It's been a couple of weeks since Donald Trump was inaugurated at the 45th president. He has spent that time initiating changes in approaches and policies that have the potential to change U.S. and thus world politics more fundamentally than any time in the last 70 years.

Rather than listing his initiatives—from the wall between America and Mexico, to the ban on certain Muslim travelers to the U.S., to policies on oil pipelines, to the first steps in reassessing relations with Europe, with Russia, and with China—I'll speculate on how to understand changes in Washington, and the impact of those changes.

First, the President is doing what he said he would do. With a few notable exceptions (such as dropping his promise to put Hillary Clinton in jail, or easing his confrontational approach to the leaders of Wall Street), he is beginning to make his campaign promises real. Between November and January, some had hoped that he would moderate those promises, believing he had no true convictions and that he had only expressed himself on such topics as torture to get votes, and thus that he would choose to govern moderately once in office. So far this is not the case. Analysts should no longer state breezily "we don't know what he'll do, and neither does he" as some did before the inauguration.

Second, the President has made clear that he is determined to make the changes he believes his electorate wants. It's important to note, however, how he views his electorate. His inaugural speech was unique in modern times in that it did not stake out a broad vision for all Americans, but rather, articulated the grievances of the core constituency that elected him. This indicates that he intends to pursue those policies he believes will benefit that core constituency. 

Why is this important? For those of us who seek to anticipate his foreign policy moves, it's now clear that the Muslim ban was not about Muslims, his spat with the Mexican president was not about Mexicans, and that his questioning of the One-China policy was not about the Chinese.  Rather, these and other foreign policy statements (and ultimately, the policies he'll pursue) will take place with an eye on those places in the U.S. where he visited shortly after election day on his "victory tour"—the heartland of America and its residents who expressed their dissatisfaction with traditional politics by electing him.  

To understand his foreign policy, we must first and foremost weigh how he thinks his core constituency will respond.  It's less about geo-strategy or global impact, and more about deepening domestic support among those who are already in his corner.  

Third, the mechanics of U.S. foreign policy will change. Two events of these past weeks give us a glimpse of this. First, by accepting the traditionally pro-forma resignations of the senior management team at the State Department—that is, of the career diplomats who run the budgets and personnel and foreign missions and consular elements of foreign policy—the new administration has begun an unprecedented process of breaking down bureaucracy. The tasks these career experts performed for previous administrations, Democratic and Republican, are unique and often arcane, and it will be difficult to find loyalists from the private sector with the proper skill set to carry them out. But that is clearly less important than keeping the promise to change the way we do business in Washington and abroad. Second, the new directive on the role and function of the National Security Council (NSC) announces, for the first time, that White House domestic policy advisers will be members of the NSC. This means that foreign policy debates will never be purely foreign, but rather, always mindful of domestic priorities. Now, domestic priorities have always been enormously important to all presidents. But up to now Presidents have received expert foreign policy advice, expert domestic policy advice, and made determinations accordingly. Under the new system, the President is not likely to receive expert foreign policy advice that has not already been shaped by domestic considerations. 

This is just the beginning of an era, then, that will be new in form and content. For EWI's mission and for the success of our programs, it's critical that we deepen our own understanding of the impact of the major changes underway in Washington.

Part I of this series described the doctrinal and organizational imperatives that cause—even require—senior military commanders to publicly advocate for their preferred policies and for resources to support the military objectives assigned to them. In some cases, this leads them to pursue what can be, in-effect, independent foreign policy objectives that support their military mission.

Domestically, commanders must also advocate for resources, policies, and permissions to achieve missions and objectives that require higher approvals. To express those national policy preferences, senior commanders give private counsel and options either directly to the President, or through the Secretary of Defense. But the military also enjoys a unique position and prestige in American public life. Public polling consistently shows the military is by far the most trusted part of government and senior commanders can build significant public profiles. That prestige affords commanders a lever of influence on policy decisions. When military figures speak on issues of foreign policy, their voice frequently dominates the public discourse over other stakeholders and interests. And while senior military leaders are typically careful to avoid explicit policy advocacy in public, it is often possible to infer the sort of private counsel they provide to civilian leadership.

Likewise, when a commander has a particularly high public profile their Congressional testimony can have outsized influence on policy decisions. While the uniformed military remains subordinated to civilian leadership, their testimony can serve as a form of advocacy. It can also provide ammunition for legislators seeking to put pressure on the executive branch by leveraging the appearance of administration disagreement with military officials. In aggregate, this can influence a policy decision in favor of military preferences.

Consider President Obama’s first-term review of U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. During the review, General Stanley McChrystal, who gained fame as head of the Joint Special Operations Command in Iraq, wrote a classified assessment of the conflict. His report, leaked to the press by an unknown party, called for a large troop-increase to conduct a long-term counterinsurgency. Later, the General spoke at a policy institute in London and publicly advocated for that strategy in Afghanistan, even though troop levels and overall strategy were still being deliberated by the White House. Congressional Republicans criticized the President for delaying or denying resources for his commander. This indirect pressure, magnified through news media, pundits, and politicians, contributed to the President reportedly feeling “boxed in” by the military to approve a deeper commitment and larger troop levels than he preferred going into the review process.

A Case Study in the Pacific

The Afghanistan surge was a wartime decision, with public and political attention. In contrast, the evolution of U.S. policy towards China’s maritime claims in the South China Sea over the past year demonstrates the influence military prestige can have in peacetime decision-making. At issue was the reported desire of the military—and the reported reluctance of the Administration—to conduct Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS) near Chinese bases on man-made islands in contested stretches of the South China Sea to demonstrate that the U.S. does not recognize China’s excessive claims in the region.

Admiral Harry Harris, commander of all U.S. forces in the Pacific, has gained significant publicity for his views on China as a strategic competitor in the Pacific, earning him dedicated profiles in the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal. These and other media coverage have tended to reinforce a public impression of Admiral Harris as a China hawk who advocates more robust U.S. responses to China’s man-made South China Sea islands and assertive enforcement of its contested claims.

In a speech to an Australian policy institute, Admiral Harris referred to China’s island-building as “a great wall of sand” that risked isolating it from the international system, and told a Senate committee that, “I believe China seeks hegemony in East Asia. Simple as that.” For its part, the Obama administration’s ‘rebalance to Asia’ incorporated a substantial military component. Nevertheless, Administration officials were reportedly concerned that more assertive FONOPS could lead to a military confrontation or risk damage to other policy priorities, such as US-China cooperation on North Korea sanctions, trade issues and climate change agreements.

As the military apparently waited for months to execute FONOPS in the South China Sea, a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing in September 2015 generated significant public attention on the issue. Admiral Harris reiterated his belief that the U.S. needed to “…exercise [freedom of navigation and flight] in the South China Sea against [China’s artificial features and bases],” and Senator John McCain (Rep.-AZ) used the opportunity to argue forcefully for conducting assertive FONOPS, making a point of the lack of such operations since 2012, before most of the island reclamation had begun.

A month later, the U.S. conducted a FONOP against Chinese reclaimed islands. To mitigate its concerns over risk to broader China priorities, the New York Times reported that the White House forbade announcements or public comments about the operation, despite the intense press speculation that preceded it and the push for more continued. Senator McCain criticized the single October challenge as inadequate, Admiral Harris has continued to testify in favor of additional FONOPS, and Congressional pressure to act increased. The U.S. has since conducted three additional FONOPS in the South China Sea, and in contrast to the reticence surrounding the first, the most recent was immediately acknowledged in a White House press statement.

Just as commanders engage foreign partners and allies through speeches, meetings with key leaders, press statements, and participation in policy forums to ensure political support for U.S. objectives and access for its forces, they need that same buy-in for their preferred policy outcomes from domestic elites and power centers. Policy speeches and press interviews help build public and elite support for those policies, yielding political influence both directly on the executive branch and on Congress, which exerts its own influence. Of course, the President is still the Commander in Chief, and has the prerogative to accept, reject or modify the advice of senior commanders, as President Obama’s steadfastness against expanding combat operations against ISIS demonstrates, in contradiction to reported military advice. Nonetheless, while the influence military commanders enjoy via their public prestige is not determinative, it is a unique lever of influence on policy decisions not available to other stakeholders.

Steven Stashwick is a writer and analyst based in New York City. He spent ten years on active duty as a U.S. naval officer with multiple deployments to the Western Pacific. He writes about maritime and security affairs in East Asia and serves in the U.S. Navy Reserve. The views expressed are his own. Follow him on Twitter.

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the author and not that of the EastWest Institute.​

The EastWest Institute (EWI) announced today that Ambassador Heiko Thoms has joined the institute as a Distinguished Fellow. Ambassador Thoms is the former Chief of Staff of the German Foreign Minister and former Deputy Permanent Representative of Germany to the United Nations. In his capacity as a Distinguished Fellow, he will lend his expertise to the institute’s programmatic work around conflict resolution and European and Middle East security issues.
 
“It is truly an honor to have Ambassador Thoms join the EastWest Institute, bringing his deep global policy experience and understanding of European security issues at a critical historical juncture,” said Dr. William J. Parker III, Chief Operating Officer, the EastWest Institute. “Ambassador Thoms joins our esteemed group of EWI fellows, and we look forward to his insights and contributions at a time when solutions to today’s critical security issues are increasingly critical.” 
 
Ambassador Thoms has over 18 years experience in foreign and security policy and multilateral negotiations. Ambassador Thoms’ career in the German Foreign Service has seen him posted in Cairo, Teheran, Brussels and Berlin. 

As Chief of Staff, he was the German Foreign Minister’s principal adviser. During his time as Deputy Permanent Representative and Ambassador to the United Nations in New York, he represented Germany in the Security Council and the General Assembly. He also served as Vice-President of UNICEF’s and UN WOMEN’s Executive Board. 

On January 11, 2017, Perot Fellow and Senior Vice President of Strategic Trust-Building and Track 2 Diplomacy David J. Firestein joined the World Affairs Forum in Stamford, Connecticut as part of the Ambassadors' Roundtable series.

Firestein examined the potential impact of the incoming Trump Administration on the U.S.-China relationship by looking at four clusters of issues: bilateral economic and trade issues; bilateral non-economic issues (such as Taiwan and human rights); regional security issues; and global issues. 

Firestein assessed that the Trump Administration’s most significant impact on U.S. policy toward China and on the relationship itself will be in the first area—but he also predicted that even so, the fundamentals of the bilateral trade and economic relationship will likely remain unchanged. Firestein also predicted relatively little major change in the three other issue clusters, which, with the exception of the South China Sea dispute, seem to be framed by the current Administration as second-tier issues.

Firestein concluded his talk by saying he was more “cautiously pessimistic” (that is, somewhat more optimistic) about the prospects for the U.S.-China relationship than most other observers, some of whom have expressed concern about greatly increased U.S.-China tensions and even possible armed conflict between the two nations; he expressed the view that, when the transitional dust settles and rhetoric becomes less important than actual actions, the Trump Administration may end up presiding over a relatively positive period in the relationship.

During the U.S. presidential election, American foreign-policy experts reassured their international counterparts that the Trump phenomenon was only a fad and that cooler heads would prevail. The foreign-policy establishment in the United States was not prepared for a Donald Trump presidency, and the international community was even more caught off guard. Trump’s surprising victory will have a significant impact domestically and internationally, because his lack of political experience will make it difficult for world leaders to ascertain U.S. policy going forward. Moreover, his penchant for outlining complex policy objectives and attacking rival superpowers on Twitter, his habit of backtracking on previous statements and his “America First” rhetoric will bring immense uncertainty and unease within the international community.

No world leader may be more impacted by an unpredictable United States than Shinzo Abe, the Japanese prime minister, who has tied much of his foreign policy to a steadfast U.S.-Japan alliance. Indeed, Abe reaffirmed this during a speech at Japan’s National Diet earlier this month: “In the past, now, and from now on, it is the Japan-U.S. alliance that is the cornerstone of foreign and security policies of our country. This is a changeless principle.” Abe’s dependence on the United States is combined with other factors. His efforts to reform Japan’s antiquated security and defense posture and his desire to nurture other relationships in the region—including those with India and Australia—contribute to that dependence.

During Abe’s second term, he has sought to “normalize” Japan by increasing the capabilities and role of the Japan Self-Defense Forces, improving Japan’s stature in international relations, and reducing the constitutional barriers that previously limited Japan’s ability to respond to a rapidly changing international-security environment and a rising China. However, this increased autonomy was, ironically, heavily dependent on a strong alliance with the United States.

Click here to read the full article on The National Interest.

"The rhetoric is certainly a departure from what we're used to," said Munter in the interview that aired on February 2. "For 70 years, the American policy has been that by extending itself outwards, by having solidarity with other countries, by having alliances, American interests are served. So this idea of America First implies that what has happened in the past has not somehow been in America's interest," he argued.

Munter said if America was turning inward, there was now a question of  America's ability to define what happens overseas and whether America's role is crucial anymore. "That's something very very new because there's never been a period since the second World War when America hasn't been part of either—in people's perception—the solution or the problem.

This change is "very troubling," said Munter, if "other people are left to think there are other ways to solve problems and many of those may not be consistent with the values that America has traditionally espoused." 

"There's a qualitative concern that—without America there, without America giving content to the values that we've always talked about—the world may be a more dangerous place and certainly a more uncertain and volatile place in the years to come," Munter said.

Listen to the full interview on Voice of America here. 

On January 20, the day President Donald Trump took the oath of office, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe delivered his annual policy speech to the Diet, pledging to strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance which he insisted remains the cornerstone of Japan’s foreign policy and national security. Abe is expected to meet with Trump in Washington on February 10 to persuade the new President of the indispensable role of the U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship in upholding the U.S.-led rules-based order in Asia. He will also lobby the President on the imperatives of free trade and the strategic logic of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)—from which Trump has withdrawn the United States.

The Prime Minister’s address follows his six-day regional tour to the Philippines and Australia—two U.S. treaty allies—as well Indonesia and Vietnam in an effort to strengthen economic and security ties with its southern neighbors. Tokyo’s outreach is driven by uncertainties about Trump’s policies toward Japan and seemingly transactional approach to the U.S.-Japan security alliance on the one hand, and a resurgent and aggressive People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) that is challenging the regional status quo and destabilizing regional security on the other.

Minding the Gap

Under Abe’s leadership, Japan is seeking to strengthen economic and security ties with regional countries in response to an increasingly threatening external environment and proactively fill a potential gap in U.S. regional leadership and engagement. Abe’s trip focused on two security objectives aimed at countering the PRC’s attempts to dominate the South China Sea—through which Japan’s vital Seal Lines of Communication (SLOC) pass. First and foremost, he seeks to shore up relations and demonstrate solidarity with the Philippines and Australia—in effect reaffirming a commitment in the U.S. “hub-and-spoke” security alliance system. Secondly, Abe aims to boost the maritime security capabilities and maritime domain awareness of Indonesia, Philippines, and Vietnam.

On the economic front, Abe’s two basic objectives are aimed at preventing China’s growing economic dominance in Southeast Asia from displacing Japan’s regional business networks and supply chains— thereby threatening Japan’s national economic security. To this end, Abe offered a substantial 1 trillion yen ($8.66 billion) package of in aid and investment to the Philippines (See: ”How Japan Plans to Counter China in Southeast Asia”). Japan is also looking to expand investment in major infrastructure and energy projects in Indonesia as well as in the manufacturing and high-tech sectors in Vietnam. Secondly, in the wake of the TPP’s apparent demise, Abe jointly promoted free-trade with his counterparts in Australia and Vietnam which are TPP member states.

However, Washington’s categorical rejection of the TPP and single-minded emphasis on bilateral free-trade agreements (FTA) means that any regional multilateral trade deals—such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)—will include China as a rule-maker. In this respect, even if Washington and Tokyo are able to negotiate an FTA, it would have little restraint on Beijing's push to shape the regional economic order. Such an outcome would indirectly undermine Japan’s efforts to build an informal regional security network to safeguard its southern approaches. Indeed, while most Southeast Asian nations look to the U.S. security alliance as a counterweight to Beijing’s hegemonic ambitions, most of these same countries have extensive and growing economic ties to China. As a result of this dichotomy between economic and security interests, most regional states (including Indonesia, Philippines, and Vietnam) are pursuing hedging strategies aimed at balancing their relations with the United States and China and are therefore unlikely to “align” too closely with Tokyo as a security partner.

So where does this leave Japan?

Prime Minister Abe’s regional security agenda is a welcome development within the region, but in addition to the external impediments discussed above, he faces domestic political constraints and the Japan Self Defense Force’s (JSDF) own limitations. There is widespread public acceptance of Abe’s regional strategy—though parts of Japan’s political, bureaucratic and business classes worry about provoking China. However, handing over patrol boats and a few aircraft while holding bilateral defense talks and engaging in periodic ship visits and small-scale exercises are one thing; sending the JSDF out into harm’s way is another. Expand the regional security agenda much and Abe opens himself up to attacks by domestic opponents—claiming he is dragging Japan into military conflict with China.

The JSDF also has its own capacity constraints that hamper Abe’s regional efforts. Japan’s military hasn’t gotten significantly bigger or better funded—and won’t see much improvement. The JSDF is already hard pressed to handle existing requirements, much less start asserting itself in Southeast Asia. Under current conditions, JSDF (and the Japan Coast Guard) cannot establish a sufficient regional ‘footprint’ to deter China, or give its neighbors to the south wherewithal to fend off Chinese coercion or the confidence to think that linking up with Japan will enable them do so.

To be clear, Japan is an exceptional ally. And, one applauds Japan and Abe taking a forward-leaning approach to regional security. This reassures friends and allies who see Japan playing a more active military role in regional affairs. However, ultimately the United States is the glue that holds together whatever informal security arrangements Japan aspires to develop.

A Japan and its JSDF closely linked to and coordinated with the United States and U.S. forces, along with their combined resources and joint efforts, is a powerful and effective check—and Chinese strategists know this. A Japan abandoned or neglected by the United States and left adrift to create a regional coalition to serve as a counterweight to China will ultimately come up short—and Japanese strategists know this. The question is whether the new and untested leadership in Washington understands the enduring strategic value of the U.S.-Japan security alliance and what is at stake if that alliance falters— the probable displacement of the regional U.S.-led rules-based order by an encroaching Sino-centric sphere of influence.

Jeremy Maxie is an Associate at Strategika Group Asia Pacific. He tweets at @jeremy_maxie. Grant Newsham is a Senior Research Fellow at the Japan Forum for Strategic Studies in Tokyo.

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the authors and not that of the EastWest Institute.