On Friday, February 15, the EastWest Institute (EWI) is co-hosting a cybersecurity roundtable at the Munich Security Conference (MSC) titled “A Dragon in Disguise? Geostrategy in Cyberspace.” 

The discussion will bring together around 45 experts from the technical, government and security communities. Bruce McConnell, Global Vice President and head of EWI’s Global Cooperation in Cyberspace program, will moderate, and Katrin Suder, Member of the Board of Trustees at the Hertie School of Governance and former State Secretary of Defense of the Federal Republic of Germany, will deliver introductory remarks.

Participants will examine the geopolitical aspects of cybersecurity, focusing on the increasingly crucial role economic actors play in bridging the divide between economic interests and policy. This year’s roundtable will feature perspectives from several prominent actors in the economic, political and cyber sectors, including South Korean Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha and former Australian Prime Minister Malcom Turnbull.

The Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace (GCSC) conducted its fifth public hearings at the Palais Des Nations, United Nations Office in Geneva, on January 22, 2019. Hosted by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), the hearings featured discussions between members of the Global Commission, Geneva-based international organizations, government representatives, civil society and the private sector, and focused on how peace and security in cyberspace is influenced by international law, human rights, Internet governance, development, sustainable development goals and other issues.

“We greatly appreciate UNIDIR hosting the Commission and lending its expertise on the incredibly complicated topic of cyber stability,” said Marina Kaljurand, the GCSC’s Chair. “This meeting was emblematic of the multi-stakeholder nature of the issue and the range of actors required to address stability, security and continued confidence in the digital platforms on which we all depend.”

Renata Dwan, Director of UNIDIR said that “These Commission meetings were important because after being on the UN agenda for over two decades, we are now seeing an expansion on the discussion around what cyber stability means and for whom. A debate that began focused on State behavior, is now becoming a much wider discussion about the role of the private sector, of regions and of individuals—and how to develop space for rights, for equity, and for access that enhances development for all.”

A keynote address was delivered by Fabrizio Hochschild, United Nations Assistant Secretary-General for Strategic Coordination, and remarks were also provided by Jon Fanzun, Special Envoy for Cyber Foreign and Security Policy, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs of Switzerland.

Over the course of the day, attendees participated in two hearings. The first focused on International Law, Peace and Security and Cyber Stability and featured the following speakers: Anja Kaspersen, Director, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, Geneva Branch; Deborah Housen-Couriel, Senior Researcher, Interdisciplinary Cyber Research Center at Tel Aviv University; Helen Durham, Director of International Law and Policy, International Committee of the Red Cross.

The second hearing focused on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, human rights and Internet governance and included remarks by: Francesco Pisano, Director of the Library, United Nations Office at Geneva; Peggy Hicks, Director of the Thematic Engagement, Special Procedures and Right to Development Division, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR); and Elena Plexida, Senior Director Government and IGOs Engagement, ICANN.

In its closed session on January 23, the Commission continued discussions on the definition and principles for cyber stability, and recommendations for a future international peace and security framework for cyberspace. The input from the hearings informed the Commissioners’ discussions. A definition of cyber stability and recommendations for the international community going forward will be central elements in the GCSC’s report.

The GCSC would like to thank the organizations that have submitted feedback in response to the Request for Consultation on the Singapore Norm Package. The received comments were collected and presented to the Commission in Geneva and will be considered in the writing of the GCSC Report.

The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, the EastWest Institute, the Chairs and Commissioners would like to thank UNIDIR for hosting the GCSC in Geneva, as well as the GCSC partners, the governments of the Netherlands, Singapore and France, Microsoft, ISOC, Afilias and the other funders for their support.

The GCSC will next convene in March 2019 in Japan on the margins of the ICANN64 meeting. In the run-up to this meeting, the GCSC continues to welcome input from other stakeholders on its work. Comments may be sent to info@cyberstabililty.org or cyber@hcss.nl.

Click here to learn more.

Following opening remarks by EWI Vice President Wolfgang Klapper and Hanns Bühler, resident representative of the HSS in Cape Town, Jakkie Cilliers, head of African Futures & Innovation at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), analyzed Africa’s demographic development, growth perspectives, manufacturing and services sectors, and regional integration and innovation potential.

One of the presented findings is that economic growth in most African countries is absorbed by enormous population growth; by 2050, the continent’s population is expected to double from 1.2 to 2.5 billion. 2019 will be an important year for politics on the continent, as 17 African countries are due for elections, some of which are expected to bring the potential for conflict.

Munter argues that the recent flurry of activity in the British parliament has narrowed options for Prime Minister May; she must attempt to get agreement from the EU to change her draft Brexit agreement, even though EU leaders have said there will be no changes.

Some critics in the UK say May's approach is sacrificing British interests to her own efforts to keep her party together. Meanwhile, businesses complain that uncertainty is driving them to make decisions that may be damaging to all.

"I don't see too many good outcomes to Brexit," said Munter.

Click here to watch the full interview. 

Conventional wisdom among Western policy makers and analysts holds that burgeoning China-Russia military ties are a shallow partnership of convenience, primarily fueled by shortsighted U.S. policies, yet bound to be undermined by diverging national interests and ongoing mutual distrust. As U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis noted during a press conference in September of this year: “I see little in the long term that aligns Russia and China.”

There is ample evidence to support the U.S. defense secretary’s assertion. For example, Russia maintains close military ties with India and Vietnam that includes selling advanced military hardware such as long-range air defense systems and attack submarines to New Delhi and Hanoi. At the same time, both countries are locked in territorial disputes with China. Both also see Beijing as their principal long-term military threat.

Additionally, Russia has remained conspicuously neutral in ongoing maritime disputes involving China in the East and South China Seas. In turn, China did not publicly support Russia’s annexation of Ukraine. Furthermore, Russia feels threatened by China’s incursions into Central Asia with its "Belt and Road Initiative," which undermines Russian preeminence in the region including the Russian-led “Eurasian Economic Union.” Furthermore, there is a corresponding fear in Moscow that Beijing could undermine Russia’s traditional role as the region’s main security provider.

Moving to the military dimension of the relationship, at a first glance, it appears to be a continuation of an uneasy bilateral relationship.

Notably, China and Russia are not committed to collective defense. The two nations do not have a formal security pact that commits them to defend one another in the event of a military conflict and bilateral military agreements between China and Russia do not contain a casus foederis clause obligating one side to come to the defense of the other. Indeed, both sides continue to see one another as an improbable, yet nonetheless real military threat. For example, Russia has repeatedly expressed concern over China’s large arsenal of conventional and nuclear-tipped land-based intermediate range cruise and ballistic missiles, while China is eying with suspicion the re-strengthening of the Russian Navy’s Pacific Fleet.

However, a closer examination reveals that China and Russia could indeed incrementally forge a stronger military strategic partnership.

The basis for military relations between China and Russia is the 2001 bilateral Treaty of Good- Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation. Article 9 of that treaty notes that “when a situation arises in which one of the contracting parties deems that peace is being threatened and undermined or its security interests are involved or when it is confronted with the threat of aggression, the contracting parties shall immediately hold contacts and consultations in order to eliminate such threats.” This could be construed as an implicit commitment to mutual defense.

In a similar vein, a 2018 joint Sino-Russian statement reads that the two countries will "build up cooperation in all areas, and further build up strategic contacts and coordination between their armed forces, improve the existing mechanisms of military cooperation, expand interaction in the field of practical military and military-technical cooperation and jointly resist challenges to global and regional security.” While it is true that neither of these agreements outlines a de jure or de facto defensive alliance, the language clearly leaves open the possibility for closer military cooperation between the two countries and possibly joint military operations in the future.

For over a decade China and Russia have been conducting bilateral military exercises, the so-called “Peace Mission,” large-scale joint military exercise primarily involving air and ground forces of both countries, and the so-called “Joint Seas” naval exercises. Including smaller exercises such as ballistic missile defense simulation exercises and internal security forces drills, the total number of Sino-Russian military drills held annually has shot up to four or five and increasingly more complex and weighty. In September 2018 3,500 Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) personnel, 900 pieces of heavy weaponry and 30 aircraft from the PLA’s Northern Theater Command marked China’s first participation in Russia’s largest military exercise in almost four decades in Siberia and the country’s Far East.

While in a previous analysis I noted that the Chinese and Russian militaries are not in the process of achieving NATO-like interoperability any time soon, China’s participation in the Vostok (Eastern) 2018 exercise has yielded tangible practical benefits for the PLA beyond political symbolism. For example, the military exercise provided valuable insights for the PLA for deploying brigade-sized forces that integrate air and ground elements, along with special operations forces, abroad. Especially in the area of expeditionary logistics the exercise offered a useful practical experience to the PLA.

Notably, Sino-Russian military exercises for the past decade have been conducted in the Russian language using joint command codes of the Russian command system. This is partially the result of a large number of PLA officers studying at Russian military academic institutions with potentially wide-reaching consequences. “Together with narrowly specialized technical knowledge, the PLA’s officers absorb the knowledge of Russian military traditions, strategies, and tactics, which is likely to exert a significant impact on China’s military build-up and army organization and make the two countries’ overall thinking about modern threats and warfare more compatible,” Alexander Korolev emphasized in an April 2018 journal article in Asian Security.

China and Russia also continue to deepen cooperation in the military-technical field. Following a fallout over Chinese unlicensed reverse engineering practices in 2006 and 2007, military-technical cooperation has gradually increased over the years with China retaining the status of a “special” or “privileged partner.” The largest bilateral defense programs pertain to air defense systems and aircraft engines, with China no longer seen as merely an export market by Russia, but a genuine defense industry partner. Russian and Chinese officials have repeatedly stressed that military-technical cooperation constitutes the backbone of the China-Russia strategic partnership.

According to an internal Kremlin study cited by Alexander Gabuev in Foreign Affairs, in less than ten years China will have little use for Russian-made military hardware given the country’s massive indigenous R&D investments. It is thus less surprising that Russia has been selling China some of its most advanced military hardware including Sukhoi Su-35S (NATO reporting name: Flanker-E) fighter jets and S-400 Triumf interceptor-based long-range air defense systems (NATO reporting name: SA-21 Growler) given that the Chinese market, it is assumed, will soon dry up for Russian imports. At the same time, the study also explains why both countries are moving toward a military technological partnership as equals increasingly focusing on R&D and the joint production of arms.

Joint concerns over U.S. actions and policies—the U.S. National Security Strategy notes that China and Russia are “attempting to erode American security and prosperity” -- are likely to further strengthen Sino-Russian ties. For example, last year’s anti-ballistic missile defense computer-simulated command post exercise, the second ever such exercise by the two countries, was a direct result of Sino-Russian concerns over the deployment of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems by the United States on the Korean Peninsula. Both countries have called the deployment “reckless” and likely to destroy “the strategic balance” on the Korean Peninsula and in the region. Apprehensions over U.S. actions could be further cemented by the likely termination of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019.

In the decade ahead, we should not only expect to see an increase in the size and scope of Sino-Russian military exercises, but also anticipate increased cooperation at the military technical level between the two countries. The recent deliveries of Su-35s and S-400 air defense systems alone will necessitate military personnel exchanges and joint trainings, as well as the sharing of operational experiences between the countries’ militaries. Closer Sino-Russian military ties should nonetheless not be confounded with a genuine military alliance. China historically has eschewed any type of formal alliance and will likely continue to do so. At the same time, dismissing burgeoning Sino-Russian military ties due to divergent Chinese and Russian national interests and a lack of NATO-type force interoperability risks glossing over the already deepening level of military cooperation between the two countries. 

The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the EastWest Institute

Dr. Lora Saalman, vice president of EWI’s Asia-Pacific program, contributed to the latest Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) White Paper sponsored by the U.S. Department of Defense entitled “AI, China, Russia, and the Global Order: Technological, Political, Global, and Creative Perspectives.”

The report, released in December 2018, focuses on the emerging Chinese and Russian models of artificial Intelligence (AI) and big data and how they will interact with the global order. It brings together deep expertise on China, Russia, strategy and technology—as well as artists to provide illuminating sidelights.

This white paper can be downloaded here at the SMA Publications site.

Dr. Saalman’s contribution to the report, “China’s Integration of Neural Networks into Hypersonic Glide Vehicles,” begins on page 153. 

Image credit: "Machine Learning & Artificial Intelligen" (CC BY 2.0) by mikemacmarketing

The EastWest Institute (EWI) convened the 10th anniversary of the U.S.-China Sanya Initiative from October 27 to 29, 2018. The dialogue was made possible through the generous support of the China-United States Exchange Foundation (CUSEF) and other private donors and was organized in close partnership with the China Association for International Friendly Contact (CAIFC). Retired American and Chinese senior flag officers and executives of the hosting organizations met in Beijing to discuss critical issues of mutual concern and interest impacting the U.S.-China military-to-military relationship, including North Korea, Taiwan, the South China Sea, emerging technologies, as well as other regional security challenges.

The dialogue afforded timely opportunities for substantive exchanges prior to the November 9th meeting between U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, and Chinese Minister of Defense Wei Fenghe and State Councilor Yang Jiechi. Planned activities included two days of off-the-record discussions at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse in Beijing with the participation of observers from both China and the United States, as well as official meetings with Admiral Miao Hua, Director of the Political Department of the Chinese Central Military Commission, and Ambassador Terry Branstad, the U.S. Ambassador to the People’s Republic of China.

The clock is ticking toward March 29, 2019. On that date, the United Kingdom is scheduled to leave the European Union. Typical of the nebulousness since the "Leave" vote back on June 23, 2016, it remains unclear how this will happen—or even whether it will take place at all.

In the first quarter of 2019, there are three options for the United Kingdom: crash out of the European Union, stay in the European Union or accept a negotiated withdrawal agreement. All of them will certainly use up most of the energy of the British leadership. And that will be unfortunate for the rest of us, because the United Kingdom will likely be preoccupied at a time when the world sorely needs Britain's engagement.

If, 100 days from now, there is no agreement, then the United Kingdom will simply crash out of the European Union. The specific and unique problems this would cause are increasingly coming into focus: the highway to Dover packed with trucks requiring customs clearance, while perishable goods spoil and contract obligations aren't met; shortages of medicines or industrial components; confusion about the landing rights of foreign carriers in the United Kingdom and British carriers in Europe. The list goes on and on. It is pure denial to think that such very real scenarios wouldn't affect the strength of the pound or produce massive knock-on socio-economic effects that would be felt for weeks and months afterward. To this, one should add the eventual political ramifications: Expect more jockeying and changes in government personnel or the prospect that Scotland moves quickly to separate from England and seeks to rejoin the European Union.

Click here to read the full article on Stratfor Worldview.

On the one hand, neither Russia, nor the West, claim that they want a repetition of the Cold War. On the other, in analysing the tone and rhetoric used by both sides, it seems that they are talking themselves into such a scenario, because renaming this confrontation as hybrid war or gibridnaya voyna does not change its nature. Moreover, continued words of hostility have been widely supported by actions: defence budgets have risen in Russia and in NATO, non-NATO member Sweden has returned to conscription, NATO has deployed forces in Eastern Europe on the largest scale since the end of the Cold War, and the Kremlin has renewed flights of its strategic bombers and is announcing a new piece of military hardware almost on monthly basis.

It is important to remember that the Cold War was not only a nuclear stand-off, with its numerous near-misses (from the Cuban Missile Crisis to the Able Archer episode) that brought humanity on the brink of mutual destruction, but also a period that was enormously expensive, both financially and politically, and extremely destabilising throughout the world. Since a new Cold War promises to be even less salutary, both sides have to face a difficult choice between a politically challenging but responsible path based on mutual respect and trust, versus an impulsive, reckless and antagonistic approach, which may be politically easier, but in which the whole world loses.

In an effort to avoid the repetition of a new Cold War scenario, Western leadership would probably have to make very difficult political decisions, but since the West (in its political, rather geographical sense) represents the most stable, experienced, economically powerful and politically progressive community on this planet, it seems that it is about time that it start behaving like one. The West should accept the fact that Russia is a major power that is going to remain ambitious, alive and kicking, with President Putin or without, protecting its interests and unwilling to dance to a Western tune. Therefore, there is little help in assessing that Moscow is “politically isolated, economically sanctioned and with few options to improve its lot” or how vulnerable “an over-geared, under-invested, over-securitised and under-legitimate Russia may be.” First, it does not represent the trend. Second, and more importantly, it misleads and creates an unhelpful delusion regarding the current state of Russian affairs.

A case in point is Ukraine. While the West is obviously right to claim that Ukrainian sovereignty and democracy is not a place for Russia’s meddling, it should not forget the other side of the coin – Ukraine is not the place for the Western interference either. In other words, as a direct continuation of the previous understanding that Russia is going to remain a major power in its neighbourhood, the West should accept its role. As John J. Mearsheimer, put it: “Washington may not like Moscow’s position, but it should understand the logic behind it. This is Geopolitics 101: great powers are always sensitive to potential threats near their home territory.”

Similarly, since the Kremlin believes that its foreign policy “reflects the unique century-old role of Russia as a balancing factor in international affairs and the development of the world civilisation,” it seems about time that Moscow starts to balance its relations with the West, rather than impair them.

On the one hand, it seems that in its game against the West, Russia enjoys an advantage – it is more prepared and knows the West’s weaknesses much better than the West knows Russia’s. Since the end of the Cold War, the number of Russian people living, studying, teaching, working or even just visiting the West is incomparably higher than the number of the Westerners, who have been doing the same in Russia. Today’s Russia (with its political leadership, academic and business communities and even average citizens) understands the West, its strengths and weaknesses, much better than the West understands Russia. 

On the other, the fact that the Russians have travelled, studied and lived in the West is also a weakness. It does not necessarily mean that the Russians think that the West is better; rather it means that they recognize it is different, and during tough times anything different looks appealing. The Kremlin should remember that Russian exposure to and engagement with the West may also have a very quick and powerful adverse effect if the Russian people should become unhappy with their leadership.  After all, these were not external adversaries, but the Russian people themselves who brought Russian the state down twice during the 20th century – in 1917 and again in 1991.

Since the end of the Cold War, the West has made many mistakes – some were recognised quickly, for others it took years to understand, for some the West was punished, for others it punishes itself. Without any doubt the West also has made many mistakes in its approach to Russia, however, the Kremlin should remember that punishing the West “for assuming Russia’s a weak power, a declining power” is not the goal, but merely a way to point towards the West’s mistakes (and it seems that the lesson has already been learnt).  

Re-establishing lost trust will not be an easy task, neither for Russia, nor for the West. Undoubtedly, it will be a long and painful process, however, the alternative could be even worse. Both sides have to understand that the world needs a wind of change, different to the sentiment expressed in the lyrics of the famous song of the Scorpions depicting the ruins of the Soviet Union. “Let your balalaika sing what my guitar wants to say” fostered a misapplied euphoria in the West and even less helpful taste of humiliation in Russia. The world needs a wind of change based on mutual respect and understanding, the ability to take responsibility for previous mistakes and a readiness to compromise. Only such a scenario will eliminate the need for future rock bands to play similar songs in the decades ahead. Otherwise, regardless the instruments that would set a future tune, whether these will be guitars or balalaikas, we all lose.

Ofer Fridman (PhD) Lecturer in War Studies, Department of War Studies, King's College London, Director of Operations, King's Centre for Strategic Communications (KCSC). 

The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the EastWest Institute