MUNICH, Feb. 18, 2017 - The Kingdom of the Netherlands, together with The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) and the EastWest Institute (EWI) today announced the establishment of the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace (GCSC)—a global body formed to convene key global stakeholders to develop proposals for norms and policy initiatives to improve the stability and security of cyberspace. Principal supporters of this initiative include the Internet Society (ISOC) and Microsoft.  

The GCSC, based in The Hague, will be chaired by Marina Kaljurand, former Foreign Minister of Estonia, and will be comprised of over two dozen prominent independent commissioners, from over 15 countries, with the expertise and legitimacy to speak on different aspects of cyberspace. The Commission will develop proposals for norms and policies to enhance the stability of cyberspace.

“Cyberspace is becoming increasingly exploited. It requires greater coordination among us all. It needs the development of norms to provide a stable and secure environment. So we can all benefit,” said Bert Koenders, Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. “This is a unique initiative to ensure that we drive activities in the right direction. We are on the threshold of a new era. It’s time to safeguard our cyberspace.”

Commissioners of the GCSC include co-chairs Michael Chertoff (USA) and Latha Reddy (India), as well as Joseph S. Nye (USA), Jeff Moss (USA), Wolfgang Kleinwächter (Germany), William Saito (Japan), Olaf Kolkman (The Netherlands), Marietje Schaake (The Netherlands) and Virgilio Almeida (Brazil), with additional representation from China and Russia.

“As cyberspace continues to rapidly evolve, it offers distinct advantages to our way of life while also posing specific threats,” added Marina Kaljurand, GCSC Chair. “It is for this reason that this body was devised as a means to ensure the exchange of knowledge and ideas between governments, the business community, academia and concerned citizens. Each is affected by, and has a contributing role to play, in shaping cyberspace.”

The GCSC will convene over a three-year period to formulate policy recommendations for action—applicable to both government and the private sector led initiatives. Detailed recommendations will be published and advocated in capitals, corporate headquarters and with the general public worldwide.

“In our globally connected society, cybersecurity norms are essential to preserving a predictable, stable and secure cyberspace. The IT industry has a critical role to play to contribute to the development of effective norms and provide the technical expertise necessary to assist in their implementation,” added Scott Charney, Corporate Vice President, Trustworthy Computing, Microsoft. “As a company, we’ve been actively engaged in the norms debate for years and support this initiative as a very important contribution to reducing risk in cyberspace and protecting global trust in technology.”

“The stability of cyberspace will only be achieved through collective responsibility and collective action. Key to this collaborative approach to security is input from the technical community and civil society, which we look forward to bringing to the GCSC,” explained Olaf Kolkman, Chief Internet Technology Officer for the Internet Society.

The GCSC is supported by two Directors, Alexander Klimburg of The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies and Bruce McConnell of the EastWest Institute.

Learn more about the GCSC, here.

About the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies
The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) is an independent private think tank established in 2007. The Centre focuses on issues that crossover the domains of geopolitics, security, and geo-economics, among which international security and defense, national security, conflict studies, cybersecurity, resource scarcity. HCSS conducts contract research for public sector organizations, such as ministries of defense, foreign affairs and security; international organizations (NATO, European Commission); NGOs as Greenpeace; and private sector companies. We stress an interdisciplinary perspective, combine quantitative and qualitative research methods for our analysis, and present intuitively and action-oriented results. Learn More

About the EastWest Institute
The EastWest Institute works to reduce international conflict, addressing seemingly intractable problems that threaten world security and stability. EWI forges new connections and build trust among global leaders and influencers, help create practical new ideas and take action. Independent and nonprofit since our founding in 1980, EWI has offices in New York, Brussels, Moscow, Washington, D.C. Dallas, San Francisco and Istanbul. Learn More

About the Internet Society
Founded by Internet pioneers, the Internet Society (ISOC) is a non-profit organization dedicated to ensuring the open development, evolution, and use of the Internet. Working through a global community of chapters and members, the Internet Society collaborates with a broad range of groups to promote the technologies that keep the Internet safe and secure, and advocate for policies that enable universal access. The Internet Society is also the organizational home of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF).

About Microsoft
Microsoft (Nasdaq “MSFT” @microsoft) is the leading platform and productivity company for the mobile-first, cloud-first world, and its mission is to empower every person and every organization on the planet to achieve more.

Learn more about our proposed norms for cybersecurity here or visit Microsoft Secure Blog.

On October 28 of last year, the Carnegie Foundation in Washington, D.C. hosted a panel of Chinese scholars and officials to discuss Chinese nuclear thinking. During the event, two former officials—retired diplomat Sha Zukang and retired PLA major general Yao Yunzhu—offered their opinions on how China might react to a U.S. military intervention if a crisis were to take place concerning Taiwan.

Yao was quite direct: “China’s No First Use policy will not change, not only in the Taiwan scenario but in other scenarios as well, and we have 100 percent confidence that we can deal with the Taiwan independence issue by peaceful means and, if necessary, non-peaceful means.”

Unsurprising, but then Sha drew legs on the snake: “And, to add [to] what General Yao said, at any cost we will certainly do the job on our own. … I wish it would never happen, but it’s a wish. But we have to think of the worst scenario … [if] this scenario appeared and China were cornered, as I said earlier, we had no choice but to do the job at any cost.”

Had this been a discussion of a Taiwan scenario, Sha’s comment may have passed with little notice, simply an expression of national resolve. But in a discussion of nuclear policy, it led the audience to a very different and chilling conclusion, expressed in the next audience member’s comment: “It seemed like there was an implied threat to use nuclear weapons in a scenario with China.”

China’s public policy seems clear enough: it will not use nuclear weapons without first absorbing a nuclear attack. It claims that its arsenal is not constructed to target an opponent’s nuclear or command and control capabilities, but rather to deter a nuclear attack by punishing the enemy populace (countervalue targeting). There are undoubtedly details China keeps guarded, but that does not change its outward policy.

Whether intended by Sha or not, the audience’s inference reminds us that a country with nuclear weapons can decide to use them at any time, regardless of policy. Ironically, the very emergencies envisioned by a nuclear policy would be so traumatic as to call any previous policy into question. Thus the threat of nuclear attack always remains as a deterrent to preventing governmental collapse, regardless of policy.

There is however a human instinct to prevent annihilation, such that even under the threat of regime collapse leaders would think twice before launching a senseless strike. They would trust that our better angels would win out in the future, even if they themselves weren’t around to see it. For these leaders, nuclear weapons may be a deterrent only, not a useable weapon.

Sadly and frighteningly, in contrast, the ruthlessness of a regime like North Korea’s makes it less likely to acknowledge others’ humanity. Its paranoia and readiness to employ any means in its own survival should make all other nations wary of the possibility of a nuclear attack out of spite, even in response to a purely internal threat.

China by all accounts, however, is well beyond the stage of needing such desperate measures to stave off collapse. Quite apart from the debate over whether a leader would actually use nuclear weapons, it is possible that a nation seeking to become a “great nation” might very well have an impulse to upgrade its nuclear arsenal and policy commensurate with its new status. Thus Sha’s apparent equivocation may not have been a snake’s legs, but rather a glimpse at a hidden dragon.

Ben Lowsen is a specialist in Chinese political and security affairs working as a program analyst for the U.S. Navy. He tweets at @lowsen88.

The views expressed are his own and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Navy, Department of Defense, U.S. Government, or EastWest Institute.

Attendees at this year's conference, reports USA Today, say that the concern is unprecedented.

Discussions of possible nation-state hacking have long been a staple at computer security conferences, but they have tended to focus on things like infrastructure hacks that might take down the power grid or hits on the banking system. Russian meddling in the run-up to the election was not on the short list of frequently predicted attacks.

"The crisis is not what we were given to expect," said Bruce McConnell, who is presenting this week at the conference in San Francisco. "We are in a fundamentally different environment.”

Click here to read the full story on USA Today.

French and Japanese Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense met in Paris on January 6 with the purpose of deepening strategic cooperation between the two countries. Gathering for their third 2+2 meeting, the ministers agreed to move forward with joint-development of defense equipment (undersea drones for minesweeping). Discussions on the signing of an ACSA (Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement) were also launched, which could ultimately allow the two countries to share defense supplies and services thus expanding cooperation in peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) operations.

This reflects a new norm for Japan: to inch more toward security cooperation with “like-minded” countries in the military realm as Tokyo’s regional environment is growing more insecure and volatile. However, if European countries, such as France, are deepening cooperation with a country they consider a new proactive security actor, more dialogue is needed to narrow the perceptions and expectations gap to allow for a more substantial partnership.

Converging interests from Asia to Africa

Despite being geographically distant, France and Japan share a number of converging interests, beginning with their attachment to liberal values and the protection of Rule of Law, as well as common concerns on unilateral challenges to the international order (by China in the East and South China Sea and by Russia in Europe), nuclear proliferation, international terrorism, piracy, and so on. Thus, their security cooperation is expanding, with 2+2 dialogues at the ministerial level since 2014, maritime cooperation in the Pacific (HA/DR operations) and in the Gulf of Aden for anti-piracy operations, coordination on building the capacities of third countries in East Asia and Africa, among others.

This said, each country has its own agenda.

For Japan, the primary objective is to ensure that France and other European partners share its analysis of the security challenges raised by the Chinese maritime expansion in East Asia. Tokyo is indeed looking for political support to face what it sees as attempts by Beijing to dominate its neighborhood and reshape the global order. Paris is generally sharing Tokyo’s line and in their Joint Statement, both countries expressed their ”strong opposition to unilateral actions that increase tensions, such as reclamation or building of outposts” in the South China Sea. Japan also wishes that France, which maintains prepositioned forces in the Pacific Ocean, increase its military presence in East Asia. Expectations in Tokyo have been particularly high after the French Minister of Defense Jean-Yves Le Drian called at the Shangri-La Dialogue last year for coordination between European navies to ensure a regular and visible presence in the maritime areas of Asia.

While France’s Asian policy has long been driven by its economic relations with Beijing, Paris increasingly wants to be recognized as a responsible stakeholder in the region. Under the administration of Francois Hollande, France has diversified its approach to Asia, building up ties with new partners (Japan, Australia, India, South Korea, Malaysia or Singapore). This new approach has also been driven by a more pragmatic objective: as a major provider of defense equipment in Asia, France cannot remain indifferent to the security concerns of Asian countries. Prime Minister Abe’s efforts to strengthen Japan’s defense posture convinced the French strategic community that Japan would soon be a normalized defense partner, eager to attain the best equipment and willing to increase security cooperation and coordination even beyond East Asia.

Indeed, both countries see an opportunity to geographically expand their security cooperation all the way to the Indian Ocean and Africa. A Joint Plan for Africa, adopted in 2015, already provides grounds for some modest security cooperation such as joint funding of peacekeeping schools on the continent. The definition of a Japanese “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy”, announced by Prime Minister Abe at the Japan-Africa TICAD conference last August, should provide an impetus toward greater coordination in the field of maritime capacity building.  

By stepping up its security cooperation with Paris in Africa, Tokyo can benefit from France’s precious knowledge of the African security environment, especially in the context of growing terrorist attacks (10 Japanese citizens died during the In Amenas attacks in January 2013 and two were beheaded by ISIS in 2015). Indeed, Japanese defense attachés based in African countries benefited from a first briefing from French defense officers in January 2016. In return, France can count on Japan to contribute to funding some security-related activities in the Sahel and West Africa.

A promising, long-term cooperation despite some challenges

If security cooperation is now under a positive dynamic, certain challenges remain. First, a threat perception gap still exists between the partners: Japan was shocked when France, along with most European countries, joined the China-founded AIIB back in 2015. Second, Tokyo is also still suspicious of France selling dual-use equipment to Beijing, despite the bilateral consultation forum on export controls set up in 2013 to reassure Japan. Finally, some differences regarding the nature of the security challenge posed by Russia can also emerge between Paris and Tokyo, as the latter has been courting Moscow despite the Crimea annexation.

Furthermore, Japan is impatient to see more concrete steps in terms of an expanded French military presence in East Asia, while Paris considers that Tokyo’s commitment to shift from checkbook diplomacy to more tangible security contribution in Africa is still too modest. Paris remains  dubious about the real opportunities offered by the Japanese market to its defense equipment, as Japan remains very much U.S.-centered in this domain.

One additional and unexpected challenge the two partners now face is the management of their respective alliances with the United States under Trump administration. For Japan, the rapprochement with European countries serves both to reinforce the existing web of U.S. allies and to complement it, in the case of an American retrenchment. In the present case, the strong uncertainty about Washington’s future diplomatic orientations requires additional consultation and political coordination between Tokyo and Paris so as to weigh on U.S. options.  

Despite these challenges, Franco-Japanese relations present no major points of friction. Looking to the future, the latest 2+2 also sought to demonstrate ambition for a long-term security relationship by expanding cooperation in fields such as space-based maritime surveillance and cyberspace. So the strategic partnership is set to grow, slowly but surely.

Céline Pajon is a Research Fellow at the Center for Asian Studies at the Institut français des relations internationales. She tweets @CelinePajon. 

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the author and not that of the EastWest Institute.

Photo: "Weathercock of France Mountain : フラ�" (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0) by Dakiny

By virtue of its size, the Department of Defense (DoD) is a sort of “natural monopoly” within the U.S. government. The State Department employs approximately 24,000 foreign, and civil service employees across its embassies, consulates and offices globally. The Pentagon alone has over 23,000 military and civilian staff working within its five walls, with thousands more spread across Defense agencies, offices and headquarters. To be clear, these are not the “warfighters” carrying rifles, flying planes or driving ships, but the bureaucracy that runs the military.

Karl Ikenberry, a former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan and retired three-star general, has highlighted that the State Department’s Bureau of Africa Affairs has about 180 staff, while the military’s analogous Africa Command headquarters has over 1,500, with additional staff covering various “Africa Desks” throughout the Pentagon and Defense agencies. This doesn’t mean the DoD is more efficient, has the expertise or required competency to take the lead on many foreign policy and foreign assistance programs. But because it can commit more staff-power, man-hours and, often, more money than other more thinly-manned and resourced departments, it simply has the bureaucratic capacity to do work others can’t.

In wartime, having staff-power to “make things happen” is a necessary virtue. In peacetime, however—especially in a quasi-bellicose environment, such as the period immediately following 9/11—it can weaken institutional checks by the State Department, nominally, the lead agency for foreign affairs responsible for creating the national policies traditionally relied upon to reconcile the military’s parochial interests with broader U.S. interests.

Who Directs Foreign Aid?

One area in which this plays out is foreign aid. Each year, the U.S. provides billions in aid to foreign partners. In the past, most of this money belonged to the State Department, though the DoD administered some. What foreign aid funds the Defense Department did have (which it calls security cooperation or security assistance) were largely subject to approval by the State Department as the lead agency for foreign policy. But after 9/11, the scale of aid rapidly increased, as did the share of exclusively DoD-administered funds. Just as military commanders’ disproportionate prestige can lend priority to their more limited issue portfolios, the DoD’s massive staff and funding can overwhelm the State Department’s ability to ensure that Defense security cooperation activities align with U.S. foreign policy—even in those cases where State has oversight.

One solution is to better resource the State Department. Instead, the DoD has sought greater authority over its security cooperation funds. The Pentagon cites efficiency; the State Department’s staff is too small to keep up with the pace and scale of assistance that DoD wants to disperse. The Pentagon believes its ability to rapidly deploy foreign aid is, at times, critical to preserving regional stability or propping up partner countries, reducing the likelihood of new regional conflicts or nation-building efforts.

Preventing conflicts before they happen is a compelling argument. But the Pentagon’s near-term quest to preserve stability has sometimes backfired. A case in point is after World War II when the U.S. Army founded the “School of the Americas” to train Latin American military leaders to defend against communist insurgencies and revolutions, not unlike training the U.S. provides to Iraqi and Afghani security forces today. However, part of this post-war legacy is that some of the school’s most high-profile graduates, like Manuel Noriega in Panama, went on to use what they learned to become despots who, themselves, required U.S. intervention to overthrow.

Oversight, Ends, Means and Effectiveness

More recently, some aid efforts surpass even the DoD’s capacity to manage. Because of widespread concern that large portions of reconstruction aid provided to Afghanistan was lost to waste and corruption, Congress established a unique, independent Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction in 2008. One report found that one-third of completed aid projects were unused, many more under-used, and nearly two-thirds failed to meet original project specifications or requirements. Of the latter, some were found to be totally unsafe or unusable because local contractors substituted cheaper, inferior materials or methods to increase profits. Some local contractors were even found to be using profits from DoD aid to support the insurgency.

Whether additional layers of bureaucracy or cross-departmental checks could have prevented these problems is outside the scope of this series. However, while perhaps less “efficient,” the State Department’s role is to provide input into what best serves long-term U.S. interests, veto potentially short-sighted Pentagon priorities or, at minimum, more deeply grapple with the tradeoffs involved. A 2016 Congressional Research Service (CRS) report concluded that when DoD controls assistance funds, it skews regional relationships, potentially giving Geographic Commanders more influence over a partner nation than the State Department-run U.S. Embassy.

The CRS report also echoes the concern that DoD’s capacity is disproportionate to its more limited goals and priorities: “DoD’s overwhelming advantage in personnel and funds allow it to evade State Department direction and oversight and to conduct activities better carried out by civilians, which may be to the detriment of long term U.S. interests.” Apart from the intense nation-building efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the DoD also provides a host of “institution building” services to help create effective foreign defense bureaucracies. Other activities defy intuitive links to Defense priorities, like DoD’s contribution to the Women, Peace, and Security effort that guides countries in women’s inclusion in peace-building, gender perspectives on peace and security policy, and other gender-specific issues. Institutional reform and gender issues are unquestionably important to long-term peace and stability, but is the military the best conduit for providing these kinds of services?

During his first year as defense secretary, Robert Gates advocated for a dramatic increase in funding for the State Department and “the civilian instruments of national security.” Later, he worked closely with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to create a stronger working relationship between the two departments, and clear recognition by Defense that “the Secretary of State is the principal spokesperson for United States foreign policy.” Since then, efforts to reconcile these dynamics have faded, and the Defense Department, because of its size, prestige and imperatives to simultaneously prevent, and prepare for, future conflict continues to accrue influence over the shape and execution of U.S. foreign policy.

Steven Stashwick is a writer and analyst based in New York City. He spent ten years on active duty as a U.S. naval officer with multiple deployments to the Western Pacific. He writes about maritime and security affairs in East Asia and serves in the U.S. Navy Reserve. The views expressed are his own. Follow him on Twitter.

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the author and not that of the EastWest Institute.​

The EastWest Institute (EWI) announced today that Hon. Syed Naveed Qamar has joined the institute as a Distinguished Fellow. Hon. Qamar will continue to contribute his time and insights toward the institute’s regional security program, in particular his active role in EWI's "Afghanistan Reconnected Process", designed to facilitate the country’s transition towards political and economic stability by forging regional cooperation.
 
“We are delighted and privileged to have Hon. Syed Naveed Qamar join the ranks of distinguished fellows at the institute,” said Amb. Cameron Munter, CEO & President, EastWest Institute. “South Asia represents a core area of focus for the institute, and the Hon. Qamar will play a critical role as a member of our network in the region and contribute to the solutions we advocate for regional stability.” 
 
Hon. Qamar is a senior statesman and former Defense Minister of Pakistan. Previously he also served as Federal Minister Finance, Federal Minister Water & Power, Federal Minister Petroleum & Natural Resources and Federal Minister Privatization. He started his political career as Member of the Sindh Assembly in 1988. He holds the position of member of the Central Executive Committee, of Pakistan's most popular political party, the "Pakistan People’s Party." 

The EastWest Institute (EWI) announced today that Kathryn (Kitty) Pilgrim has joined the institute as a Distinguished Fellow. Pilgrim is an award-winning broadcast journalist and thought leader on how media shapes global affairs. Ms. Pilgrim will continue to focus on this evolving area as part of her work with EWI. 

“We truly appreciate Kitty joining our growing team of fellows, where she will provide a unique perspective on the increasingly pivotal and impactful role media plays in global affairs,” said Maja Piscevic, EWI Vice President for Communications. “As a correspondent covering a range of issues across several continents, her unique perspectives regarding journalist’s expectations and the influence of digital platforms will add tremendous value to the institute’s programmatic work.”

Pilgrim is widely recognized for her 25-year tenure with CNN as an anchor and correspondent, where she provided in-depth geopolitical and economic analysis. Her broadcasts were viewed in more than 200 countries and territories around the world. Her work as a journalist has taken her around world, reporting on economics, politics, global climate issues, pandemics, social movements, military affairs, international conflict, genocide, revolution, international terrorism and war. 

A graduate of Columbia University, Pilgrim is a lifetime member of the Council on Foreign Relations, fellow in the Royal Geographical Society in London and a member of the Explorer's Club of New York City.