Although demography is a vital pillar of national security—alongside water, food, health, energy, natural resources and cyber, not to speak of military power—it somehow does not receive the attention it requires and deserves.

In most cases, countries lack adequate systems of monitoring, regulation, planning and legislation in sharp contradiction to the other pillars of national security. While there is a general understanding that states need early warning systems to alert against wars, natural disasters and food shortages—and indeed, in most cases, the required mechanisms are in place—demography does not fare that well.

Suffice to look at the aging and decreasing population in Japan or at the impact of "one child" policy in China to get an idea about the consequences of the absence of an effective early warning apparatus in this domain. Another good example is continental Europe, whose native population is shrinking as the influx of refugees, immigrants and asylum seekers increases uncontrollably. Arguably, the damage sometimes is equitable to the results of a serious military setback or a natural disaster (or worse), but whose impact may only be felt in a decade or two.

The European Union opened its doors, quite hastily, to a massive wave of refugees without serious consideration of the demographic implications and ramifications, and without a coordinated mechanism in place to handle the inflow. Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey are major recipients of refugees to such a degree, it might upset their delicate demographic balance. Also, the recent upheavals in the Middle East and North Africa brought to the surface another set of demographic issues such as ethnic cleansing, mass migration and vast areas that have become depopulated because of the havoc and chaos caused by civil wars or ISIS.

An interesting twist came to light recently when satellite imaging determined that because of the civil war in Southern Syria, many farmers deserted their lands and stopped irrigating their fields and orchards. This resulted in neighboring Jordan—one of the most arid states on the globe—getting extra water through the Yarmouk River.

One man's disaster is another's good fortune or opportunity.

At present, the priority of all involved—either in the West or Russia—is to stabilize the situation and to deal with the impact of ISIS-inspired terrorism at home. It seems that very few, if any, in the intelligence community, the halls of government or even academia are closely examining the demographic aspects of realities around the world, nor are they providing authorities a worthy forecast or an alert on the impact that demographics currently has and will continue to have on national and regional security, economics and stability.

Even a notable establishment such as the U.S. National Intelligence Council, which runs the Long Range Analysis Unit, seems to focus its attention on forecasting democratic transition in the Middle East and North Africa based on future median age rather than on more urgent demographic issues.

Only Australia stands as an exception with a clearly defined demographic policy; drafted in 2010, it quickly adjusted its refugee and immigration policy following the upheaval in the Middle East and the emergence of ISIS. But Australia benefits from being an island continent and can buffer itself against undesired flows of immigrants.

The ongoing tragedy associated with migrants indicates it is high time to upgrade demographic early warning systems on the scale of national security priorities—to avoid catastrophic results in the years and generations to come. Forecasting the coming age of democracy is important, but assessing the impact of sudden mass migration into new terrains is more urgent. Mass migration, from urban and rural areas alike, has its effects in economic, ecological and human terms.

In addition, consideration should be given also to those elements which fill the vacuum created by the mass migrations. In the case of Southern Syria, some areas were partially taken or infiltrated by ISIS (Daesh) thus posing a real danger to neighboring Jordan. In the Iraqi case, the presence of pro-Iranian Shia militias causes concern, as well. The Jordanian Chief of Staff was very clear about that in a recent interview with the BBC (in Arabic). Here, an early warning or alert is more than crucial.

These realities, in turn, raise several fundamental questions for policymakers: which organization or body is most suitably charged with monitoring demographic changes and providing alerts in a timely manner? Should it be the responsibility of intelligence agencies or national security councils or should this be addressed by government-sponsored think thanks? Perhaps an international organization might be able to take the lead in this important work.

Even when policymakers decide on the framework, what is the timeframe for an early warning system? Military intelligence is expected to issue an alert about outbreak of hostilities or a war in a matter of hours or days. What is the time period for an alert about a ticking "demographic bomb?” Are democratic leaders who are facing elections every four or five years able or geared to cope with such a task, which in many cases necessitates unpopular and sometimes tough measures? The answers to these questions are not simple, but inaction today might prove to be calamitous tomorrow.

Ambassador (ret.) Jacob Rosen served as Israel's ambassador in Jordan (2006-2009). He is currently an independent consultant on demographic mapping and collects books about "Lawrence of Arabia." 

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the author and not that of the EastWest Institute.​

BY: JOSHUA EISENMAN 

With the future of U.S.-China relations an open question for the incoming Donald Trump administration, many have focused on whether the president-elect’s promise to withdraw from negotiations over the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) will enhance Beijing’s growing influence in East Asia. But rather than hand-wringing over TPP’s ignominious failure, Asia watchers should turn their attention to China’s unprecedented $1 trillion strategic gambit: the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, aka “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR). Launched in 2013 as President Xi Jinping’s signature initiative, OBOR holds great promise, as well as potential pitfalls, for both China and its neighbors.

OBOR is a game-changing plan to bring about the next stage of globalization, a Sinocentric vision that harks back to the ancient Silk Roads — but this time on Beijing’s terms. The goal is to create a new economic “belt” of connective infrastructure westward into Eurasia and a new maritime “road” connecting China to Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. Examples of OBOR projects include a railway linking China to Laos and another one through Mongolia and Kazakhstan; gas and oil pipelines through Turkmenistan and Myanmar; road and port development in Sri Lanka; and the cornerstone $46 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which encompasses highways, pipelines, coal-based electricity generation, and the Chinese-operated Gwadar port.

Click here to read the full article on Foreign Policy.

Since the start of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, a myriad of books, articles, and speeches have examined the creeping militarization of American foreign policy. In 2008, then-Defense Secretary Robert Gates publicly lamented the reliance on military tools over civilian diplomacy, advocated a major increase in the State Department budget, and emphasized the importance of the military being—and being seen to be—subordinate to civilian agencies and departments. After staying on at the start of the Obama administration, Secretary Gates testified and appeared together with then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to advocate for a stronger State Department, better integration of their departments’ efforts and to emphasize the State Department’s primacy in U.S. foreign policy.

Despite these efforts, the militarization of U.S. foreign policy appears to be expanding. Why is this the case?

It would be wrong to assume individual or bureaucratic ambition is responsible. Any activity, initiative, or plan the military undertakes derives from an assigned task or responsibility, and their conduct is institutionally constrained by official guidance and doctrine; the military’s foreign engagement and policy advocacy is no different. The military defines diplomacy and engagement as part of its organizational mission and requires it by operational doctrine. In essence, the military orders itself to pursue its own foreign engagement in ways that can bleed over into broader U.S. foreign policy.

The U.S. military’s stated purpose is “to protect our Nation and win our wars.” It may be a surprise, then, that the National Military Strategy’s vision for achieving that warfighting function includes “support[ing] diplomatic, informational, and economic activities that promote our enduring national interests.” Some of the formal military objectives that result have clear foreign policy overlap like deterring aggression and supporting global partners and allies. As the military defines it, even “winning wars” has a substantial diplomatic component that is separate from, and sometimes larger than, (though notionally complementary with) the State Department’s efforts.

The key to understanding the military’s foreign policy activity is its operational Phasing Model. The model conceives a six-phase spectrum of military operations:

• phase 0 – shape, includes peacetime operations and engagement to both prevent the conditions for crisis and enable the success of potential combat operations;
• phase 1 – deter, includes specific, targeted deterrence activity to prevent the outbreak of hostilities;
• phase 2 – seize initiative, is the transition to combat if deterrence fails;
• phase 3 – dominate, is the conduct of major combat operations;
• phase 4 – stabilize, is instituting post-combat political and civil services and stability; and
• phase 5 – enable civil authority, transitions military administration back to civilian or local authorities.

Fully, four of these phases drive the military’s foreign policy activity: the two phases that precede conflict, ‘Shape’ and ‘Deter,’ and the two phases that follow conflict, ‘Stabilize’ and ‘Enable Civil Authority.’

Shaping and Deterring

The military sees a variety of engagement activities—what one might call military diplomacy—as crucial to the shaping and deterring phases of a conflict. Joint military doctrine states: “Maintaining peace and preventing conflict/crises are as important as waging major combat operations. Consequently, in addition to crisis response, the future joint force must be more involved in proactive engagement/crisis prevention.” Such operations and foreign engagement activities could be aimed at spreading democracy, promoting peace, stability, and goodwill, or even destabilizing adversarial regimes.  Ideally, this effort would prevent crises from emerging through peaceful resolution, or by building a willing and capable network of regional partners and allies to deter aggression (and who would also meaningfully participate in any potential operation).

In the event military conflict becomes necessary, combat forces require “operational access” to the crisis region. Access permits forces to rapidly and safely deploy, including a base of operations, transit permissions and logistical support. Waiting to establish partner relationships and negotiate access at the outset of a crisis is extremely risky. Thus, the military recognizes that “success in combat often will depend on efforts to shape favorable access conditions in advance, which in turn requires a coordinated interagency approach.”

The military achieves those ‘access conditions’ by engaging with partner countries and establishing “forward” presence in the region of interest. Activities like building relationships with key foreign leadership or policy institutions, conducting exercises with foreign militaries, and providing training and equipment to partners helps ensure that the U.S. military can rely on access to conduct combat operations in the region, and ideally secure an effective partner.

Military access and partnership requirements all require engagement beyond the parameters of the Department of Defense (the aforementioned “interagency approach”). The military nominally sees itself as “supporting” other agencies and departments in national foreign policy during peacetime. However, the need to pursue “access” and prepare for potential conflict before the fact means the military, in practice, not only conducts its own independent foreign engagement, but also needs the diplomatic services of the State Department for its own ends.

Stabilization and Enabling Civil Authority

National strategic objectives are not met if battlefield victories do not subsequently produce a safe and functioning political environment. To that end, phases 4 and 5 require the military to “provide security, initial humanitarian assistance, limited governance, restoration of essential public services, and similar types of assistance” after combat operations are complete. As the post-conflict insurgency and violence in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate, these phases can be even more complex, costly, or even more dangerous than the initial combat operations themselves.

Meeting post-conflict civic needs means the military must have a stable of ostensibly non-combat capabilities that were more traditionally the province of the State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). Rosa Brooks, a former Counselor to the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, is the author of a new book about the problem of the blurring definitions of war and peace, and describes her experience at the Pentagon discovering the extraordinary range of civil functions the military fills: programs to prevent sexual violence in the Congolese military, instituting agricultural reform in Afghanistan, promoting micro-enterprise for women, and helping contain the Ebola outbreak in Africa and providing healthcare in Malaysia, among other examples.

The military has thus defined the scope of its mission and responsibilities in ways that require deep foreign engagement and the tailoring of national foreign policy to achieve success.

Subsequent posts will examine how the military’s advocacy for conducting “shaping” operations, engaging and building up desired foreign partners, and preparing to conduct post-conflict civil functions affects the national foreign policy conversation, and how the weight of the military’s efforts and capacity influences the de facto conduct of that policy.

Steven Stashwick is a writer and analyst based in New York City. He spent ten years on active duty as a U.S. naval officer with multiple deployments to the Western Pacific. He writes about maritime and security affairs in East Asia and serves in the U.S. Navy Reserve. 

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the author and not that of the EastWest Institute.​

The Fondation Maison des sciences de l’homme (FMSH) in Paris has selected Kawa Hassan, Director of Middle East and North Africa Regional Program at the EastWest Institute, to serve as co-project leader of a working group to support the "rights and protection of minorities in the Middle East”. This working group is part of a new initiative established by FMSH—the International Panel on Exiting Violence (IPEV).

"We take great pride in knowing that Kawa Hassan has been selected to head up this working group for the FMSH, a recognized interdisciplinary research institute,” said Dr. William J. Parker, COO of the East West Institute. "As a highly respected expert on the issue of countering extremism in the Middle East, Kawa will bring his unique knowledge, perspectives and management skills toward the benefit of this very important and timely effort.” 

Hassan will co-lead the group along with Orit Bashkin, Professor of Modern Middle Eastern History at Chicago University. Together, they will coordinate and supervise a group of global experts to assess existing obstacles to the rights and protection of minorities in the Middle East. This working group represents one of ten such groups of researchers and experts under the IPEV initiative.  

Over a near two-year period, the IPEV will gather an international community of outstanding scholars to examine the issues of violence and exiting violence, with a focus on the Middle East, North Africa and Europe. Specific issues to be addressed include the aspects of failed states, new forms of authoritarianism, proliferation and the metamorphosis of jihadism in the Middle East, and the integration of migrants, presence of Islam and the crisis of political systems in Europe. Issues will be explored in-depth both at the local and regional levels, and by conducting comparative experience analyses of other regions, such as Latin America. This effort will conclude with the publication of a comprehensive report with policy recommendations intended for local, national, and international institutions, NGOs, policy makers and other stakeholders. 

The IPEV was established by the Fondation Maison des sciences de l’homme, with support from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, Conseil Supérieur de la Formation et de la Recherche Stratégique (CSFRS, Paris) and the Dabran Foundation (Iraqi Kurdistan). 

In 1996, the U.S. and Russia began meeting in secret to establish a set of common protocols for their respective operations in cyberspace. Since then, they’ve managed to agree, via the United Nations, that international law applies in the digital realm—and that countries must take responsibility for the actions of hackers operating within their borders. As recently as 2015, the two parties also agreed that no state should use digital tools to target each other’s critical infrastructure during peacetime.

But the common ground essentially ends there. While Russia historically has pushed for treaties that limit the use of digital weapons, the U.S. for years has claimed that cooperation among international police is a better technique for regulating cyberspace.

Throughout this standoff, both sides have taken shots at the other’s approach: U.S. critics say any treaty Russia creates would limit free speech by targeting citizens who find a way around the country’s censorship infrastructure; Russia maintains that America, in refusing to come to the table, is willfully stoking a digital arms race.

The latter assessment is not so far off, according to some experts.

“Of all countries, the U.S. has the fewest incentives to reach any binding agreements about the limitations of use of cyber weapons,” said Bruce McConnell, a former deputy undersecretary for cybersecurity at the Department of Homeland Security in the Obama administration. “When you have asymmetry in the world, as we still do, there’s less incentive in the most powerful superpower to put something on the table that says we won’t use this capability.”

Yet even as the U.S. has developed and refined its cyber arsenal, its deep reliance on information technology has made it among the world’s most alluring targets for hackers, McConnell said. 

Click here to read the full story on Reveal.

Your country has sent you, an American envoy, to advance relations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. On the surface, this intrigues you, although you may have little if any experience dealing with representatives of the Communist Party of China. Will you meet with humorless apparatchiks? Battle-hardened cadres? Disciples of Mao? The answer to that is simple: you will mostly engage with skilled technocrats who adhere closely to the Party’s line.

The more interesting question is how you intend to do it. Because while it is simple enough to visit Beijing and deliver some talking points (and make no mistake, this is precisely the goal), an appreciation of how your predecessors tackled this problem will not only inform and enrich your engagement, but also help to ensure that disagreements will center on issues, not personalities. Reading Jonathan Spence’s book The Chan’s Great Continent, I was struck by how much Western engagement with China fit the model of a few archetypes, styles of interaction which continue today. Figure out where you fit in and you will understand how to put your best foot forward while getting your message across.

The Dragon Slayer

In 1743, British Commodore George Anson commanded a flotilla on a Pacific expedition which, after many misadventures and great loss, managed at last to capture a Spanish treasure ship. Limping into the port of Canton in July of that year, prize in tow, he was dismayed to have the Chinese refuse his demands for a harbor navigator, exemption from duties and an audience with the viceroy.

Not to be bested, Anson kidnapped a Chinese navigator and forced his way upriver, determined to keep his lucre out of Chinese hands. He eventually secured the required support and returned home a rich man, but left a poisoned relationship in his wake.

Effectively, Anson showed up begging with one hand while holding a bag of gold in the other. No grievance was too small to quibble over. Echoes of Anson’s style are apparent in the varying treatment Rumsfeld and Powell received as they negotiated respectively for the release of a downed U.S. EP-3 aircraft and its crew in 2001. Powell’s willingness to issue a “vague statement of sorrow” apparently secured an early release for the crew while the plane languished in China.

The Diplomat

Commissioned by the British crown as an embassy to China, in 1793 George Macartney was sent to lower trade barriers for Britons and establish permanent relations. Attempting to bypass Chinese government-sanctioned middlemen by negotiating direct access to the Chinese market is a perennial Western tactic. Considering that we are still attempting it today, one can surmise it not too effective. Home court advantage simply makes it too easy for China to throw up new barriers.

Lord Macartney made a deliberate effort to awe Emperor Qianlong with numerous gifts displaying Britain’s technological prowess. It is often said that Qianlong rebuffed the gifts with a claim that China had no use for foreign knowledge, but I wonder if this refusal wasn’t simply a face saving measure to lessen the sting of the implied inferiority of Chinese manufactures.

Much of the embassy’s time seems to have been spent negotiating whether and how Macartney would kowtow to Qianlong. He might have spared himself much trouble by either agreeing at once (perhaps with certain conditions) or simply packing up and going home. As it happened, Macartney left having spent much time and treasure without accomplishing (or even really discussing) his objectives. Though Macartney was a proven diplomat, he failed to grasp the importance of the procedures involved in dealing with the Chinese government, causing him to lose focus and continue his futile efforts to the bitter end.

The Sinologist

The Jesuit Matteo Ricci arrived in China in 1582 with a commitment to form the relationships needed for his mission to take root there. Like Macartney 200 years later, Ricci also brought gifts of European technology. Unlike Macartney, his clocks and other articles helped him to gain status among China’s important Confucian elite and eventually in Emperor Kangxi’s court. This was likely by sparking Chinese interlocutors’ own interest to ask about the items rather than as a display of Western superiority.

To ingratiate himself further with his hosts, Ricci took up the robes of a Buddhist monk, switching later to those of the Confucian scholars on the advice of a Chinese friend. Beyond outward adornments, Ricci also made allowance for local ancestral veneration as being compatible with Catholic teaching, easing conversion by allowing Chinese converts to retain important spiritual and social practices. After winning allies among those who could advance his goals, learning Chinese, and writing several books introducing the best of his own culture, Ricci crowned his success with permission to enter the capital in 1601.

Finally, a quick note on the Panda Hugger. This epithet is most often used to cow those deemed too soft on China, nearly always a falsehood in this context. The real Panda Huggers are those foreigners who subordinate their own beliefs for those of the Chinese government, and that doesn’t help anyone in the end.

Americans believe that if the right two people simply sit down and talk, they can work anything out. While this may be true in some places, it is not so with the Chinese government. The first step is to offer a suggestion quietly, work out the details behind the scenes, and finally present the result as a shared success.

Expect Chinese leaders to do their homework, remain cool in the face of inevitable mishaps, uphold their interests, and be friendly if formal hosts. American leaders should reciprocate each of these qualities in the American fashion, maintaining the wariness of a dragon slayer, the finesse of a diplomat, and the commitment of a China hand. As President Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis, respond first with a rock-hard commitment to American interests and then with a subtle eye toward finding areas of common interest. Only when you are neither too eager nor too cynical can you find the happy medium in which personal issues give way to the common public good. Do that and you will stand tall among those explorers, missionaries, statesmen and students who came seeking the open door to China.

Ben Lowsen is a specialist in Chinese political and security affairs working as a program analyst for the U.S. Navy. He tweets at @lowsen88.

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the author and not that of the U.S. Navy, Department of Defense, U.S. Government, or EastWest Institute.

In his inaugural address, U.S. President Donald Trump said, “We will follow two simple rules: Buy American and hire American. We will seek friendship and goodwill with the nations of the world, but we do so with the understanding that it is the right of all nations to put their own interests first.”

President Trump’s “Contract with the American Voter” stated that on his first day in office, he would take several actions to protect American workers. The President indeed wasted little time. On January 23, he signed an executive order to withdraw from the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), announced his intent to renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and Treasury Secretary nominee Steve Mnuchin pledged to investigate Chinese currency policy. President Trump’s promise to identify and immediately end trade practices that are abusive to American workers is next on the agenda, and will be more complicated.

President Trump is quickly demonstrating that he is America’s Dealmaker-in-Chief, and will pursue “free and fair” international trade agreements on behalf of American workers. Defining fair trade in the 21st century global economy will be the central challenge of Trump’s trade policy.

Fair trade for mutual benefit
Throughout his campaign, President Trump articulated his philosophy of America First—a concept that recognizes trade agreements that advantage the American worker, while acknowledging other nations will do the same for their own citizens, thus resulting in the prospect of mutually beneficial trade agreements.

Looking forward, the Trump Administration must clearly and carefully articulate its concept of “Buy American and Hire American,” and clarify “fair trade” so as to inspire international cooperation and market based competition, and avoid international confrontation and dangerous, unintended consequences. 

For President Trump’s “free and fair trade” policy to effectively promote friendship and goodwill depends upon how closely it adheres to rules-based agreements, as opposed to becoming rhetoric driven, populist and protectionist.

In rules-based fair trade, “fair” is defined as nations voluntarily entering agreements based on their national interests, adhering to agreed rules and international norms of economic behavior and enforcing and renegotiating trade rules through previously agreed means of recourse. Rules-based “fair trade” takes on a legal, objectively defined outlook, where international cooperation drives market-based competition.

In such a construct, determinations of “unfair” or “abusive” trade tactics are based solely on analysis of economic evidence, in the context of the previously agreed agreements. Any declaration of abuse and change in trade practices would not be a vote against free trade, but a vote for playing by the rules. Simply put, free trade does not mean a free-for-all.

Unfortunately, fair trade in the Trump Era risks becoming rhetoric-driven and protectionist if existing agreements get labelled abusive in whichever industries American workers are not experiencing gains or wherever cities are in decline, regardless of what other technological and global economic forces might be at work. In this context, emphasis on anecdotal rather than statistical evidence is quite common. Everyone in America seems to have heard of someone who “lost a job to China,” or a company that moved to Mexico, but not every American can name someone who found a job selling goods and services to the Chinese, or a company which hired American workers while also hiring Mexican workers. There is a fine line between protecting American workers, which is rules-based, and protectionism, which is rhetoric driven.

It is important to note that President Trump has selected Cabinet members and trade advisers who clearly intend to engage China and other nations on matters of possible trade violations, but who have primarily advocated a rules-based fair trade agenda during their careers. If their past work is any indicator, arguably President Trump’s trade team seems more likely to adhere to the rules-based definition of fair trade in actually determining what trade practices have been abusive and pursuing rules-based solutions to end them. 

The key trend to watch now is whether a border tax favored by President Trump, which is selectively administered on certain companies and countries believed to be unfairly and unreasonably moving American jobs offshore, or a border adjustment favored by some House Republicans and levied on all companies, will be promoted. Moreover, President Trump has indicated trade agreements are better pursued in bilateral rather than multilateral forums, so this will also be a trend to watch.

Looking Forward

To craft trade policy in the 21st century, it is crucial to recall that the livelihoods and living standards of America’s 325 million citizens, and the world’s 7.4 billion people, increasingly depend not only on their own local capabilities and resources, but also on their access to global networks and markets. 

The prospect of an increasingly populist, protectionist approach toward a more rhetoric-based “fair” trade policy are building, which endanger the very notion of mutually beneficial, free and fair trade. Further, this type of mentality could incite international confrontation and unleash conflict over trade and jobs, should other countries follow suit and seek to close their markets.

International trade policy that aims to be free and fair has served America well. For President Trump to build goodwill between nations, he can aspire to make international trade even more beneficial by communicating and pursuing rules-based solutions. 

Despite uneasy relations between Europe and Moscow, Gazprom’s gas supplies to European consumers are projected to set a new record in 2016. In 2015, this Russian energy company delivered 158.6 billion cubic meters (bcm) to Europe and Turkey. In 2016 this number is set to hit almost 180 bcm—a 12% increase. This number includes exports to all European countries minus three Baltic States plus Turkey. Gazprom’s exports to the EU28 in 2016 are estimated at around 153 bcm. (Global natural gas exports of Gazprom went up from 195.7 bcm in 2015 to 210 bcm in 2016.)

As EU-28 gas demand increased by around 6% to 447 bcm last year, according to figures from Eurogas, this means that the share of Russian gas in Europe consumption went up to around a third. Most of the increase in Europe’s gas imports (around 30 bcm in 2016) was covered by Russia (some 20 bcm).

What these figures show is that EU utilities are not afraid of Gazprom and are eager to buy cheap energy from Russia. Gazprom does not disclose the prices it charges its European clients, only an average price charged for its European customers. Gazprom’s average European gas price was $182.50/1,000 cu m in the first half of 2016, Gazprom’s average price for 2016 is estimated at around $165-$170/1,000 cm.

Read the full commentary here.