The EastWest Institute (EWI), the National Institute of Strategic Communication at Peking University (NISC), the Centre for China & Globalization (CCG), and the Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation (CAITEC) convened on June 15-16 an international symposium entitled “’Afghanistan Reconnected’: Renewed Opportunities Under China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)” in collaboration with the Embassy of Afghanistan to China, Kabul University and the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO).

Following the Belt & Road Summit in Beijing in May of this year, the EWI symposium was the first follow-up event dedicated to one particular country along the “New Silk Road.” Given the tragic backdrop of the recent terror attacks in Kabul, the symposium was a timely event in reinvigorating a collective hope for the future as the general consensus was that peace in the region is dependent upon a stable and thriving Afghanistan.

The event focused on how China’s new outgoing economic strategy can provide benefits for Afghanistan's stability, security and prosperity in a regional context. To this end, it aimed to build trust between political and business contacts among countries (India, Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan) with significant interests in the future stability of the country as well as to develop policy recommendations for regional economic cooperation.

Conceived as a Track 2 dialogue, the symposium brought together parliamentarians, diplomats, academics and professionals from across the private sector and several international organizations. Despite being an unofficial event, significant assurances from speakers associated with the National Reform and Development Commission (NDRC), the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) represented the authentic expression of Chinese government strategy.

Key Themes

As a consequence of Afghanistan’s weakened governmental institutions and endemic corruption, the need to address the very real concerns that BRI may forgo Afghanistan completely was a main topic of concern. However, amongst Chinese reassurances that Afghanistan is very much a central cog of BRI, other delegates warned that an unstable and economically regressive Afghanistan will also hamper the future success of its neighbors.

Chief among several tangible Chinese pledges was the commitment to further financial investment and professional training.  Improving and increasing the possibilities for people-to-people exchanges between all countries along the New Silk Road was also emphasized as a perquisite to BRI’s possible success.  Several Chinese speakers voiced China’s commitment to provide 10,000 scholarships to train Afghan researchers, managers and engineers to run 50 jointly-organized laboratories.  The mining industry, in particular, was identified as a specific area of win-win cooperation, as Afghanistan boasts rich deposits of several minerals and can benefit from the infrastructure and technical expertise of China to exploit these resources.

Along with discussions concerning trade and transit, investment and infrastructure, and energy cooperation, sustainable or “green” development was a new theme to emerge as a guiding principle of BRI. In order to ensure the New Silk Road is conscious of its environmental impact, there were calls for concerted efforts from the Chinese government and its international partners to share information in order to develop thorough regulation and policy. In addition to its abundant natural resources, Afghanistan also has masses of renewable energy potential waiting to be tapped into, such as 23,000 megawatts of hydropower which, if developed, could be exported to Pakistan. Furthermore, well over 200,000 MW of solar energy and tremendous possibilities for wind energy are yet to be realized. As a concrete outcome, cooperation between Kabul University and Poly Solar Technologies was concluded to help both the university train Afghan students and the company invest in the Afghan market.

During the discussions, participants drew attention to how BRI can both learn and expand from previous initiatives which attempted to revitalize and reestablish the centrality of the Old Silk Road in global economics. Several philosophies underpinned previous attempts, but BRI’s strength lies in its extensive research and identification of significant focus areas, including Afghanistan.  A major task for BRI in this regard is to address the large trade imbalance between China and Afghanistan by creating stronger trading links through the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

When considering the more polarizing foreign policy emanating from Washington, a significant geopolitical observation to come out of the symposium was the prospect for BRI to be a driving force in convincing regional states to put aside their differences in order to foster a richer culture of cross border cooperation. With over 20 terrorist groups said to be operating in Afghanistan, several delegates dispelled the myth that a difference between “good” and “bad” insurgent groups exists. Delegates, therefore, expressed the hope that both the U.S. and China would use their leverage over Pakistan and Afghanistan to work towards a common understanding of combatting violent extremism, and at the same time towards connecting the two countries through the existing and new rail and road systems. EWI’s CEO Cameron Munter, former U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, pointed out that BRI and the converging interests of the U.S. and China represent not only an immense mobilizer of unprecedented economic opportunities, but also an opportunity to strengthen institutional capacities and state building.

These arguments echoed Afghan President Ghani’s sentiments just a week prior, while he was in Astana, Kazahkstan as part of the latest Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit, where he expressed his willingness to step up cooperation in transportation to enhance connectivity. Chinese influence is seen as a potential driver for brokering bilateral agreements regarding border management control along the hotly contested, and often tense, Durand Line. A common complaint, reiterated several times throughout the symposium, was that despite hundreds of agreements and MoU’s in place between Afghanistan and its neighbors, these policies often go unimplemented. In terms of the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, Chinese/U.S. influence was envisioned as serving the dual purpose of providing an independent check on illegal crossings and assisting with trade management processes for trucks transiting goods in and out of either country.

Contrary to more pessimistic reports amongst geopolitical and international relations analysts, and with respects to other local infrastructure projects in the region, delegates at the event highlighted the potential synergies between the Iranian Chabahar and Pakistani Gwadar ports. Some see the construction of the two ports as physical manifestations of the wider geopolitical tensions in the region, especially considering the former is largely viewed as an avenue by which India and Afghanistan can increase trade by circumventing Pakistan. Yet, it was the compatibility of the two ports which garnered most discussion at the symposium with comments that Gwadar could complement the overall function of Chabahar by handling any spillover cargo. Moreover, the short distance between the two ports was seen as the ideal reason to implement a feeder vessel service, transporting both cargo and people to greatly enhance the economy and build trust between Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan.

All parties to the symposium were thus unanimous in their insistence that Afghanistan will be an indispensable building block in the realization of BRI as it shall provide the bridge between east and west. More importantly, all delegates agreed BRI offered a unique chance for the countries of the region to focus on their mutual interests, rather than their mutual differences, in pursuit of economic prosperity and peace. As one delegate put it succinctly, this is a chance the region must not pass up.

THE HAGUE, NETHERLANDS, July 5, 2017 - The Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace (GCSC) convened in Tallinn, Estonia on June 2-3, 2017. Marina Kaljurand, GCSC Chair and former Foreign Minister of Estonia, presided over the meeting, together with the two co-chairs, Michael Chertoff, former Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and Latha Reddy, former Deputy National Security Adviser of India. The meeting was hosted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Estonia and coincided with the 9th iteration of CyCon. The Chairs, several Commissioners, and other GCSC members, spoke at CyCon at the invitation of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence.

“The Tallinn meeting was the first full Commission gathering, marking a critical step towards confirming the GCSC’s approach and direction over the next years of its three-year mandate,” said Marina Kaljurand, GCSC Chair. “Based on extensive deliberation, the Commissioners confirmed the group’s core themes to be addressed, operating agenda, research capacity and timelines.”

The meetings began on June 2 with sessions on cyberstability. Ten experts were invited to provide analysis on the critical developments and initiatives in the field of international cyberspace stability and present on the most pressing research and policy proposals that emerged from the GCSC Inaugural Meeting in Munich, in February of this year. The Hearings were moderated by the Chairs of the Research Advisory Group and helped to inform the deliberations of the Commissioners the following day.

On June 3, the Commissioners convened in a closed session to decide on the work program for the coming year, centered on developing proposals for norms and policies to enhance international stability and guide responsible state and non-state behavior in cyberspace. The prioritized topics for 2017 include the “public core of the Internet” and “critical infrastructures,” and the protection thereof. As a first step the GCSC will focus on a working definition of critical infrastructure that serves the Commission’s needs. To this end, it will set out to distinguish between the public core of the Internet, critical infrastructures of the Internet, and IT-aspects of non-Internet critical infrastructures. By means of a mapping exercise, the Commission seeks to get a better understanding of the public core and critical infrastructures, as well as the protective measures and state practices in this context.

The Commission also touched upon other topics, such as the protection of electoral infrastructures, the application of sovereignty, secure access for the next billion users, rules for offensive actions in cyberspace, attribution and compliance to norms and private sector responsibilities, amongst others. The Commission is continuing its deliberations in these areas as well, and expects to build on the substantial contributions made by multilateral expert groups to the collective understanding of the challenges and approaches to increasing stability in cyberspace.

In addition, the GCSC announced the launch of the Research Advisory Group (RAG), and its Chairs were introduced to the Commissioners. The RAG will help execute and implement the Commission’s research agenda, particularly on international cybersecurity, law, Internet governance, and technology & information security practice. More information on how to join the Research Advisory Group can be found here.

The GCSC will convene a smaller scale Commission meeting on July 27 on the margins of Black Hat in Las Vegas, U.S. In the run-up to the meeting, the GCSC Secretariat and the Chairs of the Research Advisory Group will publish the Requests for Proposals (RFPs) on the email platform of the Research Advisory Group. Researchers and institutions that are a member of the Research Advisory Group can respond to these RFPs with proposals. The subscription procedure for the Research Advisory Group is explained here. The RFPs provide additional details on the immediate research priorities of the Commission and will be published before July 5, 2017.

The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, the EastWest Institute, the Chairs and Commissioners would like to thank the government of Estonia for hosting the Tallinn meeting, as well as the GCSC partners, the government of The Netherlands and Singapore, Microsoft, the Internet Society (ISOC), and the other funders for supporting the work of the Commission.

For additional information, please visit the website or get in touch with the Secretariat via info@cyberstability.org.  

About The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies

The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) is an independent private think tank established in 2007. The Centre focuses on issues that crossover the domains of geopolitics, security, and geo-economics, among which international security and defense, national security, conflict studies, cybersecurity, resource scarcity. HCSS conducts contract research for public sector organizations, such as ministries of defense, foreign affairs and security; international organizations (NATO, European Commission); NGOs as Greenpeace; and private sector companies. We stress an interdisciplinary perspective, combine quantitative and qualitative research methods for our analysis, and present intuitively and action-oriented results. Learn more

About the EastWest Institute

The EastWest Institute works to reduce international conflict, addressing seemingly intractable problems that threaten world security and stability. EWI forges new connections and build trust among global leaders and influencers, help create practical new ideas and take action. Independent and nonprofit since our founding in 1980, EWI has offices in New York, Brussels, Moscow, Washington, D.C., Dallas, San Francisco and Istanbul. Learn more

Whenever there is an international security issue that merits the attention of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), China’s intentions are often questioned. Is China willing to work and solve crises within the international order or is it intent on replacing them? While China was once excluded from this order, it is now truly enmeshed in it.

Looking at China’s interactions with international security concerns—particularly with regard to “Rogue” states—can give us some answers. In any society, members are socialized to rules and they either adapt or get shunned. Likewise, states must observe key norms and values or be characterized as an outcast.

While there is no exact definition of a rogue state, it usually refers to a nation that is or has been a cause of regional/international instability, a target of UNSC action, an experienced internal disorder, a member of the developing world with an authoritarian ruler/group of rulers, and a state sponsor of terror. With these actors, numerous norms are at play. China’s interpretation of its role in international institutions, conceptualization of non-intervention/sovereignty, and non-proliferation play a major part in its interactions. Sudan, Iran and North Korea are perfect examples to illustrate China’s various responses. Each is a textbook rogue state, but for different reasons.

North Korea

China’s relationship with North Korea is complicated. While China is perceived to have significant influence over the nation, the reality is more complex. China maintains relations with Pyongyang to somewhat preserve stability. During the first Nuclear Crisis, China left the U.S. to deal with the Koreas. The U.S. had wanted  China’s help, but North Korea did not want them involved.

China’s more active role began after North Korea withdrew from the Non-Proliferation Talk in 2003, starting the second crisis. China predominantly limited itself to mediation or facilitation. North Korea’s nuclear test—and its abrupt notification to China—drastically changed the situation. China issued a harsh condemnation and allowed sanctions. Each subsequent test resulted in harsher sanctions and calls for talks. For Xi Jinping, China’s president, relations with North Korea started off on the wrong foot. In the short time between Xi becoming General Secretary and President, North Korea conducted a satellite launch and its third nuclear test, clearly a provocation. As a result, China supported further sanctions.

North Korea has continually ignored China’s calls for restraint. North Korea’s two nuclear tests last year further strained relations. In response to those tests, the U.S. and China worked together to strengthen UNSC sanctions. China even worked with the U.S. to maximize the impact of these new sanctions, having either vetoed or watered down the previous ones. As North Korea continues to be an issue, China will further enforce sanctions and call for restraint.

Iran

Dealing with Iran shows gradual but noticeable change in China’s approach. Iran’s quest to build a nuclear weapon, combined with its connections to terrorist groups, defines its status as a rogue. In the 1980s-1990s, much of the China-Iran relationship revolved around the sale of weapons and weapons technology. However, prioritizing relations with the U.S., China canceled weapons sales and nuclear assistance. This underscored that Iran was purely business.

Continuing into the 2000s, China viewed a nuclear Iran as a bilateral problem between the U.S. and Iran. China delayed referrals to the IAEA and the UNSC—giving Iran a chance to prove its peaceful intentions. When that failed, China pushed for Presidential Statements, then lighter resolutions, until Iran’s non-compliance could no longer be ignored.  China continually called for mediation and publically called for cooperation.

As Iran repeatedly failed to comply with international requests, sanctions grew harsher. China remained active in Iran, but allowed for sanctions. UNSCR 1929 in 2010 paved the way for unilateral sanctions, and while China did not publicly agree, they privately instructed some companies to observe them. This helped bring Iran back to the table for the negotiations that would become the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Here, China was viewed as a key mediator. China was said to have persuaded Iranian leadership of the benefits of the deal and became more actively involved.

Sudan

Sudan shows a clear evolution of China’s adaptation to unexpected circumstances. Initially, Sudan earned its rogue moniker through its 1990s connections with Al-Qaeda and the crisis in Darfur.  China’s relationship with Sudan was initially based out of mutual necessity—Sudan needed trading partners and China needed oil. China continued this “business is business” approach up until the peak of the Darfur crisis. International attention focused on the conflict and pulled China—and the 2008 Olympics—into the discussion. As China wanted to look like a responsible power, they had little choice but to act.

While dragging their feet in the UNSC, China appointed a diplomat to specifically deal with the crisis and sent high-level officials to Khartoum to obtain Omar al-Bashir’s compliance. These efforts broke past precedent and clearly indicated a shift in how China interpreted non-intervention/sovereignty. The referendum for South Sudanese independence continued this trend—from non-involvement in the peace agreement to active acceptance and support of UN efforts to ensure a fair vote. Shortly after independence, South Sudan fell into civil war, further intensifying China's role. China acted as a mediator, but after initial failed attempts, finally sent their first ever battalion of UN military peacekeepers. This emphasized how it viewed its role and further muddied China's definition of non-interference.

Constructive Engagement

Each example shows that, while imperfect in implementation, China understands the role it should take in international affairs and increasingly acts in such a way. China’s inaction was a result of not viewing issues as their concern. However, as their interests and roles within the international community grew, China became more involved in searching for solutions. This role has intensified with a willingness to address issues in their own way. China began addressing these cases through mediation, and while this is still a preference, its toolbox has expanded to include influence, peacekeeping and even sanctions.  

China’s role has moved beyond a strict definition of non-interference and sovereignty to a more “constructive engagement" that understands the values of upholding international norms. Their actions now more accurately reflect its presence in international affairs and are conducted in the interest of maintaining stability and ensuring peaceful resolution. This clearly shows that China’s membership in the international system has resulted in an internalization of values and norms and that China has chosen to stay within the international community rather than go outside it.  

Daniel Johanson is a Ph.D. candidate at King’s College London focusing on Chinese foreign policy towards North Korea, Iran and Sudan.

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the author and not that of the EastWest Institute.

EWI Global Vice President Bruce McConnell sat down with Israeli news network i24NEWS this week to discuss the state of cyberspace in an ever-digital world. Asked about whether cyberspace constitutes the next frontier for warfare, McConnell responded that he felt as if cyberspace has very much become the new frontier for just about anything—international competition included. More than just underscoring that this was the current reality, he further stressed that a set of comprehensive rules for cyber space need to be created in order to prevent flagrant cyber warfare abuses down the road. Much like international laws dictating biological warfare, cyber space should be given an international platform through which it could be regulated. 

Without such a platform in-place at the moment, countries should—in the meanwhile—continue to strengthen their cybersecurity capabilities. That being said, McConnell remains optimistic that ten years down the line, as cyberspace becomes more efficiently controlled, it will also begin to look much better.

Watch the full interview here.

The geopolitical backdrop of Moon's visit is framed around an increasingly provocative regime in North Korea and an administration in the U.S. that seems focused on forcibly changing the calculus of Pyongyang's decision to develop and maintain a nuclear weapons program. The stakes will be especially high because Moon—a progressive with dovish tendencies towards Pyongyang—is looking to demonstrate unity with President Trump without sacrificing his own policy goals of engaging the North diplomatically. There are also valid concerns in Seoul on Trump's protectionist rhetoric and his desire to amend—or maybe even withdraw from—the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement.

During Moon's election campaign, his rivals from both the conservative and progressive sides launched salvos at him outlining his dubious approach to dealing with North Korea and his sceptical take on the U.S.-South Korea alliance remaining at the core of Seoul's security ethos. They questioned Moon's flip-flopping on the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system in South Korea and his pledge to "review" the decision.

Despite THAAD being already deployed and operational, Moon has now made good in some sense on that pledge through his suspension—pending a probe's findings—on the deployment of an additional four missile launchers (there are already two launchers active and operational).

Washington's position, before the Moon-Trump meeting, is that Seoul's change of heart on THAAD is not only upsetting the operational effectiveness of the missile defence system (which is aimed to both defend South Korea and the more than 30,000 US troops in the country) but also is simultaneously weakening the credibility of the deterrence value of the US-Korea alliance. Moreover, some reports have indicated that Trump himself is "furious" over Moon's decision to suspend the full deployment of the launchers.

Read the full article here at Al Jazeera.

Today, terrorism and the global refugee crisis are two of the world’s most daunting challenges, seemingly with little end in sight. While the correlation between extremism and the refugee crisis is complex, history indicates that people will rely on desperate measures in desperate times of need; and these actions may, or may not, be aligned with those desired of stable nation states.

With terrorist attacks raging across Europe, refugee-filled boats sinking in the Mediterranean and the Middle East suffocating in the large influx of refugees caused by the six-year-old Syrian crisis, the United States and other world leaders have an opportunity to engage in counter extremism efforts that can simultaneously tackle the refugee crisis at hand. These can be measures that take root in preventing the growth of radicalism, the deepening of sectarian and socio-economic divides in host countries, as well as suppressing the popularity of Jihadist narratives in some of the most economically vulnerable and war-torn regions in the Middle East.

Success will require a combination of long-term and short-term strategies; and no long-term effort will have more positive impact to our security than responding correctly to the refugee crisis under the lens of the fight against terrorism.

The Plight of Refugees

In 2015, the United Nation’s High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that each minute, “24 people were forced to flee their home—a number that is four times greater than a decade earlier.” The numbers displaced by war and persecution rose from 59.5 million to 65.3 million worldwide from 2014 to 2015 alone. Syria, under the Presidency of Bashar Al-Assad, leads the way in generating the largest number of refugees and internally displaced people (IDP) in the world—an ongoing conflict that has created the worst humanitarian crisis since the Second World War—a catastrophe not only affecting those internally displaced inside Syria and the refugees fleeing their homes, but also the host countries struggling to handle this unforeseen population influx.

According to the UNHCR, there are over 6.5 million internally displaced people (IDP) inside Syria, making it the largest IDP population in the world. This is while half of the country’s 22 million pre-war population is in desperate need of humanitarian support in addition to the five million refugees scattered across the neighboring countries of Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and Iraq. According to many non-governmental organizations working on the ground in these host countries, however, the actual tally is much higher than official reports when considering the number of individuals not registered with the agency.

In dealing with the refugee crisis, it is critical to recognize that host countries—involuntarily forced to handle this large influx—are, themselves, bearers of massive infrastructural, economic and political challenges.

Currently, millions of Syrian refugees and IDPs are growing up without access to education or prospects of economic independence and growth. In addition, millions of them are suffering from massive trauma and psychological wounds caused by this ongoing war. Today’s Syrian children make up half of the IDP and refugee population, where 40 percent are under the age of 11. Save The Children recently reported that a large population of Syrians, particularly children, are suffering from “toxic stress” as a result of a prolonged exposure to war; where at least 3 million children under the age of six know nothing but war.

In a region where extremism lives and breathes, this calamity is building up to shape a volatile, depressed and disenfranchised future generation. If this pattern continues, in a few short years, the world will face millions of teenagers and adults who lack adequate education, vocational skills and who suffer from massive psycho-social instability. This will not only affect their own livelihoods, it will impact host countries and their communities at large.

Extremism and Terrorism

In its simplest form—whether nationalistic, religious or ethnic—terrorism is a struggle for legitimacy focused on achieving political ends. While we can measure terrorism by many factors, fatalities is the key metric. In the past 15 years, terrorist related deaths worldwide have increased by a factor of nine from less than 3,000 in 2000 to nearly 30,000 by 2015.

The United States makes up just over four percent of the world’s population, but it has experienced over 10 percent of the world’s deaths to terrorism in the past 15 years. The United States, however, is not alone as last year, Europe—with France and Turkey in the lead—bore the brunt of both homegrown and foreign terrorist attacks. According to the 2016 Global Terrorism Index report, the number of deaths from terrorism dramatically rose in 2015 after a 650 percent increase compared to the year before.

France has seen an uptick in homegrown terrorism from disenfranchised actors in the recent years. Turkey, however, presents a much more complicated scenario; attacks often stem from a variety of actors, including those disenfranchised people-turned-terrorists as a result of the instability in neighboring Syria, as well as Iraq and Afghanistan.  

Both countries are poignant examples of how radical groups such as ISIL target some of the most vulnerable, disenfranchised and economically challenged migrant youth for recruitment. In most cases, these are young men who are often in search of a defined purpose and a sense of belonging, in addition to an ingrained desire to fulfill their socio-economic, cultural and psychological voids.

Last year, Abed, a 16-year-old boy fled his hometown of Raqqa—ISIL’s stronghold in Syria—and is now living in of the most disenfranchised slums of Beirut in Lebanon. Before their escape, Abed’s right hand was chopped off by ISIL militants. A young team of psycho-social workers in Beirut came across Abed in the Fall of 2016. They welcomed him into their center, where they help Syrian refugees overcome some of the trauma, PTSD and psychological wounds caused by war. Maya Yamout, one of the forensic psycho-social workers at the center, said that the teenage boy suffers from a tremendous amount of PTSD mixed with feelings of shame and guilt. “Abed told us he is not sure if he should live here or go back home and join ISIL; he feels what happened was his fault,” said Yamout.  

While suggesting that all vulnerable youth will engage in terrorist activities or that all terrorism stems from disenfranchised environments is not a black and white argument, but addressing the plight of vulnerable youth in the region and the damaging role extremism plays in their outlook is a critical step.

Near-Term, Long-Term Outlook

The longer conflicts such as Syria continue to fester, the greater probability of a rise in further destabilization and extremism, and subsequently, greater security challenges related to terrorism. It is pivotal for the global powers to realize that the stakes are much higher than ever before—on the humanitarian, social-economic and security levels. The world community has an obligation to develop and execute a strategic plan to correct these issues—taking a robust stance to help address the burgeoning refugee problem in parallel to counter terrorism efforts.

Looking at Syria, this unspeakable crisis needs an immediate stop to civilian deaths and bloodshed; development of secure and permanent “provinces” inside Syria; development of safe transit corridors and means of transportation to move refugees from their point of crisis or refugee camp to their permanent “province;” and ultimately, a focus to resolve the root causes of the crisis to prevent and minimize future potential conflicts. In the interim, it is also crucial to support grassroots and non-governmental work on the ground in the Syrian border regions, through bilateral cooperation between the world’s leaders and local governments, particularly in efforts to temporarily-assimilate the refugee population—many of whom want to go back home to Syria.

Looking more broadly, assimilation of refugees in new host communities is critical, requiring education and vocational training. Doing so will also help boost the economic potential and self-worth of many individuals, thus eliminating the prospect of disfranchisement and minimizing the potential for extremist influences taking hold.

If properly implemented, the above recommendations should result in decreased numbers of refugees (as regards Syria), while helping to address many of the underlining factors behind the potential recruitment of vulnerable individuals targeted by extremist groups.   

Today, the world stands at a fork in the road. We either move towards peace and stability by addressing the factor conditions that breed extremism and terrorism—while offering a long-term solution to the refugee crisis—or we let these two interrelated challenges spiral out of control. The answer is not more refugee camps or softer worldwide immigration policies. The answer lies in ensuring the peace and stability of the lands from which the refugees originate and the host countries they inhabit, by choice and by circumstance.

Dr. William J. Parker III is the Chief Operating Officer at the EastWest Institute

Tara Kangarlou is an International Journalist and a Visiting Scholar at The EastWest Institute

While mounting tensions in recent years have caused U.S.-Russia relations to deteriorate—and as a matter of course, bilateral channels of communication to freeze—EWI has managed to sustain dialogue on this common threat. As a forum for cooperative engagement, the working group regularly brought together U.S. and Russian technical and policy experts to share knowledge, make consensus assessments and deliver innovative and concrete policy solutions to counter Afghan narcotrafficking that would have traction in both countries, as well as in the larger relevant policy communities.
 
In the course of its implementation, the working group engaged and consulted with a number of experts and officials from key stakeholders, including Afghanistan, Iran and the Central Asian states. The working group also garnered positive feedback and support from the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the United States Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), the United States Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and the Federal Drug Control Service of the Russian Federation (FSKN), in addition to various multilateral organizations/agencies such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). 

Published in April 2013, the working group’s first report, Afghan Narcotrafficking: A Joint Threat Assessment, provided a summary of the experts’ consensus findings on the scope and threat of Afghan narcotrafficking. In subsequent years, the working group also prepared issue-specific reports on the following: (1) an assessment of the post-2014 security, political, and economic situation in Afghanistan and the expected impact on narcotrafficking and counternarcotics efforts; (2) border protection against narcotrafficking around Afghanistan and in Central Asia; (3) alternative poppy-free development strategies for Afghanistan; and (4) flows of Afghan drug money and laundering in the international financial system. A sixth and final report, a joint policy assessment, will comprise a compendium of the group’s key recommendations and updated assessments on the overall narcotics situation in Afghanistan and is expected to be released in July 2017.

PREVIOUS REPORTS

Afghan Narcotrafficking: A Joint Threat Assessment, April 2013

In English

In Russian

Afghan Narcotrafficking: Post-2014 Scenarios, February 2015

In English

In Russian

Afghan Narcotrafficking: The State of Afghanistan’s Borders, April 2015

In English 

In Russian 

Afghan Narcotrafficking: Finding an Alternative to Alternative Development, July 2016

In English 

Afghan Narcotrafficking: Illicit Financial Flows, June 2017

In English

Afghan Narcotrafficking: A Joint Policy Assessment

Anticipated release date: July 2017

EWI CEO & President Cameron Munter is featured in the Diplomatic World magazine and discusses the unique work of the institute.

Munter talks about the various processes in which the institute works in order to bring together key stakeholders and bridge differences to prevent conflict.

The former U.S. ambassador to Pakistan also shares his insights on current global topics and future challenges in the diplomatic world.

To access the full story, click here.

Vladimir Ivanov, PhD, Director of the EastWest Institute's (EWI) Moscow office, presented a key report at a round table discussion “Current Security Issues in Information Space” hosted by the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IMEMO). The event took place on June 20 in Moscow.

Ivanov started his speech with adjusted remarks on the modern information space implications for global strategic stability. He also presented the background and current projects of the EWI Cyberspace Cooperation Program, underlining the innovative practices in a trust building process in which both government and business actors take an active part.

In addition, Ivanov introduced participants to the work of the newly launched Global Commission on the Stability of Cyber Space (GCSC), inviting the audience of about 25 Russian top-level political and information science experts to be involved in this initiative.

The EastWest Institute's call for broader and more diversified international cooperation on countering the realities of a growing systemic chaos and instability received a positive reaction.

Photos by: Anna Renard-Koktysh