Europe

I would first of all like to thank the organizers of this event, CCME (Council for Moroccans Abroad), for providing me with the opportunity to speak here about such a current topic. Having recently emigrated myself – albeit within the European Union - and working in the field of international relations, I feel today’s topic of ‘Migration, Identity and Foreign Relations’ is close at heart.

But allow me first to say a couple of things about my work, so as to give a background to the discussion points I would like to raise. I am the Program Coordinator for the Parliamentarians Network for Conflict Prevention. This Network celebrates its 5th anniversary this year, as it was launched at the European Parliament in 2008 by the EastWest Institute upon the recommendation of a high-level task force. This task force existed of seasoned diplomats and politicians, who are convinced that parliamentarians are in a unique position to not only identify the early warning signs of civil unrest and looming conflict, but that they are also capable of acting upon such early warning and respond with preventative measures.

So today we have a network of nearly 100 parliamentarians from all over the world dedicated to prevent conflict. Conflict in the traditional military or armed sense, but the network also tackles more contemporary sources of conflict, such as access to water, food and energy, as well as issues of cyber crime. And although many of these sources of conflict are addressed by parliaments individually, bringing parliamentarians together to force joint strategies is often times more effective, given the fact that these threats will not stop at any country’s border. This is the reality of globalization in which we live; we cross borders for work, we travel for pleasure, and our governments increasingly need to look outwards for partners to cooperate with. New cultures and countries are only but a click away.

But how do we make sure that in this interconnected world, we stay true to our culture and values? This can be a particular challenge for people emigrating. The new culture in which they will be absorbed might not seem welcoming and it might be difficult to overcome the language barrier. It is therefore very positive that organizations such as CCME exist in order to assist those who have moved abroad, as a focal point, ensuring they have a voice as well.

In my professional capacity, I meet parliamentarians on a daily basis and some of them worry about the amount of immigrants their country is taking up. They worry about the fact that large scale migration might change their culture and some might blame domestic issues, such as unemployment, on the immigrants. Yet other countries struggle with actively engaging immigrant communities, because they live secluded by their own traditions, hardly interacting with the host country’s culture. Many large cities have a China town, where the Chinese population lives in relative solitude, protecting values and customs from outside influences. Many of these countries struggle with being able to provide the immigrant communities with a sense of belonging. Most of these problems can be overcome, for example by providing language courses which also touch upon cultural aspects of the host society. Religious and cultural organizations, or indeed organizations such as CMEE, can also play a key role in fostering understanding and can act as a focal point for authorities to approach. The goal is to create social conditions in which people from different background can live together in harmony and enjoy their fundamental freedoms.

We encounter potential dangerous conflict when either group wishes to force their identity upon the other group, demanding assimilation. In the aforementioned scenarios dialogue might overcome misunderstanding and misinterpretations. When the host or the immigrating community insist upon the assimilation of the other is when we experience conflict. Insistence of the host community might lead to even more seclusion by the immigrant population and can lead to a strengthening of their native identity, even radicalization in extreme cases. Insisting on assimilation of the host community to accept norms and standards of the immigration community might lead to discrimination and that crimes based upon the notion that the immigrants are intruders out to destroy the values of the host community.

We believe parliamentarians have a key role to play in ensuring that the debate is taking place. Not discussing problems arising from migration does not solve any problems, but it makes them fester in society until there is a – usually violent – eruption of the build up pressure this has caused. In both the host country of the immigrant, as well as the home country parliamentarians can hold open dialogue and engage with parliamentarians on the other side of this dialogue to help foster understanding.

But also the migrating communities themselves have a large role to play when it comes to parliament. Immigrant communities with a strong sense of identity have in the past successfully lobbied parliamentarians for recognition of their particular problems. And in countries where we speak of ‘second or third generation’ immigrants – a group which often feels disenfranchised with links both (or neither) to the host county’s culture and that of the country of origin of the previous generation(s) – it is key to have political participation by the immigrant communities. As they often have grown up in the host community, we need to encourage them to vote, elect officials who advocate their cause within the host community’s culture and eventually elect role models of these groups as elected officials.

A good example of such integration where the cultural identity has not been lost is that of the Indian community, the Sikhs, in the United Kingdom. This community at first was viewed upon as foreign and almost as one encroaching upon British culture, although India had been a dominated by the British empire. By now, however, the British parliament has an ‘All Party Parliamentary Group for British Sikhs,' which deals with issues relevant to the Sikh community. That does not mean that all problems have been solved and everyone in the British society is just peacefully living next to one another. 2011 saw the first Sikh Member of Parliament wearing a traditional turban in parliament. The Sikh community found this ‘too little, too late’ whilst for many British this was already going out on a limb to give a cultural minority the right to display a religious symbol in parliament. Many European countries share this rigid separation between religion and State. Only in recent years have European societies come to accept that immigrant communities have become such an inherent part of their national identity that allowances should be made for their traditional garments. This is not something which can be changed with one single generation of immigrants though; it takes decades for such change to be broadly supported by and indeed incorporated into the culture of the host community.

I feel it is my duty, however, to point out that this is not an issue dealt with merely in Western Europe, as we sometimes are inclined to think. Let me cite another example: In Turkey the separation between religion and State may be even stricter than in some Western European countries. In 2011 it was the APK party of the current Prime Minister Erdogan who placed a female candidate on its list for the district of Antalya who was known to wear a headscarf. Now, the APK knew that the candidate in question had no chance of winning in this district, thereby preventing a full-blown parliamentary crisis, but it still caused quite the commotion. This goes to show that whilst our discussions mostly focus on Moroccans abroad and that the majority of those who emigrate to (Western) Europe, these are not issues unique for this relationship between Moroccan immigrants and European host communities.

I will leave it at that for now, but I would be delighted to continue the discussion after the interventions of the other most honorable speakers on the panel and I would welcome any questions there might be afterwards.

Thank you.

EWI's Parliamentarians Network for Conflict Prevention mobilizes members in parliaments across the globe to find pioneering ways to prevent and end conflicts

"What's Wrong with China's North Korea Policy?," Carnegie Endowment. Mar 26, 2013. 

"In China, Soviet Union's failure drives decisions on reform," The Washington Post. Mar 23, 2013.

"China's Xi tells Africa he seeks relationship of equals," Reuters. Mar 25, 2013. 

"China agencies press territorial claims in Asian waters," The LA Times. March 27, 2013. 

"Elite in China Face Austerity Under Xi's Rule," New York Times. March 27, 2013.

Follow EWI on Twitter @EWInstitute for continuing news updates.

Compiled by Michael McShane, Athina Doutis, Alex Schulman and Haolin Liu.

Contrary to all expectations, the Italian marines have returned to India for trial. After having formally announced that the marines will not come back, the Italian government has dramatically reversed its position. This suggests that the hardliners in the government — apparently the foreign and defense ministers — have been overruled by wiser heads. It was not normal for a country with diplomatic traditions as old as Italy’s to violate its solemn word to another friendly country so flagrantly, striking by its action at the basic structure of diplomacy which rests on the principle that countries will honor their commitments.

Even if the Italian government has had to swallow its pride and lay itself open to the charge internally of grossly mishandling the case in the first instance and misjudging the strength of the Indian reaction, especially that of the Supreme Court, it is just as well that good sense has prevailed and further escalation of differences has been avoided.

In such cases of volte-face, especially by a major European power, some face-saving compromise between parties can be expected, but no such compromise is visible. The clarifications sought by Rome and given by New Delhi that the marines will not be arrested on their return and will not face the death penalty amount to little as the marines were already on bail, were returning within the four-week deadline laid down by the Supreme Court and the circumstances of the case do not at all justify the death penalty.

It is just as well that the situation has been defused and further deterioration of bilateral ties averted. By announcing that the marines would not return, the Italian government had deliberately raised the political and legal ante to a level that put enormous stress on bilateral ties. The Supreme Court and the country at large felt duped by the Italian decision. It defied belief that the Italian government would knowingly give a false affidavit to the Supreme Court and cover up further its deceptive intentions by approving a false undertaking by its ambassador. Even if the Italian government has strongly disagreed with India’s position on jurisdiction over the two marines, and even if it has faced intense public pressure at home to defend their rights, recourse to duplicity and fraud to spirit away the marines from Indian judicial control was hardly defensible. It had the option to take strong political steps to show its displeasure by recalling its ambassador in protest, curtailing official links, mobilizing the European Union in its favor, taking up the issue in whichever international forum was available to it. It opted, instead, to show contempt for the Indian Supreme Court and disdain for India.

In a sense, the conditions for the crisis were created by the Indian side. The Supreme Court was extraordinarily accommodating in entertaining the plea to let the marines go back to Italy in February for voting when they had returned just a month earlier after spending Christmas with their families. Why did the Supreme Court feel that it was important that they should vote? In granting successive furloughs in Italy, the consideration shown for those responsible for recklessly killing two Indian citizens seemed excessive.

The Supreme Court, for all its generosity, had to have a guarantee that the marines would return. Such a guarantee could only come from the ambassador in the name of his government, and it was given. It was overlooked that this guarantee was inherently political, not legally enforceable in case of default. Neither the counsel for the Italians nor the government counsel had reason to clarify to the judges that, under the immunity provisions of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, any undertaking by the ambassador would not be legally actionable against his person if not eventually honored, as both wanted the marines to have a break and were willing to rely on the good faith of the Italian government. In retrospect, the Supreme Court could be accused of being naive, but, in all fairness, neither the court nor the government could have anticipated the Italian government’s unscrupulous conduct.

While the furor in India over this was justified, calls for punitive action against the ambassador, even by leading jurists, on the ground that the ambassador had voluntarily subjected himself to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, seemed ill-conceived and violative of the provisions of the VCDR, which are clear about the diplomatic immunity of ambassadors.

The Vienna Convention (Article 32.2) says that the waiver has to be expressed. In this case, the Italian government did not say, nor would it have done so, that in case of default the ambassador could be proceeded against legally as his diplomatic immunity could be considered waived. The convention also requires a second waiver for the execution of any judgment, which means that even if the court were to claim that the Italian ambassador had voluntarily submitted himself to its jurisdiction in the first instance, a further waiver by the Italian government of the ambassador’s immunity would be necessary for any punishment. Article 32.3, which says that initiation of proceedings under Article 37 by a diplomatic agent will not allow him to claim immunity in case of a counter-claim directly connected to the principal claim, is not applicable as Article 37 relates to families of diplomatic agents, the service, technical and administrative staff of the mission, and not to the ambassador.

The Supreme Court’s order restraining the ambassador from leaving the country has already created a major precedent by interpreting loosely a country’s obligation under the VCDR to respect the diplomatic immunity of an ambassador. This has caused serious disquiet in diplomatic missions in New Delhi, as the possibility that Indian courts could, in future too, interpret the principle of diplomatic immunity circumstantially cannot be ruled out. In any case, bilateral options against Italy being available to us, converting our differences with Italy into an international issue by seriously infringing the VCDR and disturbing the principles of diplomatic functioning in general would have been most unwise.

The Italian government showed prudence in not asking the ambassador to defy the court’s order, as any physical restraint on him would have gravely escalated matters. The court’s order and the external affairs ministry’s statement that the government was bound by it did put enormous political and psychological pressure on the Italian government. The EU has been measured in its support for Italy, but a big India-EU dispute could have arisen if we had been cavalier with the VCDR. While it is true that American and European countries have disregarded the principle of diplomatic immunity by subjecting some of our missions to local labor laws, to judgments of local courts on compensation issues — attaching bank accounts to force payments, imposing traffic fines and so on — we have to be careful not to widen the scope of such breaches by unilateral action against the person of an ambassador.

Fortunately, escalation has been avoided. The Italian government should be commended for retreating from an untenable position. For us, seeking to rewrite international law on diplomatic immunity was a fraught option. India and Italy can now, hopefully, resume normal, friendly business with each other. 

As a young girl, she idolized Marlene Dietrich; much later she sang with Charles Aznavour and was compared to Edith Piaf. Vera Gran, who burst to fame as a teenage Polish Jewish singer in the 1930s, craved admiration. “I wanted to stir emotions,” she proclaimed. She did so with her seductive contralto voice. But when she ended up singing in the nightclubs of the Warsaw ghetto during the German occupation, she stirred much more dangerous passions. For the rest of her long life, she was subjected to accusations that she had collaborated with the Nazis, fueling her increasing desperation and isolation.

By the time Agata Tuszynska, a Polish poet and biographer of Isaac Bashevis Singer, first managed to convince Gran to admit her into her dust-filled, nearly sealed-off Paris apartment in 2003, she was 87, bore almost no resemblance to the glamorous beauty captured in earlier photos and was understandably paranoid. Yet with infinite patience, Tuszynska coaxed her to recount her version of events. This, along with Tuszynska’s review of every bit of testimony she could find, allowed her to write “Vera Gran: The Accused.” It is as much a moving meditation on survival and morality amid the horrors of the Holocaust as it is a reconstruction of Gran’s tragic tale.

Born into a poor family, Vera Grynberg, who later went by the stage name Gran, wanted to be a dancer in Warsaw. After an auto accident ended that dream, she quickly found her calling as a cabaret singer, regularly sang on Polish Radio, and made records and advertisements. She sang in Polish but also had a role in the last Yiddish film made before the war. Suddenly, she was a star, making more than a good living, providing help to her mother and older sisters. 

Click here to read the rest of this piece at The Washington Post.

Thank you for this opportunity to address a Fidelity audience here at headquarters in Boston. With the freedom to choose the subject of this talk, I opted for the new strategic project on the transatlantic agenda – the decision of the U.S. administration and of the EU in February to negotiate a comprehensive trade and investment agreement. The President and the EU jointly announced this breakthrough on 13 February. Negotiations are to begin mid 2013 and should – to quote Joseph Biden – not take longer than “one tank of gas."

The idea of such an agreement is not entirely new. The transatlantic economic relationship is already the world’s largest and, with only just over 10% of the world population accounting for half of global economic output and 30% of the world trade, it also supports millions of jobs on both sides of the Atlantic. More than mere trade relations, mutual investment is the real backbone of the transatlantic economy. The U.S. and Europe are each other’s primary source and destination for foreign direct investment. And to compare dimensions: the total U.S. investment in BRIC countries since 2000 accounts for just 7.2 % of total U.S. investment in the EU and is altogether less than U.S. investment in Ireland.

So Europe and America already do a lot of business, and the idea of a comprehensive trade and investment agreement was one of those ideas “that’s always at the wedding party but never catches the bouquet” as the Wall Street Journal wrote on December 4th, 2012.

Why now? What’s changed?

The consequences of the financial and economic crises since 2008 changed the game in 2011/2012.

Governments as well as corporate business on both sides of the Atlantic face similar problems since 2008: weakened economies, unemployment, risk of recession or very slow growth, but high levels of public debt. Stakeholders had to recognize the co - dependence that comes along with the already closely linked economies. And they re-evaluated the potential of even closer integration through a comprehensive trade and investment agreement.

Economic growth and jobs are expected to be the short-term benefits of reducing tariffs and other barriers to trade in goods, services and investment, and of enhancing compatibility of regulations and standards. A trade and investment agreement would be expected to provide pain - free stimulus on both sides of the Atlantic to spur growth without spending taxpayers’ money.

From a global perspective, the global financial and economic crises have demonstrated the strength of new global players, emerging countries with high growth rates who impact economic and political governance. The U.S. and the EU will need to act together to defend their economic interests and to set standards for the rest of the world (e.g. intellectual property, labor and environment standards), as long as they can still do it.

And, as multilateral free trade negotiations – the Doha round – have effectively failed to achieve agreement on global trade issues, bilateral negotiations are seeing their comeback now (U.S. with Transpacific Free Trade Agreement, EU with South Korea and with Canada). This is also a chance for the U.S. and the EU to agree on cooperation to establish new trade rules that are globally relevant.

So, a comprehensive agreement would trigger growth and jobs on both sides of the Atlantic, it would help the world’s largest economic relationship to face new competitors and it would help set standards and rules for global trade that others cannot ignore.

What would the agreement be about?

While there is no official name for the project yet, it is suggested that the agreement should be comprehensive and aim high, especially in the field of harmonizing industrial standards and regulations. Some scenarios foresee additional annual growth by 2027 of 0.5 % in the EU and of 0.4 % in the U.S. (source: German Foreign Ministry)

The agreement would include:

Reduction of tariffs and tariff-rate quotas and of other, non – tariff barriers: tariffs are already fairly low (5-7% on average), some gains.

0% Tariffs would increase U.S.-EU trade by more than $ 120 billion within 5 years and generate combined GDP gains of about $180 billion (U.S. Chamber of Commerce).

Enhancing compatibility of regulations and standards, by harmonizing or at least recognizing each other’s standards would be the big challenge and lead to major gains! Key industries are car manufacturing, chemistry, pharmaceuticals. Progress in this area would be key for establishing a more integrated transatlantic market place.

Restrictions on the basis of health standards, national- security concerns or consumer protection: eliminating half of these non-tariff barriers would increase GDP by 0.7 % in the EU and by 0.3 % in the U.S. (Bloomberg)

Where are the traps?

In February, the announcement of the decision to engage in negotiations was good news that was generally welcomed, without triggering either excitement or criticism. It is the end of a long process, and the beginning of a series of ambitious negotiations which will keep politicial leaders busy for some time.

To name a few key areas of conflict: negotiations are expected to be difficult on agriculture with two highly protected markets on each side of the Atlantic and high sensitivities of consumers. Exports of U.S. chlorinated chicken, hormone- treated beef and genetically modified food (potatoes) are a perennial source of controversy with EU and European consumer associations.

Another minefield: different approaches to data protection, privacy rules and freedom of the internet. While the U.S. seems to be more tolerant about implicit data collection by Google, Facebook and other social networks, EU wants to see this limited in order to protect personal data of internet users.

On the other hand, in 2012, internet activists all over Europe helped stop the Anti- Counterfeiting Trade Agreement “Acta”, meant to protect intellectual property from free downloads. This was perceived to be an attack on “freedom of internet”, the European Parliament disapproved of the bill.

In the services sector, EU competitors face restrictions in the U.S. European airlines cannot offer flights within the U.S. They have few chances to win contracts in public procurement – local “buy American” standards prevent this. Investment does not seem to be a battlefield in these negotiations.

Some of these examples show that these negotiations will not be only conducted in the closed political circles. As they touch the everyday life of people, these may be mobilized easily and voiced in the internet, in traditional media and eventually by parliaments.

Overall strategic gains of this new phase of transatlantic economic relationship The decision to negotiate an ambitious agreement demonstrates the ability on both sides to explore the potential of a strong relationship, to overcome the tendency, in times of economic weakness, to look inward and to go for short term protectionism. Instead, the U.S. and EU have demonstrated their will to focus on growth and on win-win solutions for both economies.

A comprehensive transatlantic agreement will be a model for other players. Together, the U.S. and EU still dominate the world economy. As long as this is the case, they can drive globalisation, they can set standards which will then be adopted by the rest of the world, especially by those emerging markets (e.g. charging stations for electric cars, limits of radiation for smart phones, the admission of new pharmaceuticals, and as some point out: even perhaps the metric system).

A comprehensive agreement will strengthen the position of the transatlantic market place in the world, and help to counter-balance challenges from new players. It is considered to be the most important project on the transatlantic agenda which will impact the standing of “the West”. Many European analysts see the negotiations as a historic chance for the West. In a similar way, though less philosophical, David Ignatius referred to this agreement as the foundation of an “Economic NATO” in December 2012.

Conclusions

The negotiations will start later in 2013, the ambitions are high as to substance and to the timetable. EU Commissioner Gucht would like to conclude the talks even by end of 2014.

There will be many challenges, particularly in a number of sensitive areas which are close to key business interests as well as touching the public at large (consumers, internet users). The public can be easily mobilized, and mass concerns can be voiced directly and through parliaments.

The European Parliament and Congress will sooner or later play critical roles in this. They need to be kept in the loop before the process of final approval and ratification. Beyond compromises by governments and support from corporate business, it will be necessary to engage the civil societies in America and in Europe to form a broad alliance in support of an even more interdependent economy.

The negotiations will be complex and complicated, and they will need to keep focused on strategic gains over particular, if not parochial interest here and there. To be successful, leadership and political will – as Joseph Biden put it – are required. In the end, the prize will be well worth the effort – with a transatlantic economy spanning two continents, from the U.S. Pacific coast to the Eastern borders of the European Union.

Based in the Brussels center, Ambassador Dr. Beate Maeder-Metcalf leads EWI's Regional Security program.

 “Russian Judge Delays Trial of Dead Lawyer,” New York Times, March 11,2013.

“Two-Thirds of Russians Support Banning Foreign Adoptions – Poll” Interfax – Moscow, March 11, 2013 

“U.S. Demands China Block Cyberattacks and Agree to Rules” The New York Times. Mar 11, 2013. 

“China offers to discuss cyber security with US” Reuters. Mar 12, 2013.

"Guns and Butter: How to Prevent a Nuclear Arms Race in Asia" Albert B. Wolf, World Policy Blog. March 13, 2013

“China’s Xi Jinping charts a new PR course” The Washington Post. March 13, 2013.

“China’s New Leader Takes Full Power in Delicate Balancing Act,” The New York Times. March 14, 2013. 

Follow EWI on Twitter @EWInstitute for continuing news updates.

Compiled by Michael McShane, Athina Doutis, Alex Schulman and Haolin Liu.

In Syria, a dictator is waging war against his own people, targeting men and women standing in line at bakeries. By now, according to UN reports, more than 60,000 people have lost their lives. There is no telling when the terror will end. Those who have witnessed the wars in Yugoslavia in the 1990s are reminded of the helplessness and powerlessness they felt during those years. At that time, the international community began to develop the idea that it would not be acceptable any more for a regime to turn on its own civilian population. The result: the “responsibility to protect.” And today, two years after the outbreak of the conflict in Syria, we still hardly have a clue how to live up to this obligation. Perhaps a look back at the wars in former Yugoslavia – during which we had to learn our lesson the hard way – can help.

In the 1990s, it took us a long time to understand that the threat or even the use of military power is sometimes necessary to reach political goals and advance peace: In Bosnia, without the intervention of NATO, the Dayton accords that ended the civil war never would have been possible. Understandably enough, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have made Western societies tired of intervening. The West has come to realize that military interventions – as morally justified as they may be in individual cases – are rarely effective if they are not embedded in a sustainable political strategy. But hasn’t our skepticism gone too far? Could we not have saved many thousands lives with, for instance, a no-fly-zone and the suppression of Bashar al-Assad’s air force? Could the mere presence of NATO missile batteries a year ago have demonstrated the resolve of the West?

The experience in Yugoslavia has also underlined the importance of a joint position of the members of UN Security Council. The NATO air strikes alone could not end Milosevic’s regime. The Serbian president was not run from power until Russia turned its back on him as well. Today, the disunity of the UN Security Council allows Assad’s killings to continue unabated. For more than a year, the veto powers Russia and China have been blocking all efforts to pass a resolution.

It would, however, be too simplistic to attribute responsibility to Russia alone. To some degree, the West is also to blame. From Moscow’s perspective, the Western nations have time and again disregarded Russian interests. Former NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer once said that it was very difficult to cooperate with somebody who thinks of himself as a victim. Moscow feels that it is not being taken seriously as a partner. Again, the memories of the Yugoslav wars play a role: In Russia’s view, the West would ask Moscow for concessions when these were indispensable. Yet after Russia had cooperated, the West would, as seen from Moscow, again ignore Russian interests. Moscow knows that while its power to shape is limited, it still has a considerable power to obstruct.

Of course, the West is aware of that power. At the Munich Security Conference in 2009, just days after President Obama’s first inauguration, U.S. Vice President Joe Biden announced a reset of the U.S.-Russia relationship. Promising results ensued: Obama and then-President Medvedev adopted the most important arms reduction treaty in the past two decades – “New START” – and agreed to cooperate on missile defense. However, the relationship cooled for a number of reasons. As the West grew more concerned over the domestic situation in Russia, Moscow insisted on full partnership in missile defense cooperation – on terms that NATO could not accept.

The case of Syria again reveals the fundamental underlying issue: If the West does not want to undermine the authority of the United Nations, it will have to find a way to convince Moscow. The fact that Russia is not fundamentally opposed to any kind of intervention became clear when it abstained on the Libya resolution 1973. Nonetheless, with respect to Syria the Russian government will only agree to sanctions or even the use of military force when it feels it won’t – again – regret changing positions.

Thus, we should hope for a clear signal towards Moscow from the second Obama administration. After all, the U.S. president now does have “more flexibility”, as he had said in the “open mic” incident with Dmitri Medvedev last year. If the U.S. decided not to re-engage Russia, it would be a missed opportunity. No one wishes to gloss over or ignore deplorable domestic developments in Russia. But the fact remains that our foreign-policy interests require that we finally address the obstacles in the NATO-Russia relationship. This includes an agreement on missile defense cooperation: The base lines for a compromise are, in principle, known, yet neither side has dared to make a real move.

Without progress in our relationship, a comprehensive Euro-Atlantic security community that includes Russia will not become reality. Or, to put a positive spin on it: As the NATO-Russia relationship grows stronger and deeper, conflict resolution outside the Euro-Atlantic region will become more likely – not only in Syria.

Russia and the West share key interests in Syria. Nobody really sees a future for Assad, nobody wants to have Syria become a failing state, nobody wants an Islamist regime in Damascus. Considering the strong historical ties between Moscow and Damascus, a solution for the Syrian conflict will have to go through Moscow. The Russian secret service is superior to those of the West when it comes to information on the Assad regime. Again, a similarity to Yugoslavia.

In 2012, we jointly failed in solving the Syrian conflict – the West and Russia. Now we can and must better prepare for the time after Assad – but only if Russia is part of the solution, not part of the problem. This makes new U.S. impetus on a missile defense compromise necessary. In addition, Russia must be integrated more closely into the efforts for Syria. Similarly to the contact group on Yugoslavia, we need a contact group for Syria. The group would have to focus on strengthening the moderate opposition forces, developing a joint peace plan, and aiding refugees.

Only with the help of all Security Council members, the UN envoy Lakhdar Brahimi will be able to succeed. Those who do not want to be forced to intervene militarily after all (as in Mali) need to strengthen the UN Security Council. The path goes through Moscow.

China notably opposed military action against Libya and a UN resolution condemning Syria. Could this newfound cooperation signal a new phase, perhaps a reset in U.S. relations with China, which you have called “America’s single most consequential diplomatic partner?”

I wouldn’t characterize China’s position on North Korea in the United Nations Security Council as an effort to demonstrate cooperation with the United States, per se; China doesn’t view North Korea principally as a bilateral issue with the United States. China views North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and the ballistic missile capability to deliver those warheads more as a regional issue that requires a multilateral, diplomatic approach.

China recognizes, from the standpoint of its own security interests in Asia, that a nuclear North Korea is highly problematic; and because that is so, it has been willing to work with the United States and the other U.N. Security Council members to adopt this latest and toughest round of sanctions.

Bear in mind that, when China looks at this issue of North Korea, it’s using a very different prism than the United States. If things deteriorate on the Korean peninsula – if the North Korean regime were to collapse, or God forbid, there were an actual breakout of war between the North and the South and the various other players – that would affect China in very direct and profound ways.

What strategic considerations are at play for China here, especially in light of the U.S. “pivot” to East Asia and tensions in the South China Sea?

When countries like China, the United States or other players in the Asia-Pacific region take actions, on the one hand, they’re doing so on the merits of the case – in this case, the issue of North Korea itself; on the other hand, they’re doing so in a broader context.

The driving considerations for the Chinese with reference to this particular U.N. action are pretty much self-standing. China doesn’t want nuclear weapons anywhere on the Korean peninsula. China views nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula as antithetical to its interests. What drives this particular assessment is a cool, rational analysis of China’s own security interests.

More broadly, China does feel some sense of apprehension and wariness concerning the United States’ long-term objectives in the region. China sees the U.S. pivot to Asia in terms that are more sinister than anything the United States has described publicly. Chinese scholars and sometimes officials in off-the-record statements have made the point that there seems to be a kind of containment-like element to this policy.

These two issues, the North Korea situation and the U.S. pivot, do come together. In the back of the minds of the Chinese leadership, there must be the idea that China doesn’t want to see developments that give the United States any further cause to beef up its military presence in the region. It’s in that context, as well, that China looks at the region and looks at what’s happening in North Korea.

Do you believe this recent activity signals a lasting policy shift in China’s stance on North Korea?

I don’t think that China’s position vis-à-vis this current round of sanctions represents anything qualitatively new. The United States and China have always had a common interest with respect to the question of North Korea’s pursuit of a nuclear program. Both sides want a non-nuclear Korean peninsula. Where they have at times differed is in how far you go with the use of sanctions to try to coerce behavior, with the U.S. historically taking a tougher posture.

I think there’s been broad continuity in China’s position over quite a few years, where the basic interest is a non-nuclear Korean peninsula and peaceful resolution of these issues in diplomatic and multilateral ways. None of those things have changed, notwithstanding the fact that China has now accepted a significant intensification of sanctions toward North Korea.

So why accept the tougher sanctions this time? I think the Chinese leadership is beginning to recognize, even if begrudgingly, that previous international efforts to influence North Korea’s behavior have not had the desired effect. I think China has concluded that it has to try something a little different.

In recent history, the failure of sanctions looms large: Saddam Hussein’s Iraq during the 1990s, Iran and North Korea, which has been under sanctions for most of its existence. Do you think these sanctions will actually work?

If I were a betting man, I would say no. Is this round of sanctions a positive development? Yes. As a human being on the planet earth, I’m happy to see that these sanctions have been adopted with the unanimous support of the Security Council. But the thing about sanctions that you have to understand is that the very premise of sanctions – or of any carrot-and-stick scheme – is that the actor whose actions you’re trying to influence is a rational actor, someone who will respond to cues and inducements rationally.

If you’ve got an actor that doesn’t necessarily respond to these kinds of prompts rationally, then, in a sense, all bets are off.

There have now been four rounds of sanctions on North Korea that have passed the U.N. Security Council; and yet, so far at least, we haven’t seen the kind of change in North Korean behavior that one would hope to see. So my judgment is that North Korea is not the kind of nation that would appear to respond to these kinds of prompts or inducements in a way that other countries would look at and regard as rational.

The U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Susan Rice, has said, “These sanctions will bite,” meaning bite the North Korean leadership, “and bite hard.” And I think that’s a fair assessment. But again, if history is an indicator, I don’t think there’s a lot of evidence to suggest that the North Koreans will react in any readily predictable way to these types of international community actions – except, perhaps, to proceed with further nuclear and missile tests and ratchet up their rhetoric to even more craven heights.

Thanks so much for your thoughts on this subject. Any other comments you’d like to put on the table?

I think everyone’s now watching North Korea. North Korea’s leadership has some decisions to make. It’s very clear that the international community is quite united in its sense that North Korea’s pursuit of a nuclear weapons program is dangerous and destabilizing. It’s good to see the United States, China, Russia and the other members of the Security Council unanimously agree on this. I certainly hope that we’re entering a phase where the North Korean leadership realizes that the stakes are rising steadily with each round of these sanctions. Hopefully, it will do what’s in the interest of the North Korean people and peace on the Korean peninsula.

EastWest Direct is an ongoing series of interviews with EWI experts tied to breaking news stories.

The successive visits of French President Hollande and UK Prime Minister Cameron to India this month can be viewed from different angles. Both countries clearly attach increasing importance to the India relationship. Opportunities in India are considerable even now despite the current economic slowdown, and will grow vastly as India continues to rise. Interest in India is also part of the wider reality of economic power shifting steadily towards Asia, with France and the UK, therefore, needing to retain and expand their share of a market that is fostering linkages eastwards. UK’s share of the Indian market has dropped to 2 1/2 % from 10% at one time because they have admittedly not been pro-active enough. The fact that Europe is in crisis and the French and British economies are in trouble explains also the enhanced attention to India.

For India too, relations with France and the UK are of major importance bilaterally and within the framework of our relations with Europe, which remains India’s largest trade and investment partner. The Eurozone crisis has impacted more on the Indian economy than the US financial crisis. France and the UK as the fifth and sixth largest economies in the world with advanced technologies to offer are very valuable partners for India. We are appealing to both to ensure a “fair, balanced and forward looking” India-EU Trade and Investment FTA.

Both leaders were accompanied by large business delegations, 45 with Hollande and over 100 with Cameron- the largest delegation to leave UK’s shores. The target of doubling bilateral trade with France set up in 2008 (Euros 12 billion by 2012) has not been met. That set up with Britain in 2010 (Pounds 24 billion by 2015) is not likely to be met either given present conditions.

On the investment side, the UK is well ahead of France, with Cameron pointing out that 50% of Indian investment in Europe was in the UK and the latter was the biggest European investor in India. He promised to remove barriers to Indian investment in the UK further, asking in return that India remove its barriers too, especially for British legal, accountancy, architecture and other services.

India wants investment for upgrading its infrastructure. Hollande laid stress on cooperation in sustainable urban planning, including infrastructure, transport, water, waste management as well as railways. The UK has shown interest in the Bangalore-Mumbai industrial corridor, but the joint statement on this is couched in very tentative language, with the leaders agreeing “to examine and evolve the modalities and content of a feasibility study of this project concept through mutual discussions and to work out a roadmap for a possible partnership in this area”. British participation in India’s National Manufacturing and Investment Zones has been mooted. This, it is felt, would attract British SMEs to India. A lot of focus during Cameron’s visit was actually on potential opportunities for them.

Cameron singled out health care and education as highly promising areas. In education, the especially strong India-UK relations have been impacted by changes in the UK visa regime. However, Cameron has indicated these will be reversed- there will be no limit on visas and graduate jobs, he said. He has promised the same day visa service to Indian businessmen. France is far behind in education, but is keen to expand student exchanges through an ambitious education plan, including twinning of higher education institutions, mutual recognition of degrees, exchange of doctoral students, along with an enabling agreement on “people mobility and migration”.

Second, there is the advanced technology angle. France, unlike the UK, is a privileged partner for cooperation in nuclear energy with India. The agreement on the Jaitapur nuclear power project could not be signed during Hollande’s visit but the commitment of both sides to its early implementation “as soon as the commercial and technical negotiations, which have made good progress, are completed” was reiterated. India and the UK have now decided to open talks for a civil nuclear cooperation agreement. In space, cooperation with France has been longstanding and an agreement to launch a jointly developed satellite was announced during Hollande’s visit, but this area is absent from the gamut of India-UK ties. India concerns about easier access to hi-technology were addressed by Hollande by the signature of several memorandums of understanding between institutions to broaden the scope and depth of future engagements in science, technology and innovation. Cameron too stated UK’s commitment to make available to India the cutting edge British technologies, civil and military, that the UK currently shares with its top international partners, but in accordance with “international obligations”. Cameron supports greater cooperation betwen DRDO and the UK Defence Science and Technology Laboratory. Both Hollande and Cameron supported India’s membership of the NSG. MTCR, Australia Group and Wassenar Arrangement, the four non-proliferation and technology control regimes.

Third, there is the defence angle. Both France and the UK have been longstanding defence partners of India, but France has a record untainted by participation in sanctions. Cameron has expressed his disappointment publicly at losing the contract for the Medium Multi-role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) to France. During Hollande’s visit it was noted that “the projects for the Scorpene submarine and upgrade of the Mirage 2000 are moving forward and steps are being taken for early finalization of the Short Range Surface to air Missile project. Both sides noted the progress of ongoing negotiations on the MMRCA programme and look forward to their conclusion.” This should dampen speculation that the Eurofighter might re-enter the fray if the negotiations with Dassault run into difficulty. The Augusta-Westland controversy cast its inevitable shadow on the Cameron visit.

Afghanistan, Iran and Syria figured in discussions, as well as enhanced counter-terrorism and cyber-security cooperation. Both leaders called for an expeditious trial of those responsible for the Mumbai terrorist attacks. Both reiterated support for India’s United Nations Security Council permanent membership.

The recent tendency in India to belittle the importance of Europe in our external ties is ill-considered and ill-informed, suggesting a discomforting hubris on the part of some of our opinion-makers.