Europe

CHINA 

“Is Taiwan Part of the ‘Chinese Dream?’” Wall Street Journal, June 18, 2013.

Ever since President Xi Jinping made it clear that the “Chinese Dream” would be at the center of his 10-year term, the world has been scrambling to work out exactly what the “dream” is. “China’s dream won’t be realized until Taiwan, which was separated from the mainland when the losing side in a civil war fled there in 1949, [returns] back into the fold.”

“China’s Foreign Ministry sets up cyber security office.” Xinhuanet, June 14, 2013.

China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs has set up an office responsible mainly for diplomatic activities regarding cyber affairs. China believes that cyberspace needs neither fighting nor hegemony, but it does need regulations and cooperation.

RUSSIA

“G20 summits: Russia and Turkey react with fury to spying revelations.” The Guardian, June 17, 2013.

Mere days before the opening of the G8 summit in Northern Ireland, The Guardian released NSA documents showing that U.S. spies had intercepted communications between former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev and other top Russian officials during the 2009 G-20 summit in London, casting another shadow of mistrust on already troubled U.S.-Russia relations.

“U.S. and Russia sign pact to create communication link on cyber security.” Washington Post, June 17, 2013.

The U.S. and Russia agreed to open communication links on cybersecurity, including the refitting of a Cold War-era “hotline” to serve as a direct line of contact between the U.S. cybersecurity coordinator and his or her Russian counterpart. The agreement was announced Monday at the G8 summit.

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

“Why You Shouldn’t Get Too Excited About Rouhani.” The Atlantic, June 17, 2013.

The election of moderate candidate Hassan Rouhani to the Iranian presidency inspired hope that Iran may be headed in a more constructive direction, particularly with respect to its nuclear program. Mark Dubowitz of The Atlantic warns, however, that Rouhani is in fact a loyal devotee of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who holds ultimate sway in policymaking, and that his demonstrated approach to nuclear negotiation is more deceptive than conciliatory.

“Russia signals nuclear arms cuts will not come easy.” Reuters, June 19, 2013.

Speaking in Berlin this week, President Obama called on Russia to agree to further nuclear arms reduction agreements with the U.S. The appeal was met with a chilly reception in Russia, where Vladimir Putin expressed concerns over U.S. and NATO deployments of anti-missile shields and the development of high-precision non-nuclear weapons, which Russia fears may “disturb the strategic balance.”

Follow EWI on Twitter @EWInstitute and Facebook for continuing updates.

Compiled by Haolin Liu and Andi Zhou.

CHINA

“Obama and Xi Try to Avoid a Cold War Mentality.” New York Times, June 10, 2013.

Over the weekend in California, President Obama and President Xi had their first lengthy talk on issues ranging from economy to cybersecurity. Although they tried hard to prevent the disputes from descending into a cold war mentality, forces on both sides pushed Obama and Xi into that same exact trap.

“China's economy stumbles in May, growth may fall in second quarter.” Reuters, June 10, 2013.

Risks are rising that China's economic growth will fall further in the second quarter and that full-year forecasts will be cut further, but Premier Li Keqiang said the economy was generally stable and that growth was within a "relatively high and reasonable range."

“Chinese Media Suggest N.S.A. Disclosure Will Hurt U.S. Ties.” New York Times, June 14, 2013.

Chinese state media highlighted revelations that the U.S. government was engaged in widespread monitoring of Internet and telephone communications, carrying reports suggesting the disclosures could damage relations between the two countries.

RUSSIA

“Rice and the Russians: Will Obama’s new national security advisor play nice and get along with Moscow?” Foreign Policy, June 7, 2013.

The relatively cordial relationship that the Obama administration has built with Russia may be in for a jolt as Susan Rice assumes the role of national security advisor. As a strong proponent of humanitarian intervention, Rice may irk Russia more than her predecessor did. 

“Putin’s Self-Destruction: Russia’s New Anti-Corruption Campaign Will Sink the Regime.” Foreign Affairs, June 9, 2013.

Over the past few months, Vladimir Putin has ousted and prosecuted many state officials under a new law that forbids officials from maintaining foreign bank accounts. By pursuing this aggressive anti-corruption campaign, Putin risks losing the support of elites and stoking public demand for more radical change, potentially dooming his hold on power.

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

“In Iran Race, All 8 Candidates Toe Hard Line on Nuclear Might.” New York Times, June 9, 2013.

All of the candidates running in today’s Iranian presidential election agree that Iran should not make concessions on its nuclear program. Widespread support for this no-compromise position suggests that international sanctions may be counterproductive to the goal of convincing Iran to end its nuclear program. 

“North Korea’s Dialogue With the South Collapses.” New York Times, June 11, 2013.

High-level talks between the governments of North and South Korea have collapsed after the two sides failed to agree on whether their respective delegations were of an equal rank. The failure of the talks, due to a procedural detail, is symptomatic of the growing mistrust between the two governments. 

Follow EWI on Twitter @EWInstitute and Facebook for continuing updates.

Compiled by Haolin Liu and Andi Zhou.

"China Targets Broader Investments in U.S.," Wall Street Journal. May 20.

"US and Chinese leaders to hold summit in California," BBC. May 20.

"Analysis: From opera to exercises, U.S. and China deepen military ties,” Reuters. May 22.

“It won’t be easy to build an ‘anyone but China’ club,” Financial Times. May 22. 

Follow EWI on Twitter @EWInstitute for continuing news updates.

Compiled by Michael McShane and Haolin Liu.

"On Criticizing China," The Atlantic. May 11. 

"Week In News: Hacking — Made In China," NPR. May 11.

"China Warns Against ‘Dangerous’ Western Value," NYT. May 13.

“U.S. Envoy Talks With Chinese About North Korea,” NYT. May 15. 

“China eyes Arctic options in energy, transport,” CNN. May 16. 

“China warns EU against telecoms probe,” Al Jazeera. May 16. 

“Taiwan says Filipino apology in fisherman's death not enough,” LA Times. May 16. 

"Fearing Afghan Instability, Russia Mulls Border Troops," Reuters. May 17.  

Follow EWI on Twitter @EWInstitute for continuing news updates.

Compiled by Michael McShane, Athina Doutis, Alex Schulman and Haolin Liu.

The EastWest Institute hosted “Uranium Extraction in the Arctic: Challenges and Opportunities for Greenland and Denmark,” a  seminar with Dr. Cindy Vestergaard, visiting fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies, on May 9 at its New York Center. Vestergaard discussed an underreported but emerging issue with strong implications for the nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament regime: uranium mining in Greenland. Moderated by EWI’s Andrew Nagorski, the seminar featured a discussion on the political and regulatory challenges posed by Greenland’s massive uranium reserves.

Vestergaard’s presentation began by noting that uranium mining in Greenland rests at the intersection of a number of complex issues: climate change, resource extraction, Greenland’s movement towards independence, and nuclear nonproliferation.

One element that significantly complicates the efforts of newcomers to uranium production like Greenland is the lack of international governance of uranium. Although the IAEA requires reporting on the export and import of uranium, many countries are not complete in their reporting.

As Vestergaard stated, “For the rest of the fuel cycle we have a very dedicated aspect of inventory, material accountancy control; for the front end, there is none.”

Greenland has the potential to become one of the world’s top ten suppliers of uranium ore concentrate; the Kvanefled project at the southern tip of Greenland alone is estimated to contain the world’s fifth largest reserve of uranium. However, the exploitation of these vast resources is complicated by Denmark’s resolute non-nuclear stance. Denmark has all but foregone the entire nuclear fuel cycle by banning the mining of radioactive materials, excluding nuclear power as part of its indigenous energy grid, and shuttering all three of its nuclear research reactors. In 1957, Denmark declared itself a nuclear weapons-free-zone, a position that caused a stir following revelations that U.S. nuclear weapons were based on Greenland until 1965.

Despite Denmark’s disdain for all things nuclear, Greenland appears to be edging in the other direction. Denmark is constitutionally responsible for the defense, security, monetary, and foreign policy of the Danish Kingdom, but the 2009 Self-Government Act granted Greenland full authority over its natural resources. Following general elections in March, Greenland’s new government has indicated that it will lift its zero-tolerance policy on uranium mining. But in order for Greenland to proceed with uranium production, Denmark and Greenland will be faced with the challenge of developing an export control and regulatory system with little preexisting experience to build upon. Acknowledging the magnitude of the challenge, Vestergaard noted, “Our experience globally is that if you’re starting from scratch, building a regulatory system, minimum [of] five years … usually upwards of ten.”

Although Greenland is years away from beginning uranium mining, Vestergaard’s presentation outlined the complex and interdependent challenges that Greenland, and other territories like it, will face as they enter the global nuclear market. At the same time, the responsible development of Greenland’s regulatory framework has the opportunity to strengthen the nonproliferation policies of the Danish Kingdom and the international community at large.

"China blasts US for Asia-Pacific military build-up,” The Guardian. April 16.

"China is a cyberwar victim too," Foreign Policy. April 16.

"Afghanistan opium production increases for third year," The New York Times. April 16.

“Duma to Consider Lifting Ban on Child Adoptions” The Moscow Times. April 17.

"China Asks to Postpone Japan, Korea Summit," The Wall Street Journal. April 18.

"North Korea lays out tough pre-conditions for talks," The Times of India. April 18.

Follow EWI on Twitter @EWInstitute for continuing news updates.

Compiled by Michael McShane, Athina Doutis, Alex Schulman and Haolin Liu.

Can you outline the basic tenets of the Arms Trade Treaty and discuss what it aims to accomplish?

Prior to the arms trade treaty, there was no real global set of rules governing the trade, export or transport of conventional weapons. The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) sets up standards for the cross-border transfer of eight categories of weapons; tanks, combat vehicles, all the way down to small and light weapons. It seeks to curb the irresponsible and illegal trade of weapons and prevent their sale into illicit markets.

Prior to authorizing any sale of weapons, the exporter has to assess whether the transfer is going to be used to facilitate or commit genocide, crimes against humanity, or other international humanitarian laws. If there is a known risk, they are prohibited from making that sale or transfer. Countries will then be held accountable through annual reporting requirements on arms transfers.

What are some objections to the treaty? Can you summarize the treaty’s main limitations?

The three countries that objected to the treaty are North Korea, Iran and Syria. I should say that the objections that these three countries held were echoed by a number of other countries. North Korea didn’t like the idea that exporters would be judging the humanitarian rights record of the importing countries. Iran, for their part, said that, “they didn’t approve of the transfer of conventional arms to foreign occupiers,” which is a thinly veiled reference to Israel. Syria objected because they didn’t like the fact that transfers or exports to armed groups or non-state actors (e.g. rebels in Syria) were not covered.

The treaty is also criticized for its relatively narrow scope; it doesn’t cover gifts and loans, which is a significant loophole. Furthermore, there’s no enforcement mechanism – that’s left to states to resolve.

Though the United States, the world's biggest arms exporter, voted yes on Tuesday, what are the chances of the U.S. ratifying the treaty? There’s stiff resistance from the National Rifle Association and conservatives in the Senate, where it needs a two-thirds majority to win ratification.

The focus of this treaty is entirely on the international trade and transfer of conventional weapons. The preamble of the ATT explicitly acknowledges that states retain their sovereignty and their authority to regulate the internal transfer and internal domestic possession of conventional weapons. It no way infringes upon private ownership. In fact, the American Bar Association was commissioned to do an analysis of the ATT and they found that the treaty is entirely consistent with the Second Amendment.

In the short term, there will definitely be opposition to the treaty in the U.S. The New York Times reports that over 50 senators are against it. So I don’t think this is going to happen anytime soon. But in the long term, the position of the NRA and other treaty opponents will likely be undermined. The current gun safety debate in the U.S., triggered by the Newtown massacre, weakens their position. And considering the fact that the only three countries that currently oppose the treaty are Iran, Syria and the North Korea, the NRA’s alignment with that trio certainly does not put them in a good light.

Why have Russia and China, two leading sellers of conventional weapons, abstained from voting? What does this mean for export control?

In short, China was opposed to the fact that the treaty was approved in a setting that did not allow every state veto power. It was previously negotiated at the UN Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, but consensus was blocked by opposition from Iran, North Korea and Syria. The ATT was then moved to the UN General Assembly, which requires only a simple majority to adopt a treaty. Wary of establishing a precedent, China argued that this move weakened the treaty.

Russia, for its part, felt that a number of the definitions, such as the term “genocide,” were not sufficiently clarified. Should these definitions be more appropriately defined, I believe it would be more acceptable to the Russians.

Russia is the second largest exporter of conventional weapons and China the fifth largest. The fact that these two countries did not approve the treaty outright obviously does not bode well for its implementation.

Anna MacDonald, the head of arms control for Oxfam International, has said, “This treaty won’t solve the problems of Syria overnight…but it will help to prevent future Syrias.” How might this treaty affect the current situation in Syria, if it were to be ratified today, and how might it prevent armed violence in the future?

Even by the most optimistic estimates, we are still one to two years away from this treaty’s ratification and entry into force. If it did enter into force today, it would make Russian sales of weapons to Syria much more difficult. Eventually, post-ratification, this will develop into an international norm. This is what happened with nuclear weapons, biological weapons and chemical weapons. It takes years, but eventually, it will develop into a norm, and this will raise political costs for countries that contravene the norm.

Another thing that the treaty will do is publicly name violators, ostracizing these countries within the international community. In terms of preventing future Syrias, the treaty will fill gaps that currently exist in the global arms trade. Only about 50 countries currently have related laws on the books, so once this treaty is approved with broad support from the international community, it will serve to diminish the now flourishing illicit market for these weapons.

What challenges will stand in the way of effective enforcement of this treaty?

It remains to be seen if countries are willing to subordinate their economic interests to fulfill their obligations under this treaty, so it’s entirely likely that countries will enact laws on the books without enforcing them. We saw this with China’s national export control system in the 90s and well into 2000s; they had laws on the books but they lacked the will or the capacity to enforce many of them. As a result, Chinese missile and nuclear weapons technology found its way into illicit markets.

It’s going to take some significant work on the part of the international community to push countries to actively enforce this treaty and fill these gaps. The ATT is a good start, but it’s a framework for international export control systems; more work needs to be done to build a robust regime that prevents these guns and weapons from falling into the wrong hands.

EastWest Direct is an ongoing series of interviews with EWI experts tied to breaking news stories.

What do you feel is the motivation for this recent ratcheting up of the rhetoric and threats by the North Korean leadership?

In this situation, we have a young leader who feels he has to prove himself—in particular, to his generals. Kim Jong-un wants to solidify his claim to authority after his father’s death. He also has to prove himself internationally and I think he is being advised that this is the way to do it. You can look at similar actions that have occurred earlier – the 2006 and 2009 nuclear bomb tests, for example. They’ve also shut down Kaesong City before, as they did earlier this week. These things were done in the past to demonstrate the nation’s sovereignty; they also seem to think that this bolsters the country’s reputation in the world. I think the difference this time is that everything is happening much quicker. The pace is greater in terms of the amount of rhetoric and the threats to South Korea, the region and even to the embassies in Pyongyang.

Are these actions being taken seriously by the international community?

If you look at reports out of Pyongyang, the embassies have not fled, so it appears that foreign government officials have become immune to the rhetoric. On the other hand, I know the United States takes it very seriously. It’s one of those situations where the probability of an attack is pretty low, but the risk of large scale casualties and damage is dramatic. So you need to take actions appropriately, factoring in the tremendous risk if you get it wrong.

Based on your experiences in South Korea working with the U.S. military, can you offer an estimate of North Korea’s offensive capacity?

Their initial capacity is rather large: there are estimates of up to 7,000 artillery tubes that can reach Seoul, which could produce millions of casualties during an initial assault. On the other hand, the counterattack from the combined forces command would be devastating to North Korea. I believe that they know that. The only thing that they could do is to inflict a huge amount of casualties in Seoul and then the combined South Korean and U.S. forces would attack rather quickly and it would be pretty ugly for North Korea.

So that’s your assessment of the worst-case scenario?

The worst case scenario would be an an artillery and ground attack on Seoul. There would be immediate casualties in South Korea followed by a decisive coalition counter attack. Withan armyof over 600,000 soldiers, South Korea would provide the primary ground troops. The air and naval forces associated with that attack would be strongly supported by the United States.

Setting aside government propaganda, how do you think the average North Korean citizen views the current situation?

North Korea is a country that has been isolated for well over 50 years to an incredible degree. In 1953, the average North Korean and average South Korean were very much alike, even physically. Today the average North Korean is about three inches shorter and 40 pounds lighter than the average South Korean. There has been a policy of starvation for three generations. I think North Koreans support the government because that’s the only thing they know. If average North Koreans had a greater understanding of the outside world and could see the dramatically higher standard of living that South Koreans enjoy, I think they would be opposed to their government’s actions. But, of course, that’s why they’re kept isolated.

Given China’s role as North Korea’s only ally, do you think that it will work to lessen tensions? There were some recent comments from President Xi warning North Korea indirectly not to stir up trouble.

China stands to lose a huge amount, as does the entire region, if the situation spins out of control. The enormous economic progress we’ve seen would be jeopardized. Like President Xi, Russia’s President Putin and German Chancellor Merkel cautioned the North Koreans to avoid provocations. I think that, if needed, both Russia and China would take stronger actions to try to stop Pyongyang from doing something foolhardy.

EastWest Direct is an ongoing series of interviews with EWI experts tied to breaking news stories.

In recent months, the words of American politicians on the subject of transatlantic relations have often sounded a bit like the Van Morrison classic: “Have I told you lately that I love you?” Since the U.S. government announced its “pivot” toward the Asia-Pacific, hardly a speech has failed to mention a clear commitment to Europe: ‘Europe is still America's most important partner. America will not abandon Europe. Vice President Joe Biden is not making a special journey to Beijing, but to Germany for the Munich Security Conference.’ And so on, and so forth.

In Europe, and in Germany in particular, we like hearing these things. On both sides of the Atlantic, we seem to have this feeling that our affection for one another needs to be constantly reaffirmed. Where does this insecurity come from? Transatlantic relations are actually more harmonious and less problematic than they have been for a long time. However, in certain ways, we have begun living – staying with the metaphor – somewhat separate lives.

Both of us – Americans and Europeans – have recently been occupied largely with ourselves. The Europeans' attention has been primarily directed towards managing the Euro crisis, while the Americans, for their part, have themselves been struggling with the effects of the financial crisis and a highly polarized and self-obstructing political class. European politicians shake their heads over the endless disputes in Congress about the debt ceiling, while their American colleagues press the EU to finally generate more economic growth in Europe.

In the realm of foreign policy, the U.S. is strengthening its involvement in the Asia-Pacific, whereas Europe is barely considering its own strategic role there. On the other hand, in and around Europe, the U.S. no longer insists on taking the leading role in conflicts and interventions – for the first time since NATO was founded. This was the case in Libya and now once again in Mali.

The U.S. and NATO cannot be everywhere at once, their officials say. At the same time, they warn Europeans against further reducing their defense expenditures. Complaints were recently heard in Paris that the U.S. was demanding large payments for providing urgently required transport capabilities for the Mali operation. Perhaps this was only a misunderstanding - but it somehow seems symptomatic.

Europeans and Americans now have to come to a fundamental understanding of what they want to do together in future, and what each would prefer to do on their own. There are excellent reasons for us to continue to define as many common goals as possible. Just as in every relationship, however, it also means that we will have to invest something.

A significant step would be to set up a common economic area with a common free trade zone as a core, which, according to the estimations of some experts, could allow the gross national product of Europe and the USA to increase by several - highly valuable - percentage points. But such a free trade area would not only benefit both economies. It would also contribute to a dynamic in which standards and rules to which the U.S. and Europe agree become a sort of blueprint for the entire globe.

Fortunately, this idea, which is not exactly new, has found prominent support and has gained ground in European capitals as well as in Brussels and Washington. President Obama has just expressed his personal support. Such complex projects will only be successful if the negotiations are carried out “top-down” and do not simply get pushed back and forth in the respective bureaucracies. The obstacles are numerous and the stakes high. Let us hope that Obama, Merkel, Barroso etc. will persevere.

Another area that calls for closer cooperation is the U.S. “pivot” to the Asia-Pacific. The transatlantic conversations about potential common goals and policies in that region have been too timid. Europe will not be willing or able to involve itself militarily in Asia in the same way as Washington - nor should it be. But the EU can - and should - have its own clear positions, e.g. on the Chinese-Japanese conflict. From an Asian perspective, Europe barely appears on the radar when it comes to strategic questions. And a division of labor under which we sell expensive cars while the United States works towards strategic stability in Asia will eventually trigger significant transatlantic frictions. There are a number of issues on which we could work together more closely – with respect to promoting democracy or strengthening multilateral structures and organizations, for instance.

When it comes to NATO, there is also a need to act. Of course, we could continue to make speeches reassuring one another on a regular basis that NATO is the most successful alliance of all time. But in the long term this will be insufficient. The decisive question is how we can define the future of NATO together and ensure that it is able to fulfill its purpose. After all, the member states today have quite different ideas about the primary reason for the alliance’s existence.

It is unsettling that the alliance has increasingly developed into a sort of platform for "coalitions of the willing" in which only a certain percentage of members are actually actively involved. The integrated military structure of Nato is unique. But this alone is no guarantee that we can pursue our security interests together and successfully. It must be supported by a strategy, the relevant capabilities, and a minimum amount of solidarity.

Regrettably, over the past few years, European governments have cut their respective defense budgets without considering the bigger European picture. As a result, important military capabilities are being lost; perhaps they could have been retained had there been prior consultation. We need to use pooling and sharing to finally overcome the European ‘small-state’ approach in the area of defense. We could use the European defense budget far more efficiently if we trained and bought together. Such a step towards European self-affirmation would be met with American support.

We should take seriously the warnings of our American partners, which have become clearer and clearer, that the United Statess is simply no longer in a position to bear to main brunt of every crisis. For decades, Europeans have spoken of a two-pillar NATO, of a partnership of equals. This is their chance to actually turn this into reality. From an American perspective, further European integration and a close transatlantic partnership are no longer an either-or proposition. One depends on the other, and vice-versa.

The two new faces of American foreign and security policy, John Kerry and Chuck Hagel, are true transatlanticist with intensive connections to Europe. They take a genuine interest in us. Both have been loyal supporters of, and participants in, the Munich Security Conference. For the next generation of Americans, however, the connection to Europe is less and less close to the heart. Opinion surveys have revealed a trend that Europe's importance for the USA is slowly but consistently decreasing. In a Chicago Council survey last year, among those surveyed 58 percent aged 35 and younger said that Asia was more important to the U.S. than Europe.

This should remind us that the close transatlantic partnership is not a self-evident truth. We have always been connected by an unmatched level of economic interdependence, a network of stable institutions, many common interests, and last, but not least, our common identity as liberal Western democracies. In the coming decades these connections will become ever more important: in a world with new powers, Europe and the U.S. will only be able to stand up for their liberal values and interests together. In order to be able to do this, however, we must invest in these bonds between us. Maybe, we should not only be telling each other how important we are to one another, and how much we value each other. We should once again be embarking on inspiring projects together.