By the end of this month, the bulk of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) acting as part of the United Nations (UN) mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) will be withdrawn from the field. While the authorities argued the contrary, the degradation of the security situation in South Sudan was the primary cause of the retreat. This marks the temporary end of meaningful JSDF participation in any UN Peacekeeping Operation (PKO), and raises doubts about the ability of Japan to play a greater proactive peacekeeping role, especially in Africa.

Over the last decade, Japan’s security contribution on the continent has been actually on the rise with the unprecedented participation of the SDF in an international counter-piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden (from 2009), the subsequent build-up of its first overseas military base in Djibouti (2011), and the SDF’s longest participation in a UNPKO in South Sudan (2012– 2017). These measures contrast with the traditional Japanese approach to Africa based on development aid, as characterized by the provision of development assistance and showcased by the TICAD Summit (Tokyo International Conference on African Development). Assessing the way forward for Japan’s security commitment in Africa thus requires identifying the factors behind this new activism and understanding the means and limitations of Japan’s security-related activities.

Japanese interests in Sub-Saharan Africa are of an economic nature, and quite modest (12 billion USD of FDI stock in 2014, three times less than China). Tokyo’s active security policy is meant, in great part, to reassure a risk-averse business sector and encourage it to step up its investment in light of an increase in terrorist attacks on the continent. Japan’s Africa diplomacy also aims at checking the rising Chinese presence on the continent by emulating Beijing activism and offering an alternative model of development. The importance given to keeping up with China highlights the survival of the traditional Japanese “reactive approach.”

Looking more broadly, Japanese strategic security interests remain, first and foremost, centered on its immediate neighborhood, meaning an upgraded, more ambitious military commitment to Africa is unlikely to happen. Indeed, while media attention is focused on Japanese SDF dispatch in Africa, the bulk of Japan’s security contribution remains very low-key: mostly in the form of financial contributions (securitization of aid) and capacity-building assistance, and it is often channeled through, or in partnership with, multilateral institutions or via a third country, such as France. The withdrawal from South Sudan shows that the government is still very much constrained when dispatching its forces abroad, and the passing of the Legislation on Peace and Security in 2015 changed nothing. If a law-enforcement mission such as in the Gulf of Aden is possible, risky operations on the ground are not. Japan is thus likely to continue to rely on comprehensive principles and approaches such as “human security” and “peacebuilding” that associate security with development and favor civil-military operations in a post-conflict environment.

That said, despite the present, limited approach, new features of Japan’s diplomacy may signal the gradual, heightened integration of Africa into Japan’s overall strategic interests. First, despite limitations in terms of mandates and rules of engagement, SDF deployments to Africa are being facilitated. The proactive commitment of Japan to a peacebuilding approach is providing opportunities for the SDF to act in post-conflict, safer environments, in synergy with development assistance activities. This can constitute the real value-add of Japan’s security contribution in Africa.

Second, Africa is now being associated more tightly with Japan’s strategic core interests. Terrorist attacks on the continent pose a direct risk to Japanese nationals. Threats to the security of vital maritime shipping routes, transiting from the Middle East to the Indian Ocean and all the way to Japan, are directly undermining Tokyo’s commercial interests. The inclusion of Africa in the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy”—a Japanese counter-initiative to China’s Belt and Road project—also demonstrates Japan’s will to adopt a more strategic approach to Africa. This might lead to greater engagement, with respect to investment in infrastructure, maritime capacity-building and peacebuilding operations. The expansion of the Djibouti military base is an important symbol of this longer-term security commitment in the region.

These recent developments, however, have not yet led to a defined strategic approach. Despite political declarations of interest, there still exists a significant gap between the discourse and the reality of what Japan wants—and what it can achieve in Africa. As Japanese companies remain extremely risk-averse, insufficient or unsustainable interest in Africa on the part of Japan’s private sector would jeopardize the current ambitions to increase Japan’s economic and politico-strategic profile on the continent. Finally, Japan still lacks expertise in African affairs, which undermines its capacity to design a proper strategic approach, as advocated by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe—emphasizing increased investment and a more significant security presence. If Japan truly wants to engage more deeply in Africa, and develop a more calculated approach to the continent, , it will need to sustain political and economic interest in Africa over the long-term and continue to refine its understanding of Africa’s complex political and cultural dynamics.

Céline Pajon is a Research Fellow, Center for Asian Studies, Ifri. The author recently published a policy paper: “Japan’s Security Policy in Africa: The dawn of a strategic approach?”, Asie.Visions, No. 93, Ifri, May 2017.

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the author and not that of the EastWest Institute.

Across Asia, governments are rushing to build up expertise to fight off cyber attacks, both for defense and offense. The region's military forces are being thrust into the front lines, even though cyberwarfare reaches behind conventional battlefields.

"Threats are dynamic and state actors are determined adversaries capable of sabotaging whole economies," Greg Austin told Nikkei Asian Review.

"Concerns about a cyber Pearl Harbor are receding," said Austin. "But I think we should start to look at what a 'cyber Fukushima' or a 'cyber Twin Towers' looks like."

Click here to access the full article on Nikkei Asian Review.

Speaking on NPR's "All Things Considered" program, EWI Global Vice President Bruce McConnell discusses the ramifications, causes and potential responses for the global ransomware attack on computer networks worldwide earlier this month. 

McConnell noted that federal agencies responded accordingly, having experienced and learned from a similar attack at the Office of Personnel Management two years prior where the data of 21 million people was stolen. "The federal government has several wake-up calls in the last few years, so the Obama administration put quite a bit of emphasis on getting things patched, getting things up to date and cleaning up unsupported operating systems." 

Despite having learned from past-experiences, McConnell said the global malware attack dubbed 'WannaCry' was "relatively unsophisticated," adding that "more sophisticated attacks will be harder to stop." 

Click here to read the full article on NPR.

Listen below.

On May 15, 2017, Perot Fellow and Senior Vice President of Strategic Trust-Building and Track 2 Diplomacy David J. Firestein joined Voice of America's International Edition to discuss claims that President Donald Trump revealed classified information in a meeting last week with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Ambassador Sergey Kislyak at the White House.
 
Firestein noted that although the focus of the media has been on whether the alleged breach of classified information is deleterious to U.S. interests, the media has not devoted as much energy in reporting on the source of the allegations and the means by which such information has come to light. As relatively few participants were present in the meeting, the anonymity of the source of this information continues to raise questions.
 
Firestein then commented on the difficulty in assessing the damage of a statement without knowing exactly what was said, and accordingly, more well-informed conclusions will be made with greater authority as further details and context become available.

Listen to his comments below, beginning around the 2:00 minute mark.

Similar to the United States and France, Iran is to set to have a new President in what’s shaping up to be a polarized election between current moderate President Hassan Rouhani and his conservative counterpart—Ebrahim Raisi—who is also custodian of the wealthiest charity and business conglomerate in the Shia world. On Friday May 19, over 50 million eligible voters in Iran will take to the polls.  
 
The Iranian election will have a profound socio-political impact domestically. Even after the much celebrated 2015 nuclear accord between Iran and six other world powers, the country continues to suffer from a stagnant economy and unemployment. The Rouhani administration inherited former President Ahmadinejad’s broken economy of negative three percent and lifted it to a 26 percent growth rate since 2013. However, one of Rouhani’s biggest promises in the 2017 election is the lifting of the “non-nuclear” sanctions. Ahead of Friday’s election, Iran’s Foreign Minister Javad Zarif said that “the Supreme Leader regards the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) as a test for our counterparts, and if our counterparts show interest to find resolution we have the readiness to enter other stages.”
 
With just a few months into Donald Trump’s presidency, the Iranian election will also have significant implications on the United States, as well as its regional neighbors. It remains to be seen how President Trump will address Iran. All this while Europe has already shown vested interest in a post-sanctioned Iran and is welcoming to what can be a promise of an open Iran. More importantly the majority young population of Iran—with 50 percent of them under the age of 30—the Iranian people strive to belong to an international community and they will choose whoever can deliver them a glimpse of that hope.
 
To further unpack the 2017 Iranian presidential election and its regional and global implications, EWI Visiting Scholar Tara Kangarlou spoke with Dr. Sadegh Kharazi (pictured), one of Iran’s most prominent diplomats who served as the country’s Ambassador to the United Nations and France under President Mohammad Khatami. 
 
Q: The election is shaping up to be a close race between President Rouhani and Ebrahim Raisi—who many in the West suspect to be a favorite among the conservatives. How do you evaluate the Rouhani-Raisi match? What are some of the key make or break points for both candidates?

Kharazi: “There has been no insignificant election in Iran; because each election is a reflection of the country’s foreign policy and domestic political climate, while being entwined with an element of surprise and an unpredictable result. This time around, the elections are even more important because of the unfinished implementations of JCPOA, Trump’s election in the U.S., and unique regional conditions in particularly with Syria, Iraq, and the hostile behavior of Israel and Saudi; and its result will no doubt affect the region.”

Q: One of the biggest success stories under President Rouhani was the nuclear accord between Iran and six other world powers back in 2015. Do you think that’s a big enough score to gauge people’s vote for the second term?

Kharazi: “The nuclear deal removed a huge dam that was in front of the nation and the people of Iran; and today it needs to be mended, taken care of, and honored by its foreign signatories. This can indeed help Rouhani’s re-election.”

Q: You are a diplomat, a politician, and a strong voice among the moderates and the reformist majority in Iran. Which candidate do you think will help Iran’s economic boost, global engagement, and strength in supporting regional stability? Why?

Kharazi: “I consider Rouhani an appropriate choice at the moment who can help economic growth, diplomatic openings, and renewed political opportunities for Iran. Rouhani’s motto is ‘peaceful coexistence’ with the international community. This will ultimately lead to economic progress and growth under a calm and stable umbrella that’ll be a direct result of a better international cooperation.”
 
Q: Some regard Iran as one of the very few actual Democracies in the Middle East, while many others in the West—especially the United States and its allies doubt the “electoral process” in Iran and argue otherwise. How much influence do people’s votes truly have?

Kharazi: “Take a closer look at the United State’s allies in the region. Are any of the Saudi, Bahraini, or Qatari systems of governance based upon any sort of “election?” Let’s not go far and just look at what happened in Turkey recently—why has there been no criticism from the U.S. toward Turkey’s referendum? One of the biggest indications of a Democracy in any country is the election of an “opposite party” to that of the ruling government. For example, after Khatami there came Ahmadinejad and after Ahmadinejad you had Rouhani elected. You can also look at the shake up of our conservative parliament into a reformist one. Also, the excitement and prowling of the candidates and their supports to gain majority votes—in and of itself—is a loud indication of the power of the people’s vote.”
 
Q: When running for president, candidate Trump expressed criticism of the nuclear deal. How do you think Ebrahim Raisi’s foreign policy approach will be toward the U.S. and preserving the JCPOA? How will Rouhani’s be?

Kharazi: “All Presidential candidates have accepted JCPOA as an international agreement. Disagreement in reaching our demands falls in the helm of our Western counterparts.” 

Q: Today the Middle East region is suffering from multiple unrests in Yemen and the six-year-old crisis in Syria. There is a great opportunity for regional powers (Iran, Turkey, Russia, and Saudi Arabia) to work together in resolving some of these matters) but just this past week, Saudi Arabia’s Defense Minister and Deputy Crown Price, Mohammed Bin Salman said that Saudi won’t engage in any dialogue with Iran, accusing it of following an “extremist ideology.” How would you comment on the Saudi position?

Kharazi: “It’s mind boggling that the Saudi’s accuse Iran of having ‘extremist ideologies’. Do we see any other outcome in their support of radical religious groups other than fostering hostility and terrorism? Let’s remember which country supported ISIS in Iraq and Syria and which country fought against ISIS. Throughout history, Iran has always been in support of the middle ground and tolerance. Even the Islamic Revolution of 1979 falls within the more peaceful revolutions in history. Unlike the classic revolutions in history we didn’t see rivers of blood or massacres. The Saudi’s comments are humorous to me. I encourage your readers to read and study the history, implications, and ideologies of Wahhabism; and also do a bit of research on Shiism. Then they will be able to see the truth behind such remarks.”

The Energy Union, an ‘umbrella strategy’ launched two years ago, was initially aimed at insuring Europe’s smooth transition to the low-carbon/non-carbon future. The plan was to ensure that European citizens have unrestricted access to secure, affordable and climate-friendly energy sources.

The Energy Union was also designed to fight climate change and create new ‘green’ jobs as well as a new type of sustainable economic growth in Europe. Last but not least: determination to reduce Europe’s fossil fuel import bill also drove the initiative. The Energy Union rests on the European Union's three key pillars: energy supplies need to be secure and reliable, competitively priced and sustainable.

As surprising as it might seem, Europe is already close to achieving these goals even with the current market design. Furthermore, the EU has already all necessary instruments to implement the key goals of the Energy Union. The completion of a single energy market will make the criteria of reliability, competitiveness and security of supply — mentioned as the key priorities of the Energy Union — less relevant, if not outdated, even with present energy regulations.

The single gas market increased competition and consumers in Europe have a vast of choice of alternative supplies — both in the form of LNG and pipeline gas — and they appear to feel comfortable with this choice. In a lunchtime press briefing on February 1, 2017 EU Commissioner Maros Sefcovic said that in regard to energy security, the situation has significantly improved in 22 out of 28 countries. This was due to to better pipeline links between member states, together with significant improvements of energy efficiency and increased use of renewables.

According to the report “LNG in Europe 2016/2017: An Overview of LNG Import Terminals in Europe” published in January 2017 by lawyers King & Spalding the total regasification capacity in the EU and Turkey (23 terminals in the EU-28 and 2 in Turkey) by the end of 2016 stood at 216bn m³, amounting to 40% of EU demand and 55-60% of EU gas imports. This capacity allows (in theory) the full replacement of pipeline imports from either Norway or Russia.

Click here to read the full article on NaturalGasWorld.com

The report lays out the differing strategic perceptions of the United States and China with respect to some of the most topical and challenging issues on the U.S.-China agenda today. These starkly differing perceptions inform and exacerbate actual policy and fuel mistrust and broad mutual strategic suspicion.

By exposing the diverging perceptions of the two countries and bringing those perceptions into the fabric of bilateral discourse more explicitly and honestly, this report creates the basis for a more honest, substantive, constructive, fruitful and mutually beneficial dialogue.

Background:

In the first hundred days of his tenure in the White House, President Donald Trump has had to devote considerable attention to the United States’ single most consequential bilateral partner:  China. 

The issues currently on the U.S.-China agenda share several commonalities: they are top-tier issues that garner presidential attention in both the United States and China; they are contentious, in the U.S.-China context, to the point of raising the prospect of direct conflict (e.g., a hot war or a “trade war”) between the United States and China; and they represent enduring, and seemingly intractable, challenges. These issues also share another less obvious commonality: they are issues where the U.S.-China perceptual divide is as much a part of the problem as the actual interests or policies in question. 

Key Issues Addressed:

• The U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific 
• The stability of the Korean peninsula, including specifically, the deployment of the THAAD system
• U.S. reconnaissance operations in the Asia-Pacific region
• Disputes in the East and South China Seas
• Cross-strait relations
• Cybersecurity 

The full report is available here.

After spending the past few months skeptical of reviving the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which President Donald Trump formally withdrew the United States from in January just after he took office, Japan has changed tack and is now looking to press ahead on finalizing the major Pacific Rim trade deal with the 10 other signatory states. The about-face on the TPP by Japan, which is the largest remaining economy in the deal, came ahead of a critical meeting this week of the signatories, known as the TPP-11, looking for a path forward without the United States. 

The meeting, held in Toronto, was a first step to discuss whether the TPP is still possible in some form without Washington’s support. Japan, Canada and other member countries were not optimistic earlier this year. Now, though, Japan is leading the push for a new agreement that it hopes could be finalized, in the best-case scenario, at the end of this year on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meetings in Vietnam.

Under the rules of the current agreement, it is impossible to move forward and ratify the TPP without U.S. involvement. Therefore the focus is on constructing some kind of new cover for the TPP-11 with the same framework and rules negotiated in the TPP. The absence of the U.S. remains a major hurdle, especially because several members, such as Vietnam and Malaysia, made tough concessions on market access simply due to the U.S. inclusion in the deal.

During his first week in the White House, Trump seemingly rang the TPP’s death knell by signing an executive order outlining the U.S. withdrawal. While not a surprise given Trump’s campaign promises, that doomed initial hopes from Japan and other TPP members that the Trump administration might back off its earlier rhetoric and realize the economic and strategic benefits for the U.S. of the major multilateral deal. 

Read the full article here.

Japan has a long history of investing in Southeast Asia, a policy strengthened by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. At the same time, President Xi Jinping has had ample opportunity to increase China’s influence in the region through “checkbook diplomacy.” With a tight relationship between China’s government and state run banks, as well as an intimate marriage between China’s national finance, business and diplomatic strategies, China’s entry into Japan’s traditional forte is daunting for both Japan and outsiders anxious about the implications of a Chinese hegemony.

A major battle ground is Indonesia, the fourth largest economy in the region boasting the second largest population. China has recently doubled its investments in the country, and managed to secure a coveted deal to build Indonesia’s first high speed train. At first, it appeared Japan would soon find itself falling behind China’s expansive influence. Yet, as work on the project unfolds, China’s early victory may belie larger weaknesses in its diplomatic foreign direct investment (FDI).

The “Crown Jewel” of Chinese Infrastructure Exports

Even before assuming office, Indonesian President Joko Widodo reached out to Japan and other global investors for infrastructure funding. In a 2014 interview, he stated the importance of soft diplomacy, and expressed a desire to facilitate investments in infrastructure by being diplomatic with regional disputes. Indonesia was an early supporter of China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), with Widodo’s administration agreeing to join just one month into his presidency.

Japan has been investing in Indonesia since the 1950s, but China is quickly catching up to become Indonesia’s third largest source of FDI. The coup de grace came in 2015, when the Indonesian government signed a deal for a 5.5 billion USD high-speed rail line between Jakarta and Bandung (150 km) to be built by a Chinese-Indonesian joint venture and financed primarily by China Development Bank (CDB). Chinese ambassador to Indonesia, Wie Feng, described it as the perfect showcase of not only international cooperation, but of China’s ability to export high level technology—a realm in which Japan is actively carving a niche for itself.

This deal came as an especially big shock for Japan. After a five year, 6 million USD feasibility study, Japanese officials were convinced they would be building Jakarta’s bullet train. But unlike Japan, Chinese officials made no requests for funding guarantees from Indonesia’s government. China’s state-run financing seemed unstoppable for anyone, let alone Japan, to beat.

At first, hopes were high for speedy and efficient completion. When the deal was first signed, construction was expected to begin early in 2016, with trains operational by the start of 2019. But only a few days after celebrating the official start, construction was delayed due to incomplete paperwork. In August, rumors surfaced that there were problems securing funding from CDB, with funding contingent on Jakarta securing rights to the needed land. Those permits took a long time to acquire, with protracted negotiations undertaken both with local land owners and the nearby air force. To date, it’s not clear that all land rights have been secured, or that the CDB has issued needed funding for the project, and overall progress has been most charitably described as, “halting.”

Potential and Percentages versus Past and Real Totals

Looking closer at the numbers, China’s rise in Indonesia, though very real, is perhaps overblown. China may have become Indonesia’s third largest source of FDI in 2016, but close on its heels at number four is Hong Kong (HK). Even after combining investments from the HK administrative region and mainland China, Indonesia would still fall half a billion short of Japanese investments that year. Since China historically has invested less, its year-on-year increase is dramatic and new—but Japan also nearly doubled their FDI last year alone and quadrupled it over the past five years. Both nations still fall well behind Indonesia’s largest investor, Singapore.

Early stage investors and investees have the advantage of being able to talk up potential, but potential alone cannot sustain an empire. Bidding strong on projects but then backing down due to unforeseen problems is turning into a pattern for China. Plans to build a high-speed rail in Thailand have fallen under similarly considerable delays, and in 2014, plans for China to build a high-speed rail in Mexico were quickly canceled. Though the Jakarta-Bandung rail project has any number of specific issues, the prioritization of announcing projects rather than completing them is a habit China has a hard time shaking.

If China terminates this crown jewel infrastructure rail project, it will be harder for China to compete with Japan’s reliability. At the start of this year, Widodo and Abe met and discussed plans for updating the rail line from Jakarta and Surabaya (768 km), turning it into Indonesia’s first high-speed rail line. The deal’s first phase is expected to cost 2.6 billion USD, and has been under discussion since October 2016, with Indonesia’s transportation ministry saying, “We are giving priority to Japan.” The official agreement to go with Japan for this project was announced in late March.

Widodo’s overtures to China have received significant attention because this kind of Indonesia-China relationship is new. But the emergence of new players does not automatically discount the importance of old partners. Japan may not have an ambitious “One Belt One Road” initiative, but Tokyo also aspires to build a soft power base to counteract China. Though it may not have the same state financing flexibility as China, Japan’s hard-earned experience and reputation for driving results over the years should not be discounted.

The point is not that China cannot or should not be involved in foreign infrastructure projects. With a round of overseas investment projects in energy, China is poised to dominate the green energy economy and disseminate renewable energy infrastructure in the developing world. But when it comes to competing for major infrastructure contracts, China’s rise is far from certain and Japan’s influence is not fading from the foreground anytime soon.

Ann Listerud holds a master’s degree from UC San Diego’s School of Global Policy and Strategy. She currently works in finance and is based in Tokyo. Follow her on twitter @lianlist.

The views expressed in this post reflect those of the author and not that of the EastWest Institute.