit if European allies became serious about strategic autonomy? France, with its large domestic defense industry, is a prime candidate. Poland, which typically likes to buy American-made weapons systems, not so much.

But, strategic autonomy is also about fighting capabilities—and this is where the potential lies. The UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force (which also includes Sweden, Finland, Norway, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Netherlands) is an example of what one might call small-scale strategic autonomy: the 10,000-troop JEF is independent of NATO and can deployed to combat both missions and civil emergencies. The new French-led European Intervention Initiative has a similar profile.

Lastly: public diplomacy. Though PESCO eventually has turned out far more modest than initially planned, the much-trumpeted vision and plans being set in motion made U.S. policymakers nervous. When PESCO was activated, it unsurprisingly provoked fears among U.S. defense executives that their European sales would suffer, as a result. Ambitious measures, like PESCO, risk creating a feeling in Washington that U.S. assistance in defending Europe is no longer needed—which, of course, is false, regardless of who occupies the White House.

We live in an age where grand alliances are faring poorly: the EU, NATO, even the United Nations suffer from considerable tensions. New grandiose ideas are thus unlikely to succeed. Europeans would do well to tackle strategic autonomy with a bit more pragmatism. As for defense equipment, the European defense industry ultimately may become more unified via commercial means—that is, the very real prospect that defense companies will consolidate on their own. After all, large companies are pretty good at M&As.         

Elisabeth Braw is an associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute. She tweets @elisabethbraw.

The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the EastWest Institute

Image: "Strasbourg, Europe" (CC BY 2.0) by TeaMeister

Kawa Hassan is co-author of a research report on Iraq which aims to provide climate-related security risk assessments and recommend management strategies relevant for Iraq. The report is produced as a product of the Expert Working Group on Climate-related Security Risks, established with the aim to address the implications of climate-related security risks on international institutions that manage peace and security. 

This report was used in July 2018 UN Security Council debate on nexus between climate change and security, brought forward under Swedish Presidency of the Council. 

The expert working-group seeks to highlight the gap in climate risk informed decision-making and strives to produce timely climate security assessments. The aim of the expert working group is to:

• Produce unbranded high-quality and policy-relevant assessments of climate-related security risks for geographies under discussion in peace and security institutions
• Strengthen decision-making and programming on climate-related security risks in the United Nations (UN) system
• Support the creation of an institutional home in the UN system to develop climate-related risk assessments and risk management strategies

Why this geography: Iraq is exposed to three major threats: terrorism, corruption and climate change. Whilst the first two have received considerable attention, the climate-related security risks facing Iraq have only begun rising up on the agenda. To tackle security threats facing the post-ISIS Iraq, terrorism, socio-political and economic challenges need to be addressed interlinked with climate-related security risks. Iraq is one of the Middle East’s most climate vulnerable countries yet there is a gap addressing a comprehensive (climate) security analysis taking in to account the interconnected risks of the above challenges.

The report highlights five key current and emerging risks that increase:

1. Diminished agricultural livelihoods increase local support for terrorist groups;
2. Insufficient governance capacity to address and respond to climate change and environmental degradation;
3. Increased dependence on water flows from riparian neighbours and regional stability;
4. Mass displacement and forced migration; and 
5. Heightened communal tensions over access to food and water. 

This report recommends the following actions for the UN Assistance Mission to Iraq (UNAMI) and other international bodies in order to better address climate-related security risks in Iraq: 

1. Monitor climate-related security risks and provide regular briefings to the Security Council;
2. Conduct scenario-based workshops to build Iraqi capacity and understanding of the short- and medium-term climate-related security risks;
3. Provide technical support for regional dialogues to find solutions to water and environmental challenges; and
4. Support the Iraqi authorities in integrating climate-induced displacement, economic vulnerability and socio-economic instability into post-ISIS recovery plans. 

Click here to download the report.

Clich here to read the report's executive summary in Arabic.

Image: Wikimedia Commons

The EastWest Institute is proud to announce the establishment of its Asia-Pacific Fellows Network, which covers the regions of Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Oceania. The first set of Fellows represent expertise and nationalities that span 16 countries, including Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Maldives, Micronesia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka and Thailand. Their diverse backgrounds extend through fields that range from finance to military, from cybersecurity to nuclear arms control, and from sustainable development to conflict resolution. This ever-expanding network of both established and emerging experts is intended to provide voices from within the broader Asia-Pacific region a wider platform for engaging the international community through their publications and interactions with EWI.

 

Rizwana Abbasi
Associate Professor, Department of International Relations, National Defense University, Islamabad

 

Rethy Chhem
Executive Director, Cambodia Development Resource Institute

 

Bernard Goonetilleke
Chairman, Pathfinder Foundation, Sri Lanka

 

Ananda Raj Khanal
Senior Director, Nepal Telecommunications Authority

 

Keiko Kono
Fellow, Government and Law Division, Security Studies Department, National Institute for Defense Studies

 

Khin Khin Kyaw Kyee
Lead Researcher and Program Coordinator, ISP Myanmar

 

Ronald Mendoza
Dean, Ateneo School of Government, Ateneo de Manila University

 

Jonathan Berkshire Miller
Senior Visiting Fellow, the Japan Institute of International Affairs 

 

René L. Pattiradjawane
President, Center for Chinese Studies-Indonesia

 

Adrian Phua
Managing Director, Stratagem Group

 

Dulyapak Preecharush
Assistant Professor, Southeast Asian Studies Program, Faculty of Liberal Arts, Thammasat University, Bangkok

 

Bhagya Senaratne
Lecturer, Department of Strategic Studies, General Sir John Kotelawala Defence University

 

Sazali bin Sukardi
Senior Vice President of Strategic Research, CyberSecurity Malaysia

 

Brandon Jack Tara
CFO, Federated States of Micronesia’s Development Bank

 

Yongyuth Teerakul
Director, Plans and Organization Division of the Office of Policy and Planning, Ministry of Defence, Royal Kingdom of Thailand

 

Ahmed Thohir
Defence Advisor, Embassy of the Republic of Maldives in New Delhi, India

 

Jiang Tianjiao
Assistant Professor, Department of International Relations, Shanghai International Studies University

 

Tughral Yamin
Founder and Associate Dean, Centre for International Peace & Stability, National University of Sciences and Technology

 

Jackson Yuasise
Director, Trade and Investment, Prime Ministers Department, Papua New Guinea

 

Image: "Buddha Astride the Globe - World Peace P" (CC BY-SA 2.0) by Adam Jones, Ph.D. - Global Photo Archive

The Dialogue was split into three sections with each panel consisting of three or more participants representing their respective countries according to geographical proximity. The first panel consisted of Iraq, Syria and Turkey; the second focused more on the Levantine countries of Jordan, Lebanon and Palestine, and finally the third panel concentrated on North Africa and the Maghreb, specifically, Libya, Morocco and Algeria.

Why?

In 2016, between 10 and 24 million people had to flee their land of origin because of environmentally related issues. In contrast, 6.9 million fled their country for violent conflict in the same year. The expected future increase of the former begs the question of how these people will be integrated into other countries. Underlying the justification for the dialogue, therefore, was a need to address how governments, institutions and the international community can assist states to identify possible avenues for cooperation to offset the negative effects of climate change and possibly mitigate against the potential for irregular migratory flows in the future.

Furthermore, the reasons and consequences of Europe’s so called “migration crisis” are well documented, and with migratory pressure projected to increase in the forthcoming decades as a result of climate change, both EWI and KAS considered it necessary to establish a platform to analyze the relatively new conception of “environmental refugees” given they are set to reach into the hundreds of millions, according to some estimates, in the not too distant future.

Terminology

With these issues in mind, the dialogue started by drawing attention to the term “environmental refugee,” its recent entry into the academic vernacular, its inherent ambiguity and the lack of consensus regarding its exact meaning. Particularly, the absence of a concrete definition was noted to be one of the root problems in attempting to discuss the issue of environmental refugees and the inability of governments to shape a viable policy around them. Good, efficient policy requires that it be grounded in strong analytical data. To generate this data, requires terms to be fully operational and explicit.

Iraq, Syria and Turkey

Human interest stories dominated the first panel and were used as a reference point to advocate the need for political agreements to combat the effects of climate change, predominantly with regards to water. Two of the panelists during this panel situated their arguments, for better water management and increased multilateral cooperation, within personal stories of how the particular region of their country had changed for the worse over the course of the past twenty years. One participant spoke of a need to overcome a culture of finger-pointing in achieving this aim, given change is already occurring, and blaming only creates further problems rather than solutions. In the same vein, another participant highlighted the fact that there are agreements and memorandums of understanding between the various states of the region but that the reluctance of governments to exchange information was a major obstacle to their implantation. The same participant therefore stressed the need for trust building exercises to foster a culture of cooperation.

The Levant

During the second panel, the motif of water arose once again, as hydro-diplomacy dominated the discussion. The concept was shown to possess several facets within the context of the MENA region, including food security and stability. Emphasis was placed on how large number of refugees in the region could lead to the unsustainable management of the region’s few water resources. They also warned the region risked replicating the man-made disaster of what was once the Aral Sea in Central Asia, if it does not reform its management of the Jordan River. In terms of policy, the panel stressed the need to reform current irrigation and agricultural practices in the region, in order to securitize and meet future food demands. Of course, participants also admitted local conflicts in the region seriously impede the feasibility of implementing such structural changes to current agricultural methods. Yet, it was pointed out that states have little choice but to cooperate at some point if they are to avoid deepening current conflicts or create the conditions for the onset of new ones.

The Maghreb

The final panel concerning the Maghreb in North Africa differed from the previous two panels in its breadth of subject matter and the diversity by which the confluence of climate change, security and migration is viewed in the three represented countries. In Morocco, it was said that climate change is affecting the country in two major ways: Rural populations migrating to the larger cities in search of economic opportunities and the influx of large numbers of Sub-Saharan Africans en route to Europe. Both these phenomena have pushed the government to outline a water strategy to cope with the pressures these entail. In contrast, in Libya it was noted that migration is primarily seen through a security lens. Despite initiatives which have arguably led to the decrease in the number of migrants using Libya as a transit country to Europe, the pull factors which draw people to the country are still in place; ultimately, economic disparity and severe climate change. Finally, in Algeria, participants considered how climate change, as a process, was changing the country’s status from an emigration country to an immigration country. As a result, this metamorphosis was forcing the state to consider existential questions regarding its crisis, migration and integration policies.

Takeaways

It appears to be a cruel twist of fate that a region beset by a multitude of complexities and defined by its conflicts must also now juggle the serious challenge of climate change. Nevertheless, given the magnitude the challenge of climate change poses, it is ironic that it simultaneously offers the most potential for nurturing the kind of relations necessary to locate avenues of cooperation in the region. There is no doubt that the road ahead is immense. But, this road will seem a little less daunting if countries continue to engage with each other and tackle the issue as a collective. The issue cannot and will not be solved by a single state but will require an appropriate international response.

Image: "Arid soils in Mauritania" (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0) by Oxfam International