Below are some of Firestein's comments:

Donald Trump is now the president of the United States. What will his presidency mean for U.S.-China relations? Given that Trump was elected with a mandate to “do things differently,” predictions of sharp, decisive changes in U.S. policy toward China – and growing difficulties in this most consequential bilateral relationship – abound. I think we will see both change and continuity – and probably more continuity than generally anticipated.

On trade, the Trump administration will likely adopt a tougher course in a number of ways, but I don’t think it will change the foundational architecture of the commercial relationship. Within the WTO framework, the United States will likely press China harder on trade cases, IPR infringement, and the exfiltration of commercially valuable proprietary data (aka, cyber-enabled economic espionage); and it may continue to make noise about China’s currency policy (read:  “manipulation,” in the view of some in the administration). But I don’t think the fundamental dynamics of the trade relationship will or can change quickly. If President Trump manages merely to slow the growth of the massive U.S. annual trade deficit with China – a deficit that reached a billion dollars a day in 2015 – that will be a laudable achievement in itself. This won’t be as easy a nut to crack as it might have seemed to some during the campaign.

President Trump’s main specific goal as president is to “bring back” (or, in any case, create) millions of good-paying blue-collar jobs, particularly in the American heartland. The infrastructure sector, which figured unusually prominently in President Trump’s inaugural address, can be the key to that. And herein lies a real opportunity to transform the U.S.-China relationship, and U.S. perceptions thereof, in a fairly fundamental way. Specific ideas that I would encourage the Trump administration to consider are a possible bilateral infrastructure investment treaty (BIIT) with China; or more generally, a multilateral infrastructure investment liberalization agreement for the global economy (MIILAGE) and legislation aimed at streamlining foreign investment in U.S. infrastructure (e.g., a “Streamlining International Investment in U.S. Infrastructure Act,” or SIIUSIA).

Many are pessimistic about the prospects for U.S.-China relations under President Trump; at a minimum, I am more “cautiously pessimistic.” But actually, I would go even further: I think there is genuine upside potential in this relationship that can be realized under the new U.S. president and his Chinese counterpart. I am hopeful that, for the sake of our two peoples and the world, that potential will be recognized – and realized.

Read the full article here.

Seeking to turn geopolitical risk and political uncertainty into a strategic opportunity to demonstrate Japan’s role as regional leader, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe kicked off 2017 with a two-day trip to the Philippines. Notably, Abe announced a five-year, one trillion yen (8.66 billion USD) aid package, consisting of both public and private sector funding, targeting infrastructure development. That this marks Japan’s largest aid package to a single country, compared to 800 billion yen (7.7 billion USD package) to Myanmar, signals the focus of Japan’s strategic competition with China in Southeast Asia has shifted to the Philippines. The two leaders also signed five bilateral agreements, including a 5.2 million USD grant for high-speed patrol boats for the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) and a Memorandum of Cooperation (MOC) between the PCG and Japanese Coast Guard on maritime security. Abe also pledged cooperation in countering the country’s illegal drug epidemic, a priority for Manila.

Abe’s visit should be seen as follow-up to President Rodrigo Duterte’s trip to Tokyo in October 2016 where Japan offered a 48 million USD government loan package along with 1.85 billion USD in private sector Memorandum of Understandings (MOU) and Letters of Intent (LOI) from such companies such as Toyota and Mitsubishi, in addition to a verbal pledge by Marubeni to invest 17.2 billion USD over the long-term. Without specifically mentioning China, the two leaders issued a joint statement recognizing the two maritime nations’ shared interest in maintaining freedom of navigation in the South China Sea and application of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to peacefully resolve maritime territorial disputes.

More to the point, Abe’s outreach to the mercurial Philippine President is driven by Tokyo’s strategy to forge a closer strategic partnership with Manila in order to balance a resurgent and assertive China that is challenging the regional status quo and destabilizing regional security. Viewed from Tokyo, China’s militarization in the East China and South China Sea directly threatens Japan’s territorial integrity and sea lines of communications (SLOCs), which are vital to its national economic survival. Japan also seeks to defend its political influence with Manila as well as its long-established network of finance and trade ties against Chinese encroachment. These geopolitical and geo-economic drivers are highlighted by the fact that Abe’s trip to Philippines was part of a six-day tour that included Australia, Indonesia and Vietnam—all key nodes in Japan’s regional strategy.

Although Japan is the Philippines’ largest trade partner and source of foreign investment, China has begun to make significant inroads. When Duterte visited Beijing in October 2016, he was welcomed with 24 billion USD in pledges that included 9 billion USD in loans and Memorandum of Understandings (MOU) worth 13.5 billion USD. While Japan cannot afford to quantitatively outspend China, it retains a qualitative advantage of being a proven long-term investor that is more likely to implement aid and investment pledges fully. However, in December 2016, Manila opted to join the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which has less rigorous risk controls than the Japan-led Asian Development Bank (ADB) headquartered in Manila.

Another major strategic concern in Tokyo is the populist Philippine leader’s notoriously confrontational stance toward Washington. In response, Duterte has downgraded defense cooperation, restricted joint military exercises with U.S. forces, solicited China and Russia as alternative weapons suppliers and raised uncertainties about his commitment to implement the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA). Signed in 2014, the EDCA grants U.S. forces access to five bases on a rotational basis that elevated bilateral defense cooperation to its highest levels since the U.S. withdrew from Clark Air Base in 1991 and Subic Bay Naval Base in 1992.

Although Manila is unlikely to abrogate its 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States to align with China and Russia, one purpose behind Abe’s visit was to press Duterte for clarification and reassurance about his foreign policy priorities and intentions. It is uncertain whether U.S. President Donald Trump—who has vowed to take a hardline toward China, demanding more from U.S. allies—will “hit it off” with his Philippine counterpart and work to rehabilitate bilateral relations. While Trump is not expected to pressure Duterte over his bloody war on drugs, asking the Philippines to increase its “burden sharing” is probably a non-starter. Rather, Duterte may demand that Washington do more for the Philippines while seeking to maintain an omnidirectional state of equilibrium between the major powers. If so, then the bilateral relationship is unlikely to return the level of solidarity under former President Benigno Aquino III.

Duterte’s push for a more “independent” foreign policy—aimed at extracting maximum economic and financial concessions from his geopolitical suitors—presents both opportunities and risks for Japan. On the downside, a potential surge of Chinese capital and trade expansion could disrupt Japan’s longstanding trade and investment networks and displace Japan’s political influence with Philippine elites. Furthermore, Duterte’s strategy of distancing from the United States and rapprochement with China risks undermining emerging U.S.-Japan-Philippine security cooperation.

On the upside, these developments provide Abe with the domestic political justification to boost state-backed funding to the Philippines, while pressuring and incentivizing Japanese companies to double-down on investment. More importantly, the current rift and future uncertainty over U.S.-Philippine relations presents Tokyo with an opportunity to exercise leadership in the ongoing effort to evolve the U.S. hub-and-spoke security alliance in Asia into a more multilateral and interoperable system with increasing spoke-to-spoke linkages.

If the Trump administration turns inward and withdraws from upholding the rules-based order in the Asia-Pacific, Japan will need to become more self-reliant and take on a leadership role and increased burden-sharing. However, without decisive U.S. leadership and commitment (the “hub”), U.S. allies and partners (the “spokes”) will be limited in what they can accomplish alone or among themselves in the face of a resurgent and assertive China.

Jeremy Maxie is an Associate at Strategika Group Asia Pacific. He tweets at @jeremy_maxie. 

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the author and not that of the EastWest Institute.

Since last year’s surprising election of Donald Trump, Beijing has looked to up the stakes and increase its leverage in the disputed South China Sea. This past December, China seized a U.S. Navy unmanned underwater vehicle near the Philippines. The seizure was made outside of Beijing’s expansive and ambiguous “nine-dash line.” While the drone was eventually returned to Washington, the incident reveals a new level of mistrust and strategic rivalry between China and the United States. It has also further colored the water amid growing uncertainty on the future trajectory of Sino-U.S. relations under the coming Trump administration.

Beijing is looking to adapt on the fly to the new team in Washington, which has a frenetic, and uncertain, foreign policy direction toward China and the region. On one hand, Beijing was cautiously cheering the defeat of Hillary Clinton—as it worried the former presidential favorite would enact a tougher line toward bilateral relations. Beijing also watched gleefully as Trump repeatedly castigated allies in the region—especially archrival Japan—for not paying their fair share of the burden for U.S. security guarantees. Trump’s denouncement of the Trans-Pacific Partnership was icing on the cake as Obama’s rebalance policy—largely viewed in a containment lens in Beijing—suffered a crushing body blow.

The full commentary can be accessed here.

"The genie is definitely out of the bottle. There are measures that could be taken to delete some of this information, once we discover where it is on either criminally-based servers or on foreign state-based servers but that is not going to work because there's usually backups of this sort of information. So once it's out, once the hack occurs, the genie is out of the bottle, but in more general terms there is a new phenomenon afoot—massive leaks, terabyte leaks, for undermining the political legitimacy in democratically elected countries and also in authoritarian countries," says Austin.

Watch the full interview on ABC here. 

Nearly four years ago, U.S. National Security Advisor Susan Rice observed that the world’s “most vexing security challenges are transnational security threats that transcend borders: climate change, piracy, infectious disease, transnational crime, cyber theft, and the modern-day slavery of human trafficking.” To this list, we could add migration, violent extremism and the safety of fissile nuclear materials.

These issues share two characteristics: first, they are accentuated in their severity by modern technology; second, there are no effective international regimes or institutions that have these problems in hand. Of all these issues, increasing the security and stability of cyberspace is near the top in urgency, and will need to be a focal point of the new U.S. administration.

Beyond the everyday news of cyber intrusions, cyber-enabled attacks in the lead-up to the U.S. presidential election have roiled relationships in Washington and globally. What’s new about this case for Americans is its spectacular illustration of the long-stated Russian doctrine that they are in an “information war” with the West. In fact, the Russians do not use the term cybersecurity. They only talk about information security, which makes it tricky to reach cybersecurity agreements with those who do not also license restrictions on speech.

We are experiencing a global cyber arms race led by the United States, Russia, China, Iran, Israel and some European countries, with many others, including North Korea, following close behind. Non-state actors, such as organized crime syndicates and terrorist groups like the Islamic State are also a threat, and rapidly closing the gap.

Given the potential impacts of the deliberate or accidental use of increasingly powerful cyber weapons, it is unfortunate that there are still no binding international agreements in place. By comparison, in international airspace, norms of behavior and international law apply, including identity proofing, filing of flight plans, certification of aircraft, etc.

While there is movement in this area, it remains early days. For instance, a group of governmental cyber experts at the United Nations has worked for over 10 years to draft an initial set of non-binding norms of behavior in cyberspace. Among other things, their recommendations cover the use of cyber technologies for peaceful purposes, a more collaborative approach to combatting cyber attacks, taking responsibility for cross-border cyber attacks emanating from servers in one’s territory, and not using computer incident response teams for offensive purposes.

The corporate sector realizes the imminent threats, and major international companies are also working to develop and promote norms of industry behavior, with a focus on:

• Creating more secure products and services 
;
• Preventing states from weakening the security of commercial, mass-market ICT products and services 
;
• Practicing responsible vulnerability disclosure
;
• Collaborating to defend customers against and help them recover from serious cyberattacks; 

• Issuing updates to protect their customers no matter where the customer is located.

But norms are not enough. In other weapons regimes, self-restraint is leadership. This is not a partisan issue. Indeed, Jack Goldsmith—Assistant Attorney General under George W. Bush—advocated recently that the United States agree “to restrain itself in its activities in foreign networks in exchange for restraint from our adversaries in our networks.” Without such leadership, without emphasizing a degree of global cooperation, the new U.S. administration will not be taking sufficient steps to prevent major accidental or intentional disruptions to global economic and political stability, and thus make the world a more predictable and safe place.

EWI Chief Operating Officer, Dr. William J. Parker III, appeared on The David Webb Show on Monday, discussing U.S. President-elect Donald Trump's cabinet picks, most notably his choice for secretary of defense, General James Mattis.

General Mattis—who has had a 41-year career in the Marine Corps leading troops in Kuwait, Afghanistan and Iraq—“is known as a very cerebral guy who just happens to be a pure war-fighter at the same time,” said Parker.

Mattis, who headed the U.S. Central Command until retiring in 2013, "will be a rock solid secretary of defense," Parker added.

"Secretary of Defense is one of the key positions that they cannot afford to get wrong and I commend the President-elect for his selection." 

Click here to listen to the full interview. 

U.S. President-elect Donald Trump will likely have little time to celebrate his inauguration. The President will inherit a world with numerous foreign policy challenges. High on the list remains defeating terrorism and realizing a stable post-ISIS Iraq.  

During the election campaign, then presidential candidate Trump stated emphatically that he will defeat ISIS by "bombing the hell out of them." This traditional security focused strategy will simply not work. On the contrary, it will prove counter-productive, giving ISIS and al Qaeda a new lease of life and providing the perfect context for further radicalization of a disgruntled Sunni community in Iraq and beyond.

The military campaigns against ISIS are making some tangible progress. The terrorist group is losing territories in Iraq, Syria and Libya. Yet this is neither the military end nor the political and ideological defeat of ISIS. This apocalyptical and genocidal menace is a consequence and not a cause of the current catastrophe in Iraq and Middle East. The root causes that led to its emergence are:

• Sectarian, political and economic exclusion and marginalization of Sunnis by the post-Saddam political order;
• Systemic corruption, lack of good governance, rule of law, transparency and accountability;
• Saddam Hussein’s despotism and horrible human rights violations that created the natural and perfect habitat for ISIS’s genocidal mindset and strategy;
• Intolerant and exclusivist educational curriculum pre- and post-2003;
• Political and military miscalculations and overreach by the U.S.; and
• Geopolitical jockeying by regional and international powers for influence. 

The only way to defeat ISIS entirely is by addressing these root causes in a comprehensive manner. On a macro and conceptual level this begins with a thorough understanding of the factors that lead to radicalization. On a policy level, there is a need for developing the right strategy that should support true and real reforms in Iraq. To be fair to the new U.S. administration, it is the responsibility of Iraqi authorities, especially the ruling Shia majority, to build a truly inclusive state in which Sunnis, Kurds and other communities feel as equal citizens with equal rights. But President-elect Trump can play a crucial role in this process given the political and military leverage of the U.S. in Iraq. While already endorsing a wider approach, Trump’s strategy for Iraq should take into consideration the following components:

• Realization that a traditional and exclusive  security approach will not fully tackle, but rather aggravate root causes of the conflict; ideally an approach that combines military, political and development aspects is required ;
• U.S. should take the lead and cooperate with the EU, UN and other actors in mediating between Iraqis and initiating short-, mid- and long-term political, military and economic measures. The objective is to encourage Iraqi leaders to find common ground and reach painful but vital, historic and much-needed mutual compromises on existential topics, including the form of state governance, power sharing, fair redistribution of wealth and resources, and resolving conflicts over disputed territories; and
• Establishment of a long-term international fund for recovery and reconstruction of post-ISIS Iraq.

However, this recommended support strategy should be conditional. It has to be based on basic democratic principles, namely: true power sharing, peaceful transfer of power when office terms come to an end, implementation of real reforms, rule of law, human rights and addressing human rights violations, transparency and accountability.   

Without such a long term strategy, the new Iraq will be the old Iraq, and ISIS will be back, probably even with more brutality and vengeance. The consequences for Iraq, U.S. and the rest of the world will be destructive and far-reaching.      

Kawa Hassan is EWI’s Director of the Middle East & North Africa Program and a member of Atlantic Council’s Task Force on the Future of Iraq, which is making policy recommendations for the Trump administration on how to deal with the Iraq conflict.  

Photo: "010720-F-8217W-002" (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0) by U.S. Army Korea (Historical Image Archive)

BY: TARA KANGARLOU

After nearly four decades of estrangement, U.S.-Iran relations have seen substantial progress over the past two years. The historic nuclear agreement, peaceful resolution of the U.S. Navy sailor incident, multilateral cooperation on Syria, the first-ever conversation between the two countries’ Presidents as well direct diplomatic engagement in other venues, all offer a promise of a potential constructive U.S.-Iran engagement. This is while Iran undeniably remains a major strategic challenge for the United States in the region and important differences remain on both sides. Despite whatever perspective one takes, U.S.-Iran relations remain an area of high policy and public concern for the coming administration in both countries.

This coming year offers a possibility to build upon this tenuous framework of engagement or once again—as done under the Bush administration and that of Ahmadinejad’s—ruin the foundations of what could be a promising bridge toward peace and stability for the United States, Iran and the wider region. The Trump administration is taking office at a unique time where it has an opportunity to significantly build on his campaign’s promise of domestic economic growth through commercial engagement with Iran while maintaining its reservations against the government of the Islamic Regime. This can be achieved through conducting U.S.-Iran relations through economic and people-to-people engagement. 

For many observers the economic interest in Iran is somewhat overlooked, but not by all. It is critical that as President-elect Trump takes office, he and his team don’t overlook the EU’s strong interest in economic engagement with Iran, a relatively large market of 80 million with a young population that sits in one of the most strategic hot spots in the world. Of course, “working with Iran” does not mean that the two countries are or should be “friends”. Rather, this could signal the mutual understanding that a coercive relationship between the two countries will prove more harmful to economic interests and regional stability than beneficial.

Importantly, the Iranian regime, under the government of moderate President Hassan Rouhani—who will be up for re-election in June 2017—has demonstrated interest in global engagement and working to demilitarize Iran’s image on the international stage. On the sidelines of the 2016 United Nations General Assembly in September, Javad Zarif, Iranian Foreign Minister and Sorena Sattari, one of the country’s Vice Presidents, both emphasized Iran’s need to foster global economic engagement, use its large pool of young, highly educated human capital and diversify its economy away from hydrocarbon dependency toward trade, entrepreneurial opportunities and empowering the private sector.

And western commercial interests have responded. In December, U.S. aviation giant, Boeing, signed a $16.6 billion deal for the sale of 80 aircrafts to the Islamic Republic. In their long-term strategic planning, both countries should recognize that this deal goes far beyond a one-time business transaction. Rather, it’s the first step to a minimum 40-year-long economic and business relationship which goes beyond aircraft sales to include parts, maintenance and training. Such a relationship on this deal alone can create thousands of high-paying jobs in the U.S., an oft-stated priority for the incoming Trump administration. This is while France’s first Airbus was delivered to Iran this past week—marking the first step toward fulfilling a $25 billion dollars deal signed between the two countries.

While economic engagement with Iran—in a post “nuclear-deal” era—can be a win-win strategy for both adversaries, it is important to note that Iran continues to remain a mystery to most Americans—as does America to most Iranians. Long isolated from each other, the American and Iranian peoples’ perceptions of each other are fed by long-standing negative stereotypes and misunderstanding. Improved people-to-people connectivity offer a valuable means of helping reduce tensions and channeling future bilateral ties in a constructive direction. Dialogue and understanding are critical to building upon the framework that can—in the long-term—be more favorable for national and regional interests.

In sum, the administration has two potential policy planks—built upon engagement—that can advance American national interests far more than any policy based solely on confrontation. First, both sides would be well served to build an economic bridge to advance regional stability, encourage economic growth in the U.S., and build private sector growth in Iran and the region. Second, is facilitating engagement between the people of these two estranged nations to overcome legacies of the past, build mutual understanding, and to set up the foundations for a more constructive and stable future relationship.

Tara Kangarlou is a visiting scholar at the EastWest Institute. Kangarlou is an award-winning journalist and has reported from the United States and around the world. Her primary areas of expertise are the Middle East, socio-cultural affairs, foreign policy and women’s issues in developing countries.

Photo: "TEHRAN CITY OF LIGHTS (تهران شهر" (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0) by arash_rk